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Abstract
This dissertation responds to two recent developments in the landscape of Canadian
constitutional litigation. First, the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms has invited a wave of strategic constitutional challenges directed at systemic
social reform, including many cases aligned with progressive social justice goals. Second,
the focus of Charter litigation has shifted from legal interpretation and argument to the
consideration of extensive evidence pertaining to social and legislative facts. The recent
successes of a number of strategic Charter challenges to legislation brought on behalf of
marginalized communities and involving voluminous evidentiary records suggests that
the above developments hold considerable promise for progressive social movements.
And yet, critical scholars and activists have persistently questioned the potential of
constitutional litigation, and law generally, to effect progressive social change, pointing
to a tension between the pursuit of positive legal outcomes and the broader
transformation of social power relations.
Using a case study of Bedford v Canada (AG), along with interviews of constitutional
litigators and judges, this project explores an under-theorized facet of the above-noted
tension by asking about the epistemological implications of the wide-ranging fact-finding
processes that have come to characterize progressive constitutional challenges to
legislation, especially under section 7 of the Charter. This inquiry is premised on the
contention that the realization of social justice depends, at least in part, on the realization
of what I call “epistemological justice”, defined as the just treatment of knowledge in
legal processes. Drawing on the work of feminist epistemologists and other critical
thinkers, the account of epistemological justice that I develop in this project centers on a
commitment to fully hearing and giving due weight to the experiential knowledge of
marginalized people who are directly affected by a given law or policy in decisionmaking processes. My analysis then asks whether the progressive promise of strategic
Charter litigation is borne out at the level of epistemological justice in this sense.
Ultimately, my findings suggest that there is reason to doubt this proposition, and thus
further reason to doubt the value of strategic Charter litigation as a tool for social justice.
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Preface: Constructing Knowledge About Knowledge
This dissertation is about the construction and treatment of knowledge in litigation. It is
also, like all dissertations, itself a project of knowledge construction, arising from a
particular (albeit not static) sociopolitical location. Driven as the project is by critical
feminist commitments, this dimension of the act of research and writing cannot be
ignored.

In her article “Speaking the Truth About Prostitution”, May-Len Skilbrei urges feminist
scholars to scrutinize not only the truth claims of others, but also our own—to “critically
engage with the question of what is shaken up and what is silenced by how we see, ask,
think, and write."1 Skilbrei’s call raises a host of questions that underlie and run parallel
to the research questions at issue in this project. What experiences and interests have
motivated me to pursue this research, and how have they shaped the process and the
result? How have I mobilized, framed, and evaluated the knowledge of others? Whose
voices have I centered, and to whom have I attributed expertise? What ideas about
“good” knowledge have I perpetuated or challenged, in what ways? And what kind of
authority have I sought and obtained through the completion of a PhD dissertation in
law?

These are the questions I have grappled with under the surface of this work. In the end, I
find myself able to answer some of them in a more satisfactory manner than others. Here
is what I can say. This project is normatively driven by a commitment to the pursuit of
1

May-Len Skilbrei, “Speaking the Truth About Prostitution” [Skilbrei, “Speaking the Truth”] in Marlene
Spanger & May-Len Skilbrei, eds, Prostitution Research in Context: Methodology, Representation and
Power (London; Routledge, 2017) at 44.

ix

social justice and equality, grounded in feminist politics. It is at least partially informed
my own lived experience as a woman—in particular by my struggle to believe in and
assert my authority as a knower. At the same time, it is also limited by my experience as
a highly privileged and formally educated person, who has had the benefit of great social
and institutional support. There are many things that are difficult for me to know, or
know well, as a result.

In this project, I have tried to bolster marginalized feminist and experiential knowledge,
though I have also privileged the already-dominant voices of lawyers and judges in some
respects. I have tried to challenge mainstream ideas about epistemic authority that value
formal training, objectivity, and disinterestedness over direct engagement, experience,
and contextualized knowledge, even while sometimes perpetuating those ideas myself.
And I have made every effort to treat the words and thoughts of others carefully and
fairly (especially keeping in mind the loss of context that occurs when spoken words are
reduced to writing), even as I construct critiques for my own purposes.

I offer this honest accounting not to disparage my efforts, or the contribution I have made
with this dissertation. Rather, I do so in the spirit of an approach to scholarship that
accords with my own epistemological beliefs, developed and brought to fruition through
this work. There is no transcendent position in knowledge-making. We are all limited,
largely ignorant, and often conflicted. We all begin from somewhere, and we continue to
be somewhere as we grapple with what we are doing.

x

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The landscape of Canadian constitutional litigation has been transformed by two notable
developments in recent years. First, the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1 has invited a wave of strategic constitutional challenges directed at reforming
social policy on what are often politically contentious matters. In their progressive form,
such challenges strive towards a vision of social justice premised on a more equitable
distribution of material resources and sociopolitical power, often by asserting the rights
of socially marginalized people.2 Second, the focus of Charter litigation has shifted from
legal interpretation and argument to social and legislative fact-finding—a shift reflected
in the proliferation of evidence in recent strategic Charter cases.

In one sense, these developments appear to hold significant promise for the progressive
social causes with which this project is allied. In the last decade, strategic Charter
challenges supported by voluminous evidentiary records have yielded favourable court
rulings for marginalized communities on issues ranging from prostitution3 to supervised
injection sites4 to medically assisted dying.5 On the other hand, critical scholars and
activists have persistently questioned the potential of litigation, and law generally, to
1

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].
2
By “socially marginalized people”, I mean people who, as a result of their identification with a given
social group or groups, have been denied full recognition and participation in society on equal terms with
others. This denial may result from material deprivations and/or discriminatory attitudes and practices,
often stemming from historical oppression.
3
Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford SCC].
4
Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services Society v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 44 [Insite SCC].
5
Canada (AG) v Carter, 2015 SCC 5 [Carter SCC].
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advance social justice in a meaningful way. As I elaborate upon below, such critiques
point to a tension between the pursuit of positive legal outcomes and the broader
transformation of social power relations.

In this dissertation, I explore a facet of this tension that I believe merits further
examination in light of the current landscape of strategic Charter litigation. Critical
scholars have thoroughly analyzed the doctrinal, institutional, and practical limitations of
constitutional litigation as a tool for social change, as well as its fraught relationship with
social movement politics. However, little attention has been paid to the epistemological
implications of the wide-ranging fact-finding processes that have come to characterize
this area of litigation. What kinds of evidence, and what ideas about knowledge, have
enabled recent Charter victories for marginalized groups? Is the progressive promise of
recent strategic Charter litigation borne out at the level of epistemology? These
questions, in my view, are importantly linked to broader concerns about social justice and
equality. Indeed, it is my contention that the realization of social justice depends, at least
in part, on the realization of what I call “epistemological justice”.

“Epistemological justice” refers to an aspect of justice that is primarily concerned not
with legal outcomes or their social consequences, but with the just treatment of
knowledge in legal processes. The particular account of epistemological justice that I
offer in this project is rooted in feminist theory—specifically, the work of feminist
epistemologists, which I describe more fully in Chapter 3. At its heart, though, is an
insistence on fully hearing and giving due weight to the experiential knowledge of those

2

directly affected by a given law or policy in decision-making processes, particularly those
who have been systemically oppressed, marginalized, and/or discriminated against in
Canadian society. While grounded in a particular literature with its own distinctive
genealogy, this conception of epistemological justice is closely aligned with insights from
a wide range of critical epistemologies that have sought to challenge dominant
approaches to knowledge in the Western world.

The above body of thought gives rise to a set of political-epistemological commitments—
most notably, the commitment to centering experiential knowledge—that I refer to
broadly in this work as “progressive”. I use this term in order to highlight the importance
of a certain posture towards knowledge as an indispensable component of progressive
social justice projects. In other words, I contend that the realization of a progressive
vision of social justice entails certain epistemological commitments, which I also label as
“progressive” in order to emphasize the link. This is not to suggest that the value of
experiential knowledge within this framework depends on whether it advances politically
progressive views. To the contrary, the set of epistemological commitments I am talking
about emphasizes the importance, within legal and other decision-making processes, of
hearing and taking seriously the experiential knowledge of directly affected people in all
its diversity. That said, the importance ascribed to experiential knowledge within feminist
and other critical epistemologies is undoubtedly linked to its role in driving progressive
social movements, as I discuss further in Chapter 3.

3

We often make and hear such commitments to the centering of experiential knowledge
from lawyers, scholars, and activists under the banner of social justice. Take, for
example, the following quotations from two public interest litigators whom I interviewed
for this project:

the people who are most adversely affected by the laws have expertise in
what the laws' effects are… […] They are experts in understanding that,
and they can give both direct stories and accounts of how that happens,
and views about how that works.6

Those people [experiential witnesses in strategic Charter litigation] are the
experts on their lives, and what's happened in their lives. And sometimes
they are the experts on what's happened in their area or their neighborhood
or their community. Nobody can speak better to it than they can.7

In posing the question of epistemological justice, I ask how commitments such as these
fare in strategic Charter litigation directed at progressive social change. Of course, not
everyone engaged in litigation of this sort consciously adopts the kinds of
epistemological commitments exemplified above. My claim is not that all progressive
Charter challengers actually hold progressive epistemological commitments, but rather
that such commitments are essential to the social justice campaigns they are pursuing,
whether they realize it or not. Examining the fate of these commitments in strategic

6
7

Interview 12 (27 September 2018).
Interview 8 (14 September 2018).
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Charter litigation is thus essential to understanding the extent to which such litigation can
achieve its social justice objectives.

I approach this inquiry via two research methods: 1) an in-depth case study of the record,
submissions, and reasons issued in Bedford v Canada (AG),8 a recent strategic Charter
challenge to Canada’s former prostitution laws; and 2) semi-structured interviews with
constitutional litigators and judges involved in Bedford and other strategic Charter
litigation.9 Drawing on literature in feminist epistemology, the case study traces the
suppression, as well as the decontextualization and instrumentalization, of progressive
epistemological commitments through the fact-finding process in Bedford. The
interviews corroborate and contextualize the findings of the case study. They also shed
light on aspects of legal process that impede epistemological justice in strategic Charter
litigation more generally, including the myriad practical barriers to constructing a robust
evidentiary record centered on experiential voices, and the long shadow cast by doctrinal
law and judicial common sense over the fact-finding process. Ultimately, my analysis
leads me to suggest that there is reason to doubt whether the progressive promise of
strategic Charter litigation is borne out at the level of epistemological justice. This in turn
suggests further reason to doubt the extent to which such litigation can contribute to the
realization of social justice.

In this Introduction, I provide the background for the problem driving my research,
explain my methodological approach, and provide an overview of the dissertation as a
8

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 [Bedford ONSC], affirmed in Bedford SCC, supra note 3.
Some interviewees consented to being directly identified in this project, and are thus referred to by name.
The rest are referred to anonymously.
9
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whole. I begin, in the following section, by expanding upon the two major developments
in constitutional litigation noted above. In doing so, I underscore the important questions
these developments raise for critical scholars and advocates committed to the pursuit of
social justice, and situate those questions within the existing literature on the relationship
between law and social change.

1.2 THE CONTEXT
1.2.1 Critiques of Constitutional Litigation as a Tool for Social Justice
This project is concerned with strategic Charter litigation as a form of progressive public
interest litigation used to advance broad social justice goals. In a general sense, the
descriptor “public interest” signals the concern of members of the public regarding issues
that speak to deeply held social, political, and moral values. In this project, I use “public
interest litigation” more specifically to describe what Abram Chayes first referred to as
“public law litigation”,10 and what is often called “test case litigation” or “impact
litigation”—cases that seek to advance systemic social change by setting new legal
precedents. I am particularly interested in efforts to empower socially marginalized
people by challenging laws that encroach upon their rights and interests.

The enactment of the Charter in 1982 laid a fertile ground for public interest litigation in
both of the senses described above. As the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) remarked not
long after the Charter’s implementation, “Charter cases will frequently be concerned
with concepts and principles that are of fundamental importance to Canadian
10

Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89:7 Harvard Law Review
1281.

6

society.”11 While important to all Canadians, Charter rights are often thought to hold
particular salience for minorities and other marginalized groups. In theory, the Charter
provides a legal avenue for members of such groups to challenge majoritarian legislation
and state actions that ignore or trample upon their constitutional rights.12

While the implementation of the Charter has catalyzed a great deal of public interest
litigation, it is important to note that not all cases involving the Charter fall into this
category. Often the Charter is invoked to defend or advance the interests of individuals,
without the aspiration to effect broader social change. This is often the case where the
constitutionality of state conduct against a particular individual or entity is at issue. Such
cases can, of course, have important consequences for other similarly situated individuals
down the line. As Lorne Sossin points out, the line between individual and systemic
Charter litigation is somewhat artificial.13 Nevertheless, the need to carefully scope my
project has led me to hone in on Charter challenges that are intentionally broad in
ambition—directed at something akin to what Gerald Rosenberg refers to as “significant
social reform”.14 It is for this reason that I focus on challenges to legislation, which attack
statutory provisions or regimes on the basis of their unconstitutional effects on entire
classes of people (albeit framed in terms of individual rights). Within this subset of
Charter litigation, I direct my attention specifically to cases brought under s.7 of the
Charter, which has served as a recent hot bed for litigation on contentious social issues
11

Mackay v Manitoba, [1989] SCJ No 88 at para 8 [Mackay].
In the American context, Gerald Rosenberg presents this as the “Dynamic Court” view, according to
which “courts offer the best hope to poor, powerless, and unorganized groups”. Gerald Rosenberg, The
Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2008) at 24.
13
Lorne Sossin, “The Justice of Access: Who Should Have Standing to Challenge the Constitutional
Adequacy of Legal Aid” (2007) 40 UBC Law Rev 727 at 727.
14
Rosenberg, supra note 12 at 4.
12
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driven by capacious evidentiary records. Finally, while the Charter has often been
invoked to defend already-powerful actors or for other regressive ends,15 I focus on cases
that seek to advance social justice for socially marginalized groups.

The litigation that I am looking at, then, is strategic, Charter-based, and directed towards
progressive, systemic legal and social change—what I refer to throughout this
dissertation as “strategic Charter litigation”. Strategic Charter litigation brought on
behalf of marginalized people is often lauded as the highest form of progressive legal
work in Canada, not unlike the idealized view of constitutional test case litigation in the
United States.16 In the eyes of many, cases like Bedford are groundbreaking, holding the
potential to shift social norms and relationships in significant ways, and in doing so, to
realize the law’s loftiest ideals.17 Where public interest litigators have succeeded in
achieving favourable outcomes under the Charter, their “wins” have been widely
celebrated by progressive lawyers, activists, and directly affected community members
alike. Bedford is a case in point; the success of the challenge was, at least initially, widely
lauded as a progressive victory for sex workers’ rights.

On the other hand, some communities have long been wary of engaging law and lawyers

15

Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: the Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 7, 12 [Petter, Politics of the Charter]. See also infra notes 34 to 36.
16
Austin Sarat & Stuart A Scheingold, “What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An
Introduction” [Sarat & Scheingold, “Introduction”] in Austin Sarat & Stuart A Scheingold, eds, Cause
Lawyers and Social Movements (Stanford, CA: Stanford Law and Politics, 2006) at 1 [Sarat & Scheingold,
Cause Lawyers]; Gerald P López, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law
Practice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) at 12-13 and 24 [López, Rebellious Lawyering].
17
Allan Hutchinson, in the late 1980s, described the perceived importance of the courts, particularly
following the advent of the Charter, as the “overwhelming orthodoxy” in Canada. Allan C Hutchinson,
“Charter Litigation and Social Change: Legal Battles and Social Wars” in Robert J Sharpe, ed, Charter
litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) at 358.

8

to advance their cause.18 Their suspicion is shared by critical legal scholars, who have
cast doubt on the effectiveness of litigation as a tool for social change. This is not to
suggest that public interest litigation is always misguided and hopeless; many of the most
critical scholars still recognize that litigation likely has some role to play in broader
struggles for social justice.19 They emphasize, however, that that role is (a) highly
dependent on the sociopolitical context; and (b) generally quite limited.20

Much of this literature finds roots in the critical legal studies (CLS) movement that
originated in the United States in the 1970s. CLS scholars advanced a view of law as
inseparable from the prevailing sociopolitical order and thus impotent as a means to
transform it.21 Some have tried to nuance this view, pointing to the opportunities that law
affords to alter existing social arrangements and norms, even as it upholds the status quo
in a more general sense. 22 Nevertheless, the CLS movement has left a legacy of deep
skepticism towards legal solutions to sociopolitical problems among a certain subset of
legal scholars (albeit not the mainstream). Within the broad domain of this movement,

18

López, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 16 at 47.
See for example: Tomiko Brown-Nagin, “Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action” (2005) 105:5 Columbia Law Review 1436 at 1501 (conceding that litigation can help
to raise the political consciousness of some communities); Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights
and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 56 (noting that rights can be an
effective strategy for progressive social change despite the limitations of liberal discourse); Hutchinson,
supra note 17 at 359 (noting that constitutional litigation may be part of a broader social change strategy
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feminist legal scholars in particular have pointed to the law’s well-documented role in
perpetuating historical inequalities as a reason to doubt its capacity to effect progressive
social change.23

Building on this critical orientation, sociolegal scholars have extensively scrutinized the
relationship between law and social change, drawing on theoretical, empirical, and
practice-informed approaches. One of the most comprehensive empirical studies that has
come out of the United States is Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope, in which
Rosenberg draws on data from multiple case studies to find that American courts can
“almost never” effect major social reform.24 In his book Just Words: Constitutional
Rights and Social Wrongs, Joel Bakan casts similar doubt on the power of the Charter in
the Canadian context, arguing that its progressive potential has been thwarted by the
institutional and social conditions in which it operates.25 Andrew Petter goes further,
suggesting in his early work that the Charter is an inherently regressive tool most likely
to work against those with less social power,26 and later concluding that “the Charter’s
most powerful political influences have been its tendencies to legalize political discourse
and to legitimize neo-conservative policies.”27 The concerns raised by these and other
scholars about the use of constitutional litigation as a means to advance social justice
goals can be helpfully organized along three general themes: 1) the courts’ limited
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receptivity to progressive social causes; 2) the failure of legal victories to produce
meaningful social change; and 3) the detrimental effects of litigation-based strategies on
client communities and broader social movements, as well as on democratic institutions. I
expand briefly on each theme as it relates to my project below.

The Courts’ Limited Receptivity to Progressive Social Causes
The first theme underscores the jurisprudential and institutional limitations of courts in
responding to progressive social justice campaigns. This accords roughly with the first of
three constraints on courts identified by Rosenberg in the Hollow Hope—what he
describes as “the limited nature of constitutional rights”.28 Bakan makes a similar
argument from a Canadian perspective. He explains that courts are steeped in a liberal
rights discourse, “presenting government regulation as the primary threat to human
liberty and equality, and individuals as abstract equals unaffected by structural forms of
domination and exploitation”.29 These ideas, which Bakan refers to as “antistatism” and
“atomism”,30 are deeply ingrained in Canadian jurisprudence, narrowing the progressive
potential of the Charter.31

Antistatism imagines rights primarily as a shield against government action, and thereby
limits courts’ willingness to entertain positive rights claims that call upon governments to
actively redistribute resources.32 Not only does this understanding of rights limit the
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scope of progressive claims and remedies available under the Charter (and under the
American Constitution),33 it also resonates with right-wing anti-government ideology,
providing opportunities for regressive claims to succeed in court.34 Indeed, courts in
Canada and the United States have often used their powers of constitutional review to
strike down laws that aim to protect vulnerable groups or otherwise promote more
equitable social relations.35 And, as Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold observe (from an
American perspective), cause lawyers on the right have emulated the rights-based
strategies of the left in ways that are “analytically indistinguishable”.36

Atomism frames complex social conflicts as discrete disputes between particular
individuals or groups, precluding judicial scrutiny of the broader social context and
structural inequalities at play.37 As a result, victories for public interest litigants under the
Charter tend to be narrowly tailored to the particular parties.38 What is more, because
discrete two-party disputes do not present the full range of interests at play in Charter
cases, a victory for one marginalized group may have unintended negative effects on
others.39 Similarly, case law that signals a progressive win in one context may be applied
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regressively in another.40

Canadian courts have resisted atomism to some degree by hearing from a wide array of
interveners in Charter cases,41 emphasizing the importance of social context,42 and
showing deference towards legislation that protects vulnerable groups.43 The recent
increase in attention to social and legislative facts in Charter litigation suggests a further
loosening of the atomistic framework of legal liberalism. However, concerns about
institutional legitimacy limit how far courts can move in this direction; as Bakan argues,
the fiction of a line between law and politics must be maintained to justify constitutional
review by unelected officials.44

In addition to the influence of liberal rights discourse, Bakan points to the conservative
nature of the judiciary as a further limiting factor in the pursuit of progressive social
change through the courts.45 Not only do judges reflect a highly privileged and relatively
homogenous demographic,46 they are educated, socialized and selected in ways that tend
to shore up their support for the status quo.47 “Judges”, as Bakan puts it, “operate at or
near the centres of social, economic, and political power and within an institutional
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framework committed to perpetuating the existing social order.”48 This, combined with
ever-present concerns about legitimacy, results in a judicial posture to social reform that
is, at best, incremental. As Tomiko Brown-Nagin observes, even when courts rule in
favour of public interest litigants, they tend to be more receptive to the centrist arguments
advanced by elites than to the more radical claims of grassroots actors.49 The social and
institutional location of judges, then, further circumscribes the progressive potential of
litigation as a tool for social change.

The literature discussed above focuses on how legal liberalism and judicial conservatism
limit courts’ willingness to entertain broad public interest claims aimed at progressive
social change. As I argue in this dissertation, however, the same forces also constrain
courts’ receptivity to progressive epistemological norms and commitments in legal
processes of proof. This too limits the potential of litigation as a tool for social justice.
Just as liberalism leads courts to view individuals as abstract, independent, and
autonomous equals, so too—as I will show—does it lead them to understand knowledge
in terms of abstract propositions, the truth of which are discovered by autonomous,
interchangeable knowers whose social identities and relationships are irrelevant to what
they know.50 And, just as judges tend to favour the status quo in terms of social ordering,
so too, my research suggests, do they favour mainstream ideas about knowledge over
more progressive views that challenge entrenched epistemic hierarchies.
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The Failure of Legal Victories to Produce Meaningful Social Change
Beyond the courts’ limited receptivity to progressive social justice claims, critics have
cast doubt upon the extent to which court “wins” translate into real-world social change.51
In part, this can be traced back to the liberal underpinning of Charter rights discussed in
the previous section, which tends to preclude the kinds of broad redistributive remedies
that meaningful social change arguably requires. In addition to the limited scope of
remedies is the challenge of enforcement. As Rosenberg emphasizes, courts lack the
power to execute or enforce their decisions.52 Implementation, especially in cases where
institutional reform is required,53 depends on support from the other branches of
government, which are in turn often beholden to public opinion.54 Courts may thus only
be able to effect meaningful social change where the cause at issue already benefits from
widespread popular support.55 The American civil rights campaign of the mid-20th
century is often cited as a paradigmatic example; while the landmark 1954 Supreme
Court decision in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka56 put an end to racial
segregation in education on the books, meaningful change on the ground did not occur
until a decade later, when the 1964 Civil Rights Act threatened to cut off federal funding
to schools that engaged in racial discrimination.57
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Of course, direct implementation of court decisions is not the only way for litigation to
effect social change. As Rosenberg notes, courts may also exert influence through “an
extra-judicial path that invokes the court powers of persuasion, legitimacy, and the ability
to give salience to issues.”58 This indirect form of influence is the focus of legal
mobilization scholars such as Michael McCann, who argue that, while litigation rarely
produces significant social change on its own, it can “provide a useful resource for social
movement building and strategic political action”.59 In addition to the potential tactical
advantages that can be wrought from litigation, such as compelling governments to
disclose valuable information, legal mobilization scholars emphasize the symbolic power
of favourable court decisions, and of legal rights discourse generally.60

Many scholars have critiqued such views as overly optimistic. While most concede that
litigation can be helpful as a tool for political consciousness-raising, they point out that
the general public pays little attention to the courts, limiting the symbolic import of their
rulings.61 Moreover, “symbolic victories may be mistaken for substantive ones”,62
appeasing activists and decreasing ongoing political mobilization efforts, as occurred
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following the historic 1973 Supreme Court rulings striking down restrictive abortion laws
in the United States.63 What is more, historical experience suggests that major victories in
court often trigger a strong backlash from political opponents.64

However, there is another reason why courtroom victories may fail at a symbolic level to
which legal mobilization scholars and their critics have not paid adequate attention.
Litigation carries symbolic and discursive import not only for what courts say about
rights, but for how courts and lawyers treat evidence, facts, and knowledge in legal factfinding processes. This includes evaluations of evidence and findings of fact that appear
in court rulings, but also the construction and framing of evidence on the record and in
argument. My research in this dissertation suggests that even when progressive Charter
victories seem to offer symbolically valuable rights rhetoric, the discursive effects of the
underlying fact-finding process may be much less positive.

Given that evidentiary records and processes of proof are far less visible to the public
than reported court decisions, it may be argued that their influence on public discourse is
even more tenuous and thus unimportant. Still, the treatment of evidence by lawyers and
courts does matter a great deal to those involved in litigation. Indeed, for witnesses who
must directly bear this treatment, it may matter as much as, or even more than, the court’s
ultimate ruling. Moreover, the approach taken to evidence, facts, and knowledge in a
given case has knock-on effects on the formulation of litigation strategies and the finding
of facts going forward, influencing how truth claims will be constructed, and whose
63
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knowledge will be deemed to matter, in future cases. Indeed, processes of proof often
make up the bulk of litigation, and play a determinative role in the decisions made by
courts. In my view, the power of these processes, combined with their relative
invisibility, makes the assumptions that shape them all the more insidious and in need of
scrutiny. In this dissertation, I examine the nature of these assumptions and their effects
as they relate to the social justice goals of progressive public interest litigators under the
Charter.

The Detrimental Effects of Litigation on Client Communities and Social Movements
Finally, engaging in litigation may have a multiplicity of detrimental effects on justiceseeking communities and social movements, as well as on democratic institutions.
Perhaps most apparent is the risk of a loss in court, which, in addition to denying a
remedy to the client community, can set a bad precedent for related social movements.
Other detrimental effects arise regardless of the legal outcome of a case. For one thing,
litigation is costly, and tends to divert resources away from other political strategies that
may be more effective.65 Some have argued that Charter litigation in particular has
encouraged the legalization of politics at the expense of more robust engagement in
democratic processes. It has thereby worked against progressive social movements and
the democratic institutions that are arguably better positioned to support them.66

The atomistic form of lawsuits may also exacerbate the challenge of representing the
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diverse views, interests, and experiences within a collective, and thereby aggravate
internal movement conflicts.67 As Cummings observes, public interest litigators faced
with this challenge have “often made choices that suppressed marginalized voices and
promoted incremental reform”.68 The institutional limitations of courts and the
conservative nature of the judiciary undoubtedly contribute to such strategic decisionmaking.

The power that lawyers and judges come to exert over social movements through
litigation points to another problem highlighted by critical scholars: the reproduction of
subordination in relationships between lawyers and other movement participants
(including but not limited to client communities).69 As Brown-Nagin explains:
“Professionals are accustomed to hierarchy, expect to occupy leadership roles, and expect
to utilize their expertise; their perspectives can clash with those of lower-status
participants in a social movement.”70 Take the example of Brown and the movement to
desegregate schools in the United States. In his critique of this movement, Derek Bell
argues that civil rights litigators intent on enforcing school desegregation in the years that
followed Brown paid insufficient attention to how their efforts affected, sometimes
negatively, the primary goal of many Black communities: to increase the quality of
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education available to their children.71 In other words, these litigators failed to see how
their efforts to pursue a particular vision of racial justice in a particular manner worked
against equality in other ways that were important to those they purported to represent.

One of the leading thinkers to address the power dynamics between lawyers and their
clients is Gerald Lopez. Lopez critiques what he refers to as the “regnant idea” of public
interest lawyering, according to which lawyers view themselves as preeminent experts
who formally represent and solve problems for subordinated people, primarily through
litigation.72 He argues instead for an alternative ideal of “rebellious lawyering against
subordination”, wherein lawyers work with communities and other professional and lay
allies, learning from each other and solving problems together.73 Others have espoused
similar ideals through concepts such as “community-based lawyering”,74 client
“empowerment”,75 and “law and organizing”.76 To the extent that these approaches
recognize and seek to bolster the experiential knowledge of marginalized people, they are
closely aligned with my conception of epistemological justice. The focus of this
literature, however, is on the dynamics of the lawyering process and associated
relationships; there is little discussion of how these dynamics play out in processes of
proof specifically.
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The litigation process may also reproduce subordination by imposing an elitist discourse
and set of procedures on the social justice claims of marginalized groups. According to
Lucie White, the courtroom is a “hostile cultural setting” that has the effect of “silencing
poor people.”77 Not only are the behavioural conventions and language of the courtroom
unfamiliar and often intimidating to non-lawyers, the very concept of advocacy
“presumes a ‘client’ who does not feel the power to speak for herself.”78 Lawyers,
moreover, in their quest to construct the best legal case, often fail to attend carefully to
the views and experiences of their clients, the richness of which is easily lost in
translation.79 Even when they do, the demands of litigation can pose a dilemma. In her
article, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survivor Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G.,” White uses the story of a low-income Black woman engaged in an
administrative hearing at an American welfare office to illustrate how legal advocates,
even with the best of intentions, may feel compelled to rework their clients’ narratives of
events in order to better fit doctrinal categories and social expectations.80 As explained
by public interest litigator Raji Manjat in her interview for this dissertation research:
“[Y]ou’re always walking a really fine line between your optimal litigation strategy and
[…] what are the interests of the community you’re serving, or the community you’re
working with.”81

An important contribution of the literature on social movements and alternative
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approaches to lawyering is to de-centre the role of law and lawyers in progressive social
change campaigns. As Brown-Nagin observes, legal scholars often take a “juricentric”
approach to struggles for social justice, in part because they “wrongly conflate politicized
legal campaigns with ‘social movements’”. 82 Social science-based studies of social
movements, however, demonstrate that they have their own identities and unique
features.83 Most importantly, in Brown-Nagin’s view, social movements involve a
struggle from a place of marginality that attains leverage by disrupting the usual course of
politics.84 While lawyers may have a role to play in such struggles, it is ancillary rather
than central. 85

Taken together, the above critiques make a compelling case for the limited and at times
problematic real-world effects of progressive public interest litigation. However, they
say almost nothing about the epistemological implications of social and legislative factfinding as part of the litigation process. To be sure, some of the above scholars have
touched upon epistemological issues, particularly in discussions of alternative approaches
to lawyering. White, for instance, shines a light on the marginalization of client voices in
court,86 while Lopez emphasizes “the importance of community knowledge to effective
community problem solving of all sorts”.87 Missing, however, is an in-depth critical
account of how knowledge is constructed, mobilized, framed, and evaluated through the
litigation process. This, I argue, is particularly important given a second development in
82
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strategic litigation under the Canadian Charter, to which I turn below.

1.2.2 The Shift from Law to Fact
The importance of an epistemological inquiry into public interest litigation has been
heightened in the Canadian constitutional context by what I call the “factification” of
strategic Charter cases.88 This trend was underscored by a number of my interviewees.89
“In the early days of Charter, it was all about identifying the big principles. Not much
evidence was needed […]. Today Charter litigation is really all about showing how the
challenged law affects real people in real ways”, observed one public interest litigator
with whom I spoke.90 “If you go back to the original Charter cases in the 80s, records
were almost non-existent, and it was just pure legal argument. And over time, we've
started a practice of having more and more evidence,” explained another interviewee, this
one a litigator for the Crown.91

Nowhere is the trend towards expanding evidentiary records more apparent than in recent
cases brought under the s.7 right to life, liberty and security of the person. The 2011
reference on the constitutionality of criminal laws against polygamy in British Columbia
included over 90 affidavits and expert reports, reflecting, according to the judge, “the
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bulk of contemporary academic research into polygamy.”92 In PHS Community Services
Society v Canada (AG),93 a challenge to the Minister of Health’s refusal to extend an
exemption that would allow the Insite supervised injection site in Vancouver to continue
operating, counsel tendered 20 volumes of evidence.94 The challenge to criminal laws
surrounding prostitution in Bedford involved more than 25,000 pages of evidence in 88
volumes.95 The applicants in Tanudjaja v Canada (AG), a recent challenge to Canada and
Ontario’s housing policy, presented a record of nearly 10,000 pages, including 19
affidavits, 13 of which were from experts.96 And, in the challenge to the constitutionality
of criminal laws prohibiting assisted dying in Carter v Canada (AG),97 the record
included 36 binders of material, including 116 affidavits.98 These are but a few
examples.99 Indeed, some litigators have compared recent Charter litigation to political
commissions of inquiry.100

There are a number of factors that have likely contributed to this trend. Not long after the
Charter was implemented, the SCC emphasized the need for a robust factual context in
cases that touch upon fundamental social issues.101 However, as noted by the first
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litigator quoted in this section, counsel and the courts in the early days were largely
focused on sorting out the meaning of the Charter’s broadly worded provisions via legal
argument and interpretation. As the jurisprudence on those interpretive issues has filled
out, the focus has shifted to understanding the social context in which the Charter is
being applied.102

As Charter litigation evolves, courts may also have “come to fully appreciate their
sociopolitical role”, in the words of one litigator I interviewed.103 The recognition that
judges make, rather than simply discover law, is nothing new in legal theory. But
nowhere is this phenomenon more on display than in strategic Charter litigation. The
very centrality of “legislative facts” (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) in this context
hints at the distinct role of the judge as lawmaker.104 Given the widespread impact of
decisions in strategic Charter cases, and the complex sociopolitical issues at play, it is no
wonder that litigants and courts alike have been keen to proceed on the basis of a robust
body of evidence. At the same time, reliance on purportedly objective facts helps the
courts to dispel concerns that they may be overstepping their institutional role by
engaging in the kind of political decision-making best left to democratically elected
representatives.105

Expert evidence grounded in social science research has become especially prominent in
strategic Charter litigation. The growth of relevant and accessible research from other
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disciplines, and the trend towards empiricism and interdisciplinarity in legal thought,
have undoubtedly encouraged this phenomenon.106 Indeed, the contemporary pull of
empiricism implores lawyers and judges to view social science as essential to the
adjudication of constitutional issues. The appeal of social science in strategic Charter
litigation may also be due in part to what Mariana Valverde describes as “the global crisis
about ethnocentrism and phallocentrism, the crisis about the contents [sic] of social
common sense”.107 As legal institutions and actors make efforts to account for a wider
array of perspectives, we are no longer so sure of what we thought we knew, and we
often turn to social science evidence to resolve that uncertainty. Consequently, matters
that were once considered within the purview of legal reasoning or judicial common
sense have now been “ceded […] to outside experts”, as one of the judges I interviewed
put it.108

The hostile political climate in which social justice advocates found themselves during
the period of Stephen Harper’s Conservative federal government (2006-2015) may have
further intensified the push toward evidence-intensive public interest litigation in recent
years (though it also limited the available funding for such challenges).109 The Harper
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government was notoriously resistant to environmental, Indigenous, and minority rights,
unreceptive to evidence-based policy, and uninterested in public dialogue.110 Meanwhile,
the SCC continued to emphasize the need for careful consideration of social context in
Charter cases. In this political environment, public interest litigation became one of the
only avenues available to challenge draconian laws and policies with empirical
evidence.111

Finally, the SCC may have encouraged the proliferation of evidence in Charter cases by
finding, in Bedford, that constitutional precedents can be revisited “if there is a change in
the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.”112
The Court in Bedford ultimately gave a different rationale for revisiting the
constitutionality of Canada’s prostitution laws—two of which had been previously
upheld in Reference re ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of Criminal Code (Canada).113 A change in
social and legislative facts was, however, part of the Court’s rationale for revisiting the
constitutionality of the law against medically assisted dying in Carter,114 despite having
upheld the prohibition as constitutional in Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG).115
According to one of my interviewees, the SCC’s loosening of stare decisis in this way

110

For an overview, see: Terry Milewski, “Stephen Harper’s legacy: Good, bad and a dose of ugly”, CBC
News (20 Oct 2015) online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-harper-political-obit1.3273677>; Bruce Livesey, “Is Harper the worst prime minister in history?”, National Observer (18 May
2015) online: <http://www.nationalobserver.com/2015/05/18/news/harper-worst-prime-minister-history>.
111
As Cummings notes, “the way that litigation is used in campaigns depends on the strength of political
alternatives to legal action, which changes over time” (“Reimagining”, supra note 53 at 495). Rosenberg
similarly observes that most social reform litigation occurs in the face of resistance to social change from
other branches of government (supra note 12 at 13).
112
Bedford SCC, supra note 3 at para 42.
113
Reference re ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of Criminal Code (Canada), [1990] 1 SCR 1123 [Prostitution
Reference].
114
Carter SCC, supra note 5 at paras 46-47.
115
Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519.

27

may be another factor driving the trend towards strategic Charter challenges founded
upon voluminous records.116

Whatever the cause, one thing is clear: the adjudication of complex sociopolitical issues
on the basis of voluminous evidentiary records has become a defining feature of
Canadian constitutional litigation in the Charter era. In this dissertation, I query the
epistemological implications of this phenomenon as they relate to the quest for social
justice. On one hand, there is reason to believe that knowledge grounded in different
disciplines and life experiences can challenge the assumptions embedded within statutory
law and policy, legal doctrine, and judicial common sense, and thereby disturb status quo
distributions of power. Voluminous evidentiary records may also be able to challenge
dominant cultural narratives by telling a compelling alternative story.117 As noted above,
such a strategy has, of late, served some public interest litigants well.

And yet, the expanded role of social and legislative facts in constitutional litigation also
raises certain dangers for those committed to social justice. On a practical level, bringing
evidence is costly. Extensive fact-finding processes place a heavy burden on rightsseeking litigants and communities, with significant implications for access to justice.118
On an epistemological level, and of central interest to this dissertation, the fact-finding
process may also perpetuate hierarchies of knowledge that set back the broader
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transformation of social power relations, even while facilitating Charter victories in
particular cases. While empirical studies and other forms of academic expertise can help
to shatter misconceptions and stereotypes that normalize the unequal treatment of
marginalized groups, bolstering the authority of social science research in the service of
social justice raises other potential problems. Non-legal disciplines carry their own gaps
and biases that may, too, entrench existing distributions of power, and that courts may
have trouble discerning.119 Overreliance on academic expertise may also discount the
epistemic weight of direct, lived experiences of injustice. Indeed, the call for social
science research may create an artificial hierarchy between the scientific knowledge of
experts and lay knowledge derived from firsthand experience, further marginalizing the
community whose rights are at issue.120

Given the centrality and epistemological significance of social and legislative fact-finding
in strategic Charter litigation, it is surprising how little sustained attention has been paid
to the matter, either in practice or scholarship. In cases such as Bedford and Carter,
lawyers and judges engage in complex processes of constructing, mobilizing, framing,
and evaluating knowledge. Yet, this work is undertaken with little jurisprudential or
theoretical direction, and thus, little consistency.121 This is perhaps unsurprising, given
the under-emphasis in legal education and scholarship on fact-finding generally, and non-
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adjudicative fact-finding in particular.122 As William Twining observes, traditional
evidence scholarship “has devoted far more attention to the rules of admissibility than to
questions about the collection, processing, presentation, and weighing of information that
reaches the decision makers.”123 The tendency, moreover, has been to view the
adjudication of “particular past events” as the paradigm for thinking about facts and
evidence.124 While there have been some recent efforts to examine the role of facts and
social science evidence in constitutional cases, they have offered little insight on the
epistemological effects of the fact-finding process.125 This dissertation begins from the
view that a commitment to social justice calls for greater critical attention to the
epistemological dimensions of fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation. It is this
premise that shapes my theoretical and methodological approach.

1.3 MY APPROACH
In this dissertation, I examine the treatment of evidence in strategic Charter litigation
from an epistemological perspective grounded in feminist political commitments. My
theoretical framework, which I develop in Chapters 2 and 3, brings insights from feminist
122

William Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays, 2nd ed (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006) at 15-16; 114.
123
Ibid at 28.
124
Ibid at 114.
125
See for example: Perryman, supra note 94; Young, supra note 99; Jodi Lazare, “Judging the Social
Science in Carter v Canada (AG)” (2016) 10:1 McGill JL & Health S35–S68; Ranjan Agarwal & Faiz
Lalani, “Noting the Obvious: A Reflection on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Application of Judicial
Notice under Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter” (2016) 35:2 National Journal of Constitutional Law 131;
Rebecca Sutton, “Dirty Puddles and Safety Valves: The Path from Fact to Remedy in Canada (A.G.) v.
PHS Community Services Society” (2014) 33:1 National Journal of Constitutional Law 39; Yasmin
Dawood, “Democracy and Deference: The Role of Social Science Evidence in Election Law Cases”
(2014) 32:2 National Journal of Constitutional Law 173; Jula Hughes & Vanessa MacDonnell. “Social
Science Evidence in Constitutional Rights Cases in Germany and Canada: Some Comparative
Observations” (2013) 32 National Journal of Constitutional Law 23; John David Lee, C Tess Sheldon &
Roberto Lattanzio, “Law and Ordered C.H.A.O.S.: Social Science Methodology, and the Charter Claims of
Persons with Disabilities” (2013) 32:1 National Journal of Constitutional Law 61. In the American context,
see: David L Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008); Goldberg, supra note 88.

30

epistemology and Science & Technology Studies (STS) to the study of evidence in the
tradition of the New Evidence Scholarship. Drawing on this framework, my aim is to
examine the epistemic norms and practices at play in strategic challenges to legislation
under section 7 of the Charter, and to consider their implications for the pursuit of
progressive social change under the Charter. I pursue this inquiry through two research
methods, described below, which address distinct but overlapping sets of questions. This
mixed methods approach allows me to broaden the scope of my inquiry, and to
triangulate my research findings by holding different sources of information up against
each other. It thereby allows me to gain greater insight into the epistemological
phenomena at play.
1.3.1 Case Study: Bedford
My main research method involves an in-depth discursive analysis of the written record,
submissions, and reasons for decision issued in the Bedford case. In particular, I examine
how various actors in Bedford construct, frame, and evaluate the evidence in the case by
mobilizing different epistemic norms and paradigms. My focus is on the treatment of
experiential evidence, expert evidence (including social science research), and common
sense, as these categories are conventionally understood in the context of litigation.
Through this analysis, I test the dynamics of the fact-finding process in Bedford against
the epistemological commitments that I view as essential to the progressive campaigns of
social justice advocates.

I began the case study portion of my research by reviewing and making notes on all of
the materials filed in Bedford. This included the pleadings, affidavits and transcripts of
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cross-examination, written submissions made by the parties and interveners, and rulings
issued by the courts at all levels.126 I also used Atlas.ti, a qualitative research software
program, to code the submissions and court rulings. Following further engagement with
my theoretical framework, I reworked my coding scheme and used it to code the notes
from my initial review of the materials. I later found it necessary to rework my coding
scheme again before coding select portions of the evidentiary record that I deemed to be
the most interesting and important for my purposes. I also recoded the submissions of the
parties and the court rulings at this point, using the revised scheme. My research process
for the case study was thus highly iterative, involving constant toggling between the
Bedford materials and the theoretical concepts and categories I was using to interpret
them. In this way, my process reflected my belief—expounded throughout this
dissertation—in the intertwined and mutually constitutive nature of theory and fact.

Bedford was a Charter challenge to three Criminal Code provisions that prohibited adult
prostitution-related activities: operating or being in a common bawdy house [“bawdy
house provision”]; living on the avails of prostitution [“living on the avails provision”];
and communicating in public for the purposes of prostitution [“communicating
provision”].127 The challenge was brought as an application by three women who
identified as current or former sex workers: Terri-Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch, and
Valerie Scott. The applicants were represented by lawyer Alan Young. The central thrust
of their case was that the impugned laws prevented them from taking measures to
increase the safety of work that was itself lawful—measures such as working from a
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secure indoor location, hiring drivers and bodyguards, and carefully screening clients.
The laws thus violated the right to liberty and security of the person under s.7 of the
Charter, and could not be justified under s.1.128 The applicants also argued that the SCC
should revisit the Prostitution Reference ruling upholding the communicating provision
as a “reasonable limit” on freedom of expression (s.2b) in light of new empirical
evidence.129

While the challenge in Bedford overlapped to some extent with arguments made in the
Prostitution Reference, it was allowed to proceed on the basis that the case raised
different legal issues, and that the jurisprudence related to the principles of fundamental
justice under s.7 had evolved significantly.130 The application judge, Justice Susan Himel,
also found that the SCC’s previous decision to uphold the communicating provision
under s.1 ought to be revisited due to the “breadth of evidence that has been gathered
over the course of the intervening twenty years,” and the fact that the “social, political
and economic assumptions” underlying the Prostitution Reference may no longer be
valid.131 In the end, Himel J ruled in the applicants’ favour on all counts, striking down
all three laws as unconstitutional under s.7, and finding that the communicating
provision’s infringement of s.2b could no longer be upheld under s.1.

The SCC found that the application judge was bound by the Prostitution Reference with
respect to s.2b, and declined to revisit the matter. However, the Court affirmed Himel J’s
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ruling striking down the laws under s.7, leaving Parliament with 12 months in which to
come up with a new legal regime to regulate prostitution. The resulting legislation, the
Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, was passed by the Harper
government in 2014 with the aim of discouraging prostitution through the direct
criminalization of buyers.132 It has since been subject to several constitutional
challenges.133

As a case study for this project, Bedford is an apposite choice for a number of reasons.
First, the courts in Bedford were explicitly attentive to the role of social and legislative
facts in constitutional litigation. As already noted, Himel J justified her decision to
reconsider the s.2(b) issue on the basis of a shift in social facts and evidence. While
overturning Himel J on this point, the SCC held that constitutional precedents can be
revisited where there are sufficiently momentous evidentiary developments.134 The Court
also made two other important pronouncements pertaining to social and legislative facts.
First, it held (somewhat controversially) that social and legislative facts are subject to the
same standard of review as adjudicative facts.135 Second, it emphasized that the inquiry at
the s.7 stage is qualitative, focusing on the law’s impact on the individual:

The question under s. 7 is whether anyone's life, liberty or security of the
person has been denied by a law that is inherently bad; a grossly
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disproportionate, overbroad, or arbitrary effect on one person is sufficient
to establish a breach of s. 7. 136

The law’s impact on society as a whole, the Court clarified, comes into play only under
section 1. This finding has important implications for the distribution of the burden of
proof in Charter cases.

The second reason that Bedford makes a valuable case study relates to the nature of the
social policy questions at issue in the case. In Canada and across the globe, the exchange
of sex for money remains a deeply controversial social phenomenon. The debate over
how to interpret and respond to this phenomenon has been heated, not only between
feminist and other actors interested in social policy, but also within feminist circles. As
Debra Haak observes, the controversy is often framed in terms of a polarized contest
between those who view the sale of sex through the lens of sexual exploitation and
gender inequality, and those who view it through the lens of a legitimately chosen form
of labour and/or “a site to expand the boundaries of sexuality and gender.”137 Empirical
research on the topic—a great deal of which was tendered as evidence in Bedford—has
largely failed to transcend these competing viewpoints.138 In Haak’s words: “This
ideology frames how empirical research is conducted, what is identified as problematic,
and how it suggests law and policy should respond to articulated problems.”139 The social
136
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fact evidence in Bedford was thus heavily politicized and hotly contested, highlighting
the blurriness of the boundary between normative theory and empirical fact, and leaving
participants in the case with ample room (and motivation) to frame information in
competing ways.

Bedford was also a case in which contestation over feminist commitments was already at
play, not only in terms of the substantive issues surrounding the sex trade, but also in
terms of the approach taken to addressing those issues through litigation. On one hand,
one of the challenges of looking to Bedford to assess how feminist epistemological
commitments fare in litigation for social justice is that the case itself was not conceived
as part of a broader social movement grounded in such commitments. In his interview for
this dissertation, lead counsel Alan Young was unequivocal in claiming the case as his
own brainchild, driven by personal concerns and interests:

It’s my case. And, that poses problems sometimes for some people who
want to believe it was a grassroots case coming from some social
collective. It wasn’t.140

At the same time, many of the community groups and researchers involved in the case
viewed matters differently, leading to clashes with Young and his clients (see Chapter 8
at 8.2.1). This dissonance between Young’s approach and the interests of sex workers’
rights activists speaks to the heart of my concern about the epistemological implications
of relying on litigation as a tool for social justice. Bedford also affords an illuminating
140
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comparison to another similar Charter challenge brought at the same time on the other
side of the country: Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence v Canada
(AG).141 In contrast to Young, the litigators in SWUAV took a much more communitybased approach. While the constitutional challenge in SWUAV was never heard on the
merits, leaving no evidentiary record to analyze, my interviews offer insight into the
trajectory of the case as it compares to Bedford. This comparison offers a compelling
illustration of how different epistemological choices play out in strategic Charter
litigation.

The choice to focus on Bedford is also, admittedly, shaped by practical considerations.
Most importantly, I had access to a full copy of the transcripts in the case, as well as to
practitioners involved in both Bedford and SWUAV. Given the difficulty and expense of
obtaining transcripts in most cases, my ability to access the requisite materials was an
important factor to consider in selecting a case for study.

There are undoubted limitations to focusing on a single case study. As emphasized by
one of my interviewees, every public interest case that comes before the courts has a
unique history and social context,142 significantly limiting the generalizability of analysis
conducted with respect to it. For this reason, I had initially hoped to draw on multiple s.7
cases. Apart from the challenge of accessing transcripts, however, I quickly realized that
the materials in Bedford alone were extremely voluminous and rich in content, and that
the type of analysis I wished to undertake called for a deep dive into the transcripts.
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Indeed, it is the fine-grained nature of my analysis (among other things) that I believe
makes this project unique and important. Such depth would simply not have been
possible had I attempted to expand my sample of cases, though I am certainly open to this
work being taken up by other scholars, with the possibility of confirming, complicating,
or otherwise adding to the picture I have constructed here. To compensate for some of the
weaknesses of my focus on a single case study, I do also widen the lens of my overall
inquiry via my second research method.

1.3.2 Interviews
There is a great deal to learn from the written record in a strategic Charter challenge such
as Bedford. But there are also parts of the story that transcripts cannot tell. Those
involved in bringing forward litigation of this nature must grapple with myriad strategic
and practical considerations about which the final record is largely silent. With this in
mind, my second research method—a series of interviews with constitutional litigators
and judges—attempts to get beneath the record in order to better understand how various
contextual factors shape the treatment of evidence, facts, and knowledge in strategic
Charter litigation. This method allows me to: 1) strengthen some of the findings from
the case study while also exposing and disciplining that method’s weaknesses via
triangulation; 2) delve deeper into the roots of the tension between legal victory and
epistemological justice that I uncover through the case study; and 3) gain a deeper and
more contextualized understanding of the Bedford case and its relationship to other
strategic Charter litigation.
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For this component of my research, I conducted 18 in-depth, semi-structured interviews
with 10 public interest litigators, 4 Crown litigators, and 2 judges, all of whom had been
involved in strategic public interest litigation under the Charter. In order to gain an initial
sense of how evidentiary and epistemological issues in strategic Charter litigation arise in
practice, I began with a small set of early, exploratory interviews with public interest
litigators in Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia, where some of Canada’s most
momentous recent test case litigation has arisen. I then conducted a second round of
interviews with litigators and judges across Canada once I was further along in my
project. This second round of interviews was conducted mostly through Zoom online
videoconferencing (except for interviewees located in Toronto), and included follow-up
interviews with several participants from the first round.

In developing my list of interviewees, I used a purposive snowball sampling method,
focusing on litigators and judges with experience in constitutional and other public
interest litigation brought on behalf of marginalized groups. I endeavoured, in particular,
to speak with those who had been involved in recent strategic challenges to legislation
under s.7, including Insite, Bedford, and Carter. In this way, I was able to gain additional
insight into my case study as it fits within the broader landscape of strategic Charter
litigation.

In preparation for my first set of interviews, I developed a short interview guide that
included a series of open-ended questions organized according to key themes of interest
to me at the outset of the project. I later revised and refined this guide for the second
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round of interviews, based on the data collected in the first round and other work done on
the dissertation in the meantime. As with the case study, I used Atlas.ti to analyze and
code my interview data. Because I undertook this analysis much later in the course of the
project, my coding scheme was built largely, though not entirely, upon the dissertation
structure and key concepts that I had already developed through my engagement with the
case study and related theoretical literature. This ordering reflects the secondary role of
the interviews as a supplement to the case study. At the same time, the interviews—
particularly the early exploratory ones—also provided insights that guided my approach
to the case study and the theoretical literature in important ways, once again reflecting the
iterative nature of my methodology.

1.3.3 A Note on Terminology
While drawing heavily on the Bedford case, this dissertation does not seek to wade into
the protracted policy debate surrounding the sale of sexual services in Canada. Rather, I
am interested in how different forms and sources of knowledge are treated within this and
other policy debates as they manifest in constitutional litigation. Nevertheless, with
Bedford as my primary case study, I do make frequent reference to the issues, evidence,
authorities, and stakeholders that come up in the particular context of commercialized
sex. I must therefore grapple with the terminological choices involved, particularly
around the terms “prostitution” and “sex work”.
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The choice between these terms carries political connotations that are difficult to avoid,
signaling one’s position on either side of the polarized policy debate referred to above.143
In Canadian jurisprudence, the two terms are increasingly used interchangeably,144
perhaps in an effort to avoid an overtly political stance. According to Haak, however,
they are not synonymous.145 “Prostitution” is the term used in the Criminal Code and
related legislation; it was defined in the Prostitution Reference as “the exchange of sexual
services of one person in return for payment by another.”146 While “sex work” lacks a
similarly clear definition in law or scholarship,147 Haak notes that the term has political
roots and is generally understood to refer to prostitution and other erotic services where
the sellers are uncoerced, consenting adults.148

In this project, I have tried to remain faithful to the source material I am working with.
While the challenges in Bedford and SWUAV attack laws related to “prostitution”, and
thus affect a wide range of stakeholders, they are framed around the rights of “sex
workers”.149 Out of respect for the linguistic choices of the litigants, I use “sex work” to
refer to their experiences and related arguments. I use “prostitution” when referring to
legal and other materials that use the term.
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1.4 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
This dissertation proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I lay the doctrinal and theoretical
foundation for my project. Following this Introduction, Chapter 2 situates my concerns
about epistemological justice in strategic Charter litigation within the context of legal
processes of proof and the New Evidence Scholarship. While traditional approaches to
evidence focus on the rules of admissibility, Twining argues that the rules are relatively
marginal to legal fact-finding in practice, and that the “law” of evidence should therefore
be more broadly conceived to encompass norms of factual reasoning in addition to
exclusionary rules.150 Building on Twining’s work, I contend that admissibility issues are
especially attenuated in strategic Charter challenges to legislation due to the unique
nature of fact-finding in this context. However, the very characteristics that diminish the
direct force of exclusionary rules in litigation of this sort also underscore the influence of
legal doctrines and processes of proof—including the law/fact dichotomy—over the
construction and contestation of knowledge. Adapting Twining’s notion of “information
in litigation” as an organizing concept for the New Evidence Scholarship, I thus posit
“knowledge in litigation” as a useful starting point for thinking about evidence in
strategic Charter litigation.

Having made the case for why constitutional fact-finding in this moment calls for
attention to questions of epistemology, Chapter 3 fleshes out the theoretical account of
epistemological justice that I draw upon to analyze the treatment of knowledge in
Bedford and other strategic Charter litigation. The first part of the chapter outlines (and
thereby reconstructs) some of the key insights of feminist epistemologists and related
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scholars who have critiqued the implicit assumptions engrained in traditional AngloAmerican approaches to knowledge. Drawing on this work, the second part of the chapter
develops the concept of “experiential knowledge” as a central component of my
theoretical approach, and explores its relationship to three conventional categories of
proof in litigation: experiential evidence, expert evidence (including social science
research), and common sense. By exploring, from a critical feminist perspective, how
these categories are constructed and used to frame knowledge in litigation, I map out the
epistemological terrain through which my analysis of Bedford will proceed.

Part II of the dissertation undertakes a fine-grained analysis of the written record,
submissions, and reasons issued in Bedford as a means to examine the epistemological
effects of fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation. This Part consists of four chapters.
The first three chapters offer distinct analyses of each of the conventional categories of
proof discussed in Chapter 3, drawing primarily on the affidavit evidence and transcripts
of cross-examination in Bedford. In each chapter, I identify the key framing strategies
used by participants in the case—mainly counsel and witnesses—to discount, bolster, or
otherwise position the type of proof at issue. Drawing on the theoretical framework
developed in Chapter 3, I interrogate the epistemic norms and paradigms that animate
these strategies and critique how they are mobilized and resisted in litigation from a
critical feminist perspective. The final chapter in Part II then examines how these
categories of proof are considered and weighed against each other by the parties in
written argument, and by the courts in their reasons.
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I begin, in Chapter 4, by examining the treatment of evidence classified as “experiential”
in Bedford—i.e. evidence from those who are (or have been) directly affected by the
impugned laws. The main strategies employed to bolster or discount this evidence pertain
to two issues: qualifications and reliability. In analyzing these strategies, I demonstrate
the enduring influence of mainstream epistemic norms that perpetuate inequality in the
fact-finding process, some of which find roots in legal doctrine. While valorizations of
experiential knowledge also figure importantly in the treatment of the experiential
evidence in Bedford, I suggest that the litigation context encourages a flattened and
decontextualized mobilization of experientialism that fails to live up to progressive
epistemological commitments.

Chapter 5 considers the treatment of evidence classified as “expert” in Bedford. In the
first part of the chapter I examine strategies used to frame the social science research that
grounds much of the expert opinion in Bedford, with a focus on issues of research
methodology. Drawing on the work of STS scholars Thomas Gieryn and Sheila Jasanoff,
I explore the treatment of social science research in Bedford as a process of “boundary
work”, through which science is demarcated from non-science (or at least bad science) as
a means to further advocacy goals.151 I demonstrate that, while the record in Bedford
reveals complex and contested understandings of social science research methodology,
the adversarial context of litigation encourages participants to simplify, decontextualize,
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and instrumentalize methodological norms and principles. The dominant set of framing
strategies that emerges relies heavily on the mainstream epistemological paradigm
outlined in Chapter 3. While some witnesses resist this paradigm, often in ways that align
with feminist critiques, counsel’s participation in the resistance is minimal, and
inconsistent where it does occur. In the second part of the chapter, I turn my attention to
framing strategies related to the role of the expert in litigation. The dominance of
traditional epistemic norms, reinforced by doctrinal law, is even more apparent here. As
in the preceding examples, some witnesses do attempt to resist these norms. Such
witnesses are not, however, supported by counsel (even their own) in their efforts, and
can often be seen reverting strategically to the dominant paradigm.

Chapter 6 investigates the distinct role and treatment of “common sense”, broadly
conceived, as a final mode of proof in litigation. Once again in this chapter, I demonstrate
the influence of mainstream epistemic and legal norms—in particular, the imagined
dichotomy between common sense and evidence—on the treatment of knowledge in
litigation, despite resistance from some actors. My analysis also shows how participants
in Bedford draw on the same framing strategies to intermittently mobilize and discount
common sense for vastly different purposes, highlighting the category’s function as a
rhetorical tool that lacks a particular political valence.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I turn to the party factums and court reasons in Bedford in order to
examine how the various categories of proof discussed in the previous chapters are
weighed against each other in the case. Here I shift from a focus on framing strategies
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used in particular instances to the overall assessment of different modes of proof in
Bedford. My analysis in this chapter highlights the connection between the treatment of
knowledge in litigation and the framing of the facts at issue. It also demonstrates the
shifting nature of the weight accorded to different categories of proof in Bedford. My
main finding, though, is that despite the seeming importance of the experiential evidence
in Bedford, appeals to law, legal reasoning, and common sense, along with legislative and
other government-generated reports, are what tend to prevail at the end of the day.

Ultimately, my analysis in Part II points to a tension between legal victory and
epistemological justice in the Bedford case. In Part III, I delve further into the nature,
causes, and implications of this tension. I do this in Chapter 8 by holding my analysis of
the transcripts in Bedford up against my interview data. This allows me to examine the
practical, legal, epistemological, and human constraints that impede the realization of
epistemological justice in Bedford and other strategic Charter litigation. My analysis
suggests that, due to the long shadow cast by judges over the fact-finding process, their
epistemic beliefs, experiences, and common sense tend to trump the more progressive
commitments of other participants in litigation. Nevertheless, I contend that factual
interventions grounded in experiential knowledge can play an important, if indirect, role
in litigation by shifting judicial common sense, and thereby changing the law. I conclude,
in the following chapter, by briefly exploring some of the implications and questions
raised by the dissertation for other legal contexts.
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With this project, I make three contributions to the existing literature. First, I demonstrate
the salience, within a particular litigation context, of the New Evidence Scholars’ view
that the significance of exclusionary rules has been exaggerated at the expense of
attending to other important dimensions of the fact-finding process. Second, I expose the
thoroughly constructed nature of conventional categories of proof in litigation, by
showing how notions of experience, expertise, and common sense operate primarily as
rhetorical tools in litigation, rather than as fixed ontological categories. Finally, and most
importantly, I show how the law of evidence and the fact-finding process in strategic
Charter litigation contribute to the fraught relationship between litigation and social
justice, by failing to live up to the demands of epistemological justice.
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Chapter 2: The Evidentiary Framework of Strategic Charter
Challenges to Legislation
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this project, I am interested in the epistemological effects of constitutional fact-finding
processes. The work of feminist epistemologists—discussed in the next chapter—
provides the theoretical framework for my analysis of these effects as they pertain to the
social justice goals of marginalized groups in litigation. As a prior matter, however, I
believe it is important to make the case for why such an analysis is necessary and
worthwhile from a legal perspective. What is it, in other words, about processes of proof
in strategic Charter litigation that calls for the kind of analysis offered in this project? I
consider this prior question in this chapter by examining the legal context within which
my concerns about epistemological justice arise. For this I turn to the field of evidence
law and scholarship.

The close connection between evidence and epistemology has been recognized before. As
Jeremy Bentham famously put it: “The field of evidence is no other than the field of
knowledge”.1 There is, however, a modern tendency—owing perhaps to the nature of law
school evidence courses—to associate the field primarily with the doctrinal rules
governing the admissibility and use of evidence in litigation. In recent years, evidence
scholars have challenged this tendency through an array of different approaches grouped
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loosely under the umbrella of “The New Evidence Scholarship”. 2 In this dissertation, I
renew and build upon the New Evidence Scholars’ case for a broader conception of
evidence law—one that serves as a way into questions of epistemology in strategic
Charter litigation.

My argument is twofold. First, I posit that the doctrinal rules of admissibility work
alongside a much broader set of norms, procedures, and practices that shape the treatment
of evidence, facts, and knowledge in litigation, and that ought to be considered within the
domain of evidence law. Second, I posit that what makes the doctrinal rules important,
particularly in the context of strategic Charter litigation, is not their power to regulate
admissibility, but rather their influence as a source of epistemology.

Perhaps nowhere are these arguments more compellingly substantiated than in recent
strategic challenges to legislation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms3—what I call “strategic Charter litigation”. In this chapter I take a closer look
at the special features of fact-finding in this context that call for a broader and more
epistemologically-oriented approach to evidence. I begin by adapting William Twining’s
theory of “information in litigation” to posit “knowledge in litigation” as a useful starting
point for thinking about evidence in strategic Charter litigation. I go on to consider
Twining’s argument about the exaggerated importance of the doctrinal rules of evidence
in legal fact-finding generally. While Twining bases his argument on broad trends across
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the legal system, I suggest that the force of admissibility rules is especially attenuated in
strategic Charter litigation.

Having established a theoretical foundation for my approach to evidence, I proceed to
examine the special nature of the factual issues, and of the judicial role, in strategic
Charter litigation. I then describe a number of consequences that flow from this. First, I
demonstrate the relative impotence of the rules of admissibility in strategic Charter
litigation, drawing on my case study of Bedford v Canada (AG)4 for illustrative purposes.
Observations from my research interviews add further insight into the nature and
implications of admissibility issues in strategic Charter cases more broadly. Second, I
show how the special nature of the factual issues in this context leads to uncertainty
regarding the demands of proof. The result, I suggest, is an expansive, open-ended, and
flexible fact-finding process, with ample room for legal actors—i.e. lawyers and judges—
to manoeuvre in strategic ways.

This state of affairs may be read as an instance of lawlessness—a situation where the law
of evidence simply fails to play much of a role. In my view, however, the openness and
malleability of fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation is better understood as bringing
different modes of factual regulation, and thus a different dimension of evidence law, to
the fore. The strategic manoeuvres alluded to above play a key role in shaping the
treatment of knowledge in strategic Charter litigation, with important practical and
epistemological consequences for marginalized groups seeking social justice through
litigation. They are moreover, informed by epistemological assumptions embedded in
4
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evidentiary doctrine, as well as by the practical and institutional constraints of the factfinding process—all of which may be understood to fall within the law of evidence
broadly conceived. I thus advance a conception of evidence law that attends not only or
primarily to rules of admissibility, but to the strategic practices of participants in
litigation and their implications in context.

2.2. THE NEW EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP
2.2.1 From “Information in Litigation” to “Knowledge in Litigation”
The impetus to look beyond doctrinal rules of evidence to the broader fact-finding
process reflects a relatively recent turn in evidence scholarship—what Richard Lempert
in 1986 coined “the New Evidence Scholarship”.5 Part of the movement to examine law
in its social context, the New Evidence Scholarship shifts the study of evidence away
from legal doctrines pertaining to admissibility and use, and towards the actual processes
by which legal actors engage in information-gathering and factual reasoning in legal
contexts. As Lempert put it in 1986: “Evidence is being transformed from a field
concerned with the articulation of rules to a field concerned with the process of proof.”6
In this way, evidence scholarship has followed other areas of legal scholarship in moving
towards a more realist and empirical orientation.7

Twining uses the concept of “information in litigation” (IL) to capture this new approach
to the study of evidence. In his view, the New Evidence Scholarship movement signals an
5
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interest not only in how evidence is used to prove facts in court, but in how information is
used to make various decisions throughout the course of litigation, seen as a “total
process.”8 As Twining observes, a case that culminates in a full hearing in court is the
exception, not the rule; attention must also be paid to the role of information at other
stages of proceedings.9 A case, moreover, is itself often an unclearly bounded event
within a longer-term relationship or social process.10 And, while “evidence” evokes the
formal court record, “information” is more easily understood as playing multiple roles
throughout the litigation process, and “transcends sharp distinctions between ‘fact’ on the
one hand and ‘value’, ‘law’ and ‘opinion’ on the other”.11

Twining’s theorization of IL as a “mapping theory” for the New Evidence Scholarship
helpfully illuminates the shift—and broadening of focus—in recent evidence
scholarship.12 As he notes, this shift revives epistemological questions that have been
largely neglected by the orthodox tradition.13 Indeed, while Twining is drawn to the
nimbleness of “information” as an organizing concept, “knowledge” might serve as an
equally helpful concept for thinking more broadly about processes of proof in context.
Not only does “knowledge” denote something beyond evidence and facts, it can—at least
in some usages—include human capacities such as skills, intuitions, and relationships
(knowledge of others), that “information” does not seem to effectively capture. Using
knowledge as a key concept for thinking about evidence also helps to connect legal
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scholarship to questions of power and authority raised by feminist epistemologists and
other critical scholars. I therefore adapt Twining’s model for the purposes of this project
to think not only in terms of “information in litigation”, but of “knowledge in litigation.”

2.2.2 Twining’s Argument of Exaggerated Importance
Twining’s description of the law of evidence in England builds on the work of American
evidence scholar James Bradley Thayer. Following Thayer, Twining suggests that “our
rules of evidence consist of a series of disparate exceptions to a single principle of
freedom of proof”—a view that he purports to share with most modern common law
evidence scholars.14 For Twining, it follows that we ought to focus first on understanding
the main principle of free proof, prior to examining the exceptions. Such an approach is
reflected in the work of Thayer’s disciple John Henry Wigmore, who saw general
principles of proof (i.e. logical reasoning) as anterior to doctrinal rules of evidence, and
taught the subject of evidence to his students accordingly.15

Twining, however, takes the Thayerite view a step further, through what he calls the
“argument of exaggerated importance.”16 He contends that Thayer and Wigmore’s
conception of evidence is basically sound but does not go far enough, especially in light
of recent developments in the nature of litigation. Adding what he refers to as a “realist
gloss” to these scholars’ accounts, Twining focuses on how evidentiary rules are actually
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applied in legal decision-making.17 From this angle, he argues that doctrinal rules play an
even less important role in litigation than Thayer imagined, in both civil and criminal
contexts.18 Twining likens the Thayerite view of the rules to a piece of Gruyère—
something that consists of more holes than cheese. From a realist perspective, however,
he suggests that it is actually more like Alice in Wonderland’s Chesire cat,

who keeps appearing and disappearing and fading away, so that
sometimes one could see the whole body, sometimes only a head,
sometimes only a vague outline and sometimes nothing at all, so that Alice
was never sure whether or not he was there or, indeed, whether he existed
at all.19

This ephemeral quality can be attributed, according to Twining, to the fact that: 1) most
cases never reach the stage of a contested hearing where evidentiary rules would apply;
2) even when there is a hearing, it often takes place in a forum where some or all of the
rules are not binding (with robust application of the rules occurring mainly only in
serious criminal cases); and 3) even in a criminal trial, the rules are frequently ignored in
practice.20 Twining also observes a long-term trend away from precisely defined rules
and towards more flexible, discretionary standards, such that few hard and fast rules
remain, even in the law on the books.21 Given these realities, he argues that evidence
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scholars have overemphasized “paper rules” at the expense of more important questions
about factual reasoning and processes of proof in various legal contexts.22

While Thayer, working from a framework of legal positivism, viewed such questions as
extraneous to the law of evidence itself, Twining argues for a broader conception of
evidence law that would encompass not only doctrinal rules but also the procedures and
practices of proof.23 As Twining notes, such topics have received little attention in
traditional legal education and scholarship, perhaps because they seem to focus on
everyday principles and practices of reasoning that are not unique to law. There is, in his
words, “relatively little about it that is unique or in special need of demystification.”24
To be sure, legal processes of proof are strongly informed by elements of factual
reasoning that transcend the law. However, it is a mistake, in my view, to discount the
role of legal doctrines, institutions, norms, and conventions in shaping how such
processes unfold. One must also consider the unique social consequences of factual
arguments and conclusions in legal contexts. As Mary Eberts points out, “[s]tatements
emanating from courts about what is so and what is not so are invested with great
authority”.25 This in itself makes processes of proof in litigation worthy of study from a
legal perspective.

For Twining, the exaggerated importance of the rules of evidence stems in part from a
failure to recognize and grapple with the host of diverse procedural contexts in which
22
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modern day legal decision-making actually occurs.26 By focusing mainly on criminal jury
trials, which make up a tiny subset of all legal proceedings, evidence scholars have
ignored how evidentiary rules operate in the vast bulk of litigation that occurs outside of
this special context. Thus Twining suggests that evidence scholarship may be “overgeneralized”;27 rather than a single picture of the law of evidence, different empirical and
theoretical accounts may be required for different legal contexts.

In this project, I take up Twining’s call by focusing on processes of proof in the specific
context of strategic Charter challenges to legislation in Canada, with an emphasis on
challenges brought under s.7. Because this area is newly and rapidly developing, and in
many ways uniquely Canadian (though there are some shared characteristics with
constitutional litigation in the United States), Twining’s work does not grapple with it. It
thus presents an opportunity to both test and extend his theory. Building on Twining, I
contend that the argument of exaggerated importance holds particular salience in strategic
Charter litigation, due to the special nature of the issues and facts at play. As I
demonstrate below, formal evidentiary doctrines do little to regulate the admission and
use of evidence in this arena of litigation. At the same time, I argue that the doctrinal
rules of evidence—along with a range of other legal norms, procedures, and practices—
do play an important role in terms of their epistemological influence over the fact-finding
process in this context. I thereby illuminate a connection between doctrinal rules and
factual reasoning processes that is missing from Twining’s realist account. I begin, in the
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next section, by elucidating what makes the facts in strategic Charter litigation so
exceptional.

2.3 THE NATURE OF THE FACTS IN STRATEGIC CHARTER LITIGATION
To understand the limitations of the traditional view of evidence law in the context of
strategic Charter litigation, one must first consider the nature of the issues and facts at
play in this arena. In 1942, Kenneth Culp Davis famously drew a distinction between
“adjudicative facts” which relate to the particular case at hand, and “legislative facts,”
which relate to more general questions of law and policy.28 One of the most important
features of strategic Charter litigation from an evidentiary perspective is the starring role
of the latter. This differs from the norm in most litigation contexts, where the focus is on
case-specific, adjudicative facts.29 These may be informed or supplemented by more
general kinds of facts, in an effort to account for the broader social and legal context of
the case. At the end of the day, however, it is the adjudicative facts that take centre stage,
as these are the facts that need to be decided in order to resolve the case. In strategic
Charter litigation, however, the roles are reversed. Facts about the particular litigants are
relevant but largely uncontested. The main points of controversy instead relate to general
facts about the impugned legislation and the social world in which it operates.30

Davis viewed the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts as significant
mainly for administrative agencies that had to fulfill various law and policy-making
28
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functions in addition to deciding particular cases. However, he noted that the courts were
also faced with legislative facts on occasion, and that they had implicitly been treating
such facts differently.31 The courts had failed to draw an explicit distinction between the
different types of facts they were determining, with one exception: the category of
“constitutional facts”, which had arisen to refer to facts relevant to deciding matters of
constitutional law.32 The constitutional context was thus one of the earliest sites where
the role of non-adjudicative facts in litigation was explicitly recognized.

The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) picked up on Davis’ distinction in the 1990 case of
Danson v Ontario (AG):

It is necessary to draw a distinction at the outset between two categories of
facts in constitutional litigation: “adjudicative facts” and “legislative
facts”. […] Adjudicative facts are those that concern the immediate
parties: in Davis's words, “who did what, where, when, how and with what
motive or intent ....” Such facts are specific, and must be proved by
admissible evidence. Legislative facts are those that establish the purpose
and background of legislation, including its social, economic and cultural
context.33
While the initial distinction was between adjudicative and legislative facts, a further
division of non-adjudicative facts has since become established in Canadian
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jurisprudence. As the SCC in R v Spence noted: “Such non-adjudicative facts are now
generally called “social facts” when they relate to the fact-finding process and
“legislative facts” in relation to legislation or judicial policy.”34 The Court in Spence went
on to explain the concept of “social fact” as follows:

“Social fact” evidence has been defined as social science research that is
used to construct a frame of reference or background context for deciding
factual issues crucial to the resolution of a particular case […] As with
their better known “legislative fact” cousins, “social facts” are general.
They are not specific to the circumstances of a particular case, but if
properly linked to the adjudicative facts, they help to explain aspects of
the evidence.35

Social facts, then, can be understood as assisting in the interpretation of adjudicative
facts, while legislative facts assist in the formulation of law and policy. As I discuss
below, other scholars have developed variations on this taxonomy that, while not widely
taken up by Canadian courts, can nevertheless be helpful in illuminating the nature of the
facts at play in constitutional cases and the means relied upon to establish them.

The central role of social and legislative facts in strategic Charter challenges to
legislation reflects the special nature of the issues and judicial task in these kinds of
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cases.36 Unlike most litigation, the role of courts in this context is not to resolve disputes
between private individuals, or even between individuals and the state (though the cases
are often framed in this way for standing purposes). Rather, the court must determine
whether a given legislative provision or regime accords with the rights and freedoms
enshrined in the constitution. While the allegation may be that the legislation infringes
the right or freedom of a particular individual or individuals, those individuals are
typically standing in for a much larger class of people whose rights are at stake.
Furthermore, in addressing whether a Charter violation is justified under s.1, the court
must consider the objectives and effects of the law in relation to the public as a whole.
The task at hand involves broad policy considerations, and is arguably more akin to lawmaking than to dispute resolution—hence the anxiety that the Charter has often invoked
with respect to the institutional role of the courts.37 Just like Davis’ administrative
agencies, courts presiding over strategic Charter challenges can be understood as
engaged in a different kind of institutional function—one that is more aptly characterized
as legislative, rather than adjudicative in nature. Accordingly, they are called upon
primarily to make findings about social and legislative, rather than adjudicative facts.

One of the main things that sets strategic Charter litigation apart is the blurring of the
boundary between fact-finding and law-making itself. Indeed, the very concept of a
“legislative fact” signals a disruption of the fundamental division between law and fact
engrained in the common law and inherent in what Twining calls the “Rationalist

36

See Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89:7 Harvard Law Review
1281.
37
For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and
Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 15 onwards.

60

Tradition” of common law evidence scholarship.38 According to this tradition, the
purpose of adjudication is “rectitude of decision”: the correct application of substantive
law to proven facts.39 This accords with the notion that only matters of fact are subject to
proof through evidence, while matters of law are to be decided according to precedent
and legal reasoning. It also accords with the separation of the functions of judge (as trier
of law) and jury (as trier of fact), and the different standards of review that apply to legal
versus factual findings at the first instance.40 The descriptor “legislative”, on the other
hand, indicates that a fact serves a law-making purpose. This type of fact does not exist
separately from a law that then applies to it; rather, it informs the construction of the law
itself. To the extent that “social facts” purport to offer general truths about the world that
are not specific to the case at hand but that serve to inform legal decision-making, “social
facts” too have a law-like quality.

Social and legislative facts, then, sit in a kind of grey zone between law and fact,
highlighting the instability of this commonly invoked dichotomy. Of course, the
blurriness of the boundary between law and fact is hardly a new insight in legal
scholarship. While courts draw a sharp line between matters of law and fact for certain
purposes in a case, legal scholars have long recognized that the division belies a much
murkier reality.41 John Dickinson once wrote: “Matters of law grow downward into roots
of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without a break, into matters of law.”42 More
38
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recently, Henry Monaghan expresses the view that “law and fact have a nodal quality;
they are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience.”43 These
statements reflect an understanding of law and fact as distinct categories that are fuzzy at
the edges—more like end points on a spectrum than dichotomous opposites. Kim Lane
Scheppele, for her part, views the relationship as more complex and intertwined, arguing
that law and fact are “mutually constituting—not simply hard to tell apart.”44 Others have
gone so far as to deny any meaningful difference between law and fact, at least at the
level of ontology. Danielle Pinard has stated that the distinction “does not seem to
respond to pre-existing essential imperatives, but rather to fulfill a precise function, that
of assuring to certain questions a particular status in the juridical order.”45 Ronald Allen
and Michael Pardo offer a detailed argument to this effect, contending that there is no
ontological, epistemological, or analytical difference between law and fact, and that the
decision to categorize an issue in one way or the other is purely functional.46 David
Faigman makes a similar argument in his recent book about constitutional facts in the
United States.47 The distinction between law and fact has thus been widely exposed as a
legal fiction.
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Still, in many cases, the distinction remains largely untroubled. In a traffic court hearing
about an alleged speed limit violation, one can say without much doubt that the speed at
which the defendant was driving when pulled over is a matter of fact, while the question
of whether they violated the speed limit is a matter of law. It is upon entering the terrain
of social and legislative facts that things become more muddled.48 For example, in the
context of constitutional litigation, Canadian courts have recently considered matters
such as the importance of facial demeanour in assessing a witness’ testimony,49 the
extent to which the dangers faced by sex workers and illicit substance users can be traced
back to personal choice,50 and the potential effects of permitting medically assisted dying
on vulnerable people.51 These issues call upon courts to consider information about social
and legal context, but also to draw on analogous precedents and to engage in normative
reasoning and judgment. They thus bear attributes of both law and fact.

2.4 CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FACT-FINDING PROCESS
The “in-between” nature of social and legislative facts has a number of consequences for
the fact-finding process in strategic Charter litigation. First, it renders the doctrinal rules
of admissibility relatively impotent, demonstrating the applicability of Twining’s
argument of exaggerated importance in this context. Second, it leads to a great deal of
uncertainty regarding the process of proof. Together, these effects underscore the
limitations of the traditional approach to evidence law in strategic Charter litigation. In
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this section, I discuss each of these consequences in turn. I go on, in the final section, to
examine the resulting dynamics of the fact-finding process as they relate to concerns
about epistemological justice.
2.4.1 The Impotence of the Rules of Admissibility
The first consequence of the centrality of social and legislative facts in strategic Charter
litigation is the altered—and ultimately diminished—role of the doctrinal rules of
evidence as regulators of admissibility. In Danson, the SCC found that legislative facts
are “of a more general nature, and are subject to less stringent admissibility
requirements” than adjudicative facts.52 It is easy to understand the rationale for this
relaxed standard. As the Court observed in Spence, matters of social and legislative fact
can be difficult to prove with any degree of precision.53 Given that such matters are
complex, and cannot be definitely established or disproven by any single piece of
information, the dangers of relying on imperfect evidence, or on extra-record materials,
may be less pressing than they are with respect to adjudicative facts.54 The challenge of
determining social and legislative facts also seems to encourage a more open posture to
whatever information is at hand.55
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The attenuated role of the rules of admissibility in the Charter context may stem in part
from their origins. The traditional role of courts has been to determine factual issues
related to particular disputes—i.e. adjudicative facts.56 It is this type of fact-finding that
the common law rules of evidence were developed to regulate. Because the rules
contemplate witnesses giving testimony about particular past events or states of affairs in
dispute, rather than about general socio-legal phenomena, they are often maladapted to
the latter scenario, as the examination of Bedford in the following section makes clear.57

The frequent use of written application procedures in strategic Charter cases may also
contribute to the muted force of rules that have evolved within the hallmark common law
setting of the viva voce trial. According to the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, civil
proceedings in Ontario are generally brought as actions.58 However, Rule 14.05(3)
authorizes a proceeding to be brought by application in certain circumstances, including
where the relief sought is a remedy under the Charter.59 Applications are made to a
judge60 and heard on the basis of affidavit or other documentary evidence.61 Parties may
choose to cross-examine affidavit deponents, often out of court.62 In British Columbia
(BC), where much recent test case litigation under the Charter has arisen, the Supreme
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Court Civil Rules allow a party to an action in which a response has been filed to bring a
summary trial application,63 wherein parties may tender evidence by affidavit.64
In the case of Hryniak v Mauldin, the SCC emphasized the importance of such
alternatives to a conventional trial as a means of upholding the principle of
proportionality in civil procedure and thereby ensuring meaningful access to justice.65
And indeed, the use of application procedures to bring evidence by affidavit has become
a preferred method for bringing strategic Charter challenges to legislation.66 The
challenge in Bedford was brought as an application under Ontario Rule 14.05(3),67 while
counsel in PHS Community Services Society v Canada (AG) and Carter brought
summary trial applications under BC Rule 9-7, allowing them to tender evidence by
affidavit.68 As discussed below, the use of such alternative procedures may help to
explain the attenuated force of the rules of admissibility in Bedford and other strategic
Charter challenges.69
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Three Evidentiary Doctrines in Bedford
To demonstrate the limited force of the rules of admissibility in the context of strategic
Charter litigation, it is useful to offer a concrete example. I do so here by examining the
role of three key evidentiary doctrines—hearsay, opinion evidence, and relevance—in the
Bedford case. As I show, these doctrines do remarkably little to circumscribe the
admission and use of evidence in Bedford. I go on to situate my observations about the
role of the rules in Bedford within the broader landscape of strategic Charter litigation,
drawing on insights from my research interviews.
Hearsay
Hearsay has been defined by the SCC as “an out-of-court statement tendered for the truth
of its contents.”70 It is considered presumptively inadmissible as evidence, in part because
it can “threaten the integrity of the trial’s truth-seeking process”.71 Of course, not every
instance of arguable hearsay will be subject to challenge in court, even in a highly
contested criminal trial. Nevertheless, the rule against hearsay is one of the main legal
tools available to regulate the admission of evidence in court. It is thus remarkable to
observe the degree to which this rule is ignored in the Bedford case.

Some of the clearest examples come from witnesses who, in the course of giving
evidence, convey the secondhand accounts of sex workers not involved in the case. Such
accounts appear frequently in the testimony of the applicants and other experiential
witnesses, as well as some of the academic expert witnesses. Take, as an example, the
testimony of Valerie Scott and Amy Lebovitch, two of the applicants in the case whose
70
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evidence is central to the experiential claims being advanced. In her affidavit, Scott
repeatedly describes the experiences of other sex workers with whom she has been in
contact,72 including reports of abuse at the hands of a particular police officer.73 No
objection is raised to this evidence, despite its hearsay nature. Similarly, in her evidence,
Lebovitch describes being told by peers in the sex trade about incidents where they would
enter a client’s car and find that the locks were removed.74 In cross-examination, counsel
for Canada poses to Lebovitch that “this is a story that someone told you had happened,”
as though to emphasize its hearsay nature.75 However, no objection is raised to the
evidence, and it is later cited in the Attorney General of Ontario’s factum at the Ontario
Superior Court without comment or concern.76

There is an argument to be made that, in at least some instances, these secondhand
accounts of what other sex workers have said would meet the necessity criterion for
principled exceptions to the hearsay rule.77 One can imagine that, in some cases, the
original declarants might be unable to testify directly due to geographic location, illness,
or personal vulnerability. It may also be considered a poor use of court resources to call
all of these declarants as witnesses, given that their evidence is not central to the
disposition of the case and that it would significantly lengthen the proceedings. This type
of hearsay would not, however, likely meet the reliability criterion for principled
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exceptions to the hearsay rule.78 There are no procedural substitutes for testing the truth
of such statements, or substantive indicia of trustworthiness, that would alleviate
concerns about reliability.79 Of course, this criterion was developed to address concerns
that arise with respect to facts of a different nature. It does not carry the same urgency
when it comes to broad social and legislative facts, and thus does not prevent secondhand
accounts from figuring routinely in the evidentiary record in Bedford.

The question of hearsay is more complicated when it comes to expert opinion evidence.
Like the witnesses above, academic experts in Bedford frequently relate what sex
workers not involved in the case have told them, either via informal conversations, or in
the course of qualitative research. For example, key Crown witness Melissa Farley states
in her affidavit: “Some women in prostitution have told me that they felt safer in street
prostitution as compared to indoor brothels in USA and in New Zealand where they were
not permitted by legal pimps to reject potential johns”.80 While hearsay is admissible as a
basis for expert opinion,81 it is not admissible for the truth of its contents—e.g. that the
women Farley spoke to were prohibited from rejecting customers in indoor settings—and
must be independently proven for the resulting opinion to hold any weight, unless it is
within the scope of the expert’s expertise.82 The case law suggests that qualitative
research data would likely fall within that scope,83 however the status of informal
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conversations is less clear. Again, however, such concerns do not seem to register in
Bedford. This too may be explained by the poor fit between the rules and the litigation
context. Generally speaking, the rules of admissibility have contemplated a different kind
of expert opinion altogether from the one at work in cases like Bedford. Under the
traditional model, an expert is brought in to assess a particular person or event, based on
case-specific facts. The admissibility of such facts may well affect the outcome of a case,
and thus raises an important issue. The same level of concern does not arise where an
expert draws on unproven information to support an opinion about a general matter of
social or legislative fact.
Opinion
As with hearsay, the parameters of opinion evidence in Bedford extend well beyond the
boundaries established by legal doctrine. The sheer amount of opinion evidence on the
record in Bedford is striking, given the traditional wariness of the common law towards
this type of evidence. Doctrinally, it is well established that opinion evidence is only
exceptionally admissible.84 First, only properly qualified experts are permitted to give
opinions within the scope of their expertise.85 In her reasons in Bedford, Justice Himel
clearly affirms this rule by drawing a sharp boundary between “expert” and “lay”
witnesses: “Qualified expert witnesses are granted a right to give opinions for the
assistance of the court. Lay witnesses are not granted this right.”86 In order to be
admissible, expert opinion must also meet threshold requirements of relevance and
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necessity (as well as the absence of an exclusionary rule).87 Where the opinion is based
on “novel or contested science”, there is an added threshold requirement of reliability.88
And yet, opinions from all sorts of witnesses on a variety of matters at issue in the case
are routinely offered, and indeed solicited, in Bedford without much regard for these
requirements.

Of particular note is the prevalence of lay opinion in Bedford. Many witnesses
characterized on the record as “experiential” give opinions, in their affidavits, about
important factual issues in the case, including the relative safety of indoor versus outdoor
sex work,89 and the effects of the impugned laws on sex workers.90 For example, sex
worker and advocate Kara Gilles states that “the safety risks with respect to indoor
worksites is significantly less serious and frequent than outdoor street prostitution […] I
form this belief based on my conversations with hundreds of sex workers…”91 Here
Gilles offers what amounts to an opinion formed on the basis of hearsay evidence. In
another example, Scott states: “The law in effect deters sex workers from reporting the
violence, making the apprehension of ‘bad dates’ who perpetuate this violence
unlikely.”92 In offering inferences about general matters of social fact, such assertions
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extend beyond the limits of lay opinion articulated in R v Graat.93 Yet they are not
subject to the scrutiny that would normally apply to expert opinion evidence, either,
given the classification of the witnesses as “experiential”.

Such opinions, moreover, are not limited to the affidavit evidence in Bedford. In crossexamination, counsel on both sides routinely ask experiential and other non-expert
witnesses for their opinions about general matters such as the effects of the impugned
laws, the relative safety of sex work in different locations, and the most effective
responses to prostitution.94 In one especially interesting exchange, counsel for the
applicants, Alan Young, asks police officer Eduardo Dizon whether he would agree that
street workers are easy targets for sex offenders or serial killers.95 Counsel for Canada
interjects at this point to ask whether Young is asking the witness “for his opinion or for
information based on his experience”.96 Young’s reply is telling: “They’re all mixed up
together, everything is his opinion based on his experience.”97 With this response, Young
highlights the blurry parameters between experiential observation and opinion in the case
at hand. The questioning proceeds without further comment from opposing counsel.

As Young hints at in the above exchange, the loose regulation of opinion evidence in
Bedford reflects a breakdown of the traditional boundary between expert and lay
witnesses. The blurring of these categories is facilitated in Bedford by the lack of formal
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qualifying procedures for the experts in the case. 98 However, the point arguably applies
to other strategic Charter cases as well, even where such formal procedures are
undertaken. Because the factual issues in this context are closely linked to normative
questions of policy, they invite opinions from a range of different perspectives and
sources of knowledge, none of which can easily be said to offer a determinative answer.
As one of the judges I interviewed explained:

the expert evidence rules assume more of a scientific model, where
someone has done experiments and can prove this thing or that thing, and
they have this rarefied specialized knowledge. And a lot of these questions
are not like that. They're much more matters of debate and argument.99

So-called “lay” witnesses in these cases are often the only ones with direct, lived
experience related to the issues under consideration. They have also, in many cases, been
involved in frontline work, activism, and/or research related to the issue. These witnesses
may thus be perceived as offering a kind of expertise based on experience—a point I
return to in Chapter 3. The resultant blurriness between expert and lay witnesses may
allow for opinion evidence to slip in without being subject to the usual evidentiary
challenges.
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In addition to the leeway afforded to the opinions of non-expert witnesses in Bedford,
witnesses characterized as “expert” are sometimes invited to give opinions that exceed
the scope of their expertise, contrary to both the common law of evidence and the
Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.100 This raises the concern that expert authority may
serve to bolster opinions not actually grounded in expert knowledge and training. For
instance, counsel for Canada asks Elliot Leyton, an applicant-side expert whose research
focuses on serial killers, for his opinion on what “system” he would propose to address
prostitution.101 The question is posed and answered without objection (or later comment
from the application judge), despite Leyton’s acknowledgment that he is not an expert on
the subject of prostitution.102

As the above examples demonstrate, opinion evidence in Bedford not only exceeds its
allowed scope, but often touches upon dispositive factual issues. Although a bar on
ultimate opinion evidence no longer exists in Canadian evidence law, the SCC has noted
that opinions that approach ultimate issues should be carefully scrutinized, so as to avoid
usurpation of the trier of fact’s role.103 Nevertheless, such opinions are freely given in
Bedford, often at the behest of counsel.104 John Lowman, one of the key expert witnesses
for the applicants, even goes so far as to frame his opinion directly in terms of a key legal
issue in the case. He states in his affidavit: “it is my belief that the Criminal Code
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operates in a manner which violates the security of person for prostitutes in Canada.”105
This assertion seems to clearly usurp the role of the judge as finder of law, and yet it is
entered into and remains on the record without objection. Many opinions are also framed
as normative judgments about whether the laws should be struck down or not.106
Relevance
Finally, Bedford reflects a very relaxed application of relevance as a fundamental
restriction on the admissibility of evidence. Relevance is the cardinal rule of evidence. By
excluding information that has no bearing on the truth of a fact in issue, it preserves court
time and resources, and avoids reasoning grounded in harmful myths and stereotypes.107
In strategic Charter litigation, however, the factual issues are broad and complex, making
the boundaries of relevance far from clear. The response in cases such as Bedford has
often been to allow for a wide range of evidence within the general sphere of the issues at
hand. Relevance, in other words, is given a very broad scope, to the point where it does
not act as much of a constraint on the fact-finding process at all.

In Bedford, for example, the record includes information about diversion programs for
johns, and general statistics about the sex trade in various places that do little to advance
the debate on contested factual issues.108 In several instances, statistical figures are
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offered without an appropriate basis for comparison. For example, in her affidavit, Crown
expert Mary Sullivan claims that the legalization of prostitution in Australia has
normalized and thus increased demand for sexual services. She supports this claim by
citing research findings that one in six men have paid for sex in Australia, and that 3.1
million sexual services are purchased per year in the state of Victoria’s legalized
prostitution regime.109 However, without any pre-legalization figures as a basis for
comparison, it is questionable whether these findings can be said to support her claim.
Janice Raymond pursues a similar line of reasoning in her affidavit, offering information
about the number of German men engaged in prostitution and sex tourism, again without
comparative figures.110

The broad scope of relevance in Bedford also allows counsel to delve into some of the
opinion evidence discussed in the previous section, such as witness’ views about what
kinds of laws or polices ought to replace the challenged provisions, should they be struck
down. While important in terms of policy-making, and possibly relevant with respect to
the minimal impairment analysis under s.1, such opinions are largely peripheral to the s.7
issues that are the court’s focus in Bedford. As Himel J states in her decision, “the court
has not been called upon to decide […] which policy model regarding prostitution is
better. That is the role of Parliament.”111 Nevertheless, counsel takes significant liberties
to explore different witness’ views regarding prostitution policy, without any objection
raised as to relevance.
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Where counsel do invoke relevance in an effort to circumscribe certain lines of
questioning in cross-examination, the exception seems to prove the rule. One exchange
between counsel in the course of Crown expert Janice Raymond’s cross-examination is of
particular interest. Young is in the middle of asking Raymond for her views on abortion,
reproductive technologies, and cross-dressing, when counsel for Canada interjects to ask
about the relevance of this line of questioning.112 Young justifies his questioning as an
attempt to demonstrate that Raymond’s work is based on her moral and political beliefs,
rather than empirical observation, but refuses to put the point to the witness directly. The
exchange proceeds as follows:113

MS. SINCLAIR: …If you want to ask questions directly about moral or
religious views, then I can see relevance, but to ask a number of questions
about issues that have no bearing on the matters at issue in this
constitutional challenge, I don't see the relevance.
MR. YOUNG: I'm a little troubled with your position considering when
you have my witnesses you ask their backgrounds, about their education,
and about their home life and all that. How is that relevant to anything?
Here Young implies that, because he has taken a relaxed approach to relevance
throughout the case, the Crown should afford him similar leeway. The episode reveals the
highly selective and strategic invocation of relevance as a means to limit the scope of the

112

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Cross-Examination of Janice Raymond at para 138).
Ibid at para 138.

113

77

record.
Interviewee Perspectives on Admissibility Issues in Strategic Charter Litigation
The above survey illustrates the minimal constraints imposed upon the evidentiary record
by the rules of admissibility in Bedford. Some of the most fundamental doctrines relied
upon to exclude or otherwise manage evidence in the common law tradition do little to
regulate admissibility in this case. Instead, hearsay and opinion evidence are common,
expertise is stretched, and relevance is broad.

As noted above, the limited force of the rules in this context may be linked in part to the
use of written application procedures. In some ways, the common law rules of
admissibility apply less strictly in applications than they do in viva voce actions. For
instance, in Ontario the content of affidavits is generally restricted to “facts within the
personal knowledge of the deponent or to other evidence that the deponent could give if
testifying as a witness in court”,114 however in the case of affidavits on an application, the
rules allow “statements of the witness’s information and belief with respect to facts that
are not contentious, if the source of the information and the fact of the belief are specified
in the affidavit.”115 The BC rules provide for a similar exception, not restricted to noncontentious facts, although it only applies where the application is not seeking a final
order.116 Such provisions provide significant latitude for secondhand accounts that might
otherwise qualify as hearsay to be entered as evidence. And, while not allowing a witness
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to speak to contested facts that bear upon ultimate issues in the case, they afford some
leeway for lay opinion as well.
Counsel may also be less likely to object to potentially problematic evidence in cases that
proceed by application, simply because the mechanisms available to do so are more
cumbersome. For instance, where cross-examinations on affidavits occur out of court (as
they did in Bedford), challenges to given lines of questioning cannot be immediately
resolved except by agreement of the parties. While the Ontario rules allow counsel to
register an objection to questions posed in cross-examination on an affidavit,117 and to
adjourn cross-examination where the examiner is acting improperly, 118 these actions
require independent court rulings and possibly extra motions (the Ontario Rules are silent
regarding how to object to inadmissible evidence given by a witness in an affidavit or
upon cross-examination). According to Young, such objections were never raised in
Bedford for this reason.119

This is not to say, however, that the rules of admissibility no longer matter in strategic
Charter litigation. Nor can the treatment of evidence in one case be taken as
representative of all strategic Charter challenges. Indeed, my research interviews suggest
that the rules and their enforcement vary significantly by jurisdiction as well as by case.
For instance, unlike in Ontario, the BC rules allow for a party at a hearing to object to the
admissibility of “any question and answer in a transcript or video recording tendered in
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evidence, although no objection was taken at the examination.”120 This may increase the
practicality of objecting to potentially inadmissible evidence, since it can be done at a
later time in open court. While the practical effect of this particular rule is unknown, my
interviews suggest that objections to written evidence might be more common in BC. “I
think it depends on the context and the counsel, but you definitely would have people
objecting to that type of evidence in an affidavit, even in a written proceeding for sure
here”, opined one BC-based interviewee.121 This difference in approach is borne out in
two recent BC cases—Carter v Canada (AG)122 and British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association v Canada (AG)123—where, unlike in Bedford, the courts held separate pretrial hearings to address an array of admissibility issues.124

In some instances, moreover, admissibility issues can thwart, or at least threaten to
thwart, the advancement of experiential knowledge in strategic Charter litigation, and
thereby raise concerns regarding epistemological justice. In Carter, for instance, the
Crown objected to the plaintiffs’ experiential evidence from sick individuals other than
the parties—what the Crown referred to as “blood and guts” evidence—on the grounds
that it was intended to shock the court.125 However, the plaintiffs argued that according to
the ruling in R v Ferguson, a litigant can rely not only on the breach of their own rights,
but also on a breach of the rights of a third party, to establish the unconstitutionality of a
law. The court ultimately allowed the evidence, finding that it was relevant to the inquiry
120
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under s.1 and also possibly at the stage of determining whether there was infringement of
Charter rights.126

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against
Violence,127 the key experiential evidence came from the affidavits of sex workers in the
Downtown Eastside of Vancouver. In order to protect the identities of these highly
stigmatized and vulnerable women, the affidavits were anonymous. However, this
created a barrier to tendering them directly as evidence.128 In the application on the issue
of public interest standing (the issue that ultimately took over the case), the plaintiffs
were able to tender this evidence indirectly by attaching it to the affidavit of a volunteer
for PIVOT—the non-profit helping to organize the litigation. However, former executive
director of PIVOT and research interviewee Katrina Pacey surmised that hearsay
concerns would likely have prevented the affidavits from being tendered in a similar
manner at trial. Rather, to be admissible as part of the record, the individuals who gave
the evidence would have had to name themselves and make themselves available for
cross-examination.129 For this reason, Elin Sigurdson, another PIVOT lawyer and
research interviewee, posited that the affidavits would likely have been tendered as a
“collection of information” attached to an expert report that would have provided an
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analysis of their content.130 In this way, rules of admissibility and procedure, combined
with the challenges of participating in litigation (discussed further in Chapter 8), would
have resulted in the foregrounding of expert over experiential knowledge. Even if the
affidavit authors had been able to come forward directly, Sigurdson speculated that their
affidavits might have given rise to objections regarding lay opinion evidence, given that
many of the affiants had gone beyond their direct experience to articulate views about the
state of the law.131

Still, on the whole, my interviewees affirmed the tendency for admissibility issues to
figure less prominently in strategic Charter litigation. “I don't think generally speaking
that there are that many fights about the evidence”, observed one Crown litigator.132 “It's
probably loosier goosier in constitutional cases than it is otherwise,” remarked another
former Crown.133 As noted by several interviewees, the extent to which potential
evidentiary objections actually materialize depends largely on the approach of counsel.
Litigators must pick their battles when raising such objections, focusing on the evidence
that is likely to be most damaging to their case.134 In the context of strategic Charter
litigation, there are two important factors encouraging them to tread lightly. First, given
the large volume of evidence and broad factual questions at issue in these cases, it is
often more efficient to address concerns about the record in argument as a matter of
weight, rather than through resource-intensive admissibility motions unlikely to affect the
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final determination.135 In Bedford, for instance, the parties were encouraged by the case
management judge to avoid unnecessary evidentiary challenges as a matter of
efficiency—part of the reason why expert qualifications went uncontested.136

Second, growing concerns about access to justice have driven counsel and the courts to
avoid overly technical applications of the rules of admissibility in systemic cases
involving vulnerable groups. As constitutional litigator Craig Jones remarked, regarding
the experiential accounts of sex workers in Bedford: “maybe you have to permit some
hearsay around the edges, maybe you have to permit them some sort of anonymity, if you
actually want to get to the truth of what they're living.”137 Another Crown-side
interviewee offered the following observation:

I would say government lawyers are increasingly aware of our need to
litigate cases in a way that is more sensitive, that allows these voices to be
brought to bear, that doesn't unduly burden the process with preliminary or
technical motions. […]

However, this interviewee also warned that the SCC’s decision to heighten the standard
of review for social and legislative facts in Bedford may work against this trend:

But on the other side, you know, what's pushing against that is […] the
incredible priority and imperative now put on first instance fact-finding,
135
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and that, to the extent that there's a problematic evidentiary issue, it really
needs to be dealt with at first instance or it gets baked into a case forever
and ever, and there's less and less scope to bring that challenge.138

In other words, given less opportunity to challenge findings of social and legislative fact
on appeal, Crown counsel may be inclined to take a harder line on the admissibility of
evidence at first instance.
2.4.2 Uncertainties Regarding the Process of Proof
In addition to diminishing the potency of the rules of admissibility, the
exceptional nature of the facts at issue in strategic Charter litigation creates a number of
uncertainties regarding the process of proof. Combined with the volume of evidence at
play and the lack of constraints on the record, these uncertainties afford strategic
opportunities for counsel and the courts to approach the fact-finding process in different
ways, with important implications for epistemological justice. In this section, I illuminate
the uncertain terrain of fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation by tracing the efforts of
legal scholars and the courts to address the demands of proof with respect to social and
legislative facts. I go on, in the following section, to analyze the resulting dynamics of the
fact-finding process through the lens of epistemological justice.

The indeterminate nature of social and legislative facts has led to a great deal of
uncertainty regarding the appropriate procedures for establishing them, especially in the
constitutional context. Should these facts be addressed via legal argument or through
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extrinsic material such as social science research? If the latter, should the relevant
research be included in a factum (or “Brandeis Brief”, in the American terminology), or
presented through an expert witness? Can the court take judicial notice of such material,
whether independently researched or presented by counsel? Uncertainty has also arisen
regarding the status of the court’s findings with respect to social and legislative facts. On
what standard should appellate courts be allowed to review such findings? Do the
findings carry precedential value, or must they be established anew in each new case?
Because the “facts” at issue are in some ways quite law-like, the proper approach is far
from clear.

In the 1980s, John Monahan and Laurens Walker attempted to address some of this
confusion by considering the proper role of social science research in litigation. In doing
so, they expanded on Davis’ taxonomy, albeit in a somewhat different direction than the
SCC. Monahan and Walker argued that social science research ought to be characterized
and treated differently depending on its relationship to the litigation.139 Research
conducted to address a case-specific issue, such whether a trademarked product is easily
mistaken for another similar product, was a matter of “social fact”—a special type of
adjudicative fact established on the basis of social science research. 140 (This concept
differs from the one adopted in Canadian law, wherein “social facts” are understood as
non-adjudicative in nature, and include a wider array of background social context.)
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Research directed at legislative facts, on the other hand, had a dual character: it was
empirical like fact, but general like law. On practical grounds, Monahan and Walker
argued that such research ought to be treated as a law-like source of authority—what they
called “social authority.”141 This meant that general social science research would come
before the courts via briefs or independent judicial research, rather than expert testimony,
and would be evaluated in a similar manner to legal precedent.142 These thinkers saw
their proposal as a clear improvement over the confusion that persisted—and continues to
persist today—about the appropriate procedures by which social science research should
be obtained, evaluated, and established as precedential in litigation.

Monahan and Walker also identified a third use of social science research in litigation,
coining the term “social framework” to indicate ‘the use of general conclusions from
social science research in determining factual issues in a specific case.’143 This is the
concept that most closely resembles the Canadian courts’ notion of a “social fact.” As an
example of social framework, they pointed to a murder case where expert evidence was
called regarding the factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, given that
such testimony was crucial to the case.144 Monahan and Walker proposed that social
framework be treated in two stages, reflecting its mixed character as general research
applied to a specific case: first, judges should receive and appraise social framework as
141
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social authority; second, the trier of fact should apply the relevant authority as laid out by
the judge to the particular facts of the case.145 While the general concept of social
framework has been widely taken up, and has been cited by the SCC (along with the
concept of social authority),146 Monahan and Walker’s proposal to treat general social
science research in the same way as legal precedent has been largely rejected by courts
and scholars, leading the authors to alter their initial proposal.147

Meanwhile, Canadian courts have offered their own guidance on social and legislative
fact-finding in the constitutional context, without resolving the above uncertainties (apart,
perhaps, from the standard of review). On the one hand, the SCC has repeatedly
emphasized the need for Charter challenges to legislation to be considered within a
concrete and well-developed factual context, especially where the effects of the
legislation are under attack.148 The Court has generally associated an appropriate factual
context with an adequate evidentiary record, suggesting that legal arguments alone will
generally not suffice to establish or defend a Charter claim. As the Court stated in
MacKay: “Charter decisions cannot be based upon the unsupported hypotheses of
enthusiastic counsel.”149 While the Court has acknowledged that there may be some cases
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where the constitutionality of legislation can be determined as a matter of law alone, it
has deemed this to be an exceptional circumstance.150

On the other hand, the SCC has, on several occasions, interpreted Danson as supporting a
relaxed standard for taking judicial notice of legislative facts in constitutional and other
contexts.151 In a concurring judgment in the early Charter case of R v Edwards Books and
Art Ltd, Justice La Forest stated:

The admonition in Oakes and other cases to present evidence in Charter
cases does not remove from the courts the power, where it deems it
expedient, to take judicial notice of broad social and economic facts and to
take the necessary steps to inform itself about them.152

La Forest observed that while there are risks inherent in taking judicial notice of such
facts, it can also be problematic to rely exclusively on the evidence presented by counsel
in Charter cases.153 A relaxed approach to judicial notice in constitutional cases has also

150

Manitoba (AG) v Metropolitan Stores Ltd, [1987] 1 SCR 110 at para 49.
R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine, 2003 SCC 74 at para 28 [Malmo-Levine]; Polygamy Reference, supra
note 68 at para 63; Spence, supra note 30 at paras 59-66. The power of judicial notice as a means of
receiving social and legislative facts was affirmed in several non-constitutional cases throughout the 1990s,
wherein judges deemed it necessary to conduct their own independent research in order to properly account
for the social context surrounding an issue of societal importance. See for example: Willick, supra note
141; Moge v Moge, [1992] 23 SCR 813; R v Parks, (1993), 84 CCC (3d) 353 (Ont CA).
152
R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 713 at para 190.
153
Ibid at para 191. On this point, see also Gorod, supra note 55 at 10.
151

88

found support amongst constitutional scholars from the early days of the Charter,154 and
has even deeper roots in the United States.155

The complexity and difficulty of proving matters of social and legislative fact has also led
courts to grant more leeway on the demands of proof, especially when combined with
concerns about deference to the legislature at the s.1 stage of Charter analysis.156 Thus,
while the SCC in Oakes called for “cogent and persuasive” evidence to justify a Charter
violation under s.1,157 and a rigorous application of the civil standard of proof,158 the
Court has since clarified that proof to a scientific standard is not required,159 and that
common sense, reason, and logic may support a successful s.1 justification where the
social science evidence is inconclusive or where the proposition at issue is not readily
measurable in a scientific sense.160 In a recent s.2(b) challenge to provisions of the
Election Act in BC, the Court went so far as to find that the Attorney General was able to
meet its burden under s.1 on the basis of logic and reason without any evidence at all.161
While the Court has continued to frame justification under s.1 as a factual exercise,
dispensing with the need for evidence in this way arguably gestures towards a more
“legal” and less “factual” treatment of the analysis.
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Much of the discussion about the demands of proof under s.1 has taken place in the
context of s. 2(b) challenges, where the violation of freedom of expression is often
established with little or no evidence. This debate may appear to hold less salience in s.7
cases, given that a s.7 violation has almost never been upheld under s.1.162 However, the
SCC in Bedford made a point of emphasizing that the violation of a single individual’s
right in a manner contrary to the principles of fundamental justice is enough to make out
a claim under s.7, negating the need to establish broad social and legislative facts at this
stage.163 As anticipated by some of my interviewees, this has shifted questions of social
and legislative fact, and the burden of proving them, over to the s.1 analysis.164

The above jurisprudence suggests that, in comparison to adjudicative facts, social and
legislative facts can be more readily established on the basis of less compelling evidence
(or no evidence at all)—treatment that seems to reinforce the special, law-like nature of
such facts. At the same time, the SCC has warned against making too much of the
distinction between adjudicative and non-adjudicative facts in determining the proper
approach to fact-finding. In R v Malmo-Levine, the Court found that in spite of the
finding in Danson, “courts should nevertheless proceed cautiously to take judicial notice
even as ‘legislative facts’ of matters that are reasonably open to dispute, particularly
where they relate to an issue that could be dispositive.”165 This was reaffirmed in Spence,
wherein the Court clarified that the key consideration in determining the appropriate
standard for judicial notice is not the type of fact at issue, but the purpose for which the
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fact is being advanced—in particular, how central it is to the disposition of the case. 166
The Court in Spence also interpreted previous jurisprudence as supporting a preference
for social and legislative facts to be established via expert testimony, rather than judicial
notice.167

The distinction between adjudicative and non-adjudicative facts has been further eroded
by recent developments in the jurisprudence. Most notably, in Bedford the SCC made the
controversial finding that social and legislative facts are subject to the same standard of
review as adjudicative facts.168 This ran counter to the Court’s earlier suggestion in RJR
MacDonald that such facts may call for less deference from appellate courts169—an
approach supported by many commentators.170 The Court in Bedford justified this shift
by noting that “the use of social science evidence in Charter litigation has evolved
significantly since RJR-MacDonald was decided. In the intervening years, this Court has
expressed a preference for social science evidence to be presented through an expert
witness”.171 This suggests an increasing inclination to treat social and legislative facts as
more fact-like than law-like, in spite of warnings from some quarters about the dangers of
affording social scientists and other experts172—and trial judges173—too much power in
constitutional decision-making.
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As the above account demonstrates, the appropriate characterization and treatment of
social and legislative facts in strategic Charter litigation is shifting and unclear. This
uncertainty is compounded, in strategic Charter cases, by a general lack of doctrinal
guidance on matters of weight. While policing the boundaries of the record, evidentiary
doctrine, by and large, leaves questions of weight to the logic of the trier of fact. Where
litigation is centred on broad and complex factual issues that invite information from
multiple sources in multiple forms, with minimal constraints on admissibility, this creates
a great deal of open space. How, for instance, do the experiences and opinions of directly
affected people weigh in against the findings of social science research in proving the
social and legislative facts at issue in strategic Charter cases? Which kinds of research
studies, drawing on which methodologies and from which disciplines, are most probative
of the factual issues at play? These are important questions to which the rules of
admissibility offer no direct answer.

The end result of these uncertainties, combined with the lack of constraints imposed by
the rules of admissibility (particularly relevance), is a process of proof that is expansive,
open-ended, and often unpredictable. In the words of Alan Young, post-Bedford, “there is
a lack of clarity and consistency with respect to the nature, scope and manner of
admitting legislative fact evidence in Canadian constitutional litigation”, with “no certain
rules and principles governing the manner of admission and the probative value of the
evidence.” 174 As I show in the next section, this creates ample room for strategic

174

Alan N Young, “Proving a Violation: Rhetoric, Research and Remedy” (2015) 67:0 Supreme Court Law
Review 617 at 637.

92

manoeuvring on the part of lawyers and judges—manoeuvring that deserves the attention
of evidence scholars for what it can show about the treatment of knowledge in litigation.

2.5 A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
Looking at fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation through the lens of doctrinal rules
of admissibility suggests that the law of evidence has a limited role to play in this
context. From a broader perspective, however, this area of litigation brings to the fore
other dimensions of evidence law closely linked to questions of epistemological justice.
As I demonstrate below, the indeterminate character of social and legislative facts affords
strategic opportunities for counsel and the courts to frame these facts in different ways,
with important consequences for the demands of proof. At the same time, the lack of
admissibility constraints in strategic Charter cases, and the lack of doctrinal guidance on
matters of weight, creates significant space for different approaches to constructing and
framing the record. These strategic choices, I argue, merit close attention as part of the
study of evidence in strategic Charter litigation for several reasons. First, they play a
central role in shaping the process of proof in this context—far more so than the rules of
admissibility. Second, they are informed by the epistemological assumptions embedded
in doctrinal rules, as well as by practical and institutional factors that shape the litigation
context. Finally, and most importantly for my purposes, they carry significant
consequences in terms of epistemological and social justice for marginalized groups
engaged in strategic Charter litigation.
2.5.1 The Framing of Facts
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The “in-between” position of social and legislative facts within the law/fact dichotomy
creates opportunities to strategically characterize them in different ways to accomplish
different purposes. After all, while the division between law and fact may lack a
principled basis, most scholars agree that it carries significant practical consequences.175
Matters of fact and law are treated very differently in litigation. The former are restricted
to the case at bar, subject to proof through evidence, decided by the trier of fact, and
rarely appealable; the latter are general (they hold precedential value), not subject to
proof through evidence, decided by the judge, and appealable. Christine Boyle and
Marilyn MacCrimmon argue that the allocation of matters between law and fact “may
affect fundamental values such as equality and access to justice.”176 I suggest that it may
do so in two ways: 1) by controlling the kind of knowledge that can be brought to bear on
an issue; and 2) by tacitly shifting the demands of proof.

Legal versus Factual Knowledge
Characterizing a matter as factual rather than legal shifts the knowledge brought to bear
on that matter away from traditional legal sources.177 Where a case turns on facts, the
authority of precedent, judicial reasoning, and “common sense” give way, at least
partially, to the experiential and empirical observations (and often, opinions) of
differently positioned individuals. To be sure, the admissibility of such observations and
opinions, and the inferences to be drawn from them, will still be determined through the
175
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lens of legal authority and judicial common sense. Nevertheless, characterizing a matter
as one of fact opens the door to knowledge originating outside the legal order. Such a
move may prove vital for those seeking to challenge the legal status quo. In addition to
inviting empirical scrutiny of the issues at stake, Goldberg observes that determining
matters on a factual basis provides institutional license for courts to make progressive
decisions, by obfuscating controversial normative judgments: “…when breaking with
tradition, the Court has led with facts and left norms aside.”178 Those who wish to
unsettle an aspect of legal doctrine may do well to frame the issue as ultimately grounded
in fact.

On the other end of the spectrum, where the goal is to preserve legally established or
“common sense” understandings, it may be best to keep the focus on legal reasoning,
rather than factual proof. In Goldberg’s account, the process of social change involves
not only the unsettling of legal norms via fact-based adjudication—but also the
preservation of favourable findings of fact through their re-integration into law.179 From
this perspective, the focus on facts serves only as a catalyst—an essential but temporary
stopover on the way to social change. In the same vein, a law-oriented approach may
prove crucial to preserve progressive legislative advances achieved through the political
process. For example, feminist efforts to eradicate the sexist norms of past rape law have
led to the establishment of strict statutory standards for consent to sexual activity in
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Canada.180 At the same time, discriminatory myths and stereotypes about sexual violence
remain pervasive in society at large. In this context, framing the question of consent as a
matter of law rather than fact can help to delegitimize interpretations of sexual behaviour
that are grounded in discriminatory reasoning, both within legal proceedings and in social
discourse more generally.181

The level of generality at which factual issues are framed—what Faigman calls “frames
of reference”—can also affect the progressive potential of litigation.182 In his work on
constitutional fact-finding in the American context, Faigman identifies three types of
facts at work in constitutional cases, each of which is treated differently from an
evidentiary perspective.183 Constitutional case-specific facts play a similar role to Davis’
adjudicative facts. They are, according to Faigman, usually decided by the trier of fact
following a strict application of the rules of evidence and procedure, and they have
limited precedential value.184 Constitutional reviewable facts help to determine how predefined rules and standards apply to a law or state action under challenge in a given
case.185 Reviewable facts, at least in the American context, are usually decided by judges,
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often following rules of evidence and procedures but also sometimes via amicus briefs or
independent judicial research. They hold substantial precedential force.186 Finally,
constitutional doctrinal facts establish the meaning of constitutional provisions, by setting
out applicable rules and standards. Tightly intertwined with normative arguments, they
are decided by judges, and set a binding precedent.187

Following Faigman’s taxonomy, one particularly salient framing choice requires legal
actors to consider whether a given issue calls for proof of case-specific or reviewable
facts.188 Faigman offers numerous examples of how this has played out in the American
constitutional context. Take, for instance, the case of McCleskey v. Kemp, wherein a
Black man sentenced to death claimed that the administration of Georgia’s capital
sentencing scheme was racially discriminatory, and thus in violation of the
constitution.189 As evidence, McCleskey presented a statistical study showing that in
Georgia, Black defendants who murdered White victims were the most likely to receive
the death penalty. The Court, however, held that McClesky had to demonstrate that his
particular case was decided in a discriminatory manner. The evidence presented was
insufficient for that purpose, and the constitutional challenge was denied. In this case, the
decision to frame the fact in issue as an adjudicative fact about the particular case, rather
than a reviewable fact about the general existence of systemic discrimination, thwarted
the constitutional challenger’s case. In Bedford, on the other hand, the same framing
choice plays out in the opposite direction. There the SCC’s framing of the s.7 inquiry as a
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qualitative assessment of the law’s effect at an individual rather than systemic level
facilitates the finding of a Charter breach, by easing the pressure on contested, and
methodologically limited, social science evidence.
The Demands of Proof
The allocation of matters between law and fact—or between more law-like and more
fact-like types of “facts”—also affects the demands of proof in ways that can be
important for equality-seeking litigants and would-be litigants. Framing an issue as a
matter of fact may allow for consideration of extra-legal knowledge with respect to the
issue, but it also puts a burden on litigants to furnish that knowledge as evidence. When it
comes to the kinds of social and legislative facts at play in Charter challenges to
legislation, that burden can be especially heavy, owing in part to the relaxed approach to
relevance and the lack of clear guidelines regarding the manner of proof or the weight of
different kinds of evidence. In this context, the characterization of an issue in terms of the
law/fact dichotomy may be used to try to alter “who benefits from the status quo.”190 This
can be seen in ongoing debates over the kind and degree of proof required to justify a
Charter violation under s.1.

Interestingly, in Thomson Newspapers Co v Canada (AG), the SCC recognized the need
to consider normative contextual factors in determining whether the government has met
its burden to justify a rights violation under s.1. In particular, Justice Bastarache found
that in assessing whether a violation was “demonstrably justified” it was necessary to
consider the vulnerability of the group being protected by the impugned legislation as
190
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well as their subjective apprehension of harm.191 The implication was that legislation
aiming to protect vulnerable groups merited more deference and might therefore require
less evidence to uphold under s.1.192 According to Wiseman, however, the contextual
factors outlined in Thomson Newspapers have not been robustly applied in subsequent
cases, thwarting their progressive potential.193

The cost of bringing evidence is an important practical factor that may push litigants to
avoid characterizing an issue as factual in nature, or at least as necessitating proof via
evidence. Public interest litigants may instead hope to bypass Goldberg’s fact-based stage
of social change altogether, by shifting the tacit generalizations upon which judicial
reasoning relies through argument rather than evidence. Alternatively, they may frame
the matter at issue as an undisputed fact of which the court can take judicial notice, or as
a matter of “common sense”. As discussed above, judicial notice can also provide a
mechanism for courts to consider relevant social science research and other novel
information without hearing it as evidence. Of course, it may also be used to bolster the
status quo.194

Whether social change favours a more factual or legal characterization of the issues in
any particular instance depends on the context. What is clear is that the dual nature of
social and legislative facts affords opportunities for counsel to strategically manipulate

191

Thomson Newspapers, supra note 160 at para 90.
Wiseman, supra note 56 at 7.
193
Ibid at 9-11.
194
Patricia Cochran, “Taking Notice: Judicial Notice and the Community Sense in Anti-Poverty Litigation”
(2007) 40 UBC Law Rev 559 at 560.
192

99

the demands of proof in strategic Charter challenges to legislation, with potentially
important consequences for the groups whose rights are at stake.

2.5.2 The Framing of Evidence
As demonstrated above, the way social and legislative facts are framed can affect the type
of knowledge used to establish them in litigation, as well as the demands of proof. Even
when framed in a particular way, however, the facts at issue in strategic Charter cases are
often open to proof via many different forms and sources of knowledge. For example, the
question of whether indoor sex work is safer than outdoor sex work—a key issue in
Bedford—might be proved via firsthand experiential evidence, social science evidence
adduced via expert witnesses, legislative evidence (e.g. reports produced by legislative
committees or evidence heard by such committees, Hansard), research reports produced
or commissioned by government bodies (including foreign governments), reports from
civil society organizations, or some combination of these.

Doctrinal law offers little guidance regarding the appropriate manner of proof or the
weight to be accorded to different types of evidence in this context. At the same time, the
rules of admissibility do little to constrain the scope of the record. This leaves ample
room for legal actors and witnesses to construct and frame the record in competing ways.
As I discuss further in the next chapter, and in Part II of the dissertation, these framing
strategies are often influenced by the epistemological assumptions embedded in doctrinal
law, such as the conception of objectivity central to the test for a properly qualified
expert. They are, moreover, importantly connected to concerns about epistemological
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justice. In the process of constructing, bolstering, and attacking evidence, legal actors
mobilize particular ideas about knowledge—ideas that affirm the authority of some
institutions, disciplines, methodologies, and, ultimately, knowers, over others. In doing
so, they perpetuate—or challenge—existing social hierarchies.

2.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have explored some of the exceptional characteristics of strategic
Charter litigation that shape the fact-finding process in this area of litigation. Building on
Twining’s theory of exaggerated importance, I have argued that the broad, complex and
indeterminate nature of the social and legislative facts at the heart of strategic Charter
litigation diminishes the potency of the rules of admissibility, while at the same time
amplifying uncertainties regarding the appropriate demands of proof. The result is an
expansive, open-ended and flexible fact-finding process that leaves ample room for
strategic manoeuvring on the part of legal actors, with potentially significant effects on
epistemological justice for marginalized groups. It is these manoeuvres and their effects, I
suggest, that matter most for the study of evidence in strategic Charter litigation.

Still, there are a number of details missing from the picture. What kinds of
considerations, assumptions, norms, and practices inform the manoeuvres I am talking
about? How do they actually play out in the fact-finding process? And how do they affect
the realization of epistemological justice in strategic Charter litigation? It is to these
questions that I turn in the rest of the dissertation. To answer them effectively, however, I
must first develop a fuller theoretical account of epistemological justice, as it relates to
constitutional fact-finding.
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Chapter 3: Epistemological Frameworks in Strategic Charter
Litigation
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2, I made the case for an approach to evidence in strategic Charter litigation
focused on the treatment of knowledge, rather than on doctrinal rules of admissibility. I
stressed the need to pay attention, in particular, to how legal actors frame facts and
evidence in this context, and to the effects of these framing choices on the social justice
goals of marginalized groups. As I have already noted, I am particularly interested in the
epistemological dimension of these effects. What counts as knowledge in this context,
and what attributes are thought to render it of more or less value? Whose knowledge
matters and for what purposes? And how does the treatment of knowledge in litigation
affect those seeking to transform social power relations through strategic Charter
litigation?

In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for this inquiry centered on the concept
of “epistemological justice”. This framework draws on a range of literature that has
sought to challenge foundational ideas about knowledge in the Western World, including
critical legal scholarship and scholarship in Science & Technology Studies (STS).
However, the work of feminist epistemologists, in particular Lorraine Code, ties these
diverse strands together and sits at the heart of my approach.
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The choice of feminist epistemology as my theoretical anchor reflects a particular
political orientation shared with many other critical thinkers. While the “feminist” label
tends to be associated with gender-specific concerns, feminist approaches to
epistemology in fact encompass a much broader set of insights about the relationship
between knowledge, power, and social change. Central to these insights is the recognition
that progressive social change depends fundamentally on knowledge that arises from
lived experiences of marginalization—what I refer to as “experiential knowledge”. As
noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, many progressive organizations, lawyers,
advocates and scholars adopt some version of this epistemic ideal as part of their political
commitment to social justice.1 A key question for my research then is this: to what extent
do the dynamics of the fact-finding process in strategic Charter litigation allow for the
realization of feminist—and more broadly, progressive—epistemological commitments,
and thereby, of epistemological justice?

In order to respond to this question, I must first set out in more detail the key features of
the epistemological commitments I am talking about. I do so in this chapter, first by
describing the field of feminist epistemology and outlining some of its key critiques of
the mainstream Anglo-American epistemological tradition, and second, by developing
the concept of “experiential knowledge” that I will employ in my analysis. I then go on to
consider how the concept of experiential knowledge relates to three conventional
categories of proof in litigation: experiential evidence, expert evidence (including social
science research), and common sense. Discussions about constitutional fact-finding often

1
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refer to these categories as givens, without interrogating how or why they are constructed
as they are. In this chapter, I demonstrate how the boundaries between these categories
serve a rhetorical function, rather than reflecting ontological truths. Furthermore, I
demonstrate how this rhetorical function reinforces mainstream epistemological
assumptions at the expense of a more progressive approach to knowledge in litigation.

3.2 FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY
Feminist epistemologists bring a critical, power-sensitive lens to popular conceptions of
knowledge in Western society, and to the disciplinary traditions in which such
conceptions are rooted. They thereby offer valuable insights into the implicit
epistemological assumptions that govern processes of factual reasoning in a wide variety
of contexts, and to their sociopolitical implications. Many of these assumptions can be
traced back to the Enlightenment-era dawning of modern science, and subsequent
intellectual currents of positivism and empiricism, within which modern political
conceptions of democracy and constitutionalism are also rooted.2 These influences are
apparent in the mainstream philosophical tradition of Anglo-American epistemology.3
In this tradition, knowledge claims are paradigmatically expressed through the
formulation “S knows that P”, where S is an individual knower and P is a proposition,

2

Sandra G Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986) at 140-141
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and where knowledge is generally understood to require justified true belief. The precise
criteria required for knowledge and justification are central preoccupations of the field.4

A number of subfields of epistemology have arisen that point to the limitations of the
traditional approach, and that seek either to extend or to radically disrupt it. One of the
most relevant for my purposes is social epistemology, which challenges the
individualistic orientation of traditional epistemology, and within which feminist
epistemology can generally be understood to fall.5 Social epistemologists study various
social dimensions of knowing, including issues of social evidence (i.e. testimony from
other people rather than individual perceptions, intuitions, or memories) and social
systems and institutions.6 Unlike sociologists of knowledge/science, they seek not only to
describe knowledge practices in particular social contexts, but to advance normative
accounts of how such practices might be improved. 7 Given the institutional character of
law, and the role of testimony as the paradigmatic form of evidence in legal proceedings,
social epistemology has the potential to offer important insights to evidence scholars.

Within the terrain of social epistemology, the work of feminist epistemologists stands out
as offering especially critical accounts of social knowledge practices, rooted in explicit
political commitments.8 Feminist epistemologists come from a variety of disciplinary
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backgrounds, but share a common interest in the relationship between knowledge
practices and gender relations, and by extension, power relations more generally.9 Along
with other late 20th century thinkers, they have challenged many of the foundational
assumptions of traditional Anglo-American epistemology, albeit through more explicitly
normative projects.

Indeed, exposing and articulating these assumptions, which are often taken for granted
and thus tend to remain invisible, has been one of the main contributions of feminist
epistemology.10 Feminist thinkers have embarked on this project with a set of particular
political concerns about how dominant conceptions of knowledge have shored up
gendered and other social hierarchies.11 On this basis, they set out to historicize, and
thereby denaturalize, deeply engrained conceptual frameworks. As Harding explains:
"Once we stop thinking of modern Western epistemologies as a set of philosophical
givens, we can begin to examine them instead as historical justificatory strategies."12
Similarly, for Code, feminist epistemological projects are not so much about articulating
a singular feminist theory of knowledge, as they are about

finding the voices of the epistemology makers, uncovering the processes
of theory- and knowledge-production, relocating epistemic activity from
the ‘no-one’s land’ that it has seemed to occupy, into human speaking and
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listening spaces where dominant conceptions of experience, knowledge
subjectivity have systemically suppressed other contenders.13

Code goes on to explain that, “feminists examine practices of knowledge construction to
produce critical retellings of what historically and materially ‘situated’ knowers actually
do.”14 The above descriptions give a sense of feminist epistemology as a primarily critical
field. However, feminist thinkers have also embarked upon important theory-constructing
projects that try to imagine alternative ways of knowing in the world.15

In this dissertation, I draw on the critical and constructive work of feminist
epistemologists to interrogate the effects of the fact-finding process in strategic Charter
litigation on the social justice goals of participating marginalized groups. I am thus
engaged in a project of feminist epistemology myself—one that brings feminist insights
about knowledge to bear on the field of evidence law, broadly conceived. By grounding
my conception of epistemological justice, these insights provide a normative standard
against which I critically assess the treatment of knowledge in Bedford v Canada16, and
in strategic Charter litigation more generally. This includes both how the record in such
cases is constructed, and how legal actors mobilize different epistemic norms to frame
and evaluate the evidence tendered.
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In what follows, I prepare the groundwork for this analysis by reviewing the main
critiques levied by feminist thinkers against the dominant epistemological tradition—
critiques that I will be drawing from throughout my dissertation and especially in my
analysis of the transcripts in Bedford in Part II. At the same time, I canvas some of the
alternative approaches to thinking about knowledge that feminists have developed, which
will serve as important theoretical tools for my analysis.

In offering this brief overview, I do not wish to suggest that feminist epistemologists all
espouse the same basic views, or that “feminist epistemology” constitutes anything
approaching a singular theory.17 Many thinkers in the field are wary of such
implications. According to Lorraine Code, while “epistemological questions are
fundamental to feminist inquiry”,18 positing a general theory of “feminist epistemology”
is problematic, as this would remove theory from particular social practices and
politics—the very move that feminists critique in traditional epistemology.19 Similarly,
Helen Longino argues that rather than pointing to any particular theoretical content,
“feminist epistemology” ought to amount simply to “doing epistemology as a feminist.”20
Taking account of these concerns, my purpose is not to provide a comprehensive account
of a unified field, but to present some of the key critical insights and theoretical
contributions of feminist epistemologists that are of relevance to my own project.
17
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3.2.1 Objectivity
The concept of objectivity lies at the heart of both the dominant epistemological tradition
and feminist responses to it. Following the positivist-empiricist foundations of the
modern scientific enterprise, traditional epistemologists approach knowledge as a set of
universal and objective truths about the world, discovered by autonomous individuals
investigating the world from a neutral and impartial stance. As Lorraine Code notes, this
paradigm is deeply ingrained in Western thought, throughout which there is a “constant
thread of belief in the importance of detachment, impartiality, neutrality, and cognitive
self-reliance for knowers worthy of that name.”21 As she puts it elsewhere:

The assumption prevails that knowledge properly so-called consists of
facts, information, neutrally (=objectively) found and observationally
testable: facts whose ‘factuality’ depends on the extent to which they are
free of the taint of subjectivity, and hence are value-neutral.22

In the late 20th century, however, the tides of postmodernism brought attacks on
established notions of truth and objectivity from various quarters. For many feminists,
such challenges were necessary to recognize the failure of purportedly universal and
objective theories to account for the experiences of women and other marginalized
people. Indeed, feminists have long observed that those who purport to offer objective,
universally generalizable accounts of the world often represent the perspectives and
21
22
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interests of only a small and privileged segment of it. Skepticism about the existence of a
neutral epistemic stance has thus grounded feminist critiques in a wide range of forums,
including critiques of androcentrism, ethnocentrism, and other forms of unacknowledged
partiality in science and in law.23

As I explain further below, feminist insights into the partiality of purportedly universal
knowledge claims have depended in a crucial sense on the collective mining of women’s
own lived experiences.24 Thus, in contrast to the traditional paradigm of knowledge as a
set of value-neutral and universally true general propositions about the world, feminist
knowledge has been rooted in particular, subjective accounts of experience interpreted
through an explicitly political lens. At the same time, most feminist thinkers have been
wary of sliding into total “subjectivism” or relativism, a charge often levied against those
who challenge the ideal of absolute objectivity at the heart of the dominant
epistemological tradition.25 Nor have feminists abandoned all aspirations to objectivity in
inquiry, though many have attempted to reform the concept. As Donna Haraway puts it,
“[r]elativism and totalization are both ‘god tricks’ promising vision from everywhere and
nowhere” and are thus both epistemically irresponsible positions.26 The problem of
objectivity has thus posed a significant challenge for feminist epistemologists. While
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responses to this challenge have been myriad, they are often helpfully grouped into three
baskets: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism.27 I
review each in turn, before discussing some important theoretical developments that seek
to address the tensions between them.
A) Feminist Empiricism
One feminist response to the androcentrism of the dominant scientific and
epistemological traditions has been to try to construct an improved empiricism, rid of
gender and other social biases, via a more power-sensitive approach. Those who take this
approach continue to place stock in the traditional methods and goals of scientific
inquiry. However, contrary to the traditional view of knowers as interchangeable
individuals, they argue that greater objectivity demands attention to the social location of
knowers, and in particular, that the participation of women and other marginalized groups
in science is critical to eliminating biases and thereby improving the objectivity of
scientific knowledge. 28 Thus, rather than eschewing any role for values or politics in
science, feminist empiricists (along with standpoint theorists) contend that “some
politics—the politics of movements for emancipatory social change—can increase the
objectivity of science.”29 Feminist legal empiricists have applied the above insights to
suggest that correcting biases in law can increase law’s rationality and objectivity
according to its own standards.30
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B) Feminist Standpoint Theories
Like feminist empiricists, feminist standpoint theorists offer a path towards greater
objectivity by reforming how we understand the concept of objectivity itself. Their
solution builds on the Marxian idea that the material circumstances of the proletariat
afford workers superior insight into class relations. Nancy Hartsock—one of the founders
of feminist standpoint theory—picked up on this idea to argue that, in a similar way,
women’s material experiences of subjugation through the sexual division of labour give
them access to a privileged standpoint on patriarchal social relations.31 More generally,
the idea is that materially oppressed people may, through conscientious political struggle,
come to occupy a standpoint that gives them an enhanced understanding of social
relations as they really are, if not absolute objectivity. In this way, the epistemic privilege
that allows for claims of objectivity is shifted from dominant social groups to the socially
marginalized and oppressed.32 While early formulations of standpoint theory (such as
Hartsock’s) rely to some extent on essentialist ideas about female biology and
experience, and neglect important differences between women,33 they provide an
important foundation for further thinking about how women’s embodied experiences
might serve as a ground for critiquing dominant social theories and institutions, and how
experiences of oppression may afford unique insight into some aspects of social relations.
C) Feminist Postmodernism
Given the efforts of feminist empiricism and standpoint theories to preserve the ideal of
objectivity at the heart of the dominant scientific and epistemological traditions, albeit in
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altered forms, Harding refers to these strands of thought as “successor science” projects.34
Feminist postmodernism, by contrast, reflects a deeper skepticism towards universal
claims about the way the world is, and thus about the possibility of achieving a more
objective vantage point on reality. For postmodern thinkers, there is no essential female
subject or experience; rather, these are socially constructed through multiple overlapping
discourses that are constantly in flux.35 As Harding explains, such an approach “requires
embracing as a fruitful grounding for inquiry the fractured identities modern life
creates,”36 rather than seeking alternate foundations from which to better grasp the nature
of reality. In the legal academy, feminist postmodernism has found voice within the
Critical Legal Studies movement, which emphasizes the indeterminacy of law and the
socially constructed nature of legal frameworks.37 While appealing to many feminist
thinkers, postmodernism also presents some potential dangers; if we reject the existence
of a fixed external reality and thus the reality of women’s experiences, on what ground
can feminist politics claim the legitimacy and authority necessary for action in the world?
I discuss one way in which feminist thinkers have attempted to address this challenge
below.

D) Positionality and Situated Knowledge
In an influential early article, Donna Haraway points to a fundamental tension between
attempts to construct a feminist version of objectivity through successor science projects,
and the postmodern abandonment of objectivity in favour of a strong version of social
34
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constructivism.38 Haraway recognizes that each approach contributes something essential
to feminist theorizing about knowledge, despite their incommensurability. The problem,
as she poses it, is

how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency
for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for
recognizing our own 'semiotic technologies' for making meanings, and a
no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world…39

Building on standpoint theory, Haraway’s answer is to equate feminist objectivity with
“situated knowledges”40—a concept that has come to occupy a central place in feminist
epistemology. As she explains it, “objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific
embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all
limits and responsibility. The moral is simple: only partial perspective promises objective
vision.”41 Haraway thus flips the mainstream approach to objectivity on its head, insisting
that it calls for specificity and contextualization, rather than generalization and
abstraction. She goes on to identify “positioning” as a key practice for responsible
knowing.42
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While not directly crediting Haraway, law professor Katherine Bartlett draws from her
ideas, as well as those of Linda Alcoff, in developing the epistemological theory of
“positionality.”43 This theory responds to the tension between successor science projects
and postmodernism by incorporating aspects of both. As Bartlett explains:
“The positional stance acknowledges the existence of empirical truths, values and
knowledge, and also their contingency. It thereby provides a basis for feminist
commitment and political action, but views these commitments as provisional and subject
to further critical evaluation and revision.”44 Positionality, according to Bartlett, is not
relativistic or arbitrary because it continues to ground knowledge in experience, and thus
provides “some means of distinguishing between better and worse understanding”.45 At
the same time, it rejects the “perfectibility, externality, or objectivity of truth”,46
recognizing instead that because individual perspectives are necessarily limited, truth is
always “situated and partial.”47 It follows that individuals should try to extend their
knowledge by seeking to better understand the perspectives of others.48 In this way,
positionality continues to view experience as a powerful means by which to affirm the
interests of marginalized people, even while acknowledging its constructed nature.
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3.2.2 Ethical and Political Dimensions of Knowing
In articulating her theory of situated knowledges, Haraway appeals not only to the ideal
of objectivity, but also to a kind of ethical responsibility that accompanies efforts to
know. For Haraway, knowledge claims grounded in a “gaze from nowhere”49 (absolute
objectivity, or what she calls “totalization”)50 or from everywhere (relativism) are
“unlocatable” and thus “irresponsible.”51 This accords with her view that “politics and
ethics ground struggles for and contests over what may count as rational knowledge.”52
Haraway is not alone in this view. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of feminist epistemology
has been the recognition of ethical and political dimensions to knowing. This contrasts
with the traditional approach, wherein questions of epistemology are viewed as strictly
separate from ethics and politics, resulting in a stark dichotomization of facts and
values.53 From the traditional perspective, scientific and other knowledge is considered
independently from the social uses to which it is or might be put, and thus from its
ethical-political consequences.54
Haraway and other feminist thinkers have strongly rejected the separation of
epistemology from ethics and politics inherent in the dominant tradition. Code, for
instance, identifies as guiding principles of her work “that ethical-political and
epistemological questions are inextricably intertwined; that ethical-political action is
49
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dependent on the quality of epistemic activity that informs it; and that epistemological
questions invoke ethical requirements.”55 Harding, for her part, views moral and political
discussions as paradigmatic of rational discourse from a feminist point of view.56 In these
ways, feminist epistemologists insist that knowledge practices have real-world political
consequences, and thus place ethical obligations on knowers. This insight constitutes a
key premise of my project, which examines the sociopolitical implications of the
knowledge practices at work in constitutional fact-finding. It also serves as an important
criterion for my analysis; one of the things I ask in undertaking this research is whether
the fact-finding process in strategic Charter litigation can accommodate such an ethically
integrated vision of knowledge.
3.2.3 Relationship Between Knowers and the Known
The responsibility to know ethically shapes feminist responses to another key
characteristic of traditional epistemology—the conception of the relationship between
knowers and the known. Closely tied to the ideal of absolute objectivity in the dominant
epistemological tradition is the assumption of a stark division between knowers,
conceived as independent and autonomous epistemic agents, and objects of knowledge,
conceived as static elements of the external world waiting passively to be discovered. As
Code notes, this conception derives much of its force from the norms of modern science:

Implicit in the veneration of objectivity central to scientific practice is the
conviction that objects of knowledge are separate from knowers and
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investigators, and that they remain unchanged throughout investigative,
information-gathering, and knowledge-construction processes.57

A related assumption is that “knowledge is a product of inquiry that stands alone in the
sense that details of the processes of its production are irrelevant to its structure, content,
and/or evaluation.”58 Indeed, traditional epistemologists and scientists alike not only
assume a separation between knowers and the known, but insist on its importance, on the
grounds that the knower’s detachment from their field of inquiry helps to preserve
objectivity. Thus, “[e]xemplary knowledge is ‘of’ things that have no particular
significance for the knower”.59 By the same logic, the social identity of any particular
knower is thought to be irrelevant to the project of inquiry,60 because the same external
reality awaits discovery by any individual with a sufficiently inquiring and open mind.

Feminist epistemologists have observed that knowledge in this framework constitutes a
form of domination and control over the domain of things known.61 In this way, the
mainstream tradition reinforces oppressive social relationships at the level of
epistemology.62 In response to the traditional view, feminist epistemologists have
characterized knowers as embodied and socially situated63 (and in some cases as
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communal rather than individual subjects)64 while conceiving of the world to be known—
whether consisting of people, animals or inanimate objects—as active and agentic.65 In
this way, they have sought to transform the relationship of detachment and domination
characteristic of traditional epistemology into one of connection and mutual
understanding. Thus Haraway speaks of the “need for a logic of conversation rather than
discovery in accounts of the world.”66 As Code explains, one of feminism’s key insights
is “that an inquirer is located on the same plane as the inquiry; indeed, that she must
locate herself there if she is to fulfill the responsibilities that the very position of inquirer
invokes.”67 From this perspective, knowing does not just demand a certain cognitive
posture—it also entails an ethical obligation to know well through critical self-reflexivity.

From a feminist perspective, the traditional conception of the knower-known relationship
raises particular concerns for social science research where human beings are the focus of
inquiry, as it threatens to objectify people and deny their agency in the process by which
knowledge about them is produced.68 As Code observes, this approach provides a
rationale for treating people as “cases” or “types”, rather than as “active, creative
cognitive agents”.69 Feminist critiques in this regard overlap with and inform efforts to
develop alternative orientations to research in the social and health sciences that promote
more equitable partnerships between professional researchers and community
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stakeholders70—sometimes referred to as action research, Participatory Action Research
(PAR), Community-Based Research (CBR) or Community-Based Participatory Research
(CBPR).71 These initiatives encompass a broad range of approaches to research, drawing
from a wide array of theoretical and practical influences.72 Common among them,
however, is a commitment to pursuing research collaboratively to address real-world
problems, rather than as a unilateral, expert-driven process of discovery focused on
producing knowledge “for its own sake.”73

The “participatory” aspect of this family of approaches to research signals the importance
of meaningful participation by all actors (including those who would traditionally be
viewed as mere “subjects”) in research and the construction of knowledge, while “action”
recognizes the explicit political grounding of research directed at social change.74 Action
research and PAR practitioners also emphasize the importance of critical reflection as
part of the research process, drawing on Paulo Freire’s notion of “conscientization” as
70
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well as feminist and other critical theories.75 Indeed, following Freire and Kurt Lewin,
action research is often described as a cyclical process of reflection and action.76 As in
feminist epistemology, the value of local knowledge and lived experience—especially of
marginalized people—is central to this orientation to research.77

The link between epistemology and research orientations points to an important site for
analysis in Bedford and other strategic Charter litigation, wherein legal actors draw upon
an array of social science research to support factual arguments and conclusions. Indeed,
participatory approaches have gained particular traction in sex work research in recent
years78—research that figures prominently in the Bedford case. While some of the studies
on offer as evidence in Bedford adopt methodologies that reflect the traditional view of
the knower-known relationship, others break with this orthodoxy to varying degrees in
order to foster deeper engagement with the people whose lives the research is about. For
instance, some of the studies involve sex worker-led advocacy organizations as research
partners, or employ sex workers as research assistants. The views expressed by expert
witnesses about questions of research methodology reflect this range of approaches.
Attending to how these differing approaches to social science research are mobilized,
framed, and evaluated in Bedford gives important insight into the epistemic norms at play
in the case. In particular, such an analysis offers insight into how feminist perspectives on
the relationship between knowers and the known fare in strategic Charter litigation.
75
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3.2.4 Paradigmatic Forms of Knowledge
The dominant conception of the knower-known relationship described above has been
shaped in part by what traditional epistemologists have understood to constitute
paradigmatic forms of knowledge. Two points are worthy of note as they inform my
analysis in the dissertation: 1) the tendency to view science as the preeminent form of
knowledge, and physics and mathematics as the paradigm for all scientific activity; 2) the
emphasis on knowledge derived from direct observation over knowledge gained from the
testimony of others.79

There is no doubt that the philosophical field of epistemology has been fundamentally
shaped by the enterprise of modern science.80 As Code observes:

The rhetorical spaces of mainstream epistemology are staked out so as to
grant pride of place to the cognitive products of the ‘exact’ sciences; the
discursive spaces of the late-twentieth–century affluent societies echo and
mirror that respect in the presumption of credibility that immediately
accrues to any findings reported with the assurance that they are based on
scientific research.81
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Due perhaps to their historical significance in the Enlightenment era, physics and
mathematics are commonly viewed as the archetype of “pure” scientific inquiry.82
Accordingly, a high degree of generality and abstraction from concrete social contexts
has come to represent a kind of scientific ideal, and by extension, a broader
epistemological ideal to which all forms of knowledge should aspire. By the same token,
experimental and quantitative methods have taken pride of place as the most scientifically
“rigorous.”83 Other domains of science fall along a hierarchy according to the extent to
which they meet these ideals.84 The social sciences generally sit low on this hierarchy
(though perhaps above disciplines in the humanities), given the myriad, hard-to-control
variables that complicate efforts to understand social relations, and the acknowledged
difficulty of extricating social and political values from these projects (as well as their
frequent reliance on qualitative methods). Still, the assumption is that knowledge of
social relations is best obtained by following the same methods as in physics and other
natural sciences. The goal is thus to “establish social scientific inquiry on a ‘properly
scientific’ basis”—i.e. through experiment and quantitative observation of human
behaviour.85

The influence of modern science can also be seen in the tendency of traditional
epistemologists to focus on empirical over testimonial sources of knowledge.86 As Code
points out, propositions that express simple and immediate sensory observations, such as
“the book is red”, have provided the main fodder for the articulation and resolution of
82
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epistemological problems.87 Furthermore, epistemologists tend to view direct
observation as a far more trustworthy source of knowledge than testimony, which comes
second hand and is frequently associated with opinion or hearsay.88 This accords with the
view of knowers as primarily independent and autonomous. The problem, as Code notes,
is that this orientation “obscures how much people depend on others for what they claim
to know”89 and thus how important assessments of cognitive authority and credibility are
to knowing well in everyday life.90 Such assessments merit particular scrutiny from the
perspective of this project, given their tendency to reflect and reinforce existing social
hierarchies.
Reconsidering what ought to count as paradigmatic knowledge is one tool that feminist
epistemologists have used to reveal the historical contingency of traditional
epistemological assumptions. For instance, in contrast to the traditional view, Harding
argues that moral and political reflexivity ought to serve as the criteria for
paradigmatically objective science. According to her: “A maximally objective science,
natural or social, will be one that includes a self-conscious and critical examination of the
relationship between the social experience of its creators and the kinds of cognitive
structures favored in its inquiry."91 The effect of this model is to reverse the traditional
knowledge hierarchy: “a critical and self-reflective social science”92 becomes the
paradigm for all science, while physics and mathematics are relegated to “the far end of
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the continuum of value-laden inquiry traditions."93 Code, for her part, proposes an
alternative epistemological paradigm based on knowledge of other people, rather than of
objects. In this way, she urges a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between
knowers and the “things” they know.94 By re-embedding knowledge in socially situated
experience, and reintegrating it with political and ethical considerations, such approaches
attend to the otherwise overlooked connection between epistemology and social justice.
They thus provide a blueprint for what epistemological justice might look like.
As I illustrate in later Chapters of this dissertation, perceived hierarchies between
scientific disciplines and methodologies, and between scientific and non-scientific kinds
of knowledge, play an important role in the framing of evidence in Bedford and other
strategic Charter challenges. The role of moral and political values in the production of
social science research is also highly contested in the case. As I have shown in this
section, such judgments reflect particular, historically contingent ideas about what
constitutes knowledge in its ideal form. These ideas, moreover, are closely linked to
political ideologies that can shore up existing social inequalities. How they play out in the
fact-finding process thus has an important bearing on the realization of epistemological
justice in strategic Charter litigation.
3.2.5 Gendered Dichotomies
Underlying many of the above-noted features of traditional Anglo-American
epistemology is a basic dualism that feminists have observed as hierarchically
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gendered.95 Within this framework, imagined divisions between objective/subjective,
theory/practice, reason/emotion, universal/particular, mind/body, abstract/concrete, and
fact/value track the division between male/female. In each case, the male-associated side
of the equation is valued over the female. According to Code, these dichotomous pairs
distinguish knowledge “from aspects of experience deemed too trivial, too particular, for
epistemological notice” in a highly gendered manner.96 In this way, they perpetuate
ideologies of gender inequality.

Dichotomous thinking underlies many of the dominant tradition’s foundational
assumptions, such as the imagined division between knowers and the known. On a
somewhat different plane, Code has argued that traditional epistemology’s forceful
insistence on the ideal of pure objectivity stems from the tendency to view absolute
subjectivity (i.e. relativism) as the only possible alternative.97 Once again here, a
foundational dualism constrains the dominant approach. Unearthing and thereby
rendering contingent this conceptual framework has enabled feminists to construct new
theoretical approaches to knowledge.

One need not look far to observe the strong influence of dualism in the legal context. As I
hinted at in Chapter 2, the law of evidence is grounded in certain key conceptual
dichotomies, most notably between law and fact, and between lay experience and expert
opinion. At the same time, the nature of fact-finding in strategic Charter challenges raises
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some inherent challenges to these dichotomies, exposing grey areas that are less visible in
other contexts. Feminist efforts to reveal the contingency of dualistic thinking provide
resources for explaining these slippages, and for critiquing the ongoing use of legally
sanctioned dichotomies as rhetorical devices in constitutional fact-finding from a social
justice perspective.

3.2.6 Summary
In this section, I have reviewed some of the foundational assumptions of traditional
Anglo-American epistemology that have been subject to feminist critique, and noted
some of the ways in which feminist epistemologists have responded to them. In brief, the
traditional approach espouses a view of knowledge as consisting of a set of universally
true propositions about the world that have been objectively discovered by autonomous
individuals, while feminist responses have emphasized the embodied and socially
situated nature of knowers and the resultant partiality of all knowledge claims, the
connection between knowers and the known, and the ethical and political dimensions of
knowledge practices. The insights of feminist epistemologists provide a powerful critical
framework through which to analyze the knowledge norms and practices at play in
strategic Charter litigation from a social justice perspective. This literature also
constitutes an important theoretical backdrop to the progressive epistemological
commitments held by many social justice advocates, whether it is explicitly recognized as
informing those commitments or not. In particular, the work of feminist epistemologists
provides a theoretical foundation for the common concern regarding the treatment of
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knowledge that arises from the lived experiences of marginalized people—i.e.
experiential knowledge. It is to this key category of analysis that I turn next.

3.3 EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE
There are many different ways in which knowledge can be said to turn on experience, and
many different kinds of experience. In this dissertation I define “experiential knowledge”
in a particular way: as knowledge that is grounded in lived experiences of social
marginalization, defined as the denial of full recognition and participation in society on
equal terms with others that results from identification with a given social group or
groups.98 Informed by feminist approaches to epistemology, this concept forms the
linchpin of my vision of epistemological justice. Why does experiential knowledge take
on such significance in my account of epistemological justice, and how does it relate to
the conventional categories of proof in litigation, many of which are also tied to
experience in some way? In this section, I expand upon my conception of experiential
knowledge and explore its relationship to three such categories: experiential evidence,
common sense, and expert opinion evidence (including social science research). I
thereby build a foundation for my analysis of the treatment of knowledge within these
same three categories in Bedford.

It is important to note at the outset that I do not attach my conception of experiential
knowledge to any single, clearly defined group whose interests are at stake in Bedford or
other strategic Charter litigation. Experiences of marginalization and oppression are, of
course, closely correlated to gender, race, class, ability, occupation, and other markers of
98
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difference. In Bedford, for instance, they arise largely with respect to people who sell
sex, upon whose behalf the case was brought. As Justice Himel points out in her decision,
however, this encompasses an extremely diverse group of people, with a wide range of
experiences and perspectives.99 Given the identity of the applicants and the framing of the
issues in the case, would it be more appropriate to identify the relevant marginalized
group as women who sell sex, or (even more narrowly) women who identify as sex
workers? On the other hand, some of the arguments made in Bedford raise issues of
gender equality writ large, suggesting that the relevant group should actually be
broadened to include all women. As this example demonstrates, the identities of those
subject to social marginalization are not precisely demarcated, and often overlapping,
making decontextualized attempts to delineate a particular group as the locus of
experiential knowledge unhelpful.

Nor do I wish to reify experiential knowledge as something that exists out in the world in
a way that is clearly distinguishable from other kinds of knowledge. Indeed, such a move
would run counter to my overall theoretical approach, which challenges the sharp
distinctions that undergird traditional epistemology and constitutional fact-finding alike.
Instead, I emphasize here that “experiential knowledge” is a consciously constructed
category, employed in this project as heuristically useful to facilitate a particular kind of
analysis. Rather than reflecting any ontological theory, my use of this category is rooted
in a critical feminist perspective that insists upon the epistemic value of the lived
experiences of marginalized people in ongoing struggles for social justice.
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3.3.1 Experience as a Form of Knowledge
The conjunction of experience and knowledge itself owes much to the contributions of
feminist theorizing, and cannot be taken for granted. As Code discusses, traditional
approaches to epistemology have often upheld a hierarchical dichotomy between
knowledge and experience, whereby “knowledge properly so-called transcends
experience, whose particularity can only sully and muddle its purity and clarity.”100 This
dichotomy is gendered in that experience—understood as particular, subjective and
practical—has traditionally been associated with women/femininity, while knowledge—
understood as objective, universal and theoretical—has been associated with
men/masculinity.101 Code and Longino both give the example of the medical profession,
wherein (predominantly female) nurses have been thought of as having experience, and
(historically predominantly male) doctors as having knowledge.102 Drawing on the work
of Alice Baumgart, Code notes how this understanding was borne out in the Canadian
Grange Inquiry of 1984. The lawyers in the proceeding called doctors as expert witnesses
and asked them what they “knew”, while asking nurses (treated as non-experts) to answer
questions “based on your experience.”103 In this way, doctors were afforded greater
epistemic authority in the proceedings.

Still, there is a sense in which dominant approaches to knowledge do recognize the
epistemic relevance of experience. Indeed, as Code observes, experience plays a central
role in modern science and the philosophical tradition of epistemology that it
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underwrites, to the extent that these are grounded in empirical strains of thought that
privilege direct sensory observations over other sources of knowledge:

Empiricists, avowedly, put great store in first-person perceptual and
observational reports, maintaining that a ‘privileged access’ to one’s
experiences confers on such reports a special claim to credibility.104

In a somewhat different manner, the value of experience is also deeply ingrained in the
common law tradition. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously put it: “The life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience.”105 The common law develops not (or at
least not only) through the formulation and interpretation of universal principles, but
through the consideration of particular cases in social and historical context. Moreover, in
legal proceedings, firsthand observations often constitute the preferred form of evidence.
In the more specific context of strategic Charter challenges to legislation, the courts’
interest in hearing from people with direct experience of the law’s impacts can hardly be
doubted.

And yet, as feminist and other critical scholars have extensively documented, the
experiential accounts of at least some groups of people have been consistently dismissed
as not credible, not plausible, not reliable, or simply not important in these contexts.106
For Code, this points to a somewhat baffling contradiction:

104

Ibid at 213. See also Code, Rhetorical Spaces, supra note 3 at 156.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1881) at 1.
106
See for example: Code, What Can She Know?, supra note 2 at 211, 214, 217-8; Deborah Epstein, & Lisa
A Goodman, “Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing
105

131

The assumption that there is a sharp break between experience and
knowledge, such that accumulated experience neither counts as knowledge
nor is regarded as its source, is curious, if not paradoxical, in view of the
persistent esteem accorded to empiricist methodology as productive
knowledge.107

Furthermore, in the context of public interest litigation, legal and scientific valorizations
of experience have often clashed conspicuously both with each other and with the
experientially grounded critiques of feminist and other critical scholars and activists.
What can explain these apparent contradictions?

Despite her expressed perplexity at the failure of empiricists to recognize women’s firstperson experiential accounts as knowledge, Code herself offers an insightful explanation.
By her own account, empiricist conceptions of epistemically significant experience differ
quite substantially from feminist conceptions, suggesting that the sense of contradiction
results at least in part from a kind of equivocation. The primary form of “experience” of
interest to empiricists, and by proxy to traditional epistemologists, consists of basic
sensory observations about the external world—especially those collected according to a
systematic (i.e. scientific) method thought to facilitate more general knowledge claims.108
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In this conception of experience, the identity of the subject of experience is irrelevant,
because the types of experiences at issue are thought to be equally accessible to all.109
Indeed, for empiricists, objectivity and universality are essential characteristics of
epistemically relevant experience.

One can understand the difference between empiricist and feminist conceptions of
experience as resulting both from feminist challenges to empiricist characterizations of
experience, and from the centering of an entirely different form of experience in feminist
discourse. Beginning with the former, feminists have argued for an understanding of
experience as fundamentally socially situated and embodied. From this perspective, even
systematically collected sensory observations cannot be divorced entirely from the
individual who makes them.110 Feminist insights in this regard align with the work of
STS scholars, who have observed that despite its claims to universal and objective
knowledge, science is constructed in particular social and material spaces,111 through
processes that involve a great deal of tinkering, ad hoc decision-making, and subjective
judgment.112 Given the need for accountability in knowledge practices, feminists have
rejected the empiricist notion that true knowledge arises only when experiential
observations transcend these concrete origins to offer generalized truths about the
world.113
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At the same time, feminist discourses tend to focus on an entirely different plane of
experience. The paradigmatic form of experience in feminist theorizing is not basic
sensory observations; it is women’s narrative accounts of their lived experience. Code
helpfully describes these as “experiential stories of how it is for cognitive or moral agents
to be located as they are, and to experience the world from there.”114 The epistemic
salience of these accounts depends on their social and political meaning (hence the
significance of the social location and identify of the subject). One could argue that such
accounts are ultimately grounded in the mass of sensory data that constitutes daily life.
However, they have clearly moved a long way from that starting point, reflecting the
extensive process of interpretation and filtering needed to produce a socially intelligible
human story.

From the perspective of traditional epistemology, the narrative accounts of interest to
feminists are too particular and subjective to form a basis for knowledge. They are,
accordingly, often dismissed as “anecdotal”—“the stuff of which folklore, gossip, as
opposed to knowledge ‘proper,’ is made.”115 Code argues, however, that the details of
experiential stories are essential for “achieving the imaginative understanding that is
often a prerequisite for acting well both epistemically and morally.”116 Thus, from a
feminist perspective, the concrete particularity of experiential accounts actually facilitates
the generation of good knowledge, rather than detracting from it.
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The primacy of experiential narratives in feminist approaches to knowledge can be traced
back to the phenomenon of second-wave consciousness-raising, wherein women
collectively generated knowledge of their own social subordination through the sharing
of everyday personal experiences in small groups.117 Through this practice, women were
able to point out the gaps and distortions in dominant, purportedly objective accounts of
reality. As Joan Scott explains, feminists have appealed to the authority of subjective
experience as a means to “unmask all claims to objectivity as an ideological cover for
masculine bias.”118 This idea has been extended to include bias not only on the basis of
gender but also other markers of social privilege, such as race and class. To the extent
that certain social groups have been excluded from knowledge-making institutions, the
resultant knowledge claims have failed to reflect their lived realities.119 Prioritizing the
experiential accounts of members of these groups (which are of course diverse in
themselves) has thus served as an important strategy to challenge dominant worldviews
and the institutions that uphold them.120

This is not simply a matter of correcting innocent ignorance on the part of those with the
power to construct authoritative accounts of the world. Rather, the cognitive authority of
the privileged has been actively maintained through the persistent discrediting of those
with less social power. Thus Code writes of the “incredulity that works, unevenly across
the social order, to invalidate some processes of would-be truth production, and to
disqualify certain speakers, individually and collectively, from full membership in
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companies of truth-tellers.”121 Drawing together the philosophical traditions of ethics and
epistemology, Miranda Fricker theorizes the resultant incredulity towards certain
speakers on the basis of their social identity as a form of “epistemic injustice.”122 It is this
phenomenon that feminist valorization of the experiential accounts of marginalized
people seeks to counteract.

At the same time, feminists and other critical scholars influenced by postmodernism have
resisted overly simplistic conceptions of experiential narratives as a source of knowledge.
They have pointed out that viewing experience as a direct window on truth merely
replicates the myth of apolitical, objective knowledge that critical experiential accounts
have sought to challenge.123 Such a view, moreover, fails to account for the wellestablished insight that the interpretation and narration of experience in a way that is
intelligible to others depends upon a shared language or discourse, which constrains what
it is possible to think and say. In other words, pre-existing social discourses shape both
our original perceptions of experience, and the narratives by which we communicate
those perceptions.124 Even at the level of basic sensory observations, Harding contends
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that “[s]tudies of the social construction of what we count as real […] make it highly
implausible to believe that there can be any kind of value-free description of immediate
experience to which our knowledge claims can be 'reduced' or thought equivalent.”125
Experience cannot be separated from language, and thus, “[f]acts cannot be separated
from their meanings.”126 Value-laden theoretical frameworks are already at work in the
simplest acts of perception.

Insights about the discursive construction of experience leave feminist epistemologists in
somewhat of a bind. On the one hand, the feminist turn to experiential narratives as a
source of knowledge is premised on the understanding that the lived experience of
women and other marginalized groups has been persistently ignored, misconstrued and
discredited by mainstream authorities, with significant social and material consequences.
On the other hand, insistence upon unconditional belief in the truth of such accounts
threatens to replicate the problem in a different guise. The dilemma, as articulated by
Code, is

how feminists and others, who know they are not operating on a level
playing field, can negotiate legitimate demands that they (we) take one
another’s experiences seriously, and yet can resist the temptation to
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substitute a new tyranny of ‘experientialism’ immune to discussion for the
old and persistent tyrannies of incredulity, denigration, and distrust.127

Code’s response calls for a “ responsible” and “respectful” practice of listening to
experiential accounts, without denying a role for incredulity or reinterpretation on the
part of the listener.128 Fricker, for her part, advocates a “reflexive awareness” on the part
of the listener in order to correct for deeply ingrained forms of social prejudice and
discrimination.129 My goal here is not to provide a definitive answer to the problem of
how to treat experiential narratives from a feminist perspective, but simply to highlight
the nuanced understanding of experiential knowledge that a feminist epistemology
demands. It is this conception of experiential knowledge—as something grounded in the
first-person experiential narratives of marginalized people, but also shaped by, and
subject to interpretation through, a variety of overlapping social discourses—that I adopt
for the purposes of my analysis in this dissertation.

3.4 EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND PROOF IN LITIGATION
How, then, does experiential knowledge arise in litigation, in particular strategic Charter
litigation? How does the concept of experiential knowledge elaborated above relate to
other kinds of experience-based knowledge at play in this context, and to the
conventional categories of proof used to delineate them? In this section, I explore the
relationship between experiential knowledge and three well-established forms of proof in
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strategic Charter litigation: experiential evidence, common sense, and expert opinion
evidence (including social science research).

3.4.1 Experiential Evidence and other Sources of Experiential Knowledge
I begin with the category of proof most intuitively associated with experiential
knowledge: what legal actors often refer to as “lay” or “experiential” evidence. This
includes the accounts of litigants and others directly affected by the issues under
consideration in a given case. In the joint application record in Bedford, for instance,
several witnesses for both sides were characterized as “experiential”. These witnesses, all
of whom were or had been involved in the sale of sex, were thereby distinguished from
“experts”, police officers, and others by the marker of “experience”.130 In addition to the
accounts of experiential witnesses, experiential evidence may also be relayed second
hand through other witnesses. In Bedford, for instance, police officers, researchers,
community activists and others who gave evidence commented extensively on what they
had learned from women who sell sex in the course of their work. While the accounts of
these women made their way into the record through intermediaries, I treat them as
experiential evidence because they, too, arose from people who were directly affected by
the issues under consideration.

Like experiential knowledge, “experiential evidence” in this context clearly refers to
something other than the methodically gathered sensory observations of interest to
empiricists—otherwise, those witnesses brought to speak about their social science
130
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research would be the “experiential” ones, or at least be counted among them. Indeed, the
use of the descriptor “experiential” in cases like Bedford seems to refer to witnesses who
offer something akin to the feminist conception of experience described above: a
narrative account of their own lived experience, often (though not always) from a place
of social marginalization. This reflects, in part, the value placed in our common law
adversarial system on hearing from those most directly affected by a dispute. Aligning
with feminist discourses, experience here takes the form of highly processed social
narratives, where the particular social location of the subject matters.

This does not mean, however, that references to experiential evidence in public interest
cases carry the same connotations as political theorizations of experience within feminist
and other critical discourses. For one thing, experiential witnesses, like all non-expert
witnesses, are expected to furnish only the “facts” of their experience; they are explicitly
prohibited from delving into the territory of “opinion”, where only experts are allowed to
go.131 This rule, depending as it does on the assumption of a stark dichotomy between
fact and opinion, demonstrates the deep influence of the dominant epistemological
tradition on the law of evidence. Feminist epistemologists have long rejected this
dichotomy in favour of more nuanced understandings that recognize the inevitable role of
theory-laden interpretation in even the most factual accounts of experience. Experiential
accounts, after all, have always been an explicitly political resource for feminists, as well
as a source of knowledge. Despite these differences, however, there is a shared
recognition in feminist and legal discourses that it is essential to hear directly from those
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most affected by an issue about their lived experiences, especially when those people are
socially marginalized.

While experiential knowledge appears most obviously through experiential evidence, it
also comes up in a number of other ways that do not seem to accord with the traditional
taxonomy of proof in litigation. For instance, experiential knowledge can figure
importantly in the legal arguments of public interest organizations acting as parties or
interveners in a case. As I discuss further below (see section 3.4.2), it also arises in
qualitative social science studies relied on by expert witnesses. These studies may in turn
be cited as evidence in governmental and other reports, adding further layers of epistemic
packaging to the original experiential accounts (which are themselves already the product
of interpretation and construction, as discussed above). In this way, experiential
knowledge is reframed by a variety of different actors and institutions with their own
epistemological and/or political commitments. Social scientists, for instance, must
display fidelity to the epistemic norms established within their disciplines and
institutions, while NGOs, government actors, and community activists are usually bound
to particular political agendas. All of these influences are then further framed by the
dictates of the legal process itself, putting ultimate control in the hands of lawyers and
judges. As I will show, these layers of framing often take power and authority away from
those most directly affected by an issue, even as they purport to allow their voices to be
“heard”.132
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Thus far, I have been speaking about experiential knowledge conceived in terms of a
feminist politics that privileges the firsthand experiential accounts of marginalized
people. But there is another, often conflicting, category of experience-based knowledge
that plays an equally important role in strategic Charter litigation. Indeed, marginalized
people have often looked to their particular individual and collective experiences as a
means to expose the partiality of legal determinations based on purportedly universal
experience, or “common sense.” The invocation of “common sense” in legal proceedings
thus raises important questions about the relationship between different kinds of
experience, knowledge, and social justice in litigation. How ought we to understand the
concept of “common sense” as it relates to experiential knowledge, and to the other
conventional categories of proof outlined in this chapter? And what, exactly, is its
significance with respect to the question of epistemological justice in strategic Charter
litigation?

3.4.2 Common Sense
Conceptions of Common Sense
As a concept, “common sense” carries almost as many meanings, and as many layers of
theorizing, as the notion of “experience” itself. In her extensive treatment of the topic,
feminist legal scholar Patricia Cochran draws on the work of three thinkers from different
times and places to offer a “perspicuous representation” of common sense as (a) a kind of
shared quotidian knowledge (drawing on Thomas Reid), (b) a historically and politically
constructed worldview subject to transformation (drawing on Antonio Gramsci) and (c) a
142

community-based standard for the legitimacy of judgments (drawing on Hannah
Arendt).133 For the purposes of this project, her discussion of Reid and Gramsci is
especially helpful.

Reid’s view in particular helps to illuminate the link between common sense, experience,
and knowledge. For Reid, “common sense” refers to widely held, non-expert knowledge
grounded in everyday experience.134 There are democratic and egalitarian connotations to
this understanding: common sense is framed as the knowledge of ordinary people who
make up the community-at-large, in contrast to specialized expert knowledge. 135 As
Cochran observes, this accords with how common sense is often understood in legal
discourse.136 Indeed, the democratic impulse underlying the common law’s valorization
of common sense can be seen in a number of areas of the law of evidence. The law on
expert opinion evidence closely guards against the incursion of expert opinion into
matters that can adequately dealt with through the common sense of the trier of fact.137
The doctrine of judicial notice empowers courts to dispense with the need for proof of
facts that are widely known and uncontroverted within a given community.138 And the
test for relevance reflects the law’s fundamental reliance on “logic and human
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experience” as a means to manage the fact-finding process.139 Some scholars also view
the common law tradition itself as a kind of “embodiment of the ‘common sense’ of a
given community”.140

And yet, critics have noted that the invocation of common sense in law can be deeply
problematic for marginalized people.141 The trouble, as they note, arises in considering
whose experience and knowledge actually counts as “common.” Thus Cochran observes
that, “feminist thinkers from various disciplines have crucially identified how claims
about universality and commonality – claims that sit at the heart of “common sense” as
an idea – can actually function to exclude and marginalize.”142 These critiques parallel,
in many ways, feminist critiques of the objectivity and universality of knowledge as
portrayed by traditional epistemologists.

One might argue in response that legal valorizations of common sense are founded on
respect for the knowledge of a particular community where legal judgment is being
passed. Arguably, such knowledge claims are locally rooted in some sense. However,
even when a community is truly localized—a questionable proposition in light of
contemporary references to large and amorphous groups such as the “Canadian
community”—the assumption of a unified common sense within that community is
virtually guaranteed to have exclusionary effects. Indeed, as Cochran observes, by
139
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making a rhetorical claim to represent the knowledge of a given community, appeals to
common sense actually shape the boundaries of that community, determining who is
deemed to be in and out.143 Furthermore, as Mariana Valverde points out, the law in
practice leaves it to judges, who are often quite removed from community life, to
determine and articulate the common sense of the community with little or no evidence of
what ordinary people actually think.144 In this way, courts insert their own preferred
narrative of community experience and knowledge, erasing the plurality of views and
internal disagreements at play on the ground.145

Cochran asks: “If common sense is rooted in the fundamental reality and equal
legitimacy of daily life knowledge, what happens when peoples' daily lives differ
dramatically?”146 In a similar vein to my own project, her concern arises from her
examination of constitutional cases that address issues of poverty, inequality and social
marginalization. She contends that in this context, the knowledge deemed to constitute
common sense may not actually reflect the experiences of the marginalized group in
question.147 While purporting to speak for all in a universal register, it may in fact reflect
only the experiences and perspectives of a particular, socially privileged community (in
the legal context, the community of judges and lawyers). As Cochran argues, “The
consequences of attributing a false consensus in this context are not just to paper over
difference, but also to reiterate inequality and hierarchy.”148
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We are thus “challenged to ask the critical question: ‘common to whom?’”149 Asking this
question emphasizes the hegemonic function of common sense as a rhetorical tool, but it
also points to the potential for progressive transformations of common sense through
feminist appeals to experiential knowledge. What is experiential knowledge, after all, but
a newly emerging form of common sense within a particular community, being
constructed and advanced as a political challenge to other, more established forms? As
Alan Hunt puts it:
The achievement of real social change requires the securing of what I have
termed 'local hegemony', that on grounds of political contestation, ethical
justification and legal recognition, some claim which at one time was
controversial and contestable becomes self-evident and thus secure. Such
claims become secure when they achieve hegemonic status, that is, they
become a component of 'good sense'.150
Gramsci’s theory of common sense, as elaborated by Cochran, helps to develop this
point. For Gramsci, a thinker in the Marxian tradition, “common sense” denotes a
historically constructed, fragmentary and constantly shifting worldview that varies from
one social location to another.151 Common sense is bound up with power relations in that
it serves as a means for dominant social groups to assert their understandings of the world
as universal.152 At the same time, there exists a kind of “organic” common sense that
emerges from daily life experiences, and that may conflict with hegemonic forms of
149
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common sense.153 This conflict can disempower socially oppressed people by obfuscating
their ability to understand their own lives.154 However, according to at least some
interpretations of Gramsci, the conflict may also serve as a basis for critique, and for the
construction of alternative worldviews.155 Thus Cochran argues that critical scholars
should not reject “common sense” outright, despite its oppressive capacities, as this
would “relinquish ‘common sense’ to a specific, dominant political ideology”156 when in
fact it can serve both hegemonic and progressive political purposes.157

It is important to pay attention to these different faces of common sense when
considering how it is treated as knowledge in litigation. Common sense occupies a unique
role in legal fact-finding processes. On the one hand, its defining feature is a refutation of
the need for proof. Appeals to common sense thus play a role akin to the doctrine of
judicial notice (albeit less formalized), invoking a boundary similar to the boundary
between law and fact. And yet, the role of common sense in fact-finding is well
recognized—not as a type of evidence, exactly (though it is sometimes referred to in this
way), but as the substratum that undergirds, bounds, and fills gaps in the evidence on
offer. In this sense, common sense provides an answer to the doctrinal question of
relevance. Because it informs the fact-finding process in this way, common sense can
also be understood as a mode of proof.
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By setting out which claims are to be tacitly or explicitly accepted in litigation absent
proof to the contrary, common sense frames the contours of factual reasoning in
litigation, with varying possible political effects. As Cochran puts it, “the foreclosure of
debate on certain points can be used to transparently establish the normative values that
will ground fact-determination for legal judgment; certain things are simply not up for
discussion in a court of law, and this might serve either progressive or oppressive ends,
depending on the context”.158 In considering how to evaluate the normative values being
advanced by appeals to common sense, Marilyn MacCrimmon suggests that we ought to
look to the Charter, and in particular the s.15 right to equality, for substantive
guidance.159 While embracing the spirit of MacCrimmon’s approach, this project turns
instead to the notion of epistemological justice and the related concept of experiential
knowledge as means to assess the operation of common sense in strategic Charter
litigation. More specifically, I examine whether appeals to common sense in this context
work against, or in support of, experiential knowledge (see Chapter 6).

Despite the clashes that can sometimes arise between general appeals to common sense
and particular experiential accounts, both of these categories are often thought of as
occupying the same side of yet another, deeply entrenched dichotomy—the one between
lay experience and expert opinion. Expert opinion, of course, plays a critical role in much
strategic Charter litigation. How, though, are its role and parameters defined in relation
to experiential evidence and common sense? Who counts as an expert in the first place,
and why does it matter?
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3.4.3 Expert Opinion
My approach to expert opinion evidence in this project differs in two important respects
from much of the legal literature to date. First, while scholarship in this area tends to
focus on the role of forensic experts in criminal cases,160 I shift attention away from this
paradigmatic context to consider the emergence of a broader array of social science
experts in constitutional litigation. Second, I eschew the traditional focus on reliability
and the capacity of courts to assess expert opinion evidence.161 Instead, my interest lies
in the legal framing of witnesses and evidence as “expert.” Following Sheila Jasanoff and
other STS scholars, I am concerned with how legal actors draw upon notions of expertise
to advance competing knowledge claims in litigation.162
The Experience/Expertise Dichotomy
The dichotomy between lay experience and expert opinion at common law can be
understood as operating along two dimensions, tracking the two categories of lay
experience discussed in the previous subsections. First, expert opinion is distinguished
from the “common sense” of the trier of fact. To be admissible, expert opinion evidence
must provide specialized scientific or technical knowledge beyond the understanding of
an ordinary person.163 Experts, moreover, are expected to apply this specialized
knowledge in a particular way. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in R v Abbey:
“An expert's function is precisely this: to provide the judge and jury with a ready-made
160
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inference which the judge and jury, due to the technical nature of the facts, are unable
to formulate.”164 As Emma Cunliffe notes, the legal test for admissibility thereby
presumes a clear distinction between expert and lay processes of reasoning about a given
set of facts.165

A second dimension of the dichotomy distinguishes expert opinion evidence from the
experiential evidence of lay witnesses. This distinction rests both on professional
credentials and on the type of information that a particular witness is thought to
contribute to the case. While experts furnish opinions on the basis of specialized
knowledge or training (i.e. professional experience), lay witnesses describe factual
particulars that arise directly from their individual life experience. This second dimension
of the experience/expertise dichotomy differs from the first dimension in that particular
experiential evidence may or may not accord with the general experience or common
sense of the trier of fact (as discussed in the previous section).

In many ways, the dichotomy between lay experience and expert opinion parallels the
subjective/objective dichotomy that divides experience from knowledge in traditional
epistemology. As Code observes:

Established claims to authoritative expertise, in present-day western
societies, are commonly articulated against the background of just that
regulative ideal of a neutral, detached, impartial scientific knowledge, in
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whose acquisition political and other ‘subjective’ factors are scrupulously
eliminated.166

This ideal is reflected not only in how expertise tends to be identified and framed in
litigation, but in the doctrinal law of expert opinion evidence itself. It is well settled that
expert witnesses have a duty to provide objective assistance to the court in an impartial
and independent manner.167 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has recently
affirmed that concerns about independence and impartiality fall within the question of
whether an expert is properly qualified—a threshold requirement for the admissibility of
expert opinion evidence.168 As the SCC stated, citing the influential English case Ikarian
Reefer:

An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by
way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his [or her]
expertise […] An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the
role of an advocate.169

The duty of expert witnesses has also been codified in a number of Canadian
jurisdictions. In Ontario, for instance, the Rules of Civil Procedure require experts to sign
a form acknowledging their duty to “provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and
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non-partisan”.170 This legally defined duty of expert witnesses aligns notably with the
ideals of scientific objectivity that underpin traditional epistemology. Indeed, the
expectation that an expert will offer “objective, unbiased opinion” maps perfectly onto
empiricist/positivist notions of science, according to which scientists act as neutral and
interchangeable investigators of the social world, following established methods to
discover objective truths. In this way, expert opinion is associated with objectivity, while
lived experience remains subjective, and thus (so the implication goes) of less epistemic
value.

It is no wonder, then, that courts and litigators have turned increasingly to expert
evidence as a means to address complex social issues. As Valverde observes, there is a
desire in many cases to “establish a purely empirical basis for a legal judgment that,
especially these days, shys [sic] away from making strictly moral or philosophical
pronouncements…”171 So long as expertise is equated with objectivity, reliance on this
type of evidence seems to prevent value judgments from entering the fact-finding
process, and thereby seems to enhance the legitimacy of the process. The problem, of
course, is that the dichotomy between objective expert opinion evidence and subjective
experiential evidence turns out to be far less stable than it appears. As noted in the
previous chapter, this becomes especially apparent in the context of social and legislative
fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation.
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Ultimately, I argue that the legal entrenchment of the dichotomy between experience and
expertise obfuscates its real instability, creating opportunities for legal actors to
manipulate how evidence is perceived. Rather than mapping ontological categories, the
dichotomy serves as a key framing device for legal actors to bolster or discount evidence
in strategic Charter litigation. In some instances, this is done by appealing to the
rhetorical power of experiential knowledge or common sense. In other instances,
however, legal actors assert epistemic authority through appeals to expertise, defined in
opposition to experience-based forms of knowledge.

Appeals to expertise serve different purposes in different litigation contexts. In some
cases, so-called experts give opinions that clash directly with experiential accounts of a
given phenomenon, raising questions about who is “allowed to have ‘knowledge’.”172 For
instance, in the context of environmental disputes, Dayna Scott notes the tendency for
legal forums to favour the findings of accredited scientists over information collected by
directly affected citizens in communities facing pollution.173 In other cases, though,
including many Charter cases, rights-seeking litigants use accredited experts to bolster
their own credibility as experiential witnesses.174 While potentially invaluable in securing
a favourable legal outcome, the latter use of expert opinion gives rise to similar questions
172
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about whose knowledge is seen as authoritative in legal proceedings. As Code points out,
women have often had to rely on experts due to their own assumed lack of cognitive
authority, “even when they have good reason to believe that they know as well as, or
better than, experts do”.175 Thus Graham Mayeda worries that even when experts are
used to advance a marginalized perspective, “the firsthand stories of individuals from
equality-seeking groups who have lived through injustice and marginalization are ignored
in favour of the accounts of experts.”176 Such reliance on expert opinion evidence may
prove particularly dangerous when there are gaps in research such that a layperson “has
no ‘expert’ voice to speak for her.”177

Experts themselves may have qualms about playing this kind of role in litigation,
especially when they are driven to support a given group or social cause through their
work. Drawing from her own experience testifying as an expert sociologist in LGBT
rights cases, Valverde reflects upon how she

unwittingly disempowered the movements which had originally given rise
to my academic research interests in sexual and moral regulation. While
appearing to promote legal and social change, then, I in fact colluded with
law’s claim that oppressed peoples cannot represent themselves but must
be represented by others.178
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This is not to suggest that there is no legitimate role for experts in litigation or other
knowledge-producing processes, but that the epistemological effects of relying on expert
authority ought to be carefully considered. For one thing, as Code points out, most forms
of expertise are actually highly contestable.179 We should, moreover, be wary of too
easily accepting the epistemic authority of purported experts without considering the
social and institutional structures (often hierarchical ones) that support their claims to
expertise. There is, in other words, a need for critical scrutiny of who is deemed to be an
expert on what grounds, and how such designations might both reflect and reinforce
existing social hierarchies.180 This calls, in part, for critical scrutiny of the
experience/expertise dichotomy itself.
Deconstructing the Dichotomy
In her book, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge, Valverde underscores the
limitations of analyzing legal knowledge in terms of the experience/expertise dichotomy.
She argues: “The knowledges that are constituted in and circulate through law are rarely
so coherent and bounded as to allow classification into one of the two traditional
categories (expertise and experience).”181 The nurse witnesses in the Grange Inquiry may
help to illustrate this point. As Code observes, nurses testifying in their professional
capacity are ascribed a kind of “practical experience”.182 However, they are not generally
categorized as “experiential” witnesses, nor are they expected to recount personal life
stories. The same goes for police officers, journalists, and leaders of community
organizations in Bedford, who are treated neither as experts nor as experiential
179
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witnesses.183 These witnesses, and the experience accorded to them, thus seem to occupy
a kind of middle ground between subjective personal experience and objective expertise.
And yet, despite the presence of many such hybrid or “in-between” forms of
knowledge,184 the dichotomy between experiential and expert evidence continues to carry
rhetorical weight, thanks in part to its legal entrenchment.

Given the weight it carries in litigation, it is worth considering the basis for the
experience/expertise dichotomy in both its dimensions. Along the first dimension, the test
for admitting expert opinion evidence requires a line to be drawn between the domain of
the expert, and the domain of the trier of fact operating according to lay or common sense
reasoning. Indeed, it is often argued that expert opinion can provide important
opportunities to reassess or correct faulty common sense185 (just as common sense may
serve as a check on expert opinion). And yet, efforts to draw a line between the two have
been notoriously fraught. Legal scholars have expressed fervent disagreements over the
proper range of facts about which ordinary people can make judgments, as opposed to
those that call for expert knowledge.186 Knowledge about human behaviour that was once
thought to fall within the realm of common sense has later been subject to challenges via
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expert evidence. 187 And, experts themselves often draw heavily upon common sense,
significantly blurring the boundary between the two.188

In her study of criminal infant death cases, which focuses on the Australian case of R v.
Folbigg,189 Emma Cunliffe demonstrates the latter point by showing how scientific
investigations of infant deaths are influenced by social norms around mothering,190 and in
some cases, by a general suspicion that mothers are getting away with murder under the
guise of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.191 In Folbigg, one of the experts who was
influenced by such suspicions sought to validate his opinion by appealing to its
acceptance by courts in other cases. Cunliffe explains:

[He] drew upon law's ideological power when he asserted that if a court
agreed with his findings, those findings were very likely to be correct. By
virtue of being objectified through the criminal trial process, the belief that
mothers can and do murder their children without detection was
discursively detached from the expert communities who initially promoted
the idea.192

Cunliffe’s analysis, here and in other parts of her work, calls into question the sharp
division between expert and lay reasoning enshrined in the law of expert opinion. At the
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same time, she demonstrates how this division is used rhetorically to render the influence
of normative, common sense views over expert opinion invisible.

Kimberley White-Mair similarly explodes the dichotomy between expert and common
sense knowledge in her historical study of expert witnessing in cases of battered women
who kill or harm their abusive partners.193 She writes: “Common sense beliefs about
women not only guided the judicial use and interpretation of expert evidence, as the law
stipulates it should, but was, and still is, deeply inculcated in ‘expertise’ itself.”194 WhiteMair’s historical research illustrates the flexible and selective qualification of experts in
battered women cases, and the selective taking up of expert views by the court depending
on their accordance with the social mores of the time.195 At the same time, her research
shows that women accused’s own accounts of what led them to kill abusive partners were
often dismissed in favour of the common sense views affirmed by experts.196
White-Mair observes that while expert opinion purportedly extends the trier of fact’s
knowledge beyond common sense, the trier of fact is ultimately left to evaluate such
opinion according to that very standard.197 She explains: “…during a scientific age, when
objectivity constituted legal truth, and experts claimed to be objective, the explicit appeal
to expertise served to simultaneously cast the law as outwardly objective, while
maintaining its implicit appeal to popular opinion and common sense.”198 This analysis

193
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shows how the framing of evidence as “expert” projects an image of objectivity, even
while such evidence remains infused with, and contained by, lay views. To the extent that
such views affirm status quo understandings of marginalized groups, the influx of expert
opinion evidence in litigation may prove less progressive than it seems.
In some cases, expert appeals to common sense may be hardly veiled at all. Drawing
from her own experience as an expert witness, Valverde notes how expert qualifications
may be used simply to lend authority to views that are intentionally framed as
commonsensical:
In my own expert intervention, I presented myself more as the reasonable
person than as the erudite scholar. In keeping with the practice of self
honed over a decade of similar interventions, I arrived […] ready to
deploy a knowledge of lesbian/gay styles of life that was more anecdotal
and commonsensical than social-scientific.199
Of course, experts are not always so reflexive about their own mobilization of common
sense. Regardless, there can be little doubt that the boundary between expert opinion and
common sense blurs significantly upon closer inspection.

Nor does the second dimension of the experience/expertise dichotomy—the division of
experiential and expert witnesses—hold up very well to critical scrutiny. A compelling
basis for the distinction is hardly to be found in the legal test for the qualification of
experts, at least in the context of strategic Charter litigation. To be qualified, experts
199
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must “have acquired special or peculiar knowledge through study or experience” likely to
be beyond that of the fact-finder (emphasis added).200 Experience, then, is part of the very
definition of expertise. Experience in this context may refer to scientific research
conducted on the basis of sensory observations, but it more often connotes the practical
application of established (i.e. theoretical) knowledge to real life cases.201 It thus
amounts to a kind of practice-based professional experience. Interestingly, this kind of
experience is understood as distinct from the “lay” experience that grounds experiential
evidence, common sense, and even other kinds of professional experience, such as the
experience of nurses in the Grange Inquiry.

Taking the above definition at face value, however, one could easily argue that the
experiential knowledge of sex workers, illicit drug users, and other marginalized people
in recent s.7 Charter cases ought to count as a form of expertise, arising as it does from
specialized experience-based knowledge unfamiliar to the trier of fact. Indeed, feminist
scholars working in a variety of contexts have called attention to the expertise that some
“lay” witnesses have acquired through community advocacy, citizen science, and direct
experiences of injustice.202 In Bedford, many of the witnesses presented as “experiential”
had also participated not only in advocacy but also in the production of research studies
and reports, undertaken either through non-profit organizations or through academic-
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community partnerships. Such witnesses may thus be viewed as offering a kind of
expertise grounded in both experience and in research.

At the same time, the formally credentialed academic witnesses recognized as experts in
Bedford (and in many other cases) often ground their opinions in qualitative social
science research based on methodically collected experiential narratives. I argued earlier
that such narratives can be distinguished from the sensory experience upon which
empirical or scientific knowledge relies. However, when we move away from
paradigmatic conceptions of science, which privilege the natural sciences and especially
physics, the distinction begins to break down. The data of interest to social scientists
often cannot be gleaned from basic sensory observations. Rather, in many cases, social
scientists make observations on the basis of the testimony of others, gathered through
surveys, interviews and other methods. As the record in Bedford shows, in social science
research related to the sale of sex, qualitative interviews of sex workers and others
involved in the industry are common. The data collected in such projects can be read as a
kind of experiential knowledge. This is not to say that social science research and related
expertise is, itself, experiential knowledge, but rather to illustrate how these categories
are actually deeply intertwined. Social scientists use experiential knowledge to construct
a different kind of knowledge entirely, following different epistemic norms.
Nevertheless, the one draws fundamentally upon the other.
Legal Constructions of Science
It is clear from the above discussion that notions of expertise in litigation are tied heavily
to the epistemic norms and institutional markers of science. Indeed, according to Sergio
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Sismondo, the typical model of expertise in public controversies attributes most
knowledge to science, based on notions of universal applicability.203 Likewise, scientific
norms such as universalism, disinteredness, and the “scientific method” play an important
role in demarcating expert knowledge in litigation. And, as noted above, experts in many
cases rely directly on social science research to ground their opinions.

In line with the legal doctrine on expert opinion, scientific research is often framed as
universal, objective and disinterested, in opposition to the subjectivity and particularity of
knowledge grounded in experience. However, observations of laboratory scientists in
action have led STS scholars to question the characteristics commonly attributed to
science.204 As discussed above (see section 3.3.1), these scholars have observed that
despite science’s claims to universal and objective knowledge, the actual work of science
unfolds in particular, concrete contexts, 205 and demands a great deal of ad hoc decisionmaking and interpretation, most of which is erased in the final reporting of results.206
Thus, “rhetoric always mediates material actions like experiments and observations,
standing between readers and the material world.”207 Nor can science be purified of
normative beliefs and assumptions.208

Rather than trying to identify the inherent attributes of science, STS scholars illustrate
how ideas about the nature of science are used as “rhetorical resources” to assert
203
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epistemic authority.209 In this vein, Robert Merton argued that science serves the social
function of “certifying knowledge”.210 Building on this idea, Thomas Gieryn coined the
term “boundary work” to describe how scientists strategically demarcate science from
other forms of intellectual activity in order to bolster their authority and professional
resources.211 According to Gieryn, “‘science’ is no single thing: characteristics attributed
to science vary widely depending upon the specific intellectual or professional activity
designated as ‘non-science,’ and upon particular goals of the boundary-work.”212 Thus,
science has been characterized as practical, empirical and skeptical in comparison to
religion,213 but as foundational, experimental and theoretical in comparison to the
engineering.214 Boundary work also operates to divide the production and consumption of
scientific knowledge, thereby shielding scientists from responsibility for how science is
applied to solve non-scientific problems.215

The concept of boundary work can also be instructive for thinking about other categories
of knowledge in litigation. Efforts to delineate expert opinion from lay experience, for
instance, may be subject to a similar kind of analysis. A philosophical heritage of
dualistic thought underlies these dynamics, creating opportunities for boundary work
between a whole series of conceptual dichotomies.216 In this project, I examine how legal
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actors strategically exploit such opportunities, in part by drawing on the boundary work
of scientists and others.

Jasanoff is helpful in this regard as she extends the idea of boundary work directly to the
legal context.217 She identifies legal disputes as “sites where society is busily constructing
its ideas about what constitutes legitimate knowledge.”218 “Different types of evidence
routinely elicit different credibility judgments from fact-finders”, Jasanoff writes.219
“[S]uch credibility judgments incorporate the fact-finder's own tacit understandings of
science and expertise, although these private judgments may be hidden from critical
review by rhetorically effective boundary work.”220 According to Jasanoff, the process of
adjudication not only relies on common ideas about science and expertise, but plays an
active role in their construction. Legal cases can also stimulate new scientific work,
which may in turn be interpreted in the legal realm.221 Thus, law and science are
“mutually constitutive.”222

This way of thinking presents a challenge to the common notion that knowledge from
other disciplines is simply welcomed into the fact-finding process as an aid to decisionmaking. To be sure, the epistemic posture of constitutional law (and other areas of law)
has shifted, exhibiting greater openness to knowledge from other disciplines. However,
the ongoing power of law in the processes by which judges and litigators recognize these
217
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other sites of knowledge should not be underestimated. As Valverde puts it, law
incorporates scientific and other knowledge by “transmuting such alien knowledges into
legal formats and frameworks” and thereby “shapes the world it claims to adjudicate.”223
Scholars of evidence, for instance, have long observed the distortions of scientific
knowledge that result from the adversarial system’s reliance on partisan expert
witnesses.224 From this perspective, the structural features of our legal system condition
the scientific opinions heard in court in significant ways. Thinkers like Jasanoff and
Valverde have gone further, arguing for an understanding of science and law as coconstructed. Speaking from her own experience testifying as an expert witness, Valverde
observes both how the law has certified her as an expert sociologist, by repeatedly
qualifying her as such,225 and how she has felt compelled to frame her opinions more
definitively in the legal context and to present an image of sociological knowledge that
she herself does not believe in.226 Thus she contends that, “social science, purportedly
courted because it can inject useful ‘facts’ into the legal process, is through the legal
process reduced to the status of mirror for law’s narcissistic deliberations.”227

What links these insights is the recognition that social science (along with other extralegal knowledge) is never simply imported, wholesale, into law. Rather, law, through its
structures, procedures and norms, renders its own version of social science. What we see
in strategic Charter challenges such as Bedford is not simply the opening up of law to
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social science, but the active construction and instrumentalization of ideas about social
science (and science more generally) through the legal process.

Given the close connection between scientific norms and ideas about knowledge
generally, these moves can have important implications for epistemological justice. For
instance, as I show in Chapter 5, qualitative research methods are persistently discounted
in Bedford as inferior to quantitative methods. Such arguments often boil down to attacks
on the reliability and probative value of firsthand experiential accounts gathered through
interviews and other methods. They thus work against the feminist, and more broadly
progressive, commitment to taking experiential knowledge seriously. Constructions of
social science in Bedford also frequently serve to bolster mainstream understandings of
objectivity, the relationship between knowers and the known, and the strict separation of
facts from politics, though not without resistance from some actors.

3.5 CONCLUSION
In this Chapter, I have laid the theoretical groundwork for my project by exploring, from
a critical perspective, some of the central epistemological frameworks, norms, and
categories at work in strategic Charter litigation. Building upon the work of feminist
epistemologists, I have developed the concept of “experiential knowledge” as central to
my vision of epistemological justice, and used this as a springboard to examine and
critique three conventional categories of proof in litigation. By considering how these
categories are constructed in relation to each other, and used to frame knowledge in
litigation, I have exposed the rhetorical, rather than ontological, nature of their role in the
adversarial process, and raised a question about the epistemological work that they do. In
166

these ways, I have established a foundation from which to critically analyze the treatment
of knowledge in Bedford as it relates to the case’s social justice goals.
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Chapter 4: The Treatment of Experiential Evidence in Bedford
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the first Part of this dissertation, I made the case for investigating the epistemological
effects of the fact-finding process in strategic Charter litigation through a social justice
lens, and laid a legal and theoretical foundation for doing so. In the second Part, I use
Bedford v Canada (AG)1 as a case study to conduct this investigation. I do so first, in
Chapters 4 to 6, by closely examining the rhetorical framing strategies used by counsel
and other participants in the case with respect to each of the conventional categories of
proof discussed in Chapter 3.2 Specifically, I examine how each of these modes of proof
is mobilized, bolstered, attacked, or otherwise framed in particular instances on the
record in Bedford. I go on, in Chapter 7, to consider how the parties, in their facta, and
the courts, in their reasons, weigh these different modes of proof against each other in
responding to the factual questions at issue in the case. Throughout my analysis in this
Part, I unearth and scrutinize the epistemological norms and paradigms at work in
Bedford as they map onto the critical feminist framework developed in Chapter 3. I
thereby consider how the treatment of knowledge in Bedford stacks up to progressive
epistemological commitments that I contend are essential to the realization of social
justice—in particular, the commitment to take seriously and prioritize (but not to
idealize) the experiential knowledge of marginalized people.
1
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I wish to emphasize at the outset of this Part that my purpose in tracing these rhetorical
manoeuvres and their epistemological effects is not (or at least not primarily) to criticize
counsel, the courts, or other participants in Bedford for their approach to the fact-finding
process, nor to suggest what a better approach might be. Rather, my purpose is to
demonstrate how the legal context and process of strategic Charter litigation drives
participants to approach evidence, facts and knowledge in certain ways—ways that often
conflict with feminist epistemological insights and commitments. While I draw on
specific examples to illustrate my arguments, my ultimate aim is not to attribute fault to
individual actors but rather to illuminate the epistemological perils of engaging in
strategic Charter litigation as a tool for social change.

As in Chapter 3, I begin my investigation by examining the category of proof most
closely associated with the concept of experiential knowledge: the experiential evidence
of those directly affected by the impugned laws. This is the focus of the current chapter.
Because the evidence of the Crown-side experiential witnesses in Bedford falls under a
confidentiality order and publication ban, my analysis is limited to the treatment of the
applicants and applicant-side experiential witnesses. While it would have been preferable
to examine the treatment of the Crown-side experiential witnesses as well, it should be
noted that only one of these witnesses was cross-examined, suggesting that their evidence
was largely uncontested.3 In addition to the applicant-side experiential witnesses, I also
consider secondhand experiential accounts relayed through other witnesses, including
accounts gathered via qualitative research, to the extent that such accounts are treated as a
3
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source of experiential evidence. As a result, there is some overlap between the type of
evidence discussed here and in Chapter 5.

As my analysis demonstrates, many of the strategies used to frame experiential evidence
in Bedford rely upon, and thereby perpetuate, epistemic norms that have long served to
prop up social inequalities, including sexist stereotypes. These norms find roots in
mainstream Anglo-American epistemology as well as in law. At the same time, I point to
instances in which participants in Bedford resist these norms in ways that display
sensitivity to the importance of experiential knowledge. For some witnesses, this
resistance seems to arise from genuinely held progressive epistemological commitments.
And yet, I show how, in the context of adversarial litigation, the valorization of
experiential knowledge is often oversimplified and unmoored from its political roots,
serving primarily as an instrumental tool of advocacy rather than a thoughtfully held
political-epistemological commitment.

4.2 FRAMING STRATEGIES
The main strategies used to frame the experiential evidence in Bedford focus on two
general issues: 1) qualifications; and 2) reliability. Framing strategies related to
qualifications scrutinize the source(s) of an individual’s epistemic authority. In particular,
I canvas framing strategies that focus on an individual’s level of formal education,
knowledge of relevant law and policy, the immediacy of their experience, and the
representativeness of their experience. Framing strategies related to reliability ask
whether a given experiential account can be trusted as an accurate reflection of reality.
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These strategies speak to concerns about veracity and consistency, as well as the proper
interpretation of experience.
4.2.1 Qualifications
Formal Education
“Qualifications” is admittedly a strange place to start when thinking about experiential
evidence, reserved as this evaluative factor normally is for experts. The seeming
mismatch here highlights the slippage between the categories of experiential and expert
evidence in Bedford and other strategic Charter litigation (see Chapter 2 at 2.4.1 and
Chapter 3 at 3.4.3). The first set of qualifications-based strategies in Bedford exploits this
slippage to frame experiential witnesses as akin to unqualified experts. One such strategy
appeals to the mainstream privilege accorded to formal education, to discount the
epistemic authority of experiential witnesses. All three applicants in Bedford are subject
to questioning about their education in this vein, sometimes in an evidently demeaning
manner. For instance, counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario begins her crossexamination of Terri-Jean Bedford by asking: “It's not clear to me what grade you
actually achieved in school.”4 She questions Valerie Scott in a similar manner about her
efforts to obtain a university degree, emphasizing the fact that she only finished four
courses over a period of 13 years.5
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Given Bedford and Scott’s purported status as non-expert experiential witnesses, such
questions are arguably irrelevant.6 Doctrinally speaking, experiential witnesses do not
require special educational credentials, restricted as they are to offering immediate
observations of fact. As discussed in the previous two chapters, however, the line
between experiential fact evidence and expert opinion becomes significantly blurred in
strategic Charter litigation. In Bedford, the applicants and other experiential witnesses
offer opinions about matters of social and legislative fact that extend well beyond
firsthand sensory observations. Rather than arguing that these opinions are beyond the
scope of experiential evidence, counsel here challenges the qualifications of the witnesses
to give them. From a feminist perspective, the necessary qualifications may be
legitimately located in firsthand experience. The traditional approach at common law,
however, has been to privilege formal education and training as the most appropriate
bases for opinion evidence. Informed by this idea of whose knowledge counts, counsel
highlights the applicants’ (and other experiential witnesses’) lack of educational
credentials as a means to discount their epistemic authority.

In some ways, the applicants themselves play into the privilege accorded to formal
education as a ground for epistemic authority in the fact-finding process, despite their
own position as experiential (rather than expert) witnesses. Scott, for instance, repeatedly
emphasizes the importance of school and expresses her regret about not finishing high
school.7 And, when asked her views about how prostitution should be regulated,
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applicant Amy Lebovitch seems to qualify her authority on the topic: “Myself,
personally, as a sex worker and not a lawyer who understands, you know, the law like
you would, I'm someone who believes…”8 In other instances, however, resistance to this
norm arises through assertions of the significance of knowledge gained through lived
experience. For example, when asked about her level of education, Bedford remarks, “I
have a PhD in hard knocks.”9 While speaking from a different perspective and kind of
experience, Crown witness and anti-prostitution advocate Kathleen Quinn positions
herself in similar way. When asked, under cross-examination, whether she has studied the
sex trade in an academic context, she responds: “I have learned from the school of life.”10
Remarks such as these push back on the call for expert-like qualifications from
experiential and other lay witnesses by emphasizing the distinct epistemic value of
experience. An alternative epistemic norm emerges here—one that understands
experiential knowledge as on par with conventional forms of education and expertise.
The influence of the feminist epistemological insights discussed in Chapter 3 is apparent
in these moments.

Knowledge of Relevant Law and Policy
In addition to highlighting the applicants’ lack of formal education, another strategy
employed by Crown counsel in Bedford is to frame the applicants and other experiential
witnesses as ignorant of the laws and policies at issue in the case. Here it is the lawyers
themselves who elicit opinion evidence from the experiential witnesses, only to suggest
8
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that they are not qualified to give it, or at least that what they offer is of little value. In
this way, they cast doubt on the epistemic authority of the witnesses, without giving due
weight to their experiential knowledge.

Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, for instance, challenges Scott and Lebovitch
on their understanding of the living on the avails provision, so as to highlight their
relative lack of knowledge about the law being challenged.11 Counsel for Ontario asks
Lebovitch if she has obtained legal advice about the risk posed to her by the bawdy house
laws, to similar effect.12 The implication in each case is that the applicants have
misunderstood the extent to which the law negatively affects them. Probing the legal
understanding of the applicants themselves, however, is (once again) arguably irrelevant
given their role as experiential witnesses. The only purpose of such inquiries seems to be
to underscore the applicants’ ignorance, and thereby to undermine their authority.

Counsel for Ontario also poses a number of policy questions to the applicants and other
experiential witnesses in cross-examination, only to frame their responses as
unsophisticated. For instance, when Scott responds to a question about how to deal with
minors engaged in survival sex work, counsel retorts: “You haven't really defined any
sort of program, any specific program that you think these kids would benefit from. […]
This is just sort of some thoughts in your mind. Is that right?”13 After questioning a
number of experiential witnesses affiliated with sex work organizations about their
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preferred prostitution policy, counsel for Ontario points out in argument that none of
these organizations “appeared to have developed a specific platform concerning how
prostitution businesses would operate post-decriminalization.”14 The experiential
witnesses and their associated organizations are thereby portrayed as ignorant of the
nuances of relevant policy debates, despite the fact that these questions are arguably
outside the scope of experiential evidence, and irrelevant to the facts at issue in the case.
The applicants resist this strategy not by reinforcing the boundary between experiential
and expert evidence, but by pointing to their lived experience as a vital source of
expertise for decisions about how to regulate the sex trade. Contrary to counsel’s
insinuation that they lack the requisite knowledge for law and policy-making, they assert
that women in the trade are actually the “most knowledgeable” about how to regulate it.15
There is also a normative component to this view. As Scott and Lebovitch emphasize,
women in the trade should have input into policy decisions that directly affect them.16 By
framing firsthand experience as an important source of expertise, and by linking the
treatment of knowledge to ethical and political considerations, these claims challenge the
epistemological assumptions embedded in doctrinal law, and reflected in the fact-finding
process.
Immediacy of Experience
So far, I have discussed framing strategies in which counsel privilege conventional expert
qualifications as the proper basis for opinion evidence, and thereby implicitly discount
experiential knowledge. However, as I discuss further in section 4.2.2, there is also some
14
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recognition amongst counsel in Bedford of the importance and progressive connotations
of experiential knowledge in the fact-finding process. In light of this understanding, other
qualifications-based framing strategies take the opposite approach to those described
above: rather than discounting the epistemic value of lived experience, they co-opt the
progressive valorization of experiential knowledge, only to narrow the parameters of its
legitimacy, or to use it as a means of essentializing those whose rights are at stake.

One way in which counsel police the boundaries of proper experiential knowledge is to
suggest that a witness’ experience is too indirect. This strategy appeals to traditional
concerns about hearsay to discount the authority of experiential witnesses. For instance,
in cross-examining Scott, counsel for Ontario emphasizes that she hasn’t worked as a sex
worker since 1993, and is therefore relying on the secondhand accounts of other sex
workers to support her views on the trade.17 Similarly, counsel for Canada challenges
applicant witnesses Susan Davis and Carol-Lynn Strachan on their description of the
conditions faced by sex workers on the streets, by highlighting that they themselves have
not recently worked there, even though they have been closely involved in helping others
who have.18 Rather than discounting experiential knowledge as inadequately informed or
objective, the contention here is that the witness’ experience is not immediate or personal
enough.

When confronted with this strategy, Davis and Strachan respond by emphasizing their
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Scott cross, ibid at para 429 onwards.
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cross]; Strachan cross, supra note 8 at pp 22 and 29. See also Lebovitch cross, supra note 5 at paras 74-75.
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ongoing connections to the community of street sex workers where they live.19 Scott also
resists this strategy by turning it back against counsel in another part of the crossexamination. When asked to confirm counsel for Ontario’s depiction of what happens to
trafficked women in Canada, she responds: “I’ve heard that, though I do not have any
direct evidence.”20 In this way, she highlights the instrumentality of counsel’s approach
to the experiential evidence. In one moment, experiential witnesses are invited to offer
general opinions about the experiences of women in prostitution; in the next, their
observations are discounted as insufficiently grounded in direct, personal experience.

Representativeness of Experience
Another, closely connected and similarly shifting set of strategies focuses on the extent to
which a witness’ experiences and views are representative of the larger population whose
rights are at stake.21 The salience of this issue stems in part from the nature of strategic
Charter litigation itself. Taking Bedford as my example, it is widely recognized that the
experiences of people in prostitution are extremely diverse.22 The notion that this group
constitutes a cohesive community is itself questionable,23 let alone an individual’s claim

19

Davis cross, ibid at para 104; Strachan cross, ibid at p 23.
Scott cross, supra note 5 at para 627.
21
This question of representativeness connects to issues of standing and participation in litigation that I
address in Chapter 8. It also bears some parallels to the issue of sampling and generalization in social
science research, which I discuss in Chapter 5.
22
This is affirmed at several points on the record. See for example: Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC
4264 (Cross-Examination of Wendy Harris at para 200) [Harris cross]; Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010
ONSC 4264 Cross-Examination of Kara Gillies at para 243); Bedford ONSC, supra note 1 at para 88.
23
May-Len Skilbrei historicizes this notion by describing how, in Norway, targeted social services aimed at
prostitution contributed to the construction of people who sell sex as a cohesive group, beginning in the late
1970s. May-Len Skilbrei, “Speaking the Truth About Prostitution” in Marlene Spanger & May-Len
Skilbrei, eds, Prostitution Research in Context: Methodology, Representation and Power (London:
Routledge, 2017) at 37-38 [Spanger & Skilbrei, Prostitution Research]. Mariana Valverde similarly
describes how LGBT rights litigation contributed to the construction of "sexual orientation" as a "natural or
20

177

to represent that community. And yet, the applicants and other experiential witnesses
inevitably do play a representative role in the litigation, standing in as they do for a much
larger group of people whose rights are affected by the impugned laws. In Bedford, some
of the experiential witnesses also give evidence in their capacity as directors of
organizations that purport to represent sex workers, adding a further layer of
representation.24

One way in which counsel exploit the problem of representativeness in strategic Charter
litigation is to frame certain experiential narratives as exceptional, and thus
unrepresentative of the wider population whose rights are at issue. This strategy relies on
the assumption that experiential evidence matters only to the extent that it can be
generalized to the wider population (an assumption that the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) in Bedford ultimately rejects as inappropriate to the determination of s.7 rights).25
For example, when Scott talks in her evidence about aspiring to be a sex worker from a
young age, counsel for Canada seizes on this point to suggest that she is “pretty
exceptional”—i.e. not representative of most sex workers.26 On the other side of the
litigation, the applicants’ (respondents on appeal) factum at the Ontario Court of Appeal
argues that the experiential evidence tendered by the Crown is largely irrelevant to the

quasi-natural entity preexisting law". Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) at 114.
24
For instance, at the time of the litigation, Scott and Lebovitch were the Executive Director and
Spokesperson, respectively, for Sex Professionals of Canada (SPOC), an organization founded by Scott.
Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Affidavit of Valerie Scott at para 27) [Scott affidavit];
Lebovitch cross, supra note 5 at para 210.
25
Bedford SCC, supra note 1 at paras 123, 126-127.
26
Scott cross, supra note 5 at para 75. Counsel pursues a similar strategy with experiential witness CarolLynn Strachan: Strachan cross, supra note 8 p 13.
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factual issues at play in the case, since only 4 out of the 9 Crown-side experiential
witnesses had experience doing in-call work.27
In other instances, however, counsel take the opposite tack. Here, counsel draw on
particular experiential accounts to bolster a more general narrative about prostitution,
suggesting that a given account is indeed typical of the wider population. This strategy
assumes that the experiences of people who sell sex are homogenous enough to be
knowable through particular, representative individuals. An especially striking example
occurs in the cross-examination of Lebovitch by counsel for Ontario. Having first asked
Lebovitch if she has ever been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder,28 counsel
launches into a series of questions about why she was crying earlier in the cross (the
crying was in response to a different counsel’s questions). Noting that Lebovitch cried
“about five times”29 during the cross, counsel suggests that she may be experiencing
“some emotional disturbance about your experiences in prostitution”30 and eventually
asks Lebovitch if she thinks she might be suffering from PTSD, which Lebovitch
denies.31 Given that the judge will only receive a transcript of the cross-examination,
counsel here goes out of her way to paint a descriptive picture of Lebovitch’s distraught
demeanour, thereby recreating the compelling human drama of a viva voce experiential
witness. In this way she uses Lebovitch’s testimony to reinforce the Crown’s general
narrative about the traumatic effects of prostitution.
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While framing experiential narratives in opposing ways (exceptional versus
representative), these two strategies rely on a common epistemological approach—one
that privileges generalization over contextualized accounts of experience, and thereby sits
in tension with feminist epistemological commitments. Several participants in Bedford
resist this approach and the archetypal narratives about prostitution that it gives rise to.
For instance, when asked to affirm that people often enter the sex trade due to various
forms of abuse, Wendy Harris, an applicant-side experiential witness, responds:
Well, I find all of these are the negative aspects of the sex trade and, yes,
there is that faction of the sex trade population, that these things have
possibly affected the outcomes of their lives. But there's also the other
ones that it doesn't pertain to at all, so I'm stuck for an answer here
because in certain cases this is very true. In other cases, it's totally
irrelevant. I cannot lump everybody together.
[…]
I don't find that this is the basic description of a sex trade worker.32

And, while Scott does not shy away from playing a representative role in litigation,33
Lebovitch and Strachan make a point of noting that they do not purport to speak for
others in the trade. 34
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In her reasons on the application, Justice Himel similarly refuses to lump the experience
of all people in prostitution together. As a result, however, she finds the experiential
evidence in Bedford to be of limited value. Having summarized the evidence of the
experiential witnesses (excluding the applicants), she states:
While this evidence provided helpful background information, it is clear
that there is no one person who can be said to be representative of
prostitutes in Canada; the affiants are an extremely diverse group of
people whose reasons for entry into prostitution, lifestyles, and
experiences differ.35
As I discuss further in Chapter 7, for Himel J, the inevitable failure of the experiential
witnesses in Bedford to represent all people in prostitution gives reason to discount the
weight of their evidence in favour of other types of evidence. The assumption that
experiential evidence is significant only to the extent that it is generalizable returns again
here. Given this assumption, essentialized ideas about prostitution cannot be complicated
without rendering the experiential evidence meaningless.
Himel J’s treatment of the experiential evidence here illustrates the conundrum presented
by such evidence in the context of strategic Charter litigation. On the one hand, firsthand
experience is often viewed as central to a Charter challenge. It is at the heart of
understanding the law’s potentially unconstitutional effects; without it, there could be no
rights violation. On the other hand, individual experience is inevitably idiosyncratic. This
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presents a problem for courts tasked with adjudicating systemic socio-legal issues that
affect large swaths of the population.
4.2.2 Reliability
Apart from qualifications, the other main focus of the framing strategies used on the
experiential evidence in Bedford is reliability. Included here are strategies related to: 1)
veracity and consistency; and 2) the proper interpretation of experience. While raising
legitimate concerns in some instances, these strategies (like many of those above) tend to
bank on mainstream assumptions that undermine the experiential knowledge of
marginalized people. This includes longstanding sexist stereotypes of women as
manipulative, untrustworthy, and not knowing their own minds.36 As in the previous
section, my analysis here is complicated by the fact that these framing strategies are
employed in shifting ways, alongside appeals to the importance of attending carefully to
firsthand experiential accounts. As I will show, however, the latter norm is often
mobilized only instrumentally, without regard for its political roots and associated
commitments.
Veracity and Consistency
One framing strategy used to challenge the reliability of the experiential evidence in
Bedford is to raise doubts about its veracity. For the most part, such challenges are not
aimed directly at the experiential witnesses in the case, but rather at secondhand
experiential accounts relayed or discussed by other witnesses. A related strategy points to
36
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perceived errors and inconsistencies in experiential accounts as a means to discount their
reliability.37 Underlying both of these strategies are longstanding stereotypes of women,
and of sex workers, as dishonest, untrustworthy, ignorant, and/or confused.38

Of course, it may be objected that attacks on credibility, along with allegations of error or
inconsistency, are simply standard fare in adversarial proceedings, and thus
unremarkable. To this I offer two responses. First, the fact that these strategies are a
typical component of the adversarial process is precisely what makes a close analysis of
their epistemic assumptions and effects worthwhile. Second, it is important to remember
that strategic Charter challenges to legislation differ significantly from other forms of
litigation. Where a case centres on adjudicative facts, attacks of this nature are indeed to
be expected. In the context of strategic Charter challenges to legislation, however, where
the focus is on social and legislative facts, such attacks are arguably much less essential.
Indeed, several of the litigators I interviewed, including Alan Young (counsel for the
applicants in Bedford), suggested that it is often not necessary or helpful to question the
credibility of experiential witnesses in strategic Charter challenges, or even to crossexamine them at all.39
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In some instances, doubts about the veracity of experiential accounts in Bedford are
raised in ways that do not trade on stereotypes about women’s and/or sex workers’
general lack of credibility. For instance, in their scholarship on sex work research
methodology (included in the record in Bedford), applicant-side experts Frances Shaver
and Cecilia Benoit note that the stigmatization of sex work may lead sex workers to give
untruthful or otherwise unreliable information to researchers due to concerns about
protecting their identity and other personal information.40 To the extent that these
concerns are acknowledged as legitimate, characterizing the resulting research data as
unreliable does not show a lack of respect for experiential knowledge, but rather
highlights the challenges of effectively accessing it. In other words, the underlying
assumption here is not that sex workers are liars, but that they may have good reason to
lie in particular circumstances.

On the other hand, negative stereotypes may also play a role in challenges to the veracity
of sex workers’ responses in the context of qualitative social science research. Take, for
example, the following exchange from the cross-examination of key applicant expert
John Lowman, regarding one of his research studies:
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Q. And am I also correct that you yourself indicated a very important
limitation, namely, there's no way of knowing if or how much your
respondents underreported their own violent behaviour, correct?

A. There is no way of knowing in any of these prostitution surveys that
we're talking about the veracity of the respondents. Some people, for
example, say that women on the street exaggerate their miserable
circumstances in order for researchers to feel sorry for them. I don't
believe that for one minute, but you hear those kinds of arguments made
about all forms of interview research.41

In this passage, Lowman indicates how negative stereotypes about sex workers may
inform arguments about the reliability of research data. Indeed, Lowman himself seems
to be banking on the stereotype at issue here to make a point (that women on the streets
are not as miserable as they report), even while explicitly disavowing it.

Beyond the context of qualitative research, the question of veracity arises where
witnesses (experiential and otherwise) describe impressions they have formed on the
basis of more informal interactions with sex workers. Scott, for example, relies on
information received from “contacts in the industry” to ground her opinion about the
ongoing difficulties faced by sex workers as a result of the impugned laws.42 In crossexamination, counsel for Ontario suggests that these women may be lying to her:

41
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Lowman cross, supra note 37 at para 1107.
Scott affidavit, supra note 24 at para 30.
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Q. Whom do you rely on to provide your information?
A. I rely on the women in the business, as opposed to social workers and
people like that.
Q. Where do you meet these women?
A. Oh, either on the street, either at Maggie's, either at my house, or often
on the phone, or at other girls' houses, too.
438. Q. But you have really no way of checking whether or not what they
tell you is the truth.
A. No.
Q. You have to rely on them and really you don't know whether they're
telling you the truth.
A. I don't.
Q. You believe them.
A. I do.
Q. And you're asking us to believe them because you believe them.
[…]
A. Look, when a girl is calling me and when I'm really trying to get her to
report a bad client and she's terrified because she's terrified she'll be
arrested, and this happens often, do you really think she's lying? I don't
think she's lying.
Q. You don't think she's lying.
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Counsel’s line of questioning here may be interpreted as raising general concerns about
the reliability of hearsay evidence. However it also arguably invokes a stereotype-infused
view of sex workers as lacking credibility. In her responses, Scott resists this underlying
norm. Not only does she affirm her belief in the truthfulness of her peers’ accounts, she
frames them as a better source of information than others who may purport to speak on
their behalf, like social workers. In this way, Scott displays her commitment to the
prioritization of experiential knowledge. It is important to note that Scott’s confidence in
the truthfulness of the accounts at issue here also arises from her own position as a
listener. As evidenced by her statement about the circumstances in which she might
receive a call from a sex worker, Scott’s own experience and engagement with the
community at issue puts her in a better position to elicit truthful experiential accounts,
compared, for instance, to researchers with limited ties to the community. I discuss this
point further in Chapter 5.

In his cross-examination of various police officers, counsel for the applicants, Alan
Young, also seems to resist the notion that sex workers cannot be trusted to tell the truth,
suggesting instead that they should be believed and taken seriously. Young, however,
advances this idea in a much more instrumental fashion. His exchange with officer Jim
Morrissey is illustrative. In his affidavit, Morrissey suggests that sex workers often lie to
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him at first, but become more honest as they get to know him—an assertion also made by
officer Eduardo Dizon and others: 44

It is typical for prostitutes who I encounter for the first time to claim to
like what they are doing. However as I build relationships with these
women and gain their trust, they tell a different story of unfortunate
personal circumstances which led to prostitution.45

In cross-examination, Young probes Morrissey on this point, suggesting that rather than
taking sex workers at their word when they claim to be engaging in the sex trade by
choice, Morrissey searches for dark stories from their past (Young makes a similar
accusation against both Dizon and Crown expert Richard Poulin).46 But then, when
Morrissey repeats the explanation from his affidavit, Young suggests that perhaps he has
it backwards: perhaps when these women tell Morrissey that they actually don’t like
prostitution and want to leave the trade, they are only saying the things that Morrissey
wants to hear so that he will help them with whatever problem they are facing in the
moment.47 Young makes a similar suggestion in his cross-examination of officer Sonia
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Joyal.48 In this way, Young too perpetuates the stereotype of sex workers as lying and
manipulative—only to make a different point.

Nevertheless, Young continues to admonish Morrissey for refusing to believe sex
workers throughout the rest of the cross-examination. One exchange is particular telling.
It begins when Morrissey asserts that most street workers don’t account for police
presence in choosing where to work, even though that is what they claim. The exchange
proceeds as follows:

Young: You know, that is the second time since we have been talking that
you said they claim something and you don’t believe it. You discount a lot
of things they tell you that you don’t agree with; isn’t that right?

Morrissey: Well, we’ve already discussed they lie to me every day.

Young: So when they are claiming choice, you don’t see it. When they
claim they care about police presence, you are saying, no, that is not their
consideration?

[…]

Morrissey: I don’t discount what they say when I think they’re being
truthful.49
48
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By framing Morrissey’s disbelief of sex workers as troubling, Young appeals to critical
insights about the importance of taking experiential accounts seriously. In one sense, this
view accords with his explanation for not cross-examining most of the Crown-side
experiential witnesses in Bedford. As he put it in an interview for this project: “I never
denied there's two narratives, my witnesses and theirs. They're both narratives. And
they're both real […] So I didn't see a need to question these people about horrors they
had in their work.”50 A certain respect for the experiential knowledge of people in the sex
trade can be gleaned from this comment. At the same time, the notion that experiences of
prostitution can be boiled down to two essential narratives illustrates the extent to which
feminist insights about experiential knowledge are flattened and oversimplified in the
context of adversarial litigation. Young’s own suggestion that sex workers may be lying
to police in a different way also reveals the instrumentality of his appeal to experiential
knowledge in the litigation context. Whatever his personal views, Young in Bedford
shows a readiness to mobilize shifting epistemic postures as suits the needs of his case.
Progressive insights about the importance of experiential knowledge are thereby
decontextualized and instrumentalized through the adversarial process of litigation.
Interpretations of Experience
A second framing strategy aimed at the reliability of experiential accounts in Bedford
casts doubt on how sex workers interpret their own experiences. This strategy is informed
by the assumption, ingrained in common law doctrine, that factual observation and
interpretation are distinct and readily separable components of the process by which
49
50
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knowledge is formed. Speaking of qualitative research, Lorraine Nencel observes, “there
are a significant number of studies that retell the stories of sex workers through the moral
lens of the researcher, claiming that sex workers who think they choose freely to work in
the trade suffer from ‘false consciousness’”.51 In litigation, non-experiential witnesses
and counsel mobilize similar notions of false consciousness, or at least false
interpretation of experience, to advance their own narratives of what sex workers’ lives
are like. In doing so, they discount the experiential knowledge of sex workers’
themselves.

This strategy can be seen in the evidence of several Crown police officers. Officer Dizon,
for instance, asserts in his affidavit: “If you were to ask a sex worker, ‘Do you want to be
here?’, the initial response for virtually every one would be ‘Yes’. […] The reality
couldn’t be further from this initial response.”52 Dizon goes on to offer a number of
sweeping generalizations about the “reality” of sex workers’ lives before explaining that,
“‘Yes’ is more appropriately viewed as a psychological defence mechanism”.53 Officer
Jim Morrissey frames the secondhand accounts of women who sell sex in a similar way
in his cross-examination. In the course of a discussion about pimping, Young asks
Morrissey if he disagrees with studies indicating that most adult sex workers work
independently. In response, Morrissey claims that “those girls” will say they are
independent operators when they are really not, because “their man” is arranging their
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dates and controlling their money.54 “That’s not an independent operator. She can try and
justify this any way she wants, because they do with me all the time, but I’m sorry…”55
The implication is that women who sell sex are either in denial about their situation, or
misinterpreting what it means to operate independently.

As Dizon’s comment about psychological defence mechanisms illustrates, some
witnesses draw on a pathologizing discourse to cast doubt on the self-interpreted
experience of those who sell sex. Further examples of this occur in the evidence of
several Crown experts. For instance, Poulin, a Canadian sociologist, states in his affidavit
that because prostituted persons suffer from emotional dissociation, “what they say is
generally extremely ambivalent”56—a term Poulin defines as “the simultaneous existence
of contradictory psychological states”.57 Similarly, Alexis Kennedy, a Crown expert in
psychology, claims that women often have “cognitive distortions” about how or why they
began working. 58 These opinions are later cited in the Attorney General of Ontario’s
factum at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (ONSC).59

In some instances, the experts in Bedford reinterpret the firsthand accounts of women in
the sex trade so as to construct a general narrative about prostitution that accords with
their own political views. This is illustrated by the evidence of Melissa Farley and Janet
Raymond, two key Crown witnesses who draw on notions of false consciousness to
54
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advance their view of prostitution as a form of exploitation. In discussing her research in
cross-examination, Raymond explains, “I have spoken with women who say they have
chosen this, but as I speak with them more, it becomes very clear that they have been
abused...”60 Raymond goes on to challenge researchers who rely on one-time interactions
with sex workers to collect data, and thus “don’t work with women over a period of time
when you really begin to hear the truth about their lives.”61 The assumption, of course, is
that Raymond herself is well positioned to discern that truth. Farley similarly asserts that
those who are interviewed for research may “underestimate the extent of the traumatic
circumstances and the violence they were subjected to.”62 As pointed out by the
applicants in argument, however, she accepts women’s accounts of violence and fear in
the sex trade without reservation. 63

Counsel for Canada and Ontario also draw on the notion that sex workers falsely interpret
their experience as a framing strategy to discount experiential evidence as unreliable in
Bedford. One example occurs in Lowman’s cross-examination, where he is describing a
study of off-street sex workers conducted by his master’s student, Tamara O’Doherty.
Lowman explains that the study targeted women who had previously said they took
offence to the assumption that all prostitutes were victims. Counsel for Canada then
suggests that the interviewees may have minimized their experience of violence, given
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their resistance to being labeled as victims.64 The interviewees’ accounts are thus framed
as politically constructed, while the expert narrative of prostitution as victimization
remains unchallenged in this way. In another instance, counsel for Ontario questions
Scott’s firsthand evidence about her negative experiences with police, asking “Were they
just doing their job? Is that what you consider negative?”65 While the interviewees in
O’Doherty’s study are alleged to have minimized experiences of violence, Scott is
thereby accused of exaggerating hers when it comes to encounters with the police.

As the above examples suggest, the notion that people who sell sex falsely interpret their
experience is deployed mainly by the Crown in Bedford. Nevertheless, examples can also
be found from the applicant side of the case. For instance, in her affidavit, applicant
expert and sociologist Eleanor Maticka-Tyndale describes the findings of a major study
she co-conducted as follows:

While some street-based workers reported feeling safer on the street
because they were more visible, our study determined that the perceptions
of these particular workers are not aligned with the reality, which is that
street-based workers do experience the greatest degree of violence of all
sex workers.66
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In this passage, Tyndale discounts the reliability of sex workers’ experiential reports by
measuring them against her own research findings. Of course, one might argue that her
research provides a broader perspective on “reality” than any one individual can offer.
However, to suggest that people’s reports of feeling safer “are not aligned with reality”
not only discounts feelings of security as real and significant in themselves, but ignores
local variations in safety conditions that may not be captured by generalized research
findings, but would be well known by those on the ground.

The notion that sex workers falsely interpret their experience, then, is widely mobilized
in Bedford, especially but not exclusively by the Crown, to discount the reliability of
experiential accounts. By privileging their own experience, research and judgment in
these instances, witnesses and counsel bolster their own authority as knowers at the
expense of those with firsthand experience in the trade. The latter thereby lose control
over their narratives through the fact-finding process. Still, as with most of the other
framing strategies discussed so far, this strategy does not operate monolithically. In many
instances, participants in Bedford (sometimes the same ones) resist the notion of false
consciousness, and/or appeal to progressive ideas about the importance of experiential
knowledge that seem to run counter to it. As discussed in Chapter 3, these ideas can be
traced back to critical feminist politics and scholarship. However, while some witnesses
display a genuine commitment to this alternative epistemological approach, others—
including counsel—invoke it only in a highly selective and instrumental manner.
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As might be expected, one can clearly see this alternative approach at work in the
applicants’ case. In some instances, applicant-side experts adopt progressive
epistemological commitments on a seemingly principled basis, as guiding their approach
to research. Lowman is a good example. In his affidavit he sets out a classification
scheme to reflect what he views as a spectrum of choice to participate in the sex trade.67
In cross-examination, counsel for Canada asks Lowman where on this spectrum a teenage
runaway recruited by a pimp would fit. Lowman responds: “I would need to interview the
young person to see what they felt about the situation. That’s the point of research.”68
Rather than claiming the authority to assess the level of choice exercised by a sex worker,
as counsel implies he should, Lowman affirms the worker’s own authority to interpret her
level of choice. As he puts it, “unlike many researchers, particularly prohibitionists, I
recognize the degree of choice that women themselves insist that they make.”69

Another expert witness for the applicants, Deborah Brock, also describes her approach to
research as one that pays attention to how women portray their own experiences in the
sex trade. In describing the trajectory of her research, Brock recounts speaking to sex
workers who did not endorse the views of prostitution that she had been exposed to
through sociology and radical feminist scholarship, and feeling the need to account for
that.70 Again here, there is an appeal to the firsthand knowledge of sex workers as a
foundation for responsible research.
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As counsel for the applicants, Young too draws on the progressive valorization of
experiential knowledge to frame the evidence of various Crown witnesses as problematic.
For instance, in cross-examining Farley, he invokes this idea to cast doubt on her claim
that women in prostitution tend to minimize their negative experiences:

Q: […] Is this this idea that because of dissociation, unhappy people aren't
aware that they are unhappy? Is that what you're saying?
A. No.
Q. Why would these people not be able to tell you…71

In another instance, Young challenges Crown expert Alexis Kennedy’s use of indirect
sources to support her claim that women do not enter prostitution as a fully informed and
free choice:

Q. So you're drawing conclusions about whether a woman has made a free
choice based on what third parties are saying women are doing.
A. No, ten of the women were women who were prostituted.
Q. But you also had police officers, social workers, and others. Do you think
they're a valuable source of understanding what goes on in the mind of a sex
trade worker?
A. Well, they're a source, not as strong a voice as the women themselves.
Q. Do you think there's a problem in sex trade research that a lot of people
make assumptions about what sex workers want and think? Do you think
71
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that's a problem in the literature you've read?
A. Yes.72

Young also challenges the manner in which Crown police witnesses impose their own
interpretations onto sex workers’ lived experience, rather than taking what they say at
face value. As he puts it to officer Sonia Joyal: “You said once you hear their story, you
realize it is not a choice. So it is a conclusion you drew. It wasn’t what they said.”73
Young thus presents himself as a defender of sex workers’ experiential knowledge.
However, as with the framing strategy targeting veracity, Young invokes progressive
epistemological insights in a selective manner here, bolstering only those experiential
accounts that emphasize work satisfaction and choice.

The emphasis on attending carefully to what sex workers say about their own experience
is, moreover, not restricted to applicant-side witnesses. Indeed, despite her reliance on
notions of false consciousness, Farley also makes a point of adopting this epistemic
posture throughout her affidavit and cross-examination, noting the importance of
“listening carefully to women in prostitution” and “paying careful attention to what
people tell us happens to them”.74 In cross-examination, she justifies her claim that
people in prostitution tend to minimize the abuses they face not by citing her research
data or clinical expertise, but by directly quoting one of her research subjects—a woman
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formerly involved in prostitution—who explains: “There’s a protective denial. You have
to convince yourself and everyone around you that it’s great. You tell the lie – ‘I like it’ –
so much that you believe it yourself.”75 In this instance, Farley aligns her approach with
the feminist commitment to centering experiential knowledge. However, she does so in a
highly selective way, mobilizing one experiential account to cast doubt on others.

Anti-prostitution advocate and Crown witness Kathleen Quinn also mobilizes progressive
epistemological commitments to support her views in cross-examination. When Young
suggests that her organization (the Prostitution Awareness and Action Foundation of
Edmonton, or PAAFE) relies upon literature produced by the likes of Farley and
Raymond, Quinn responds that in fact PAAFE relies on “the stories of women and
families”.76 In describing PAAFE’s mission, Quinn underscores the organization’s
efforts “to create spaces for people to express their voice” and “to give voice to those
experiences”.77 Like Young, then, Farley and Quinn also appeal to the notion that
firsthand experiential accounts ought to be prioritized and taken seriously. They just have
a different set of accounts in mind—those that describe suffering and exploitation, rather
than choice and autonomy. In either case, the self-interpreted accounts of those with
firsthand experience of the sex trade are valorized only to the extent that they accord with
a particular political stance.

The above examples suggest that, regardless of their position in the litigation, or their
actual epistemological commitments, participants in Bedford recognize and draw upon
75
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the power of the experiential knowledge paradigm. Indeed, the very same actors who
discount experiential accounts that do not accord with their view as false interpretations
of experience often also recognize and bank on the perceived importance of experiential
knowledge in some other way. The quickly shifting nature of these rhetorical moves
betrays their instrumentality. While feminist epistemologists such as Code grapple with
how to challenge the mainstream discounting of marginalized voices without resorting to
a naïve experientialism, the litigation context seems to impel actors to alternate between
these two opposing inclinations according to the needs of the moment. In this way,
progressive feminist insights are either frustrated, or instrumentalized through the factfinding process.

4.3 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have canvassed a number of strategies used by participants in Bedford to
frame the experiential evidence of those directly affected by the laws at issue in the case.
As I have demonstrated, these strategies reflect and perpetuate mainstream epistemic
norms—some of which are reinforced by evidentiary doctrine—that run counter to the
demands of epistemological justice. At the same time, I have also pointed to instances in
which witnesses and counsel resist the above strategies by appealing to progressive
insights about the importance of experiential knowledge. As I have shown, however, the
adversarial context of litigation tends to encourage oversimplified and decontextualized
appeals to experientialism that fail to live up to the more nuanced and principled insights
of feminist epistemologists. These conclusions are further supported by my analysis of
the strategies used to frame social science research and expert opinion evidence in
Bedford, to which I turn next.
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Chapter 5: The Treatment of Expert Opinion Evidence and
Social Science Research in Bedford
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, I began my examination of how progressive epistemological
commitments fare in Bedford v Canada (AG)1 by considering the treatment of
experiential evidence—a seemingly obvious starting point given the centrality of
experiential knowledge to my analysis. As it turns out, however, other categories of proof
offer even richer insights into the fate of these commitments in litigation. The treatment
of expert opinion evidence in Bedford is particularly illuminating in this regard, in part
because of how closely bound Anglo-American epistemology is to notions of science and
expertise. There is also significant overlap between experiential evidence and qualitative
social science research in Bedford, both of which serve as source of experiential
knowledge. It is thus to expert opinion evidence and the social science research upon
which it is founded that I now turn.2

Building on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter begins from
the understanding that what we see in strategic Charter litigation is not simply scientific
knowledge informing legal decision-making, but the active construction and strategic
mobilization of ideas about (social) science and expertise through the legal process. In
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Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 [Bedford ONSC], affirmed in 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford SCC].
Given the order established in Chapter 3, I might be expected to move from experiential evidence to
common sense as a related “lay” mode of proof. However, because of the overlap between experiential
evidence and qualitative social science research, I have found it more fitting to turn first to expert opinion
evidence. Leaving common sense to the end also suits what I have found to be its unique nature and special
importance in strategic Charter litigation.
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this I follow Sheila Jasanoff, who, as discussed earlier, critiques the notion that legitimate
science and expertise “are presumed to exist unproblematically in a world that is
independent of the day-to-day workings of the law.”3 According to Jasanoff, legal
proceedings contribute significantly to the process through which scientific knowledge is
constructed and disseminated.4 Importantly for this project, the legal treatment of science
and expertise also has broader epistemological effects. As Jasanoff puts it: “legal disputes
around scientific ‘facts’ often appear as sites where society is busily constructing its ideas
about what constitutes legitimate knowledge, who is entitled to speak for nature, and how
much deference science should command in relation to other modes of knowing.”5
Starting from this insight, I ask how ideas about science and expertise are constructed,
reinforced, and/or resisted through the fact-finding process of strategic Charter litigation,
and with what implications for epistemological justice.

To begin to answer these questions, I identify the main strategies employed by
participants in Bedford to frame the expert opinion evidence in the case, and consider the
underlying epistemic norms that these strategies rely upon and perpetuate. Drawing on
the work of Jasanoff and Thomas Gieryn discussed in Chapter 3, I explore the treatment
of this type of evidence as a process of boundary work, wherein actors in litigation draw
lines between good, bad, and non-science as a means to bolster or discount different parts
of the record. My analysis shows that, in doing this work, participants in Bedford
repeatedly bank on, and thereby reinforce, a set of hierarchical dichotomies that are

3

Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1995), Preface at xiii.
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Ibid at xv.
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deeply entrenched in mainstream science and epistemology (and sometimes also in legal
doctrine). These include: quantitative versus qualitative research; empirical observation
versus experiential anecdote; researcher versus research subject; expert versus
experiential witness; research versus advocacy; and fact versus opinion. Each of these
pairs can be mapped onto a more fundamental division between objective and subjective
knowledge, and in each case, the former is privileged over the latter.

By reinforcing these hierarchical dichotomies, participants on both sides of the case in
Bedford promote an epistemic ideal of detachment at the expense of knowledge that is
contextualized, sociopolitically engaged, and grounded in firsthand experience.
Underlying this ideal is the assumption—contrary to the feminist epistemological
perspective outlined in Chapter 3—that direct experience and engagement diminishes,
rather than enhancing, one’s understanding of a social phenomenon. As in the previous
chapter, attempts to resist and/or complicate this mainstream ideal also arise in Bedford,
revealing an alternative epistemological paradigm aligned with critical feminist insights.
In most cases, however, the adversarial context of the litigation drives counsel and other
actors to either suppress this alternative paradigm, or to mobilize it in a highly
instrumental manner.

The chapter proceeds in two sections. In the first section, I examine the treatment of the
social science research upon which expert opinions in Bedford are often founded,
focusing on issues of research methodology. Here I show how, despite the efforts of some
witnesses to underscore the complex and contested nature of methodological issues in
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social science research, the fact-finding process in Bedford encourages 1) the
construction of simplistic accounts of scientific methodology that reflect mainstream
epistemological and legal norms, and 2) the instrumentalization of such accounts in a
highly decontextualized manner. In the second section of the chapter, I examine framing
strategies related to the expert’s role, with a particular focus on issues of bias. Once again
here, I demonstrate the influence of mainstream epistemic norms rooted in the
objective/subjective dichotomy, and bolstered by doctrinal law. While some witnesses
resist these norms, their efforts are both subdued by the adversarial context of the
litigation and overridden by counsel.

Although I draw from the entirety of the record in Bedford, I focus primarily on two
important exchanges between opposing experts: the exchange of key applicant expert
John Lowman with Crown research methodology expert Ronald-Frans Melchers; and the
exchange of key Crown experts Melissa Farley and Janice Raymond with applicant reply
expert Ronald Weitzer. In these exchanges, experts with formal training in the social
sciences are called upon to articulate and apply disciplinary norms and principles of
research methodology to defend their own research and opinions, while discrediting those
of opposing experts, in a process that is carefully orchestrated by counsel. I also draw on
the written arguments of counsel, focusing on the facta of the applicants and the
respondent Attorney General of Canada.6

6

Although only an intervener, the Attorney General of Ontario also played a significant role in the case.
My analysis of the record thus includes cross-examinations conducted by both the Attorney General of
Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario. For practical reasons, however, and given the similarity of the
arguments made by both governments, I focus primarily on Canada’s facta.
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Before going on, a word of clarification is in order. There are many possible approaches
to examining the treatment of social science in Bedford and like cases. For instance, one
might follow the example of evidence scholars who have long raised concerns that legal
actors are poorly equipped to recognize good science from bad, and that they often get it
wrong.7 In this vein, it is tempting to shine a light on the many seeming misconceptions
of science, or errors in scientific reasoning, that arise in Bedford. To do so, however,
would be to jump wholeheartedly into the very boundary work that I seek to critique. To
be sure, my own judgments about science do, inevitably, inform this project. Still, it is
important to note that my interest is not in assessing how well legal actors understand
science, but in analyzing how they bank on common ideas about science in the course of
legal advocacy and judgment, and with what implications for the marginalized groups
whose interests are at stake. While there is undoubted value in scrutinizing the
competence (or lack thereof) of legal professionals in handling scientific information, I
leave this project to other, differently orientated scholars.

5.2 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Discussions of social science research on the record in Bedford are an important site for
the construction and mobilization of epistemic norms. This occurs both through
generalized articulations of scientific norms, and through the framing of particular
research studies. I begin this section with some preliminary remarks about how the factfinding process in Bedford shapes the construction of scientific norms generally, before
7

See for example: Learned Hand, “Historical and Practical Considerations regarding Expert Testimony”
(1901) 15:1 Harvard Law Review 40 at 54-55; David Paciocco, “Evaluating Expert Opinion Evidence for
the Purpose of Determining Admissibility: Lessons from the Law of Evidence,” (1994) 27 CR (4th) 302;
Gary Edmond, “Forensic Science and the Myth of Adversarial Testing” (2020) 32:2 Current Issues in
Criminal Justice 146.
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turning to the substantive content of those norms. My focus is on the explicit construction
of principles of research methodology. As I will show, the fact-finding process in
Bedford encourages simplistic and decontextualized articulations of methodological
principles grounded in a positivistic understanding of social science. While many of the
academic experts called as witnesses highlight points of contestation, complexity, and
uncertainty regarding methodological issues, these tend to be dismissed or minimized by
counsel in favour of more definitive articulations of key principles, and further diluted or
simply rendered invisible by the courts.

5.2.1 The Explicit Construction of Scientific Norms
One need not look far to observe how ideas about social science are explicitly constructed
and certified through the fact-finding process in Bedford. This often occurs at the behest
of counsel, who invite academic experts to describe the parameters and methodologies of
their home disciplines, and sometimes of science itself. The foundational definitions that
result, imbued with the authority vested in legally recognized experts, then serve as a
basis for attacks on specific pieces of research as “unscientific.”

The exchange between applicant expert John Lowman and Crown expert Ronald-Frans
Melchers offers one of the most interesting examples of how ideas about social science,
and research methodology in particular, are explicitly constructed in Bedford. Lowman, a
professor of criminology at Simon Fraser University, is the applicants’ principal expert
on commercialized sex. In his affidavit, he makes the following assertion:
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Based on my research, it is my belief that the Criminal Code operates in a
manner which violates the security of person for prostitutes in Canada. My
conclusion is threefold: 1) these provisions force survival sex workers
outside and into vulnerable areas, such as isolated streets and industrial
areas; 2) street-involved prostitution is more violent than working in offstreet venues; 3) in spite of this increased vulnerability, prostitutes do not
benefit from the same level of protection and response from police
authorities, especially when compared to other citizens.8

Lowman also claims that the communicating law has led to an increase in violence
against sex workers, without reducing street prostitution.9

Counsel for Canada calls on Melchers as an expert to critique Lowman’s findings. The
nature of Melchers’ role in the litigation is itself telling of how the fact-finding process
shapes the construction of social scientific norms. As he candidly acknowledges in his
affidavit (and as counsel also acknowledges),10 Melchers has no research expertise in
commercialized sex. Rather, he is called on the basis of his expertise in research
methodology generally.11 Melchers thus serves as a kind of meta-expert. His entire
contribution is grounded on the premise that there are agreed upon general principles of
research methodology that can be applied to evaluate specific research projects without

8

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Affidavit of John Lowman at para 7) [Lowman affidavit].
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10
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affidavit]; Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Factum of the Respondent at para 186) [Factum of
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any knowledge of the particular context of such projects (a premise questioned by
counsel for the applicants in cross-examination)12. The same is true of the Crown’s other
research methodology expert John Pratt,13 though his role in the case is less central.

In his affidavit, Melchers sets out to examine “to what extent the empirical evidence
submitted in support of Dr. Lowman's conclusions can be said to be the valid and reliable
results of independent, bias-free observations conducted following accepted standards of
social science research.”14 The framing of this question itself reveals a great deal about
the understanding of social science being put forward—one in which the researcher
operates as an independent epistemic agent, there are clear “accepted standards” of
research, a given set of observations ought to lead anyone to the same conclusions, and
where “bias-free observation” is possible (though Melchers does qualify the latter point
somewhat later in his affidavit).15 Not surprisingly, Melchers finds that Lowman’s
conclusions fail to meet this test. In order to explain his assessment, he sets out a ten-page
exposition on “Research Methods in Social Science” in which he outlines “Key Structural
Elements of Scientific Method”16 and includes a half-page flow chart entitled “Is it
Science?”17 Applying these general principles to Lowman’s research, Melchers concludes
that Lowman’s findings “do not meet even the minimal threshold that would qualify them

12

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Cross-Examination of Ronald-Frans Melchers at paras 1013) [Melchers cross]. See also Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Factum of the Applicants at
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as scientific statements of fact.”18
In a response given via supplementary affidavit, Lowman challenges Melchers’
description of scientific research methodology. He notes that, “Dr. Melcher’s positivistic
view of social science has been the subject of intense controversy for the past 150
years.”19 In particular, Lowman claims that Melchers has inappropriately applied
experimental and quantitative research standards to qualitative research.20 Counsel for the
applicants, Alan Young, reinforces this critique in cross-examination, implicitly accusing
Melchers of “scientism”.21 By highlighting differing approaches and ongoing debates in
the field, these responses complicate Melchers’ portrayal of scientific norms.
At the same time, Lowman advances his own explanation of research methodology,
based on his preferred textbook, and focusing on qualitative methods.22 While Lowman
volunteers much of this alternative account, counsel for Canada also elicits it by asking
Lowman to affirm several passages from a methods textbook in which the purpose and
methods of social science are broadly defined.23 Portions of Lowman’s account of
qualitative methods are later recited in written argument at the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice (ONSC).24 In this way, Lowman too participates in the articulation of a set of
general, decontextualized methodological principles for the purposes of the litigation.
18

Ibid at para 80.
Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Supplementary Affidavit of John Lowman at para 17)
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Furthermore, just as Melchers accuses Lowman of drawing unscientific conclusions, so
too does Lowman levy this accusation at Melchers, arguing that, “his claim that
‘prostitution is dangerous’ is informed by neither science nor social science.”25
Applicant expert Ronald Weitzer also makes a notable contribution to the construction of
methodological principles in Bedford. Like Melchers, Weitzer’s main role in the
litigation is to attack the evidence of the other side’s experts, in this case Melissa Farley
and Janice Raymond. (Weitzer, however, does have research expertise in commercialized
sex). In his affidavit, Weitzer contends that Farley and Raymond make claims that are
“based on an unscientific, ideological perspective” and that “violate some standard
canons of scientific research”, without directly stating what those canons are.26 In crossexamination, counsel for Canada explicitly articulates the principles that Weitzer implies
are canonical and asks him to affirm them.27 For instance, he asks Weitzer to affirm the
following statements: “Research should avoid the use of sweeping generalizations”; 28
“Research should avoid the use of unscientific and deterministic language”;29 and
“Research should use random, representative samples, where available”.30 Counsel also
asks Weitzer to explain how a scientific study differs from an unscientific one.31

The above examples illustrate how the fact-finding process in Bedford encourages
experts to engage in scientific boundary work, resulting in a highly definitive,
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decontextualized and positivistic portrayal of social science research methodology. In
part, this can be attributed to how experts frame their opinions to meet the demands of
litigation. Jasanoff, for instance, speaks of “the problem of ‘aggrandizement’: the
temptation of experts to give definitive rather than qualified answers, to deemphasize the
existence of other schools of thought, and to exaggerate the significance of their own
inferences.”32 Valverde’s description of her experience as an expert sociologist in LGBT
rights cases supports this observation. Under pressure to help the cause for which she was
testifying, and recognizing the positivistic understanding of social science at work in the
case, she found herself trying “to retain some intellectual integrity, for instance by
introducing unsolicited complexities serving to educate my interlocutors…”, only to end
up “undermining the theoeretical move I had just made and restoring the appearance of
the kind of social science I instinctively knew the law wanted.”33 This kind of dilemma
might explain Lowman’s inclination to both complicate Melchers’ summary of scientific
principles and to substitute his own account.

On top of the implicit pressure exerted by the adversarial context of litigation, however,
are the more deliberate efforts of counsel, in their quest for a clear and settled foundation
from which to mount attacks on opposing expert evidence, to minimize whatever
complications and nuances do arise in the accounts of social science on offer. Through
such efforts, often enacted in cross-examination, the more or less tentative explanations
of scientific norms and principles given by experts are hardened into “the facts” about

32
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science. For instance, in cross-examination, counsel for Canada asks Lowman whether he
has ever conducted research to disprove alternate hypotheses for the differing experiences
of street and off-street sex workers (i.e. that differential levels of violence between these
two arenas are actually just a reflection of the different demographics of the workers).34
Lowman embeds his answer within an extensive explanation of the iterative nature of
both quantitative and qualitative research, noting that it is “not quite as simple as it looks
in the textbooks.”35 Rather than acknowledging or engaging with this explanation,
however, counsel simply concludes “I’ll take that as a no.”36 In this way, the nuances of
the research process being interrogated are dismissed in favour of clear-cut answers that
better serve the adversarial goals of litigation.

The cross-examination of applicant expert Deborah Brock provides a particularly striking
example of the tendency for counsel to erase complexities in the definition of social
science in order to facilitate boundary work. When asked to define “ ‘sociology’ in
general”, Brock launches into a discussion of the many possible ways of doing research
in this field.37 Counsel responds to Brock’s extended explanation by attempting to distill
it down, and to confirm that sociology involves “the application of scientific principles to
a study of social context.”38 Brock agrees, but, taking an approach similar to the one in
this project, also notes that some researchers examine “how notions of science itself are
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socially constituted.”39 This comment gestures towards scholarship in sociology of
science, Science & Technology Studies (STS), and feminist epistemology, among other
fields. It has the potential to disturb, or at least complicate, descriptions of social science
offered by other experts. Counsel, however, is quick to brush the comment aside: “So
apart from this study of science itself, it’s important to sociology that scientific rigour be
brought to bear in the discipline.”40 In this way, counsel marginalizes the core insights of
STS and related fields, suggesting they can simply be hived off from mainstream
sociological research, where a clear standard of “scientific rigour” continues to prevail
unproblematically.

Scientific principles constructed through the fact-finding process are further hardened in
legal argument. In Bedford, this phenomenon is especially apparent on the Crown side.
Canada’s factum at the ONSC, for example, includes a section entitled What the expert
affiants agree are the principles governing social science research methodology – and
how these principles should be applied to research on prostitution in Canada and
abroad. Glossing over the kinds of contestation and nuance described above, the factum
declares that the experts in Bedford agree on many of these principles in the abstract, if
not their application.41 Not only do Canada’s facta make repeated reference to “the
principles of research methodology” (emphasis added) and their proper application—as
though these principles are clearly defined and agreed upon by all—they also suggest that
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Melchers, along with Dr. Pratt are in the best position to evaluate these principles.42
Based on the views of these two methodologists, the factum confidently asserts that the
Crown’s experts have complied with the principles of research methodology, while the
applicants’ experts have not.43 Any contestation over scientific principles, for instance in
the exchange between Melchers and Lowman, is thereby dismissed in service of a more
clear-cut narrative that serves the adversarial objective.

The subtleties of how experts construct the world of social science research in Bedford
are even more obscured in the reasons of the court. In her decision on the application,
Justice Himel does recognize some disagreement between the experts in Bedford over
methodological issues—specifically, what kinds of inferences can be drawn from
qualitative data.44 At the same time, she also recites, and thereby publicly certifies, some
of the general principles articulated on the record and in legal argument. 45 Most notable
in her reasons, however—and certainly in the reasons of the courts above—is the almost
complete invisibility of the whole discourse on scientific methods and norms that takes
place on the record and in argument. In this way, the whole process by which scientific
norms are constructed and mobilized in litigation becomes submerged, operating covertly
in the background to influence decision-making (or not), without exposure to critique.
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5.2.2 Mobilizing Scientific Norms: Four Key Framing Strategies
Having discussed the general manner in which principles of social science research are
constructed in Bedford, I turn now to the substantive content of these principles as they
are articulated and mobilized to attack particular research studies. Here I focus on four
methodological norms rooted in mainstream epistemology that serve as the ground for
key framing strategies in Bedford: 1) the privileging of quantitative over qualitative
research; 2) the idealization of random sampling; 3) the division of researchers and
research subjects; and 4) the privileging of primary over secondary research.
The Privileging of Quantitative over Qualitative Research
The first framing strategy banks on the privilege traditionally accorded to quantitative
research methods as more “rigorous”, “empirical” or “scientific” than qualitative
methods. As discussed in Chapter 3, this epistemic hierarchy is rooted in the
paradigmatic status of physics and mathematics in the history of science. It is, moreover,
tied to a particular ideal of objectivity that strives for the exclusion of all subjective
influence. As Isabel Crowhurst explains:

Numbers are construed as superior epistemological units, because they are
not viewed as interpreting reality - a process that is seen as liable to
subjective bias - rather they are assumed to accurately and truthfully
describe it. They are believed to be pre-interpretive and even noninterpretive, even though, of course, they are themselves interpretations,
which are embedded in and reflect particular epistemological and
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ontological perspectives.46

In Bedford, the purported superiority of quantitative research serves as an important
ground for boundary work, while also inviting resistance and challenge in some
instances. Given the close connection between qualitative research and experiential
knowledge, these rhetorical moves have important implications for epistemological
justice, as my analysis demonstrates.

Some of the most explicit affirmations of the privilege accorded to quantitative research
occur in Melchers’ affidavit evidence. There he states:

In statistical studies, there are commonly accepted tests, criteria and
thresholds for the making of confident conclusions. In qualitative designs,
it is more difficult to assess whether the work of exploring alternative
explanations was thoroughly and properly done. Reasoning fallacies
abound in such work.47

Melchers expresses particular wariness towards qualitative projects that rely upon
accounts of lived experience. In his view, reasoning fallacies are especially likely to
occur “when the observer defines her task as that of ‘unearthing’ understandings or
46
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revealing the subjective experience of those observed.48 In the same vein, he warns that
research observations,
may rely excessively upon the memory or perspectives of subjects of often
unique, lived events not clearly representative of the larger concepts they
seek to inform, as in the case of anecdotal evidence. If any of these
assurances are found wanting, one is faced with either unsupported
opinions, appeals to the authority of the observer, or spontaneous
(informal or clinical) and irreproducible observations rather than with
scientific statements.49
The connection between the privilege afforded to quantitative research and the
devaluation of experiential knowledge becomes apparent here.
Despite his concerns, Melchers does recognize the value of qualitative methods for
researching certain kinds of questions, namely “the understandings social actors have of
their experiences and environment, and how these constitute their beliefs and inform their
decisions.”50 His wariness regarding the use of qualitative research in Bedford arises
largely from his view that such methods are “not suited for purposes of inference or
generalization.”51 Melchers’ mobilization of the quantitative/qualitative hierarchy to
attack Lowman’s evidence is thus closely related to how Lowman frames his own
conclusions, which is in turn linked to the framing of the facts at issue in the case.
According to Melchers, qualitative research cannot support Lowman’s claim that the
48
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Criminal Code provisions “endanger prostitutes”, because the claim is “quantitative and
causal in nature.”52 This leads him to find that Lowman’s affidavit “is speculative and
offers no empirical testing of hypotheses or valid and reliable evidence in support of its
conclusions.”53 Despite the large body of qualitative work cited by Lowman (including
both his own studies and those of other researchers), Melchers focuses his assessment on
a single table of numerical data about homicide rates in British Columbia, which he
identifies as “the only empirical evidence” that Lowman presents in support of his
claim54 (a characterization later adopted in Canada’s factum at the Ontario Court of
Appeal (ONCA)).55 Having cast doubt upon the reliability of the data in the table, he
concludes that Lowman’s opinion is unfounded.

However, neither the framing of Lowman’s conclusions, nor the framing of the
underlying facts at issue, remains static throughout the litigation. With respect to the
latter, the degree of causality that must be demonstrated between the impugned laws and
the dangers faced by sex workers to make out a security of the person violation under
section 7 is highly contested in Bedford. The law on this issue determines the fact that
must be proved, which in turn determines the nature of the evidence required. According
to Melchers and counsel for Canada, the language used in Lowman’s affidavit tends to
suggest a direct causal connection between the laws and the endangerment of sex
workers. This accords with counsel’s argument regarding the nature of the connection
that must be proved by the applicants. Under cross-examination, however, Lowman
52
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expresses repeated dissatisfaction with how the affidavit was drafted, and reframes his
opinion in weaker terms. Rather than asserting direct causation, he claims that the law
“materially contributes” to the endangerment of sex workers.56 This phrasing aligns with
what Young, as counsel for the applicants, argues is the appropriate legal test under s.7. It
also makes Lowman’s opinion easier to justify on the basis of qualitative evidence, while
rendering Melchers’ critique less compelling.57 Hence the applicants’ argument that
Melchers “has asked the wrong question and assessed the wrong conclusion.”58

While driven in part by the language used in Lowman’s original affidavit, Melchers’
insistence on a purely quantitative approach to the facts nevertheless relies on a view of
qualitative data as too trapped in subjectivity to provide any empirical evidence of
broader claims about the world. Qualitative observations, he suggests, may provide
insight into the experiences and perspectives of others, but they “cannot be taken as
evidence of the existence […] of phenomena.”59 Hence his repeated assertion under
cross-examination that the experiential accounts collected through Lowman’s interviews,
while “certainly valuable information”60, do not provide any evidence of whether the
impugned laws actually endanger prostitutes.61

Counsel for Canada invokes this view at many points in cross-examination to attack the
research of Lowman and others. Take, for instance, the following exchange discussing
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Lowman’s research finding that working for an escort agency is safer than street
prostitution:

Q: …that observation was based on what the women were telling you in
the interviews you were conducting. Is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. You didn't do an empirical measure of that, as you may have in other
circumstances.
A. Not at this point.62

Counsel pursues the point again a few paragraphs later:

Q: …is it really possible to draw any factual conclusions in an empirical
way comparing the rates of violence suffered by one population as against
any other?
A: those interviews do provide important empirical observations on the
basis of what women tell you about their experiences. 63

A similar exchange occurs later in the cross-examination, when counsel for Canada turns
to Beyond Decriminalization—a study by Pivot Legal Society in which Lowman and
others interviewed over 80 sex workers, as well as a few owners of indoor
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establishments.64 In his affidavit, Lowman cites this study to support his conclusion that
street sex workers are much more likely to face serious violence than off-street workers.65
To challenge this claim, counsel suggests that the study merely recorded “the overall
impression” of participants regarding the difference in violence between locations,
without “any actual comparison in terms of stats from one group or another.”66 In
response, Lowman explains that statistical analysis was not needed because the two
business owners could not recall a single violent incident on their premises. Counsel,
however, persists:
Q: I'm sorry, were there statistical analyses done here? My question is,
you're just recording overall impressions, correct, from the group?
A: Well, there's not much of a statistical analysis to do. […]
Q: So again I go back to my point, there is no objective measuring of one
versus another. This is overall impressions of people telling you…
A: This is not an impression. This is an objective report of the
circumstances of the happenings in these environments.67

Lowman, here, affirms the capacity of his interviewees to provide reliable empirical
observations that form the basis for social scientific findings. In spite of this, Canada’s
factum at the ONSC goes on to assert that because Beyond Decriminalization is based on
64
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interviews and not statistical comparisons, it offers “no findings” and “no empirical data”
on violence in indoor versus outdoor prostitution.68

Counsel for Canada pursues a similar strategy with other applicant witnesses. For
instance, in the cross-examination of applicant expert Cecilia Benoit, counsel emphasizes
that Benoit offers only qualitative, and not quantitative data on the relative safety of
different venues,69 and that her conclusions are “entirely from the self-reported comments
that were made by respondents to the interviewer.”70 Canada’s factum at the ONSC then
argues that according to “principles of research methodology”, Benoit’s study ought to be
discounted because “[d]ata in several instances is based on qualitative statements as
opposed to quantitative data, which calls into question the study’s usefulness.”71 The
factum makes a similar argument regarding the evidence of applicant expert Gayle
MacDonald, suggesting that because her study is qualitative and ethnographic, it is “less
empirical and more descriptive”, and thus fails to support her expert opinion.72 In
questioning sex worker and advocate Kara Gillies on her government-funded report about
the impact of Canadian prostitution laws on women, counsel once again discounts the
value of qualitative research, putting to Gillies: “So, in fact, there are no findings of

this study - as you say, the study was just qualitative.”73
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These are but a few examples of how the mainstream privilege accorded to
quantitative research is invoked to do boundary work in Bedford, at the expense of
feminist epistemological insights and associated commitments.74 In these examples,
counsel discounts the epistemic value of qualitative data—and the experiential
knowledge that underlies it—by excluding it from the realm of “objective”, “empirical”
science. This framing strategy rests upon an imagined dichotomy between the empirical
observations of researchers and the experience-based “impressions” of research subjects,
the latter being understood to carry little weight as evidence. In this way, the strategy
denies people with firsthand experience of the sex trade a role in the production of
knowledge about their own social world.

Still, as Lowman’s responses to counsel in the above examples show, the
quantitative/qualitative hierarchy does not stand uncontested in Bedford. In addition to
his resistance in cross-examination, Lowman raises an extensive challenge to this
epistemic norm in his supplementary affidavit, in response to Melchers’ critique. He
explains that since the 1920s, “alternative social scientific approaches have led to the
development of qualitative research methods which challenge the claim that experimental
and quasi- experimental methods are the only way to produce social scientific ‘truth’.”75
According to Lowman, Melchers’ account of methodological principles fails to canvas
qualitative methods, despite the fact that they are “widely accepted among social
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scientists.”76 In contrast to “purists” such as Melchers, he positions himself in the camp
of social scientists who take an “integrative approach”, viewing qualitative and
quantitative methods as complementary.77 In this way, Lowman constructs a counternarrative of research methodology in the social sciences—one that reframes Melchers’
account as marginal to the field.78

In opposition to Melchers, Lowman also asserts at several points that qualitative research
offers empirical information relevant to the facts at issue before the court,79 including
information capable of supporting causal inferences.80 He critiques Melchers’ focus on
the homicide data table as the only empirical evidence capable of speaking to the effects
of the impugned laws, arguing that Melchers “recognizes as ‘empirical’ only that which
is ‘quantitative’ ”81—a point reinforced by Young in the applicants’ factum at the
ONSC.82

Young further bolsters Lowman’s resistance to the quantitative/qualitative hierarchy in
his cross-examination of Melchers. In his affidavit, Melchers states that Lowman
“provides no empirical support for the proposition that the Criminal Code provisions on
prostitution cause the endangerment of street prostitutes or that the communicating
offence introduced in 1985 was the cause of increased danger to street prostitutes.”83
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With his very first question, Young asks Melchers to define “empirical”.84 Later in the
cross-examination, he uses the answer—“something that's available to observation using
the five senses”85—to challenge Melchers’ assertion about Lowman:

Q: …where you say there is no empirical support for the proposition, you
don't think that's a very overstated statement.
A: Not at all.
Q: Let's go back to your definition of empirical: observation. Why are
Professor Lowman's surveys and interviews with sex workers, police
officers, social workers, not empirical support? 86
In response, Melchers concedes that the surveys and interviews are indeed “empirical”,
but asserts that they are not “support”87—not even “weak support”, as Young tries to
suggest.88 Young presses the point:
Q: If I interview a sex worker and the sex worker says, “I don't want to
work on the streets, the police don't protect me, I'd like to be able to work
inside but the law doesn't permit me,” that's no evidence of anything.89
A: […] It's not support for a conclusion as to the actual effect of the law as
causing endangerment. It is an opinion, but it's not support. Now, I don't
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mean to be flippant, but if I were to ask a member of the Elvis Sighting
Society whether Elvis lives, the answer would not be support for the
proposition that Elvis is alive.

In this exchange, Young defends accounts of firsthand experience as a legitimate source
of empirical evidence, against Melchers’ dismissive approach. Later in the crossexamination, he goes on to affirm the value of qualitative research to the case by
challenging Melchers’ quantitative characterization of the facts at issue (and his attendant
focus on quantitative evidence):

Q: Not only is the experience of the sex trade amenable to qualitative
research, would you agree with me, that when you're asking what is the
impact of the law, it would be very hard to measure that in any
quantifiable way.

[…]

Q. And you would agree that quantitative research, despite best efforts,
has not yielded a clear and consistent answer to the question of does the
law deter. Will you agree with me?

A. I agree with you, yes.
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[…]

Q. I'm just trying to establish that there are difficult questions that
quantitative research won't necessarily answer. Even something as simple
as crime rate, raw data numbers, there are some problems with just using
the quantified numbers, correct?90

In this way, Young not only defends the value of qualitative research, but underscores the
limits of a purely quantitative approach. His final comment in particular highlights the
dangers of relying on decontextualized quantitative data in legal decision-making. This
accords with Crowhurt’s observation of how the contextual details of quantitative data
are often omitted from policy reports, resulting in “a process of simplification, which
entails the loss of depth and analytical complexity, while at the same time unreliable,
incomplete, or context-specific data become popular and generalised via their public
repetition, eventually acquiring the status of timeless ‘fact’.”91
So far, the discussion in this subsection suggests that the Crown side of the litigation in
Bedford tends to lean heavily on the epistemic privilege traditionally accorded to
quantitative research, while the applicant side resists the dominant paradigm. However, it
would be misleading to portray these opposing epistemic norms as tracking neatly onto
the two sides of the litigation. To the contrary, the instrumentality of Young’s strategy in
cross-examining Melchers is apparent when compared to the approach he takes with
Crown witnesses Richard Poulin and Melissa Farley. Despite having attacked Melchers
90
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for overemphasizing quantitative data at the expense of qualitative, Young does the same
thing to these witnesses. In his cross-examination of Poulin, he attempts to discount the
weight of informal research interviews by suggesting that they fail to produce “any data,
empirical data of percentages.”92 (To which Poulin responds: “You're empirical also
when you do this kind of interview. It's not only because you have percentages that you
are empirical.”93) In a discussion about Farley’s research on legalized brothels in Nevada,
Young puts to her: “…this is a purely qualitative, impressionistic study. There are no
quantitative data that come out of this, are there?”94 The factum of the applicants at the
ONSC also disparages Farley for her reliance on “anecdotes” told by her research
subjects.95 While admitting that these stories “do constitute some qualitative data”, the
factum draws on Weitzer to discount their value as evidence:

As noted by Dr. Weitzer, an expert witness called by the applicant in
reply, presenting anecdotes as definitive evidence “violates most of the
criteria for meaningful, serious, systemic, scientific thinking” and will
inevitably produce “questionable findings and spurious conclusions.”96
Thus, the applicant side too is willing to invoke the dominant paradigm where it suits
their case. In the hands of counsel, the defense of qualitative research and experiential
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knowledge turns out to be no more than a tool of advocacy, to be advanced or discarded
according to the needs of the moment.
The Idealization of Random Sampling
The privileging of quantitative research methods in Bedford is closely linked to another
key framing strategy that banks upon the perceived superiority of large-scale probability
(i.e. random) sampling. While often touted as the “gold standard” for scientific research,
the ideal of random sampling applies mainly to quantitative research, where the goal is to
generate numerical data that is as representative as possible of the larger population.
Qualitative studies, on the other hand, tend to sacrifice scale and representativeness in
order to gather richer, more-depth information. The idealization of random sampling thus
accords with the quantitative/qualitative hierarchy mobilized throughout the record.

Interestingly, the invocation of random sampling as a methodological ideal in Bedford
occurs despite clear acknowledgment from all sides that such an approach is impractical
if not impossible in the context of research on the sex trade (and a great deal of other
social science research). As noted in the materials on the record, the illicit and
stigmatized nature of sex work impedes researchers’ ability to ascertain the size and
boundaries of the population in a given location, and thus to obtain a random sample.97 It
is also extremely difficult to yield a representative sample via other methods.98 Despite
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the consensus on this point in Bedford, actors on both sides of the litigation (albeit more
on the Crown side) instrumentalize the ideal of random or representative sampling to
discount research studies that work against their interest in the litigation, often in highly
decontextualized manner. When seeking to defend or bolster helpful research, on the
other hand, witnesses and counsel (primarily on the applicant side) take a far more
nuanced and contextualized approach to sampling methods.

Counsel for Canada’s cross-examination of Lowman is once again illustrative here.
Despite counsel’s own acknowledgement that representative sampling is “difficult, if not
impossible” to achieve in prostitution research,99 and despite Lowman’s readiness to
concede that his research findings are not based on representative samples,100 counsel
repeatedly invokes the ideal of the random sample to attack Lowman’s research and the
research he relies upon. When asked if he has pursued “next best” alternatives to random
sampling discussed in a given methodology textbook,101 Lowman explains that such
methods are “effectively not possible” in a field setting, and emphasizes that there are
many other ways to examine the factual questions at issue, including qualitative
methods.102 Nevertheless, with each new study addressed in the cross-examination,
counsel asks Lowman to confirm that the sample used was not representative. In a
response that becomes rote, Lowman agrees: “It has that characteristic, along with every
other field study of prostitution in the world.”103 This exchange repeats itself at least 14
times throughout the cross-examination, to the point where Lowman begins to anticipate
99
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the question, and counsel the answer.104

In addition to stressing the practical limitations on representative sampling, Lowman
points out that a random sample may be unnecessary to achieve the goals of a given
study, and thus not part of the research design.105 A good example arises later in his
cross-examination when counsel for Canada addresses the work of Lowman’s Masters
student, Tamara O’Doherty. Lowman relies on O’Doherty’s study, which examines highend off-street prostitution in Vancouver, to support his conclusion that prostitution can be
conducted safely.106 In cross-examination, counsel asks Lowman to affirm that the
sample used was not random or representative of all off-street sex workers.107 Despite
Lowman’s immediate acknowledgement of these points, counsel spends the next 50
paragraphs of transcript reinforcing them through extensive questioning about the nature
of the study. Lowman, for his part, emphasizes that O’Doherty’s sample was not intended
to be representative, but rather purposive, as it was “deliberately targeted in order to show
variation among different types of sex work venues during a period when very strong
claims are being made by certain researchers about the general nature of prostitution”.108
He adds: “There are many, many different kinds of research questions, some of which
probabilistic sampling is not relevant to.”109 Nevertheless, counsel continues to reiterate
the non-representative nature of the study sample, both in cross-examination and in
104
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written argument.110

A similar exchange occurs when counsel for Canada questions applicant witness Kara
Gillies on her government-funded report, which was based on a study involving
interviews and focus groups with sex workers. In addressing the report, counsel decides
to ask Gillies “some general questions about research methodology” not specific to the
study at hand.111 In the exchange that follows, Gillies is repeatedly asked to affirm the
virtues of large and random sampling as the gold standard of “traditional research
methodology.”112 In response, she emphasizes the impossibility of large and random
sampling when studying a “hard-to-reach” population such as sex workers.113 Gillies
defends the value of her study by specifying its particular objectives: “It was a small,
qualitative study, not to generate large numbers, but to get really rich, nuanced
understandings of women's experiences…”114 However, counsel’s response to this point
is simply to reiterate Gillies’ agreement that “in an ideal world, […] large sample size
and random sample would be best.”115 As in the O’Doherty example above, counsel here
invokes the random sampling ideal in order to discredit Gillies’ study, without any
attention to the study’s actual goals, or the limitations of the context in which it was
undertaken. Canada’s factum at the ONSC goes on to argue that the study ought to be
discounted due to its small sample size and use of a snowball sampling technique.116
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While counsel for Canada instrumentalizes the perceived superiority of random sampling
in an especially persistent and decontextualized fashion, applicant-side witnesses and
counsel also draw strategically upon this ideal at certain points in the record. Weitzer’s
evidence provides one example. Like Melchers, Weitzer does not hesitate to identify
random sampling as an abstract methodological ideal within the “canons of scientific
research.”117 In his affidavit, he mobilizes this ideal to attack Melissa Farley’s
conclusions for being based on studies with non-representative samples,118 despite his
own acknowledgment that random sampling of sex workers is “typically impossible”. 119
Weitzer’s main concern, however, appears to be the sweeping nature of the
generalizations that Farley makes on the basis of these studies—a concern also
emphasized in the applicants’ factum at the ONSC.120

Indeed, actors in Bedford often attack non-representative sampling techniques not for
being invalid in any absolute sense, but because they serve as improper grounds for the
broad generalizations they are being used to support. This reflects a principle agreed upon
and reiterated by all at a general level: that findings based on non-random samples must
be properly qualified.121 As the application judge puts it, researchers must “limit their
conclusions to the discrete sample studied and avoid making generalizations.”122 Like the
random sampling ideal, this principle is uncontroversial in the abstract, but becomes
problematic, and subject to challenge, when invoked without careful attention to the
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research context and the nature of the facts the research is being used to support. Without
such care, the fear of drawing unwarranted generalizations from data may lead to the
improper discounting of experiential knowledge advanced in litigation through the
qualitative research of experts.

For example, in attacking the research of Lowman and others, counsel for Canada
focuses largely on the geographic limitations of the study samples. Thus counsel argues
that because Lowman’s research focuses on the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, it
cannot be relied upon to support generalizations about prostitution nation-wide.123
Lowman resists this strategy in two ways. First, he points out that he is not using his
research to support such broad generalizations. Here Lowman distinguishes broad
research questions, which require “geographically comprehensive” approaches, from the
more narrow factual issue in Bedford, namely “the material contribution of law to
violence against prostitutes and other forms of victimization”.124 According to Lowman,
a case study of a particular region can properly ground a finding on this issue by
identifying the “causal mechanisms” through which the law endangers sex workers.125
This response once again highlights the connection between the framing of the facts at
issue and assessments of the evidence.

Secondly, while counsel for Canada attacks each unfavourable study in isolation, arguing
that it cannot serve as a basis for generalization, Lowman contextualizes particular
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studies within a larger body of research. He explains:

It's the cumulative weight. The cumulative weight of various samples does
allow you to start the process of generalization. When you take any one
study and you ask that question, can it be generalized, is it a probability
sample, the answer is always no. That doesn't mean to say that
generalization is impossible.126

This accords with Lowman’s emphasis on “triangulation” as key to the process of
qualitative research.127 As he puts it later in the cross-examination: “The whole trick with
qualitative research is the triangulation, not necessarily every individual piece. It is the
jigsaw puzzle, it is the picture that they're putting together.”128 Triangulation is thereby
posited as a counter-norm to the ideal of representative sampling—one that Canada casts
doubt on, 129 but that Young appeals to in order to defend Lowman’s method and
findings.130

At the same time, Young also attempts to minimize unfavourable social science research
by pointing to its lack of representativeness. In some instances, he follows the same
approach as counsel for Canada by pointing to geographic limitations, albeit of a different
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sort. Hence his argument that the Crown’s social science evidence comes “from
jurisdictions which bear little relationship to Canada, both culturally and legally”.131
Young’s emphasis, however, is on other types of sampling biases. In particular, he
suggests at several points that the sampling methods of Farley and Raymond tend to
target those who are most vulnerable and have experienced the most violence and trauma
in the sex industry, in part by focusing almost exclusively on street workers132 (a point
picked up on by the application judge in her reasons).133 Young then critiques Farley for
making unqualified generalizations about sex workers without expressly noting the
limitations of her samples.134 The thrust of these arguments is captured in the applicants’
factum at the ONSC: “it is submitted that virtually all of the research presented by Crown
witnesses is tainted by the fundamental mistake of generalizing about the nature and risks
of ALL sex work from studies conducted with street prostitutes, children and trafficked
women.”135 As explained in the methodological literature reviewed in the applicants’
factum, such generalizations can reinforce the stereotypical view of all prostitutes as
victims, glossing over important differences in working conditions across the industry.136
Unlike geographic variations, these kinds of differences are arguably central to the facts
at issue in Bedford case, suggesting that Young’s invocation of concerns about
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representativeness here is more appropriately contextualized as compared to counsel for
Canada.
The Division of Researchers and Research Subjects
The role of Gillies and other sex workers in conducting research on the sex trade gives
rise to a third framing strategy at play in Bedford with respect to research methodology.
This strategy banks on the assumed importance of a strict boundary between researchers
and research subjects as a means to discount a number of studies on the record in which
these roles overlap. As discussed in Chapter 3, this ideal of a strict separation between
knowers and the known has been subject to extensive critique from feminist
epistemologists for its reinforcement of an oppressive social dynamic wherein some
individuals wield epistemic agency over others.

Research on the sex trade presents a particular challenge to the commonly imagined
boundary between researchers and research subjects. As noted in the materials on the
record in Bedford, academic researchers working alone have been unable to access large
swaths of the relevant population. Research conducted by, in partnership with, or with the
assistance of sex trade participants has thus proved essential to filling gaps in the field (in
addition to reaping other benefits – see Chapter 3).137 The research on offer as evidence
in Bedford reflects this development in two ways. First, several of the sex workers who
gave evidence as experiential witnesses had also contributed to the production of research
studies and reports, undertaken either in partnership with academics, or in association
with government or civil society organizations, that were filed in the case. Second,
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academic experts on both sides of the litigation relied upon studies that involved current
or former sex trade participants as interviewers or research assistants/consultants. In the
context of litigation, this blurring of the line between researchers and research subjects
also blurs the boundary between experiential and expert witnesses.
The contribution of sex trade participants to the production of research about the sex
trade provides ammunition for attacks on unfavourable evidence in Bedford through the
reassertion of the traditional boundary between researchers and research subjects. Indeed,
counsel on both sides of the litigation (and some witnesses) repeatedly point to the
involvement of current or former sex trade participants in carrying out research as an
indication of potential bias. One example comes from the cross-examination of applicant
expert Cecilia Benoit, who conducted a study in Victoria, BC, in partnership with a
community organization run by former sex workers. Former sex workers were involved
in various parts of the research, including conducting interviews.138 In cross-examination,
counsel for Canada suggests to Benoit that, “by opening up the definition of who
qualifies as a researcher, you yourself can be criticized for undermining traditional
scientific standards of objectivity.”139 Counsel goes on to suggest that those not trained in
sociology may have difficulty “understanding the rigorousness of the scientific
process.”140
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In her response, Benoit strikes a delicate balance between affirming and challenging the
core pillars of her discipline as constructed by the legal process. On the one hand, she
acknowledges the weaknesses of involving community partners in research, and the need
to put measures in place to overcome potential bias.141 On the other hand, she notes that
sociologists themselves have recognized the limitations of traditional scientific methods
when studying populations such as sex workers, and have developed “refined”
methodologies that seek to balance effective access with scientific rigour.142 In this way
Benoit resists counsel’s decontextualized understanding of “scientific process”, albeit
leaving the notion of “scientific rigour” unpacked.
A less explicit mobilization of the traditional boundary between researchers and research
subjects arises in Lowman’s cross-examination. There, counsel for Canada draws
attention to Lowman’s employment of sex workers as interviewers in his 1989 study of
street prostitution in Vancouver, questioning their experience and training, and asking
whether Lowman himself “evaluated” the interviews.143 Counsel for the Attorney
General of Ontario returns to this theme later in the cross-examination, putting to
Lowman, “the facilitators of your research were prostitutes who were also the research
subjects?”, and asking him to affirm that the women involved in conducting interviews
were “practicing prostitutes”.144 In resistance to this strategy, Lowman explains, at
several points in his cross-examination, that working with sex workers was essential to
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ensuring that the language used in his research instruments would make sense to the
population, and thus lead to reliable findings.145
Interestingly, the fact that Lowman, Benoit, and other applicant experts (e.g. Brock) did
research in collaboration with sex workers does not stop Young from attacking the
research of Crown experts on the same basis. In cross-examining Farley, for instance,
Young suggests that allowing sex trade “survivors” and others who take an abolitionist
position to conduct research interviews risks importing bias into the process even when
they receive training, and asks why Farley didn’t just use “neutral graduate students”
instead.146 This concern is reiterated in the applicants’ facta at the ONSC and ONCA.147
Like Benoit, Farley in some ways aligns herself with the prevailing view of social science
at work in the case; hence her affirmation of the need to avoid bias in the collection of
research data.148 At the same time, she suggests that the life experience of sex trade
workers and frontline service workers may actually enable them to be more “neutral”
than graduate students with “unknown biases.”149 She also emphasizes the benefits of
choosing interviewers with a common racial and experiential background to the
interviewees, in order to establish a comfortable rapport.150
In a similar vein to Young’s questioning of Farley, applicant experts Lowman and
Weitzer attack one of the most important studies that Farley, and the Crown side
generally, relies upon—a study comparing indoor and outdoor prostitution venues by
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Jody Raphael and Deborah Shapiro151—for employing survivors with a negative view of
the sex trade as interviewers.152 In her response, Farley once again challenges the notion
that survivors who have exited the sex trade are more prone to bias than other
interviewers.153 She also points out the hypocrisy of the attack by noting that Lowman
relies on data from a researcher (Libby Plumridge) who takes a similar approach,
employing current sex workers to conduct research.154 Indeed, as counsel for Canada
highlights elsewhere, members of the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective—an advocacy
group supporting decriminalization—administered the questionnaire used in Plumridge’s
study.155

Similar exchanges occur where counsel challenges the research contributions of certain
experiential witnesses. For instance, when questioning Gillies about the research she
conducted for her report, counsel for Canada dwells on her sampling methodology, which
involved using some subjects known to Gillies personally, as well as a snowball sampling
technique.156 The implication is that such methods are problematic, raising the risk of
confirmatory bias.157 Gillies, however, frames her “personal location” as a boon to the
project, noting that, “as a sex worker, I was well-positioned to break down some of the
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barriers of resistance that many researchers face.”158 She goes on to demonstrate the
significance of her involvement in the research project. When asked whether the median
age of the study participants (42) was “relatively old for sex workers”,159 Gillies explains
that it seems old due to the skewed samples often used in sex work research. She notes
that for most researchers not involved in community-based participatory research, the
easiest sex workers to access are those who are doing street sex work, incarcerated, or
involved in exit programs—all of whom tend to be younger than average.160 Gillies goes
on to explain:
Over my 20 years of sex work experience and sex work advocacy and
support, there are many, many workers who are aged 35 and above, but to
date those numbers haven’t been reflected in a lot of the formal research
simply because of access problems.161
This type of insight demonstrates how Gillies’ experiential knowledge and personal
connection to the research participants could actually enhance her effectiveness as a
researcher, rather than diminishing it, as counsel’s line of questioning seems to
assume.162
Thus, while counsel on both sides of the litigation, and some expert witnesses, appeal to
the traditional boundary between researchers and research subjects as a framing strategy,
several witnesses also challenge this boundary. (Lowman, for his part, does both in
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different moments). These witnesses do so both by questioning the assumption that
formally trained researchers have no biases, and by extoling the value of experiential
knowledge to the research process. These responses to the framing strategy at issue
advance an alternative understanding of the relationship between research participants,
aligned with the critiques of feminist epistemologists. This alternative view is not,
however, picked up by counsel on either side of the case.
The Privileging of Primary over Secondary Research
A final framing strategy used with respect to social science evidence in Bedford centers
on the distinction between primary or “original” research and secondary research. As
with the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research, counsel and witnesses
draw on the primary/secondary divide to do boundary work around what counts as
“scientific”, “empirical”, and “expert.” To the extent that these actors favour primary
research conducted directly by the researcher, they engage a framing strategy that reflects
and reinforces the traditional view of knowledge as produced principally by individuals
through immediate observation, rather than as a social process wherein individual
knowledge depends heavily on the knowledge of others. Once again here, the mainstream
epistemic norm prevails over the insights of feminist epistemologists. As with the other
framing strategies discussed in this subsection, however, resistance to this strategy and
the norm that underlies it also arises at some points in the litigation.
The best example of how the privilege accorded to primary over secondary research is
wielded in Bedford occurs in the cross-examination of applicant expert Ronald Weitzer.
Having established that Weitzer’s work is primarily “synthetic” (with the exception of a
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few studies), 163 counsel for Canada pursues an extended line of questioning on this issue,
asking Weitzer repeatedly to affirm that he hasn’t “primarily conducted primary, original,
empirical research on the sex industry per se”,164 and that no such research has been
appended to his affidavit.165 This point is then reiterated in Canada’s factum at the ONSC
to discount Weitzer’s claim that indoor prostitution is less dangerous than street
prostitution.166
When counsel for Ontario gets the chance to cross-examine Weitzer, she returns to this
theme. Having asked him to define “synthetic”,167 she follows up:168
Q: Do you consider this kind of research to be sufficient to determine the
level of harm to an individual of a particular activity such as prostitution?
A: It depends upon the research that I'm basing my review on […] So, yes,
I think that doing a literature review […] is a solid piece of work, and
there's a role for that, a need for that, in addition to, of course, the
empirical studies.
When counsel presses the point, asking whether there are disadvantages to basing public
policy on synthetic work,169 Weitzer says no, and goes on to explain that the role of his
work is “ not necessarily policy related, it's scientific. What do we know about X, what
do we have yet to know, what kinds of research in the future is recommended based on
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the lack of information that we have on that today?”170 Weitzer thereby resists the
underlying premise of the framing strategy being advanced.
The issue of primary versus secondary research arises again, in a slightly different way,
in Young’s cross-examination of Melchers. Here Young challenges Melchers’ assertion
that Lowman provides no empirical evidence in support of his conclusions, by suggesting
that the citations Lowman gives to studies done by other researchers around the world
ought to count as supportive empirical evidence.171 Young questions why Melchers did
not look at these studies in his assessment of Lowman’s opinion (a point reiterated in the
applicants’ factum at the ONSC).172 Melchers counters: “It's secondary sources”173—the
implication being that these carry less weight than Lowman’s own research—and
ultimately puts the blame on Lowman for failing to provide enough detail about the
studies he relies upon to facilitate such an assessment. He (Melchers) later makes his
adoption of the primary/secondary hierarchy more explicit:
You know, I'm not sure that I would consider secondary evidence to be
empirical evidence in the same sense that I mean here. Lowman having
read other articles and citing (--), that citation, it's a perfectly reasonable
thing to do in social research. […] but I wouldn't qualify that as empirical
evidence. That's secondary sources.174
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Melchers thus draws the boundary of what counts as “empirical evidence” for a claim
based on whether a study was conducted directly by the person making the claim (in this
case, Lowman) or not.175
In another exchange on the same issue, Melchers draws on his understanding of the role
of an expert in litigation to reinforce the prioritization of primary research:176
Q. But he [Lowman] says he relied upon these studies and you haven't
looked at them.
A. No, he read those studies, that's fine. Forgive me if I'm wrong, but I
don't think you become an expert simply by reading other studies, at least
I've been told that by....
Q. I agree.
A. You become an expert by doing research and applying and honing
those other skills. So it's the evidence on Dr. Lowman's research that
supports his contention and his value to you as a researcher, not someone
who's read a whole bunch of other studies. Is that not true?
While not entirely clear from the context, Melchers’ reference to what he has “been told”,
and the affirmation he seeks from Young, suggest that he may be drawing on his
understanding of the legal definition of an expert to support the privilege he accords to
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primary research. In this instance, perceived legal norms and scientific norms mutually
reinforce one another.
The framing strategy at work in the above examples banks on a view of scientific
research as a highly individualistic enterprise; it thereby fails to account for feminist
insights about the social nature of knowing, and the value of collectively constructed
knowledge—including experiential knowledge. The latter example also highlights, once
again, how Melchers’ role in the litigation itself reflects a decontextualized approach to
social science research and expertise. In order to make his task manageable, Melchers
limits himself to assessing Lowman’s own research findings, without considering how
those findings are corroborated by other research that Lowman cites. This is undoubtedly
a practical approach, given limited time and resources, and the fact that he is not an
expert on the sex trade. The result, however, is to buttress the privilege accorded to
primary research, and the underlying view of knowledge as something produced mainly
by individual researchers in isolation from others, rather than as a collective enterprise.177
Counsel for Canada further promulgates this notion in argument, suggesting that due to
the flaws in Lowman’s own findings, “there is little for these other studies to affirm.”178
This accords with the approach taken in Canada’s factum at the ONSC more generally,
which focuses on the number and quality of the primary studies relied upon by applicant
expert witnesses.179 Other sources that might inform these experts’ opinions are thereby
discounted. In addressing the evidence of applicant expert Deborah Brock, Canada goes
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so far as to suggest that because her scholarship is “not empirical” and “not supported by
any social science evidence of her own”, “clearly her claims should be accorded little
weight, and they need not be addressed.”180
Nor is the use of this framing strategy restricted to the Crown side in Bedford. While
bolstering the value of corroborative studies as support for Lowman’s claims, Young’s
resistance to the primary/secondary hierarchy is ultimately weak, and highly
instrumental. As seen in the passage above, Young agrees with Melchers’ suggestion
that expertise cannot be founded on secondary research alone. And, in cross-examining
Crown-side experts, he too invokes the privilege accorded to primary over secondary
research. In fact, he challenges Farley on the very same practices that he defends on
behalf of Lowman, putting to her: “Beyond the primary research you've done, you would
agree that you, in your affidavit and your articles, you rely a lot on secondary sources to
support some of your claims.”181 Young employs a similar strategy with Poulin,
suggesting that he is “primarily a literature review scholar.”182 The applicants’ factum at
the ONSC also emphasizes the lack of primary empirical research conducted by several
Crown experts, including Raymond.183 This last point is picked up by the application
judge in her reasons, where it is noted that Raymond has not conducted any empirical
research to support her claim about the “illusory” difference between indoor and outdoor
prostitution.184 The privilege accorded to primary research, and the epistemic norm that
underlies it, is thereby endorsed to some extent by the court as well.
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In this section, I have discussed the construction of scientific principles in Bedford and
mapped out several specific framing strategies used to attack social science research in
the case. These strategies bank on epistemic norms that are deeply rooted in mainstream
epistemology—norms that have been critiqued by feminist scholars for their tendency to
perpetuate inequality. I have also shown how some witnesses in Bedford attempt to
counter or complicate mainstream norms by invoking insights similar to those raised by
feminist epistemologists. Ultimately, however, I argue that these insights fail to prevail in
the fact-finding process. Instead, they are decontextualized and instrumentalized by
counsel, who revert back to the dominant paradigm whenever it suits their needs.

5.3 THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT
Having examined the main strategies used to frame the social science research upon
which expert opinion evidence is founded in Bedford, I turn now to framing strategies
that relate to the role of the experts themselves and their opinions. This section is divided
into two subsections. In the first, I consider a set of framing strategies grounded in
concerns about expert bias. Underlying these strategies is a particular notion of
objectivity, rooted in mainstream epistemology, which requires knowers to strive for
disinterest and detachment from the things they know. As discussed in Chapter 3, the
legally defined role of experts as neutral assistants to the court both reflects and
reinforces this view. In the second subsection, I examine a strategy that relies upon
similar epistemic norms, but focuses on the character of particular claims made by
experts—in particular, whether they are statements of “fact” or “opinion”.

249

5.3.1 Expert Bias
Given the common law’s insistence on the independence, objectivity, and impartiality of
experts, it is perhaps unsurprising that allegations of bias are one of the main methods
used by both parties to discount expert opinion evidence in Bedford, as well as one of the
main factors considered by the application judge in assessing the expert evidence. The
focus on expert bias in Bedford is likely further heightened by the deeply controversial
nature of prostitution, the close link between research and law and policy-making in this
area, and the methodological challenges that necessitate novel approaches and that often
lead to disparate findings—all of which contribute to a highly politicized field of study.185

Despite their differing perspectives, the parties and the application judge in Bedford each
rely on four closely related framing strategies to discount expert evidence on grounds of
bias. One pair of strategies focuses on the expert as researcher, the other on the expert’s
role in litigation. Because these strategies are often entangled in practice, I will describe
them at the outset before canvassing specific examples from the Bedford case.

First are attempts to peg experts as primarily engaged in activism or advocacy work, as
opposed to research. While most of the participants in Bedford (including counsel)
acknowledge that academic researchers can legitimately be involved in at least some
forms of advocacy, the predominant view advanced in the case is that this should only
occur where the advocacy arises from a foundation of objective and disinterested
research. This idealization of a sharp boundary between research and advocacy tracks
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onto the dichotomization of science from politics, facts from values, and, ultimately,
objectivity from subjectivity, in mainstream epistemology. By the same token, it
discounts approaches to research that strive to address real-world problems, such as
Participatory Action Research (see Chapter 3).

Closely related to accusations of activism or advocacy are suggestions that a given expert
holds ideological views that predate their research, and give rise to confirmatory bias.
Underlying this strategy is the notion that researchers can, and should, approach their
work without any preconceived views or interests—an ideal that counsel and the courts
hold firm to in Bedford. While many of the academic experts in the case challenge, or at
least qualify this view somewhat, as participants in litigation, they are largely pressed
into acknowledging that detached objectivity is the theoretical ideal, if not the practical
reality. The fact-finding process in Bedford thereby perpetuates the devaluation of
knowledge informed by personal experience and engagement.

Another pair of strategies relates to the role of the expert witness in court. First there is
the allegation that an expert’s participation in the case is in the nature of advocacy, and
thus fails to provide neutral assistance to the court. In this case, the operational
dichotomy is between advocacy and expert opinion (rather than advocacy and research).
In a similar vein, it is sometimes suggested that an expert’s opinion has been influenced
by the demands of the litigation and is thus not independent. In Bedford, counsel on both
sides accuse certain expert witnesses of tailoring their evidence to the litigation.186 This
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strategy invokes longstanding concerns about expert partisanship. Unlike the first pair of
strategies, the epistemic norms at work here are directly enshrined in law, leaving even
less room for the transgression of boundaries.

Having briefly outlined the key framing strategies related to bias, I now turn to the
Bedford case to illustrate how these strategies are operationalized in practice. I begin by
examining the applicant side’s use of these strategies, and the Crown side’s responses,
before turning to the Crown’s approach and elicited responses, and finally, to the
approach of the application judge.

Applicant Side Allegations of Bias
The applicant side’s use of framing strategies related to bias is apparent throughout the
their factum at the ONSC. There it is argued that much of the expert opinion evidence
tendered by the Crown—especially on the key issue of whether prostitution can be made
safer indoors—is tainted by “a distinct political ideology” which views sex work as
inherently violent and exploitative.187 The factum specifically targets Crown experts
Farley, Raymond, Poulin and Mary Sullivan, for bringing this predetermined standpoint
to their research and opinions.188

These arguments are consistent with Young’s approach in cross-examination, where he
accuses Farley and Raymond of holding strong political opinions that predate and taint
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their research.189 As noted in Chapter 2, Young goes so far as to question Raymond’s
views on a range of tangential issues, such as abortion, reproductive technologies and
cross-dressing, in order to portray her as a political reactionary. The exchange that ensues
between counsel is worth revisiting here:

MS. SINCLAIR: …If you want to ask questions directly about moral or
religious views, then I can see relevance, but to ask a number of questions
about issues that have no bearing on the matters at issue in this
constitutional challenge, I don't see the relevance.
MR. YOUNG: I'm a little troubled with your position considering when
you have my witnesses you ask their backgrounds, about their education,
and about their home life and all that. How is that relevant to anything?
MS. SINCLAIR: Those are not experts, those are experiential witnesses.
MR. YOUNG: Experts also have experience. It's fine, I'm finished190
[emphasis added]

With this last remark, Young challenges the conventional boundary between expert and
experiential evidence in litigation. At the same time, however, he casts the experiential
aspect of expertise as a dangerous source of bias, and thereby reiterates the mainstream
ideal of expert objectivity via detachment.
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Beyond suggesting that Crown experts hold predetermined views, Young portrays them
as driven largely by political goals, highlighting their direct involvement in activism and
advocacy work.191 To each of Farley, Raymond and Poulin, he poses the question: “Do
you consider yourself a researcher or an activist?”192 Similarly, after noting that the stated
goal of Farley’s organization is to abolish prostitution (according to the organization’s
website), Young asks her: “Is that a research statement or is that your statement as an
advocate?”193 While a statement about abolishing prostitution may seem an obvious
target, at times Young’s use of this framing strategy is more subtle, for example in his
cross-examination of Mary Sullivan, where he remarks: “You're not just doing this as an
abstract exercise, you want to see a change for women, right?”194 With this line of
questioning, Young strategically invokes a paradigm of research as fundamentally
disinterested and divorced from normative goals.

In mounting these attacks, Young draws upon the evidence of Weitzer, called by the
applicants specifically to critique the opinions of Farley and Raymond. In his affidavit,
Weitzer opines that Farley and Raymond’s conclusions are “based on an unscientific,
ideological perspective” that views prostitution as inherently oppressive and violent.195
On this basis, he describes them as not only biased, but as falling outside the realm of
“mainstream” scholarship on the sex trade. As becomes clear in cross-examination,
Weitzer’s opinion is founded on a particularly staunch belief in the importance of a
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disinterested approach to research. When asked what makes a study “scientific”,196 he not
only emphasizes the need for objectivity and neutrality on the part of the researcher, but
goes so far as to note that he discourages students from choosing research topics in which
they have a strong personal interest or investment in order to ward against the threat of
bias.197 According to Weitzer, a strong view or personal connection is itself sufficient to
taint research198 (though he softens this somewhat under further questioning,
acknowledging that researchers are not “necessarily a blank slate politically”, and
drawing a distinction between those who form political views on the basis of research,
and those who come to research with pre-established views).199 In the same vein, he
praises the work of researchers who “let the data speak for themselves” rather than
adopting a “paradigm” at the outset.200

Interestingly, Young also enlists the views of Crown expert Melchers as a means to
reinforce his attacks on other Crown experts (particularly Farley).201 In a passage from
cross-examination later cited in the applicants’ factum at the ONSC, Young gets
Melchers to affirm that where a researcher expresses strong views that predate their
research, one must be “on guard”.202 Unlike Weitzer, however, Melchers recognizes bias
as an inevitable aspect of research that must be consciously addressed by the researcher:
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to recognize those, needs to state them up front, and needs to demonstrate
to the reader how those biases have been dealt with, have been managed in
such a way that the results of that research can be considered valid and
reliable.203

In other words, biases exist, but can be set aside with some effort in order to ensure
objectivity. While not raising a deep challenge to the mainstream epistemic ideal of
detachment, Melchers’ view here differs notably from Weitzer. Young, however,
mobilizes both opinions without distinction, once again underscoring how the adversarial
process encourages the instrumentalization of a range of epistemic norms. Nor does
Young’s use of Melchers in the above example prevent him from attacking Melchers’
opinion as tainted by partisanship at another point on the record. Indeed, at an earlier
point in the cross-examination, Young asks Melchers a series of questions about the
nature of the work he does (mostly contract work)204 and the terms of his current contract,
with the implication that he is merely a “hired gun” for the Crown.205

A final noteworthy example of how applicant-side actors invoke framing strategies
related to bias pertains to the study by Raphael and Shapiro, discussed earlier in this
Chapter. The attack in this instance is fueled in part by the authors’ distinct approach to
the issue of bias in research. Rather than presuming their own neutrality, Raphael and
Shapiro make their political perspective explicit at the outset, stating that their research
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project was “designed within a framework of prostitution as a form of violence against
women”. They go on to warn:

Every attempt has been made to interpret the data objectively, but the
survey questions and administration were likely biased to some degree by
working within this framework and by employing surveyors who had left
prostitution. We do not believe that this conceptualization of prostitution
detracts from the importance of the findings presented.206

By acknowledging the background perspective that they bring to their research, these
authors take an alternative epistemological approach—one that openly recognizes
research-based knowledge as politically situated, and thereby aligns with feminist
epistemological views and commitments.207 This approach, however, does not fare well
in Bedford. Not only do Lowman, Weitzer and Young seize on Raphael and Shapiro’s
admission of bias to discredit the study at issue,208 the application judge picks up on, and
appears to adopt, their critiques in her assessment of the evidence.209

Young also banks on Raphael and Shapiro’s transparency about their political framework
as a means to further attack Farley. In cross-examination, Farley agrees that she has made
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similar “framework” statements in her work, but rejects the notion that such a framework
leads to potential bias (disagreeing with Raphael and Shapiro).210 In the applicants’
factum at the ONSC, Young emphasizes this point: “Unlike other researchers who share
this framework, she [Farley] denies that it introduces true risk of bias into her research on
the subject.”211 According to Young’s logic here, once an expert admits that they bring a
particular perspective to their work, they lose credibility whether they admit a resultant
risk of bias or deny it.
Responses from the Crown Side
In response to the applicant side’s allegations of bias, some Crown experts raise a
challenge to the ideal of the disinterested researcher. Farley and Raymond, for instance,
reject the line Young attempts to draw between researcher and activist by identifying
themselves as both.212 Farley also makes the following comment in her affidavit: 213

All research is permeated with values. Researchers have our opinions,
especially where gross violations of human rights are studied. It is
dangerously naive for any researcher to assume that he or she is capable of
absolute neutrality. […] I have made my perspectives and the hypotheses
that I was evaluating clear in my research.
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At the same time, Farley emphasizes at several points in her affidavit and in crossexamination that her opinions about prostitution are based upon her research.214 She also
tries to portray her opinions as more qualified and evidence-based than other advocates in
the field.215 Farley thus seems to hedge her resistance to the epistemic ideal of
detachment, challenging but also aligning herself with it. Raymond, on the other hand,
does not deny that she held strong opinions about prostitution policy prior to conducting
research. Her response to this framing strategy is simply to explain that her expert
opinion has been informed not only by empirical research, but by her practical experience
as director of the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, and her “scholarly”
conversations and interviews with women in many countries.216

While Raymond, and to some extent Farley, resist the mainstream ideal of a sharp
boundary between research and advocacy, counsel for Canada reasserts it on their behalf.
While acknowledging that many of the Crown’s experts have taken positions against
prostitution, and that they have been involved in advocacy, counsel insists that: a) their
political positions and activities stem from their research, and not the other way around,
unlike the applicant experts;217 and/or b) they are professionals who are able to separate
their political views and advocacy from their research.218 Canada’s defensive strategy
when faced with allegations of expert bias is thus to realign the experts with the

214

Ibid at paras 3, 10 and 11; Farley cross, supra note 94 at para 52.
Farley cross, ibid at para 160.
216
Raymond cross, supra note 132 at paras 88-90. It should be noted that Farley takes a similarly holistic
view, pointing to research as one source among others that has informed her expert opinion.
217
Factum of Respondent, supra note 10 at para 178 (see also at paras 182 (re Poulin) and 185 (re
Sullivan)); Factum of Appellant ONCA, supra note 42, at paras 38 (re Sullivan) and 45 (re Poulin).
218
Factum of Respondent, supra note 10 at para 181 (re Raymond) and at Annex 5 at para 25 (re Sullivan);
Factum of Appellant ONCA, supra note 42 at para 41 (re Farley).
215

259

mainstream epistemological paradigm, even where this clashes with the experts’ own
views.

Furthermore, rather than challenging Weitzer on his strong beliefs about disinterested
research in cross-examination, counsel for Canada gets him to double down on these
views and then seizes upon them to attack Weitzer and other applicant experts who
support decriminalization for failing to meet their own standard of objectivity. By
emphasizing the political nature of the views held by Weitzer, Lowman and others, and
highlighting moments where they appear to engage in advocacy, counsel challenges the
notion that it is only the Crown experts who bring a political perspective to their work.219
As counsel puts to Lowman in cross-examination: “Are you saying there is no moral
imperative or perspective behind what you call the decriminalization model? One is
moral and the other is objective, empirical.”220 Similarly, in response to the attack on the
Raphael and Shapiro study, counsel points to an article cited by Weitzer and other
applicant experts, in which the author, Ine Vanwesenbeeck, states that she is reviewing
the literature from “a ‘pro-sex work feminist frame of reference’”.221 As counsel remarks,
the caveat here sounds a lot like the one given by Raphael and Shapiro, suggesting a
double standard on Weitzer’s part.222

Canada’s strategy here might be read as underscoring that all researchers are politically
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situated, and thus as aligned with the approach of feminist epistemologists. For instance,
in defending the Raphael and Shapiro study against Weitzer, counsel comments: “They
themselves are putting their perspective out there and acknowledging it, correct?”223
Placed within the broader context of Canada’s response to allegations of expert bias,
however, counsel’s goal is better read as leveling the two camps of experts, rather than as
challenging the underlying ideal of detachment being advanced. As Canada’s own
mobilization of bias-based framing strategies makes clear, the resort to alternative
epistemic norms is at best partial and instrumental.
Crown Side Allegations of Bias
In addition to the examples just discussed, Canada’s reliance on the same bias-related
framing strategies and underlying norms as the applicants is well demonstrated in its
facta at the ONSC and ONCA. The factum at the ONSC, for instance, argues that the
alleged link between the impugned laws and the endangerment of prostitutes is based on
applicant evidence that is “more in the nature of advocacy than expert opinion”.224
Specific allegations of bias focus mostly on Lowman, and, to some degree, Frances
Shaver.225 Melchers also accuses Lowman of bias in his affidavit evidence. 226

At the outset of Lowman’s cross-examination, counsel for Canada suggests that Lowman
has long advocated for a constitutional challenge to prostitution laws, and that his
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research may have been designed with this objective in mind.227 The notion that
Lowman’s opinions predate and taint his research, leading to predetermined results,
arises again and again throughout his cross-examination,228 as well as in written
argument.229 In Canada’s factum at the ONSC, it is further argued that Lowman’s
affidavit and testimony is “in the nature of advocacy, rather than objective expert
opinion”, and is “replete with deliberately partisan arguments”. In support of this
contention, the factum points to the central role of students in drafting Lowman’s
affidavit, as well as Lowman’s own description of his affidavit evidence as
“argument”.230 All four framing strategies outlined at the beginning of this subsection are
thus mobilized to attack Lowman as biased. Canada’s facta make similar arguments
about Shaver, portraying her scholarship as focused mainly on advocating for particular
prostitution policies, and emphasizing that, contrary to what she says in her affidavit, her
policy positions predate her empirical research.231

Responses from the Applicant Side
Lowman meets the suggestion of confirmatory bias in his research with persistent denial,
repeatedly emphasizing that his opinions have always been based on his research,232 and
framing his research as beginning from hypotheses rather than entrenched political
views.233 He also banks on his professional status to deflect allegations of bias, asserting:
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“I am a professional researcher and it is my responsibility not to let that kind of thing
happen.”234 At times, Lowman does seem to recognize and defend a role for advocacy in
his work, remarking, for instance: “I feel it is my responsibility as a public academic to
articulate some of the implications of the research that I do. It's actually part of my
job.”235 However, he insists that his advocacy proceeds only on a firm foundation of
disinterested research, and thereby reinforces the boundary between the two.

Young defends Lowman against the charge of bias on a similar basis. Indeed, he makes a
point of explicitly countering the Crown’s depiction of Lowman and Weitzer as
advocates via the re-examination of both witnesses.236 Young also deals aggressively
with Melchers’ allegation of bias against Lowman in cross-examination, remarking that
this is a “strong suggestion” and pressing Melchers to justify it.237 In a move similar to
counsel for Canada’s treatment of Weitzer, Young ultimately flips Melchers’ argument
around, suggesting that he (Melchers) may be the one displaying confirmation bias in his
assessment of Lowman, given the latter’s reputation as an advocate for
decriminalization.238 When it comes to the issue of bias, then, the applicant side remains
firmly moored to the mainstream epistemological paradigm, opting not to challenge the
epistemic ideal of detachment even on an instrumental basis.
The Court on Bias
Whatever doubt remains about the dominance of mainstream epistemic norms around
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bias in Bedford is laid to rest in the application judge’s reasons. At the outset, Justice
Himel emphasizes the “attitude of strict independence and impartiality” required of an
expert by law, and the need for courts to ward against bias and advocacy.239 She then
goes on to make the following statement with respect to the international evidence in the
case:

I was struck by the fact that many of those proffered as experts to provide
international evidence to this court had entered the realm of advocacy and
had given evidence in a manner that was designed to persuade rather than
assist the court. For example, some experts made bold assertions without
properly outlined bases for their claims and were unwilling to qualify their
opinions in the face of new facts provided. While it is natural for persons
immersed in a field of study to begin to take positions as a result of their
research over time, where these witnesses act primarily as advocates, their
opinions are of lesser value to the court.240

Himel J makes similar comments in her conclusion on the expert evidence regarding
whether the impugned laws violate the right to security of the person. There Himel J finds
that some of the expert evidence did not meet the requisite standard of admissibility.241
Though she does not clearly specify what she is referring to, she proceeds to identify
problems in Farley’s evidence, remarking that, “her advocacy appears to have permeated
239
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her opinions”,242 and noting that, as admitted by Farley herself in cross-examination,
some of her views on prostitution predate her research.243 Himel J assigns less weight to
Farley’s evidence on this basis.244 Similarly, she finds that Crown experts Raymond and
Poulin “were more like advocates than experts offering independent opinions to the
court.”245 (She goes on to address Lowman’s evidence, but focuses on the problems with
Lowman’s original affidavit, making no comment about Canada’s allegations of bias and
advocacy on Lowman’s part).246

As in the other examples in this subsection, Himel J acknowledges that experts may
legitimately form views on the basis of their research. In line with common law doctrine,
however, she emphasizes the need to maintain a firm boundary between advocacy and
expert opinion. From a feminist perspective, insistence on this boundary perpetuates a
problematic fiction of total objectivity as both a feasible and desirable goal. In the words
of Sonia Lawrence, this standard “should give any careful scholar serious pause. It
reveals the strict limits of the frame in which the law seeks and receives expertise—a
frame in which a whole truth is possible and the limits of the ‘whole’ are
ascertainable.”247 As Himel J’s reasons demonstrate, however, critiques of this nature
ultimately fail to gain traction in the fact-finding process in Bedford, surrendering instead
to the mainstream epistemological paradigm and the legal doctrine that reinforces it.
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This is not to suggest that Himel J’s treatment of the expert evidence in Bedford is wrong.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how she, as a judge in our legal system, could have
approached the issue of expert bias much differently. My point is rather to show how
judges in cases like Bedford act as part of a legal system that promotes and perpetuates
certain epistemic norms—norms that do not square well with progressive epistemological
commitments.

5.3.2 Fact Versus Opinion (and Related Dichotomies)
In the previous subsection, I discussed a set of framing strategies centred on allegations
of bias in Bedford. I move on now to examine a strategy that banks on similar epistemic
norms, but focuses on the character of specific claims made by experts, rather than on the
expert’s general political orientation and approach to research or litigation. This strategy
discounts the claims of experts by framing them as mere “opinion” or “argument”, rather
than matters of “fact”.

The invocation of a dichotomy between fact and opinion in this way seems strange given
the doctrinal understanding of experts as witnesses whose role is precisely to offer
opinions on matters of fact. From a doctrinal perspective, the direct observations of lay
witnesses and the opinions of experts both ultimately contribute to the fact-finding
process. The difference is that experts are granted the privilege of drawing inferences
from direct observations to more general factual conclusions. As noted by Himel J, citing
David Paciocco, this calls for a certain level of transparency on the part the expert about
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their reasoning process.248 Nevertheless, a properly elucidated expert opinion is expected
to be objective, and is understood to inform the court’s determinations of fact. In the
actual fact-finding process in Bedford, however, where evidence is tendered and parsed,
the term “opinion” is often used to discount a given claim by removing it from the realm
of objective fact. Instead of reflecting the privilege accorded to experts, the gap between
direct observations and inferred conclusions becomes a potential source of bias, and a
weakness to exploit. “Opinion” thus comes to signal a subjective, value-inflected
judgment rather than an impartial, reasoned assessment of the facts.

This wariness towards expert judgment often manifests in subtle ways, such as in counsel
for Canada’s repeated reference to Lowman’s “theories”.249 But there are also more
explicit attempts to attack expert opinions that extend beyond the reporting of empirical
data (itself assumed to be judgment-free). For example, in cross-examining Lowman on
one of the research reports he prepared for the Department of Justice, counsel for Ontario
seizes on a boilerplate disclaimer that the views expressed in the report are solely those of
the author to suggest that the report “contains not just empirical data, but opinions, views,
correct?”250 Counsel for Canada pursues a similar strategy in his questioning on the same
report, pointing to a passage where Lowman expresses the need to go

…beyond the confines of a purely instrumental and empiricist conception
of what it means to 'evaluate' the new street prostitution law to a
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consideration of the way that moral and political considerations have
aligned to create a constellation of prostitution laws which, when
examined historically and logically, appear to be contradictory and selfdefeating.251

Counsel then puts to Lowman:

Q. So in order to assess the prostitution laws, according to this, you had to
go beyond fact-based empirical assumptions. Is that correct? You had
to enter the realm of moral and political considerations.252

A. Well, but we're still dealing with observation, we're still dealing with
empirical tasks, which is looking at the nature of the law, the purposes
of the law, the purposes stated in the laws, the legislative debates
talking about what law is supposed to achieve.253

The concern about value judgments polluting expert opinion is apparent here. Lowman’s
response attempts to diffuse this concern by framing his analysis as still within the realm
of the empirical.
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As the above example demonstrates, attacks on expert opinion evidence in Bedford bank
not just on concerns about the application of judgment in the inference-drawing process,
but about what kind of information actually informs a given opinion in the first place.
Opinions based on experience, informal study, secondary literature, reasoned analysis,
and other sources are thus discounted in favour of opinions based on empirical research,
which are no longer labeled “opinions” at all but rather “empirically-based” or “factbased” assertions. The mainstream privileging of quantitative over qualitative research
also comes into play here, further narrowing what counts as “empirical” or “factual”.

Counsel on both sides in Bedford repeatedly draw upon the resultant dichotomy between
fact and opinion as a framing strategy to discount various claims made by expert
witnesses. For instance, in asking Farley about her claim that women and children can be
better controlled in indoor prostitution than on the street, Young asserts: “that's a
statement of opinion. That doesn't come from any study, correct?”254 Young repeats the
question a few lines later with respect to her claim that prostitution damages women’s
sexuality.255 Nor does he reserve this strategy for claims that seem politically inflected or
controversial. In his written cross-examination of Dutch social historian Lotte Constance
van de Pol, he banks on the same dichotomy to attack what seem like non-contentious
statements about the physical vulnerability of people engaged in the sale of sex (due to
services being performed in private), and the potential forms of violence they face,
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repeatedly asking: “Is this a statement of opinion or an empirically-based statement?”256
Counsel for Canada uses a similar strategy to discount the evidence of several applicant
experts. For instance, when questioning Weitzer about his claim that the internet insulates
sex workers from violence, counsel remarks: “But this is maybe your opinion, then, but
this isn't based on any objective or empirical study of the subject. Am I correct?”257
Further examples abound throughout the record.258

This strategy is also mobilized in written argument. The applicants’ factum at the ONCA,
for instance, argues that the conclusion of the Crown experts on indoor sex work “is
primarily an expression of opinion and not one based upon their research.”259 At the
Supreme Court of Canada, the applicants attack Canada’s claim that prostitution is
inherently dangerous in part by noting that this is “not an evidence-based proposition but
rather a mere statement of opinion.”260 Canada makes similar arguments about many of
the claims advanced by Lowman and other applicant experts, though not couched in
terms of a dichotomy between fact and opinion. Instead, counsel for Canada simply
argues that there is “no evidence” for many of these claims. 261 Of course, the use of this
framing strategy does not stop either party from advancing expert claims that lack, or are
simply not amenable to, empirical support, where it suits their interest.
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The response of various expert witnesses to this framing strategy reveals their own
internalization of the dichotomy at issue. For instance, when Weitzer asserts, contrary to
Farley and Raymond, that there is not actually a lot of overlap between sectors of
prostitution, counsel for Ontario remarks: “That’s your opinion.” To which Weitzer
responds: “That’s not my opinion. It’s based upon the research that I’ve reviewed.”262
Similarly, when asked to reaffirm her opinion that the law exacerbates women’s
vulnerability, applicant expert Cecilia Benoit responds that her research supports this
claim, adding: “It's not my opinion. My opinion is something quite different than my
research.”263 Underlying these retorts is the assumption that “opinion” connotes a kind of
epistemic devaluation, and that a conclusion based on research amounts to something
different and better.

Thus far, I have canvased examples in which the claims made by experts are
disparagingly framed as mere “opinion” because they lack empirical support. Underlying
this strategy is a concern that purportedly factual claims are actually grounded in, or at
least influenced by, subjective or political factors. But there are also instances where
expert claims are attacked as expressly moral, political, or normative on their face. The
distinction between fact and opinion at this point gives way to the dichotomies that have
always underlain it: science versus morality and politics; research versus advocacy.

The treatment of Farley and Raymond is once again illustrative. For instance, in
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addressing the claim that prostitution is inherently dehumanizing, Young puts to Farley:
“Would you also agree that this statement is really a value or morally-charged statement?
It's not a scientific statement, is it?” 264 In his affidavit Weitzer similarly asserts that the
terminology used by Farley and Raymond to describe the world of prostitution—e.g.
“paid rape”, “prostituted women”, “survivors”, “predators”, “sex offenders”, and
“batterers”—is “emotionally laden and lacking in scientific objectivity.”265

On the other side of the litigation, counsel for Canada spars with Weitzer over how to
characterize the views he expresses in an article about prostitution policy. When counsel
describes Weitzer as “advocating” for a particular policy in the article, Weitzer responds
defensively, insisting that he is not advocating but drawing reasoned conclusions. As he
puts it, “it's not my political or ideological view here, it's objective tests to current public
policy”.266 It is not until later in the cross-examination, when counsel presents a passage
from another article in which Weitzer himself says that he has advocated for the model in
question, that he acquiesces to this characterization.267 Weitzer’s defensive posture here
demonstrates his commitment to the prevailing norm separating research from the realm
of the political.

The framing strategies discussed in this section derive their power from mainstream
epistemology’s insistence on a strict separation between what is objective (facts,
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research, empirical evidence, science, and expert opinion in the legal sense) and what is
subjective and normative (values, politics, advocacy, and opinion in the colloquial sense).
Boundary work between these categories both obfuscates the positionality of all knowers,
and discounts the value of knowledge that is consciously grounded in firsthand
experience. While there is some push back against the operative paradigm from the
academic experts in Bedford, the litigation context often compels them to align
themselves with it. Moreover, unlike some of the examples in the first section of the
chapter, where counsel’s mobilization of epistemic norms and counter-norms shifted
strategically, the set of dichotomies at work in this section are consistently enforced by
counsel and the courts in Bedford.

5.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have mapped out some of the key strategies and underlying epistemic
norms used to frame expert opinion evidence in the Bedford case. My analysis gives rise
to two overall observations. First, mainstream epistemic norms tend to prevail over
feminist epistemological insights and associated commitments in the treatment of expert
evidence in Bedford. In particular, the strategies used to frame this type of evidence
reflect and reinforce an epistemic ideal of detachment, expressed via a range of
hierarchical dichotomies, all of which are rooted in the mainstream objective/subjective
divide. Second the fact-finding process encourages the decontextualization and
instrumentalization of epistemic norms of all kinds. As a result, alternative
epistemological approaches—including those aligned with feminist insights—become
mere tools of advocacy, unmoored from their sociopolitical roots. Once again, this is not
a critique of the actions of counsel and the courts in Bedford, most of which come as no
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surprise in the context of adversarial litigation. Rather, it is a critique of strategic Charter
litigation itself as a process that encourages the treatment of evidence and knowledge in
particular ways. The combination of mainstream boundary work and instrumentalization
observed in this chapter reappears in the treatment of common sense in Bedford,
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6: The Treatment of Common Sense in Bedford
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Thus far in Part II, I have examined the treatment of two conventional categories of proof
in litigation that are often conceived as dichotomous opposites, but that in fact overlap
significantly: experiential evidence and expert opinion evidence. By identifying the most
common strategies used to frame these types of evidence, I have analyzed the epistemic
norms at work in Bedford v Canada (AG)1 as they relate to the progressive
epistemological commitments entailed by progressive campaigns for social justice. To
round out my analysis, I turn now to one last category of proof, of a somewhat different
nature—common sense.

As discussed in Chapter 3, common sense plays a unique role in legal fact-finding,
representing both a refutation of the need for evidence and a particular mode of proof
whose role is to fill evidentiary gaps and to support inferential reasoning. From an
epistemological perspective, common sense is often conceived as a form of lay
knowledge that sits in opposition to expert opinion. In this way it is similar to experiential
evidence and knowledge. While the latter are particular to those who offer it, however,
appeals to common sense assume an abstracted universality of experience, raising
questions about the imagined community for whom the relevant experience is shared.2 As

1

Bedford v. Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 [Bedford ONSC], affirmed in 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford SCC].
Isabel Crowhurst puts it this way: "In essence, a matter of common sense is expected to make sense no
matter where or when its ‘sense’ actually originated". “Troubling Unknowns and Certainties in Prostitution
Policy Claims-Making” in Marlene Spanger & May-Len Skilbrei, eds, Prostitution Research in Context:
Methodology, Representation and Power (London; Routledge, 2017) at 52.
2

275

a rhetorical tool, common sense is often invoked to shore up socially privileged
worldviews, and has thus been the subject of much critique and general wariness on the
part of feminist scholars.3

In Part I of this dissertation, I posited that the shift in focus from law to facts and
evidence in strategic Charter litigation holds the potential to contest such worldviews, by
challenging the common sense assumptions engrained in legal policy, doctrine, and
reasoning. As discussed in Chapter 3, experiential knowledge has an especially important
role to play in this endeavour from a feminist perspective (though it should not be taken
simply as an alternate source of objective truth). On the other hand, as Patricia Cochran
argues, appeals to common sense may also serve to advance previously subjugated forms
of experiential knowledge.4
How do these conflicting aspects of common sense play out in Bedford, and with what
consequences for epistemological justice? In this chapter, I examine how participants in
Bedford both invoke and challenge common sense as a means to respond to this question.
The scope of my inquiry is broad, including both explicit references to “common sense”,
and implicit appeals to common sense via language such as “assumptions”, “beliefs”,
“notions”, “myths”, and “stereotypes”. My analysis suggests that the treatment of
common sense in Bedford generally rests on a presumed dichotomy between common
sense and evidence—a dichotomy that closely parallels the one between law and fact, as
well as the one, discussed in Chapter 5, between opinion and fact. Like the other
3

Patricia Cochran, “Common Sense” and Legal Judgment: Community Knowledge, Political Power and
Rhetorical Practice (PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013) [unpublished] at 59. See Chapter 3
at 3.4.2.
4
Ibid at 182-187.
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dichotomies discussed in this dissertation, the dichotomy between common sense and
evidence serves as an important conceptual device used to organize knowledge in
strategic Charter litigation. As I demonstrate, however, its terms are both vague and
ambiguous, creating rhetorical opportunities for participants on both sides of the case in
Bedford to do strategic boundary work in different ways. Experiential knowledge, in
particular, is associated with different sides of the dichotomy at different moments on the
record.
As a result—and despite longstanding feminist concern about appeals to common sense
serving to shore up privileged social perspectives—common sense in the fact-finding
process in Bedford carries no particular political-epistemological valence. Rather,
invocations and critiques of common sense are each used instrumentally by both sides of
the litigation to advance a range of differing and often opposing ideas. In some cases, the
mobilization of evidence—experiential and expert—does help the applicants to challenge
problematic forms of common sense, in service of broader social justice goals. In other
instances, however, appeals to evidence work against the experiential knowledge of the
applicants and their peers. By the same token, appeals to common sense as a check on
evidence work to both bolster and discount experiential knowledge.

While diverse in their purposes and effects, what these rhetorical moves do share is their
reliance upon and reinforcement of the dichotomy between common sense and evidence
itself. On the surface, this dichotomy may seem to accord with feminist efforts to
challenge common sense via experiential or other evidence. Recall, however, that critical
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feminists have largely resisted what Code calls the “tyranny of ‘experientialism’”5 in
favour of a more nuanced view that understands the construction of all knowledge—
including expert and experiential evidence—as a deeply social and contextual process,
inevitably shaped by background assumptions and normative values.6 This understanding
is reflected in the work of several feminist legal scholars, whose research, discussed in
Chapter 3, has raised a challenge to the legally engrained dichotomy between expert
evidence and common sense in particular.7 In this way, I argue, the boundary work
between evidence and common sense in Bedford works against feminist epistemological
insights.
The Chapter proceeds in four sections. In the first, I discuss a framing strategy which
draws on feminist critiques of common sense, and which I refer to as “partializing”
common sense. In the second, I look at strategies that pit evidence against common sense,
with privilege granted to the former. In the third, I consider strategies that reverse this
hierarchy, banking on the intuitive appeal of common sense to cast doubt various pieces
of evidence. Finally, I demonstrate the inextricability of evidence and common sense on
the record in Bedford, and point to moments where this is explicitly, albeit fleetingly,
recognized.

5

Lorraine Code, Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations (New York: Routledge, 1995) at 64.
See Chapter 3 at 3.3.1. Implied in this view is the understanding that particular experiential evidence and
general common sense are co-constructed.
7
Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2003); Emma Cunliffe, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011); Kimberley
White-Mair, “Experts and Ordinary Men: Locating R. v. Lavallée, Battered Woman Syndrome, and the
‘New’ Psychiatric Expertise on Women within Canadian Legal History” (2000) 12:2 Can J Women Law
406. See Chapter 3 at 3.4.3, under Deconstructing the Dichotomy.
6

278

6.2 PARTIALIZING COMMON SENSE: COMMON TO WHOM?
As discussed in Chapter 3, the invocation of common sense relies on an appeal to shared
experience, with both community-building and exclusionary effects. Because the power
of common sense lies in its claim to universality, an important strategy used to discount
appeals to common sense is to reframe the “common sense” at issue as in fact particular
to a specific actor or group, and thus not really “common” at all. To the extent that this
move situates and contextualizes knowledge, it aligns strongly with the ethos of feminist
epistemology. Indeed, feminist and other critical scholars have often looked to
experiential knowledge in order to partialize common sense in this way. They have
thereby exposed the exclusionary effects of appeals to common sense that in fact only
reflect and perpetuate socially privileged worldviews.8

Given its critical connotations, one might expect to see this strategy being used, in the
context of strategic Charter litigation, by those seeking progressive social change through
the Charter, as a means to challenge status quo assumptions engrained in law and legal
reasoning. And indeed, examples of this can be found on the record in Bedford. For
instance, in the course of cross-examining applicant sex worker Amy Lebovitch, counsel
for Canada asks her about the safety measures that she takes when working from home or
at other in-call locations.9 Lebovitch proceeds to explain how she screens client phone
calls, relies on building surveillance at her condo, records the names and numbers of

8

Dana Phillips, “Let’s Talk about Sexual Assault: Survivor Stories and the Law in the Jian Ghomeshi
Media Discourse” (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall L J 1133 at 1149 and 1152; Joan W Scott, “Experience” in
Judith Butler and Joan W Scott, eds, Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 30.
See Chapter 3 at 3.2.1 and 3.3.1.
9
Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Cross-Examination of Amy Lebovitch at para 136 onwards)
[Lebovitch cross].
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clients, and makes a safe call to her partner or a friend once a client arrives. Counsel then
continues:

Q. But after that call is made, you're alone with the customer.
A. I am.
Q. There is a level of risk in terms of a potential attack that could happen.
A. Yes, there's a potential risk of me getting hit by a car, right. There's a
potential risk of me inviting a relationship date from a bar over to my house
and being raped. That's probably bigger than sex work, I would imagine,
from my eyes, from where I'm sitting and from what - the safety measures
I take.10

Counsel in this exchange relies upon a common sense assumption about the risky nature
of sex work regardless of where or how it is conducted (the implication being that
decriminalizing in-call work would not necessarily enhance safety). In response,
Lebovitch invokes her own situated, experience-based perspective to challenge the
universality of the assumption that sex work is inherently risky and violent in a way that
other everyday activities are not. Lebovitch’s experiential knowledge thus serves to
partialize counsel’s common sense argument.

Another example arises where counsel for Canada questions applicant expert John
Lowman about a survey of people in the sex trade conducted as part of his 1995 Violence

10

Ibid at para 154.
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Study.11 Having asked Lowman a series of questions about the precise definitions of and
distinctions between various terms used in the survey, counsel suggests that the
respondents may not have been clear on the exact meaning of the terms at issue, or shared
the same understanding of them:

Q. I just stand back and think we - and maybe I'm thick but we just spent
the last 20 minutes debating the term and it wasn't crystal clear to me. Now,
it's true, I'm not in the business, but I would think there would be some
level of uncertainty as to what exactly we're talking about.
A. And I suggest that basically that is a reflection of your lack of
understanding of the street argot, the subculture […].12

With this response, Lowman emphasizes the limits of counsel’s perspective, pointing to
an alternate (albeit partial) common sense rooted in the day-to-day experience of people
in the sex trade.

The strategy of partializing common sense, however, is not always mobilized in Bedford
in a way that invokes the experiential knowledge of directly affected people to challenge
hegemonic social norms. An example from the Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA)
majority decision makes this clear. In the relevant passage, the majority is reviewing the
issue of whether the communicating provision, which criminalizes public communication

11

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Cross-Examination of John Lowman at para 502 onwards)
[Lowman cross], referring to: Department of Justice, Violence Against Persons Who Prostitute: The
Experience in British Columbia by John Lowman and Laura Fraser (Ottawa: 1995).
12
Ibid at para 533.
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for the purposes of prostitution, is grossly disproportionate, and thus contrary to the
principles of fundamental justice under s.7 of the Charter. In coming to the conclusion
that the law is grossly disproportionate, the application judge, Justice Himel, relied on her
finding that the provision “can increase the vulnerability of street prostitutes by forcing
them to forego screening customers at an early and crucial stage of the transaction.”13 She
also referred to screening as “an essential tool to enhance safety”.14 The ONCA majority,
however, casts doubt on these findings:

…[The application judge] failed to point to evidence in the record that
would support her finding that face-to-face communication with a
prospective customer is essential to enhancing prostitutes' safety. On our
reading of the record, such a finding was not available.
There was anecdotal evidence from prostitutes that they often felt rushed
in their negotiations with potential customers, and would quickly get into
the customers' cars to avoid detection by the police. To the extent that the
application judge relied on that evidence, informed by her own common
sense, to find that screening customers is essential to enhancing the safety
of street prostitutes, we think her conclusion reaches well beyond the
limits of the evidence.15 [emphasis added]

In the above passage, the ONCA majority challenges the universality of the common
sense that Himel J purportedly relies on by reframing it as merely “her own”. Rather than
13

Bedford ONSC, supra note 1 at para 421.
Ibid at para 432.
15
Bedford v Canada (AG) 2012 ONCA 186 at para 311.
14
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invoking experiential knowledge as a means to challenge common sense, though, the
court here lumps experiential (i.e. “anecdotal”) evidence and common sense together and
then uses the partialization strategy to attack both. The strategy is thereby detached from
its feminist roots and wielded instrumentally against the experiential knowledge of
people in the sex trade. It is worth emphasizing that the relationship between common
sense and experiential knowledge shifts significantly in this last vignette. In the first
example given above (citing Lebovitch), experiential knowledge is cast as raising a
challenge to mainstream common sense. In the latter passage, however, experiential
knowledge is itself associated with common sense, and thereby excluded from the realm
of evidence proper. Whatever progressive political-epistemological valence the
partialization strategy has outside the litigation context is lost in the process.

6.3 PRIVILEGING EVIDENCE OVER COMMON SENSE
To the extent that the partialization of common sense does rely upon experiential
evidence to cast doubt on purportedly universals, it can be read as a special case of a
more general set of strategies in which evidence is invoked as a means to challenge
common sense. In this section, I discuss two such strategies: 1) the mobilization of
evidence to contest common sense assumptions; and 2) the framing of common sense
claims as unsubstantiated by evidence. Generally speaking, these strategies bank upon the
privileging of evidence over common sense, where “evidence” refers either to evidence
tendered in litigation, or to information—most often empirical research—perceived as
offering legitimate grounds for belief in a given proposition. They thereby reflect the
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increasing importance accorded both to the tendering of evidence generally, and to social
science research specifically, in strategic Charter challenges to legislation.16

While feminist epistemological commitments are most clearly linked to the mobilization
of experiential evidence and knowledge, the invocation of other forms of evidence—
particularly expert social science evidence—in litigation is often also perceived as
holding the potential to disrupt conservative common sense assumptions embedded in
law and legal reasoning.17 Once again, then, one might expect to see this set of strategies
being mobilized by the applicants as a means to challenge the laws under scrutiny in
Bedford. As I show, however, the invocation of expert evidence to challenge common
sense is not attached to any particular position with respect to the impugned laws in
Bedford. Furthermore, to the extent that this set of strategies reinforces the perceived
boundary between common sense and expert evidence, it actually works against critical
feminist insights.
6.3.1 Evidence Contesting Common Sense
The progressive potential of evidence as a challenge to common sense in Bedford is most
apparent where participants in the litigation draw on expert evidence—often grounded in
social science research—to actively debunk what they deem to be erroneous common
sense assumptions. Often, the claims being challenged or debunked in this way are
framed not only as incorrect, but as harmful stereotypes. The turn to evidence is thus

16

See Chapter 1 at 1.2.2.
See for example: Mary Eberts, “New Facts for Old: Observations on the Judicial Process” in Richard
Devlin, ed, Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1991) at
473-474, discussing the case of R v Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852; Cochran, supra note 3 at 148, discussing
the case of R v DD, 2000 SCC 43. See also Chapter 1 at 1.2.2.
17
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presented as an equality-promoting move. This is most readily observed in the discourse
of actors on the applicant side in Bedford.

Applicant expert Frances Shaver, for instance, in cross-examination, repeatedly expresses
her desire to dispel various stereotypes about sex workers and sex work through her
research. This point is captured in the following passage:

I think one of the most important parts of the work I have done right since the
very early days is to show the diversity in the sex trade […] I think that that's
really essential for undermining this homogeneous stereotype about they're
victims and they are all exploited and they're (--) which seems to pervade a lot
of that literature, perhaps less now than before, but has been pervasive, and is
certainly pervasive in the minds of the public.18

Later in the cross-examination, Shaver ties this concern specifically to the policymaking
context: “…we do know that policymakers and others are making decisions based on
some of the stereotypes of these particular individuals, and so our concern is that there be
good research and good evidence based decisions made on what's happening.”19 Shaver
thus highlights the practical importance of evidence, conceived as social science research,
as a check on common sense stereotypes in public decision-making.

18

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Cross-Examination of Frances Shaver at para 62). See also
at para 206.
19
Ibid at para 118.
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The following comment from applicant expert Deborah Brock further illustrates how the
use of evidence as a check on common sense is tied to concerns about social equality:

Many of the problems in securing a protective working environment for sextrade workers relates to fundamental misconceptions about the nature of sex
work. In a study I conducted a few years back, I find that many women enter
the sex-trade not because of desperation or degradation, but because they see it
as a legitimate means for them to earn a living. When we treat prostitution as a
social problem, relying uncritically on knowledge derived from 'authoritative'
sources like the police, the courts, and the media, we unwittingly participate in
the silencing, marginalization, and control of prostitutes.20

In their factum at the ONSC, the applicants reiterate the stereotype-checking power of the
evidence on offer in Bedford. Brock’s research, for instance, is framed as debunking the
“all-encompassing view of the ‘prostitute-as-victim’”21, and “the mainstream assumption
that prostitution is immoral and harmful.”22 Sex worker and advocate Kara Gillies’ study
is cited as challenging the assumed prevalence of pimping, which, according to Gillies,
“really holds a place in people’s mythologies and perceptions about the sex trade.”23 The
factum also refers to the legislative report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee in
New Zealand, itself informed by multiple social science research projects, as
20

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Affidavit of Deborah Brock at para 5).
Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Factum of the Applicants at para 148) [Factum of
Applicants].
22
Ibid at para 149.
23
Ibid at para 77, citing Bound By Law: How Canada’s Protectionist Public Policies in the Areas of Both
Rape and Prostitution Limit Women’s Choices, Agency and Activities, 2007. Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010
ONSC 4264 (Application Record, Vol. 6, Tab 24(A), p 1358).
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“documenting and refuting many industry stereotypes”, including the notion that most
prostitutes are coerced into the industry, and the imagined link between decriminalization
and youth prostitution.24

The effectiveness of the applicant side’s rhetorical appeal to expert evidence as a means
to challenge mainstream views about the sex trade is apparent in the following passage
from Himel J’s reasons on the application:
Many of the applicants' experts gave opinions on stereotypes and
misperceptions about the sex trade in Canada. For example, some experts
challenged the notion of the prostitute as a victim, maintaining that some
turn to prostitution not out of desperation, but because they see it as a
better option than other opportunities, such as unskilled labour. As well,
evidence was led that homeless, drug-addicted prostitutes represent a
small percentage of prostitutes, also known as "survival sex workers."
Some experts opined that pimping is far less prevalent in Canada than
some popular literature and media depictions would hold, and that the
"mythology of the pimp" is rooted in racial and sexual bias.25

It is important to note, however, this strategy is not the exclusive preserve of the
applicants in Bedford. Take for instance the evidence of key Crown expert Melissa
Farley. In her affidavit, Farley points to research to debunk various claims that she frames
24

Factum of Applicants, supra note 21 at paras 357-361, referring to New Zealand, Ministry of Justice,
Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003,
(May 2008).
25
Bedford ONSC, supra note 1 at para 120.
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as “misconceptions” or “myths”—for instance, the notion that drug addiction tends to
precede prostitution.26 Similarly, she frames the notion that sex work involves only
physical violence as “an erroneous assumption”, pointing to her own affidavit evidence—
in which she describes various other kinds of violence (e.g. emotional violence)—as
evidence to the contrary.27 Farley, too, then, mobilizes evidence as a means to challenge
what she views as problematic common sense assumptions.

Nor do the applicants demonstrate any kind of epistemic fidelity to the privileging of
evidence over common sense throughout the course of the litigation. To the contrary, as I
discuss further below and in the next chapter, they draw actively on a different kind of
common sense to challenge the Crown’s evidence, and ultimately to lay the foundation
for their own case.
6.3.2 Common Sense as Unsubstantiated by Evidence
Another way that actors in Bedford pit evidence against common sense is by framing
unfavourable claims advanced by the opposing side as “theoretical”, “speculative”, and
ultimately, not grounded in evidence. The key accusation in this case is not that the claim
at issue is wrong, but that it is unsubstantiated.

In some instances, this strategy is mobilized by applicant-side actors to challenge
assumptions about the sex trade that do not accord with the experiential knowledge of the
applicants and their peers. In her affidavit, for instance, Crown expert Melissa Farley

26

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Affidavit of Melissa Farley at para 60). See also at para 75,
where Farley challenges the assumption that most clients use condoms.
27
Ibid at para 150.
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opines that most women in prostitution have pimps whose behaviour towards them is
akin to torture or domestic violence.28 Under cross-examination, applicant expert Ronald
Weitzer frames Farley’s depiction of pimping as a “stereotype” that is “unsubstantiated
given the lack of data”.29 Another example can be seen in the evidence of Crown expert
Janice Raymond. In her affidavit, Raymond compares figures on sex trafficking in
Sweden—which criminalizes the purchase but not the sale of sex—to figures from
Finland and Denmark. According to the evidence she cites, the rate of sex trafficking in
the latter two countries is much higher, despite their populations being smaller.30
Raymond uses this evidence to support her claim that the Swedish model of regulating
prostitution is most effective at reducing sex trafficking.31 In cross-examination,
however, Young notes that the source of Raymond’s data on Finland—the Finish
Criminal Intelligence Division—actually states the number of women from different
countries that are prostituted in Finland every year, not the number that are trafficked.
Young proceeds to challenge Raymond’s assumption that all of these women must be
victims of sex trafficking.32

In many other instances, however, it is the Crown that frames claims made by the
applicants (and accepted by the court) as unsubstantiated, in a way that discounts the
evidence of experiential witnesses. The use of this strategy is especially apparent in

28

Ibid at para 13.
Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Cross-Examination of Ronald Weitzer at para 171) [Weitzer
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Canada’s written arguments in Bedford. In its factum at the SCC, for instance, Canada
argues: “While the OCA found it a matter of common sense that allowing off-street
prostitution to take place in bawdy-houses will make it safer for women, the evidence did
not support that conclusion.”33 The factum goes on to describe the evidence on this point
as “inconclusive”.34 The same rhetorical strategy is repeated a few paragraphs later:

…while the OCA was prepared to accept, on the basis of common sense,
logic and anecdote, that many street prostitutes would avail themselves of
the opportunity to work indoors if it were legal, this finding was not
supported by the evidence.35

The framing of “anecdote” as something other than “evidence” in this example is telling,
once again shifting experiential evidence away from the “evidence” side of the common
sense/evidence dichotomy. This framing calls to mind Crown expert Ronald-Frans
Melchers’ assertions that qualitative research interviews do not provide any actual
evidence of the dangers posed by the prostitution laws (see Chapter 5 at 5.2.2 under the
Privileging of Quantitative over Qualitative Research). As in that case, boundary work is
used here to discount the weight of experiential evidence and knowledge in Bedford.36

33

Bedford SCC, supra note 1 (Factum of the Appellant AG Canada at para 74).
Ibid at para 75.
35
Ibid at para 78.
36
The effectiveness of this strategy seems to depend on equivocation between the two meanings of
evidence described at the outset of this section: anecdotes are distinguished from empirical evidence, which
is then referred to simply as “evidence”, suggesting that there is no support on the record for the
proposition being advanced—despite the fact that the “anecdote” at issue is a form of tendered evidence on
the record.
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The inevitable role of background assumptions and inferential reasoning in social science
research and expert opinion provides further rhetorical opportunities for Canada to
challenge applicant-side claims as unsubstantiated. In this context, the framing strategy at
issue closely resembles the boundary work between fact and opinion discussed in Chapter
5 (see section 5.3.2). Take for instance, the moment on the record where counsel for
Canada challenges applicant expert Ronald Weitzer’s claim that advertising on the
internet enhances the safety of sex workers, by helping them to better screen clients. As
noted in Chapter 5, counsel for Canada attacks this claim by framing it as merely
Weitzer’s opinion, unsupported by empirical evidence (the opinion/fact dichotomy).37
Just prior to that passage, counsel for Canada asks Weitzer: “Where did you get that
information from? Is that all logic or is it based on a particular scientific study?”38 The
use of the term “logic” here can be understood as referring to a kind of common sense
inference, which is discounted as epistemically inferior to empirical evidence. Counsel
for Canada mobilizes a similar strategy again later in the cross-examination. In this
instance, Weitzer is defending a conclusion reached by other researchers that brothels are
the safest environment for prostitution by arguing that brothel owners have a vested
interest in keeping their workers safe and healthy. Counsel for Canada attacks this point
as “highly speculative”,39 once again describing it pejoratively as “a logical inference, not
based on any evidence.”40 In response, Weitzer describes his opinion as “based on the
logic in terms of owners wanting to keep their workers safe, and the evidence out there

37

See Chapter 5, section 5.3.2 at note 257.
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regarding legal brothel systems.”41 He thus points to common sense as working alongside
the available evidence to inform his expert opinion.

In Lowman’s cross-examination, too, counsel for Canada repeatedly invokes the
language of “speculation” to cast doubt on expert claims that are somehow informed by
common sense and logic.42 This framing builds on Melchers’ critical assessment of
Lowman’s opinion. Regarding Lowman’s research findings about homicide rates against
prostitutes in Canada, for instance, Melchers comments: “The level of assumptions in
what he does go beyond anything that I can reasonably assess. It comes down to a matter
of belief and that's really all I can point out.”43 The framing of Weitzer and Lowman’s
claims as unsubstantiated in these examples is a reflection of strategic boundary work,
premised on the detachment of social science research and expert opinion from the
common sense assumptions that inevitably inform them.

A final example helps to illustrate the shifting use of this strategy by actors on both sides
of the litigation in Bedford. The exchange, in this case, is between Young and Melchers.
In the course of a discussion about the homicide rate against prostitutes in Canada,
Melchers suggests that the reported homicide rate of 50 for the most recent period (19951999) is overinflated by the Pickton murders.44 Young counters that the rate may in fact

41
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be underinflated due to a high number of ongoing investigations of missing women.45
Melchers, however, refuses to draw the inference required to make this argument:

Q. That's not a matter of logic. Eighty missing women, surely some of
them were killed.
A. But we don't know how many, we just don't know.
Q. You need evidence of that before you would admit that some of them
would be killed.
A. Of course I do.
Q. You don't find it to be implausible as a hypothesis that 80 women
would just go missing.
A. It's not a question of plausibility or not plausibility. I'm not asked to
access the plausibility of things, I'm asking to assess the evidence of
things. That's been my role here.
Q. But I told you the evidence is that there are 80 missing women. You
haven't contested that.
[…]
Q. …You can't use common sense to conclude this or you just don't want
to answer it?46

In this passage, Melchers denies a place for common sense reasoning in his own expert
opinion, restricting himself strictly to the known data, while Young suggests that the

45
46
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application of common sense is necessary to draw appropriate inferences. However, in
the applicants’ factum at the ONSC, the roles are reversed. There Young argues that
Melchers relies on “the erroneous factual assumption” that Pickton was largely
responsible for the 50 homicides.47 According to Young, the error stems from the fact
that Pickton was only charged with 26 of the homicides, and only convicted of 6. Young
asserts that there is “no evidence Pickton is believed to be responsible” for the other
homicides48—even though Pickton claimed to have murdered 49 women in a jail cell
conversation with an undercover police officer.49 At this point, it is Young who critiques
Melchers for relying on assumptions to draw conclusions beyond the narrow confines of
the data on charges and convictions.

As the above examples show, the framing of common sense claims as unsubstantiated in
Bedford is invoked instrumentality by both parties to advance different and sometimes
opposing claims. Regardless of how this strategy is mobilized, however, it reinforces a
kind of boundary work that insists on a sharp divide between common sense and
evidence, and thereby fails to recognize how these two categories are actually
inextricably intertwined. In this way, the use of this strategy reflects and perpetuates the
mainstream epistemological paradigm at the expense of feminist epistemological
commitments.

47

Factum of Applicants, supra note 21 at paras 200-201.
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6.4 PRIVILEGING COMMON SENSE OVER EVIDENCE
In the above sections, I examined how actors in Bedford bank on an implicit privilege
accorded to evidence in the dichotomy between evidence and common sense. There are
some moments in the case, however, where the hierarchical order of this dichotomy is
reversed. In these instances, common sense is invoked to challenge the evidence being
tendered, instead of the other way around. Rather than highlighting the speculative and
unfounded nature of common sense, this framing strategy banks on its intuitive appeal.

Just as one might expect the applicants in Bedford to mobilize evidence as a progressive
check on legally embedded common sense, one might expect the opposing strategy to be
advanced by the Crown, in defence of the status quo. Once again, this is sometimes the
case. Take, for example, the following moment in the cross-examination of applicant sex
worker Amy Lebovitch, in which counsel for Ontario attempts to highlight a
contradiction in Lebovitch’s account of how the bawdy house laws have affected her. In
her affidavit, Lebovitch explains how she began selling sex on the street, but later
transitioned to working independently from home, or from rented hotel rooms, in order to
gain more control over her work and to better protect herself from potentially dangerous
clients.50 Now that she has purchased her own home and is living with her life partner,
however, she is afraid of being charged under the bawdyhouse and living off the avails
provisions. Lebovitch states: “This fear has forced me on several occasions to venture
back onto the streets in the past few years.”51 In cross-examination, counsel presses her
on why she does not just rent a hotel room to work from, as she has done in the past:
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Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Affidavit of Amy Lebovitch at paras 5-6).
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Q. Do you not feel that there's a contradiction there?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Why are you choosing to practice such an unsafe form of prostitution
when there is the alternative that you have resorted to before, that is
renting a hotel room?
A. I don't know, but I don't think there's a contradiction.52

In this passage, counsel frames Lebovitch’s stated choices as irrational, thereby casting
doubt on the severity of the law’s effect on her. In other words, she appeals to common
sense and logic, as she sees it, to cast doubt on Lebovitch’s experiential account.

In other cases, however, it is the applicants who mobilize common sense to contest the
evidence tendered by the Crown in Bedford. For instance, in his cross-examination of
Crown expert Richard Poulin, Young appeals to how the “common person” would define
violence in order to cast doubt on Poulin’s definition—and the statistics he produces
based on this definition—as overly broad.53 Poulin in turn suggests that a survey would
have to be conducted to be sure of the common meaning, thereby challenging Young’s
confidence in his own assessment of common sense. 54 Notably, the argument here is not
only about research methodology, but about the framing of the facts at issue—i.e. how
“violence” is defined in debates over the differential rates of violence in indoor versus
outdoor prostitution. Young invokes common sense in order to advance a narrow
52
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definition limited to physical violence, for which the data on differential rates is most
compelling.

The applicants also mobilize common sense as a check on certain kinds of evidence from
experience (albeit not the experiential accounts of people in the sex trade, as far as I can
tell from the available portions of the record and from my interviews with Young). One
example comes from an exchange about the relative dangers of outdoor versus indoor
prostitution in Young’s cross-examination of Crown witness and police officer Jim
Morrissey. In the relevant passage, Morrissey opines that the violence is similar in both
locations, but emphasizes that he can only speak to the cases he himself has worked on.55
In an attempt to challenge Morrissey’s stated opinion, Young asks:

Q: And besides any of your experience, wouldn't common sense -forgetting what you think you know, but wouldn't common sense suggest
that basically the street is where more danger lurks than inside? Common
sense.
A. Obviously.
[…]
Q. And you are saying your experience contradicts what
would be the common sense view, which happens?56
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Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Cross-Examination of Jim Morrissey at pp 27-28).
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Interestingly, Young goes on to blur the dichotomy between the experience at issue and
common sense later in the cross:

...let me ask you this as a matter of common sense and you being a cop
for 30 years. What is more likely for someone to commit an assault? In a
dark car somewhere where no one is seeing you or in a location where
people have taken your name as you have come in and maybe even had a
camera at the door?57

Like experiential knowledge in some of the examples above, a subtle shift in the framing
of Morrissey’s professional experience occurs here. In the first passage, Young questions
Morrissey’s experience as contradicting “the common sense view”. In the second, he
merges Morrissey’s experience of “being a cop for 30 years” into everyday common
sense. In both cases, common sense is privileged as the predominant way of knowing—
one that either discounts or assimilates Morrissey’s firsthand experience. I offer further
examples of how common sense works to assimilate other forms of proof in the next
chapter.
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Ibid at p 72.
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6.5 EXPOSING THE ENTANGLEMENT OF EVIDENCE AND COMMON
SENSE
6.5.1 Common Sense Informing Evidence
Thus far, I have shown how actors in Bedford draw strategically on the dichotomization
of common sense and evidence as the foundation for a variety of rhetorical framing
strategies. In doing so, they bank alternately on the privileged status of evidence, and the
intuitive appeal of common sense. In either case, however, the strategies discussed so far
reinforce an imagined boundary between common sense and evidence, similar in kind to
the boundary between law and fact (and between opinion and fact). There is, in other
words, a continuous pattern to these moves at a higher epistemic order. In this way, I
argue, the framing of common sense in Bedford runs counter to the feminist insight that
all knowledge arises from a particular sociopolitical and experiential context, and that
background assumptions and normative values pervade observation and analysis at every
level. From this perspective, evidence and common sense are inextricably intertwined.

A close look at the expert opinion evidence and associated social science research on the
record in Bedford makes this interconnection apparent. Take, for instance, Lowman’s
description of his 1989 study: “Street Prostitution: Assessing the Impact of the Law in
Vancouver”, a study commissioned by the Department of Justice to assess the impact of
the then recently passed communicating provision.58 As part of this study, Lowman’s
research team performed “counts” of street-based sex workers, to be compared to
previously collected baseline data in order to measure changes in the levels and
58
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geography of the street sex trade.59 The findings from these counts are part of what
informs Lowman’s opinion that the communicating provision has facilitated the
displacement of survival sex workers in a way that places them at greater risk of harm.60
In explaining how his research team conducted the counts, Lowman notes that they relied
in part on mode of dress and behaviour to identify people engaged in the sale of sex.61 In
other words, common sense assumptions, in this case about how sex workers look and
act, informed the research data underlying Lowman’s opinion regarding the law’s
displacement effects—an opinion relied upon by the application judge, and ultimately by
the Supreme Court of Canada, in the decision to strike down the communicating
provision as unconstitutional.62

On the other side of the litigation, one can see how common sense informs expert opinion
evidence in the example cited earlier from Raymond’s cross-examination.63 Raymond, in
that instance, draws on her own common sense assumptions about how women come to
sell sex in a foreign country to inform her expert opinion about the rate of sex trafficking
in Finland. She draws a similar inference about the rate of sex trafficking in the
Netherlands at another point in the record. The source she relies upon states: “Experts
estimate that as many as 60 percent of the women working in prostitution are foreigners,
59
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However, the report in turn cites Lowman (along with others) on the issue of displacement and isolation
caused by the communicating provision (p. 63). See also Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264
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but no one knows how many of these women are illegal immigrants or how many are
coerced into the business.”64 From this, Raymond concludes that most of the women
selling sex in the Netherlands “are women from other countries who were probably
trafficked into the Netherlands”.65 When questioned on this inference by Young,
Raymond responds: “Well, I would agree that it's a loose interpretation, but certainly I
think one could draw that conclusion from that statement, yes.”66 Based on such
inferences, Raymond opines that decriminalizing prostitution results in higher rates of sex
trafficking compared to other policy approaches.67

The intertwined nature of common sense and evidence illustrated in the above examples
does not go entirely unrecognized in Bedford. While the predominant strategies used to
frame common sense exploit the blurriness between these categories to reassert a
dichotomy between them in various ways, there are some instances in which participants
in the case resist this type of boundary work. One of the clearest examples of this
resistance comes from Lowman, who repeatedly underscores the legitimate role of
common sense and logic in the process of qualitative research, and thereby in his expert
opinion.68 Indeed, Lowman explicitly points to “common sense” as “very important in the
process of understanding how qualitative research works.”69
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Lowman’s stance is further illustrated in the following passage from his crossexamination, which addresses one of the research articles that he relies upon in his
affidavit—a small-scale qualitative study of women in the sex trade in Melbourne,
Australia.70 According to the study’s findings, women working in brothels generally felt
safer than those working on the street, but those working in massage parlours reported a
constant threat of rape.71 As Lowman notes, however, those working in massage parlours
also reported an ongoing threat of police raids.72 The exchange between Lowman and
counsel for Canada proceeds as follows:

Q. ….you're not suggesting that the constant threat of rape is due to the
police raids.
A. There may well be some kind of link. If those women work in a
circumstance where they're worried about raids all the time and what
they're trying to do is make a living, it may be that they are more
susceptible to certain kinds of violence because of the way that they're
worried about law enforcement. […]
Q. Am I correct that you're speculating here? There's nothing in the study
that would indicate that link that you are speculating about.
A. Correct.73
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A few paragraphs later, Lowman repeats his theory about the possible link between the
women’s fear of police raids and their fear of rape, to which counsel retorts:

Q. Again, that's sheer speculation on your part, is it not?
A. I think we have - well, it's interesting - no, it's not. I'm looking at the
evidence that we have here.
[…]
A. Well, we can call it speculation, but […] we are involved in various
kinds of reasoning processes throughout this exercise, as we should be, as
far as I can see.74

With this response, Lowman legitimizes the role of common sense reasoning both in his
own evidence, and in the fact-finding process more generally.

Young makes a similar point in his cross-examination of Melchers. In the course of
discussing research methods for ascertaining crime rates, Young observes that the final
step in the research process involves the drawing of inferences, which, he puts to
Melchers, is “really a matter of logic and application of rationality”75:

Q. And you can gain, say, the significance of some common sense in
drawing inferences. Sometimes it's just a matter of common sense.
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A. There's reasoning. I don't know if you call it common sense, reasoning is
not very common sometimes. It's reasonable argument.76

Melchers’ response questions the equation of inferential reasoning with common sense
by questioning its universality. This may be read as another instance of the partialization
of common sense, discussed earlier in this chapter. Young, however, persists, using an
example from one of Melchers’ own statements to the media to show how his expertise is
permeated by common sense.77

Like Lowman, Young, in this example seems to be pointing to the legitimate role of
common sense in the formulation of expert opinion evidence. In the next portion of the
cross-examination, however, it becomes apparent that his aim is not so much to resist the
boundary work between evidence and common sense as to emphasize the primacy of the
latter. In this subsequent passage, Young points to the following statement made by
Melchers in his affidavit, regarding Lowman’s research interview data: “Interviews found
a consistent lack of support among prostitutes for the criminal law. Support was found
among prostitutes for legalization of off-street prostitution. Such opinions are not entirely
unexpected.”78 Young rephrases Melchers’ claim as follows:

Q. Professor Lowman has evidence that many prostitutes support indoor
legalization and you find that to be a not surprising comment because
common sense suggests people would prefer to work indoors than on the
76
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street. Is that what you're saying?79

[…]

Q. I'm just asking you, when you read the interviews, you just thought
common sense, yes, of course they're going to say they want to move
indoors. It just makes sense.80

Common sense here is framed as an independent form of knowledge that accords with the
evidence, rather than as something with which evidence is inevitably infused. This suggests
that Young’s resistance to the dominant paradigm (i.e. the dichotomization of evidence and
common sense) is instrumental and transient at best.

6.5.2 Evidence Informing Common Sense
It may seem counterintuitive, but just as the examples in the above section show the
infusion of evidence with common sense, the common sense at play in Bedford can at
times be read as driven by evidence. For instance, in the literature on research
methodology included in the record and highlighted by the applicants in their factum at
the ONSC, Ine Vanwesenbeeck and Frances Shaver comment on how unrepresentative
sampling in sex trade research constructs a distorted portrait of the industry as
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characterized by victimization. 81 In this way, social science research actually informs
“common sense” stereotypes about the sex trade.

On the other hand, this area of research also gives rise to a different kind of common
sense, supportive of the applicants’ position. Take the following example from
Lowman’s cross-examination, addressing differential rates of violence in different forms
of prostitution. The relevant passage begins with Lowman offering a description, based
upon his research, of escort prostitution in which women are assisted by drivers and/or
check in with the escort agency.82 Seeking clarification, counsel for Canada asks: “Just so
I understand, then, that would be a safer form, obviously of prostitution, because it would
have this built-in safety mechanism in it”.83 At this point, Lowman seizes on counsel’s
phrasing: “Well, it was interesting that a common sense understanding of that situation
told you immediately that it was safer, hence your use of the word obviously”.84 A few
paragraphs later, counsel goes on to ask:

Q. …is it really possible to draw any factual conclusions in an empirical
way comparing the rates of violence suffered by one population as against
any other?
A. Yes, I'd do it the way that you did it, which was to say once you see
that description from those women describing why the escort service
81
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situation where you've got that monitor, the driver, your word was
“obviously" safer, I agree with you.85

With this response, Lowman once again recognizes common sense as a component of the
empirical research process. However, he also points to qualitative interviews as
illuminating this new version of common sense. The common sense at issue is, in other
words, grounded in an understanding of the lived experience of sex workers. As I argue
in Chapter 8, this is in fact where experiential knowledge holds its greatest power in
strategic Charter litigation.

6.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have shown how the treatment of common sense in Bedford banks
largely on the assertion of a fundamental dichotomy between common sense and
evidence. I began from the feminist intuition, expressed at the outset of this dissertation,
that appeals to common sense have a conservative valence, serving to shore up already
dominant worldviews, and that such worldviews may be fruitfully challenged via
experiential or expert evidence in litigation. My analysis, however, suggests that common
sense in Bedford is a rhetorical chameleon, sometimes pitted against experiential
knowledge but sometimes aligned with it, and invoked or attacked to advance an array of
different views from one moment to the next. It is perhaps for this reason that, as I argue
in the next two chapters, common sense plays such a dominant role in the fact-finding
process.

85

Lowman cross, supra note 11 at para 420.

307

Chapter 7: The Weight Accorded to Different Categories of
Proof in Bedford
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous three chapters, I examined how participants in Bedford v Canada (AG)1
frame experiential evidence, expert opinion evidence, and common sense respectively
within the fact-finding process. My analysis of these three categories of proof drew on
the feminist theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 to identify and critique the
underlying epistemic norms and paradigms at work on the record in Bedford, and to
consider how they align with feminist epistemological commitments and associated
social justice goals. Having considered the treatment of each of these categories of proof
individually, I conclude Part II by examining how they are weighed against each other by
the parties in their facta and by the courts in their reasons.

This chapter serves two key purposes. First, it provides a space to examine the interaction
between experiential evidence, expert evidence, and common sense in Bedford, and
thereby to transcend individual categories of proof, the boundaries of which I have been
questioning all along. Second, it allows me to consider the relative importance accorded
to different categories of proof, as they are conventionally constructed, in the fact-finding
process as a whole. In particular, it provides insight into the weight accorded to
experiential evidence in Bedford in relation to other forms of proof, giving a proximate
sense of how experiential knowledge itself is valued in the case.

1

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 [Bedford ONSC], affirmed in 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford SCC].
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One important outcome of my analysis is to highlight the link between how evidence is
weighed in Bedford and how the facts at issue are framed. This harkens back to my
discussion of Faigman’s “frames of reference” in Chapter 2 (see 2.5). Beyond this, my
analysis leads to a few key findings. First, the weight accorded to different categories of
proof in Bedford often shifts instrumentally within a given set of arguments or reasons.
Thus, like the epistemic norms discussed in previous chapters, the categories of proof are
themselves mobilized instrumentally through the fact-finding process. The same
information is also sometimes weighed differently depending on the form in which it is
packaged—i.e. whether as experiential evidence, expert evidence, legislative or
government-generated evidence, or common sense. This once again underscores how
different categories of proof serve as rhetorical tools rather than as ontological givens.
Most importantly, however, my analysis leads me to find that, with one or two
exceptions, experiential evidence is not explicitly accorded much weight in Bedford,
including in the arguments of the applicant rights-seekers. Rather, it is appeals to law,
legal reasoning, and common sense, along with legislative and other governmentgenerated reports—a more legally familiar and judicially noticeable form of evidence—
that tend to take precedence in the fact-finding process. This, I suggest, casts doubt on the
capacity for outside sources of knowledge to disrupt the legal status quo in strategic
Charter litigation. By the same token, it raises concerns about the alignment of the factfinding process in such cases with feminist epistemological commitments.
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The chapter proceeds in two sections. In the first, I canvas the main arguments made by
the parties in Bedford in their facta, with attention to the role and weight ascribed to
different categories of proof. My analysis here shows how, contrary to my intuition at the
outset of this dissertation, the applicants rely heavily on legal reasoning and common
sense to advance progressive litigation, while the Crown leans on the importance of
expert evidence (along with deference to the legislature) to preserve the status quo. This
once again demonstrates common sense’s shifting political valence in the fact-finding
process, as discussed in the previous chapter. While often thought of as upholding the
prevailing sociolegal order, appeals to common sense largely serve the opposite purpose
in Bedford. In the second section, I examine how the courts weigh the various categories
of proof in their reasons. Here I show how the courts rely on a shifting combination of
expert evidence, legislative and other government-generated evidence, and common
sense to draw findings of fact, with experiential evidence—particularly the evidence of
the experiential witnesses in the case—largely left by the wayside. I also consider how
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)’s reframing of the facts at issue under section 7
versus section 1 may affect the weight accorded to different categories of proof in future
cases.

7.2 THE PARTIES
7.2.1 The Applicants
As noted in the previous chapter, I began this project with the intuition that the shift in
focus from law to fact in strategic Charter litigation, and the concomitant trend towards
increasingly voluminous evidentiary records, could support progressively oriented

310

Charter challengers to disrupt the legal status quo. Drawing on feminist theory, I pointed
to experiential knowledge, in particular, as holding the potential to challenge dominant
norms and assumptions in a way that accords with progressive epistemological
commitments. 2 If my intuition was correct, one would expect to see progressive public
interest litigants emphasizing the weight and importance of evidence tendered in strategic
Charter litigation, with a particular emphasis on experiential evidence.

At first blush, the applicants’ case in Bedford appears to fit these expectations. The record
brought by the applicants is undoubtedly extensive, including evidence from 11
experiential witnesses, 10 expert witnesses, and 3 reply witnesses, and totaling over 9000
pages.3 As described in previous chapters, this evidence is invoked to disrupt common
stereotypes about the sex trade, and to demonstrate that the risks associated with the sale
of sex vary greatly depending on the circumstances—a key premise of the applicants’
case. It also provides some of the impetus for the application judge to revisit the s.1
analysis undertaken in the Prostitution Reference.4 In their facta, the applicants draw
from the full gamut of evidence tendered, pointing to experiential accounts, expert
opinion and social science research, and government reports to support their arguments.

However, a closer look at the applicants’ written arguments in Bedford casts doubt on the
centrality and importance of evidence—experiential and expert—to the applicants’ case.

2

See: Chapter 1 at 1.2.2; Chapter 3 at 3.3 and 3.4.1.
Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Index to Joint Application Record).
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[1990] 1 SCR 1123 [Prostitution Reference].
3
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At the outset of their factum at the ONSC, the applicants remark upon the social and
legislative fact evidence tendered in the case as follows:

It is respectfully submitted that the proposition that street prostitution is
far more dangerous than indoor prostitution being conducted with the
assistance of third parties is primarily a matter of common sense and
simple inference. Nonetheless, the Applicants have presented a substantial
body of supporting evidence to comply with the Supreme Court of
Canada’s admonition that Charter arguments should not be advanced in a
“factual vacuum” in the absence of legislative facts to provide some
context and information as to the operation of the law.5

The evidentiary record is thereby framed as secondary to the applicants’ case—a matter
of legally compelled background context rather than a critical driving force. This
minimization of the importance of the record appears once again in the applicants’ review
of the expert opinion evidence, which begins with a lengthy discussion of the
methodological limitations of research on the sex trade.6 While purporting to illuminate
the deficiencies of the research tendered by Crown experts,7 this section of the factum
arguably also serves another, broader purpose: to decentre the role of social science and
expert opinion in the case altogether.

5
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The applicants begin this section by remarking that in an ideal world, “empirical research
in the area of sex work should be able to provide clear statistical data which can
demonstrate whether or not the anecdotal information provided by the Applicants’
experiential witnesses is representative of the general population of sex workers.”8 This
statement is notable in itself for reflecting, once again, the privilege accorded to
quantitative research, and for reinforcing the notion that the value of experiential
evidence depends on its generalizability.9 The statement also acknowledges the potential
power of social science research and associated expert opinion evidence as a bridge
between adjudicative facts and social facts in strategic Charter challenges to legislation.
As Young explains, however, the research on offer in Bedford falls short of this ideal,
and thus cannot provide a complete answer to the factual questions at issue in the case:

It is respectfully submitted that the body of empirical research tendered in
the case at bar does support the claim that the law does contribute to the
risk of harm by prohibiting safe avenues of work; however, it is
recognized that the empirical research conducted to date on sex work,
while voluminous, is fraught with methodological limitations. In light of
these limitations it must also be then recognized that the constitutional
issues to be decided in this case cannot solely be resolved by asking this
Honourable Court to make specific findings of facts on issues which have
eluded researchers for decades. It is submitted that the empirical research
data provided by both Applicant and Respondent should be seen as
8

Ibid at para 123.
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9
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constituting one piece of the puzzle to be considered along with the
anecdotal evidence, government reports and studies and common sense.10

One might read this as potentially augmenting the role of experiential evidence relative to
expert opinion evidence in Bedford. And indeed, the applicants draw extensively from
experiential evidence in their factum, alongside expert social science evidence and
legislative evidence. At the end of the day, however, these various sources of information
are framed as bolstering a case that is fundamentally grounded in common sense and
legal reasoning. This is evident not only in the assertion made at the outset of the
applicants’ factum that the key facts at issue in the case are “primarily a matter of
common sense and simple inference”,11 but also in the factum’s later discussion of the
legal issues in Bedford. Here the applicants submit that, even if the court is not persuaded
by the evidence, the case can still be decided on the basis of a “reasonable
hypothetical”.12 Indeed, the applicants argue, constitutional adjudication on the basis of
reasonable hypotheticals is well-suited to the proportionality analysis required in a case
like Bedford, where the target is the legislative means used to achieve a state objective
(rather than the objective itself).13 Once again here, the suggestion is that the court need
not rely on the evidentiary record at all in order to find in the applicants’ favour.

Part of the impetus behind this approach seems to be to remove the potential obstacle that
the complexity of the expert evidence tendered in Bedford presents to the courts,
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Factum of Applicants, supra note 5 at para 123.
Supra note 5.
12
Factum of Applicants, supra note 5 at para 432.
13
Ibid at para 433.
11

314

especially for those not well versed in social science research and methodology. For
instance, in discussing Crown expert Ronald-Frans Melchers’ critique of applicant expert
John Lowman, the applicants’ factum makes a point of arguing that the court ultimately
“need not address the qualitative vs. qualitative issue, nor is it necessary to address the
thrust and content of Professor Melchers’ critique.”14 This is not necessary, according to
the applicants, because Melchers’ critique is directed at the wrong question of fact; while
Melchers’ assessment focuses on whether there is a direct causal connection between the
law and the increased risk of harm, Lowman merely asserts that the law “materially
contributes” to the risk of harm.15 In this way, the applicants subtly shift the court’s focus
from technical debates about research methodology to the appropriate framing of the
facts necessary to meet the legal test for a s.7 Charter violation. Of course, the framing of
the facts bears significantly on the adequacy of the evidence tendered.

The desire to make things easier for the courts comes through again in the applicants’
factum at the Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA), though the concern here is more about
the complexity of the relevant policy issues than of the social science evidence. The
applicants address this concern as follows:

Although the policy issues surrounding many aspects of the sex trade are
controversial, divisive and the subject-matter of endless debate, it must be
remembered that the factual issues raised in this application are far more
simple: can safety be enhanced by moving indoors, recruiting assistance

14
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and communicating with clients? In light of the simple nature of these
factual questions, it is important not to overlook the role of common sense
in their resolution.16

Once again here, the applicants give the court permission to skip over the messy details
of the debates between experts and other witnesses, in favour of a simpler and more
familiar way of knowing.

What are the implications of this approach for marginalized groups seeking social justice
through the courts? There is little doubt that, on a practical level, minimizing the
importance of the evidence in Bedford has the potential to ease the burden of proof for
other Charter challengers, for whom the costs of bringing an extensive record are often
prohibitive. On an epistemological level, however, the implications are less clear. On the
one hand, what the applicants put forward as common sense in Bedford aligns, in many
ways, with the perspectives of the experiential witnesses in the case, at least on the
applicant-side. The applicants may thus be viewed as invoking common sense in a
epistemologically progressive way to normalize and legitimize the experiential
knowledge of people in the sex trade. On the other hand, the rhetorical appeal to common
sense erases differences in this experiential knowledge, and evades any commitment to
situated knowledge in favour of traditional claims to universality. Giving courts
permission to rely on their own common sense also poses a threat to equality-seekers in
future cases, where the views of decision-makers may not align with experiential
knowledge holders.
16
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7.2.2 The Attorney General of Canada
While the applicants promote common sense and reasonable hypotheticals as
sufficient to establish a violation under section 7, the Attorney General of Canada
insists on the applicants’ burden to establish the facts necessary to make out their case
on the basis of conclusive scientific evidence—evidence that Canada suggests is
lacking in Bedford due to the methodological limitations of the applicable social
science research. According to Canada, the applicants’ de-centering of social science
and expert opinion amounts to no more than an attempt to be improperly relieved of
this burden.17 Canada thus invokes the perceived importance of expert social science
evidence not to challenge but to preserve the legal status quo, discounting the
applicants’ appeals to common sense and experiential evidence in the process.
In written argument at every level of court, Canada repeatedly points to the applicants’
own acknowledgement of the weaknesses in the social science research as a means to
argue that they have not met their burden of proof under s. 7.18 In its words, a section 7
violation should not be founded on social science evidence that is “disputed”,
“contested”, “speculative”, and “rife with conflicting opinion”19—evidence that “does
not provide any scientific basis” for the causal link alleged.20 For Canada, these
acknowledged limitations and gaps in the research on the sex trade support a broader
17
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strategy of emphasizing the extent to which our knowledge about prostitution is
contested and incomplete21 (though, according to Canada’s factum at the ONSC, the
social science does show that prostitution is inherently risky).22 In particular, Canada
argues that we simply do not know enough about indoor prostitution to draw the
conclusion that it is safer than street prostitution.23 Canada draws on this lack of
knowledge not only to argue that the applicants have not met their burden of proof
under section 7, but to advocate a general posture of deference to Parliament on the
“complex” matter of regulating prostitution.24 In this way, Canada portrays the
extensive evidentiary record tendered in Bedford as inadequate to disrupt the legal
status quo.

According to the applicants, other sources of proof—most importantly common sense
and logic—are sufficient to bridge the gaps and uncertainties in the social science
research on the sex trade in Bedford. Canada argues, however, that these other sources
are insufficient to meet the high standard of proof required in a sweeping constitutional
challenge. In its factum at the SCC, for instance, Canada argues that there was
“considerable dispute” about the link between the violence experienced by people in the
sex trade and the impugned laws.25 The factum goes on:
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In circumstances such as these, where a particular fact that lies at the heart
of the dispute is a matter on which reasonable and informed people
disagree, it is not appropriate for the Court to circumvent the usual
standard of proof by inferring a dispositive fact under the auspice of logic
and common sense. […] It is these very inferences that are the subject of
considerable disagreement among experts. It is only by applying a
rigorous standard of proof that courts can avoid usurping Parliament’s
essential role in weighing complex policy choices.26

Similarly, Canada dismisses the applicants’ reasonable hypothetical argument as an
“attempt to escape their onus of proof” in a manner “completely unsupported by the
jurisprudence.”27

While disparaging the applicants’ reliance on common sense, there are some moments
where Canada points to the experiential evidence in Bedford as capable of responding to
the facts at issue. In its factum at the ONCA, for instance, Canada argues that the
application judge erred by failing to adequately consider the experiential evidence, and in
particular, by privileging anonymous experiential accounts cited in a 2006 Subcommittee
Report over the direct experiential evidence adduced by the Crown in the case:

By not considering the evidence of the experiential affiants, the court
below overlooked a rich body of direct evidence which was properly

26
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entered by way of affidavits, including evidence which related directly to
the major issues in dispute, such as whether there is a hard divide between
street and off-street prostitution; whether off-street prostitution is less
dangerous; and whether the impugned provisions “materially contribute”
to the risk of harm suffered by prostitutes.28

When it comes to the experiential evidence tendered by the applicants, however, Canada
is quick to dismiss this form of proof as inadequate to establish key facts at issue in the
case. Take, for instance, the following passage from Canada’s factum at the SCC,
discussed in the previous chapter:

…while the OCA was prepared to accept, on the basis of common sense,
logic and anecdote, that many street prostitutes would avail themselves of
the opportunity to work indoors if it were legal, this finding was not
supported by the evidence”.29

The weight Canada accords to experiential evidence, then, does not reflect a consistent
epistemic position, but rather a rhetorical strategy that depends on the nature of the
account being advanced. Nor does the experiential evidence tendered in Bedford play an
important role in Canada’s arguments generally. Rather, Canada’s main focus is on the
need for conclusive expert evidence to justify striking down the impugned laws as
unconstitutional.

28
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7.2.3 Shifting Approaches
On both sides of the litigation in Bedford, then, the treatment of experiential evidence is
at best instrumental, and at worst outright dismissive. The respective parties’ positions
with respect to expert opinion evidence and common sense are more fixed. In general,
and contrary to my intuition at the outset of the dissertation, it is the applicants who
invoke common sense as a means to challenge the status quo, and Canada who dismisses
it in favour of expert opinion evidence (which it ultimately finds to be inadequate).

Still, there are moments when even these relatively consistent approaches shift. In
particular, when it comes to the Crown’s burden to demonstrate a rational connection
between the communicating law and its objective under section 1, the applicants contend
that common sense will not suffice:

The Courts have allowed the Crown to rely upon “common sense” in
demonstrating a rational connection between law and objective if the
available social science data is inconclusive, but it is submitted that
common sense alone cannot defeat the growing body of evidence
demonstrating lack of effectiveness with the communication law.30

Thus, while the applicants center common sense as the lynchpin of their case under
section 7, they invoke the record as a challenge to common sense under section 1. Canada
in turn asserts—amongst other arguments—that according to the jurisprudence, “an
30
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analysis based solely on logic and common sense is acceptable” to demonstrate a rational
connection under section 1.31 In this interaction, we see once again how the parties
strategically shift their approach to different modes of proof according to their adversarial
objectives.

7.3 THE COURTS
Having examined how different categories of proof are weighed in the arguments of the
parties, I turn now to the approach taken by the courts. The most interesting observations
about the judicial treatment of different categories of proof in Bedford arise at the first
two levels of decision-making, where the courts engage fully with the record and factual
issues. I have already offered some examples from the ONSC and ONCA decisions
throughout the previous chapters of Part II, in the course of discussing various framing
strategies. I bring those examples together here, along with some additional observations,
to consider the overall interaction and weighing of different forms of proof in the courts’
reasons.
7.3.1 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Although agreeing with the position of the applicants, Justice Himel, the application
judge at first instance, does not appear to take up their invitation to rely primarily on
common sense arguments, nor does she find it necessary to base her decision on
reasonable hypotheticals, given the available evidence.32 The role of different forms and
pieces of evidence in her decision, however, is somewhat difficult to say. This is partly a
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result of the extensive nature of the record, and the procedure used to bring the
application. As Himel J explains with regard to the expert opinion evidence:

The procedure used in this application was to place large volumes of
expert opinion on the record. Simply placing this evidence before the court
does not automatically render it admissible. In a trial, any inadmissible
information would be distilled and segregated. The application process is
not generally amenable to that same process.33

While Himel J reviews the law on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence in some
detail, she does not ultimately analyze the admissibility of discrete pieces of expert
evidence, opting instead to deal with questions of admissibility as a matter of weight for
practical reasons.34 Furthermore, as argued by Canada on appeal, Himel J does not
always specify what evidence she relies on in making key findings of fact.35 For example,
in addressing whether the harm faced by people in the sex trade can be reduced, she
concludes, following a review of the relevant legislative and expert evidence (including
social science research relied upon by the experts):

These studies, as with the other prostitution-related studies before me,
must be viewed in context and the discreet findings cannot be generalized.
That said, upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole presented on
this issue, in my view, the applicants have established on a balance of
33
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probabilities that there are ways in which the risk of violence towards
prostitutes can be reduced.36

In other instances, Himel J is even less specific, for instance when, in the course of
determining whether the impugned laws are grossly disproportionate, she lists a number
of relevant findings of fact made “after weighing all of the evidence presented to me”.37
Given the monumental volume of evidence in the case, and the practical constraints on
court time and resources, such imprecision is understandable, and indeed, sensible.
However, it makes it hard to see how different forms of proof are weighed against each
other in the decision-making process, and to uncover the epistemic norms at work in this
process. While not my main focus in this chapter, this lack of transparency is itself
concerning from a feminist epistemological perspective intent on exposing and
articulating the assumptions that underlie knowledge practices in various contexts,
including through self-reflexivity on one’s own practices (see Chapter 3 at 3.2).

Still, a few significant points can be gleaned from Himel J’s decision as articulated. First,
in her reasons on the application, Himel J accords little explicit weight to the evidence of
the experiential witnesses on either side of the case. While she does spend some time
reviewing the biographies of the applicants, she summarizes the evidence of the 17 other
experiential witnesses in four short paragraphs, and ultimately frames this evidence as
limited to providing “helpful background information”. 38 As Canada notes in its factum
before the ONCA, Himel J does not make any further reference to the evidence of the
36
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experiential affiants.39 Interestingly, Himel J does however draw on secondhand
experiential accounts tendered via experts in the form of social science research, and via
legislative reports.40 This suggests that experiential evidence may carry more weight
when it comes repackaged and framed by legal or academic experts.

That said, the expert opinion evidence and underlying social science research does not
entirely carry the day in the first instance decision either. In her summary of the
applicants’ expert evidence, Himel J does recognize the potential of this evidence to
disrupt “stereotypes and misperceptions about the sex trade in Canada”.41 However, she
also acknowledges the methodological limitations of the relevant social science research,
as described in the record and agreed to by the parties.42 And, as already discussed in
Chapter 5, she discounts the weight of the evidence given by a number of experts on
account of concerns about bias. While such concerns are directed mainly at experts on the
Crown-side of the case,43 Himel J also expresses some reservations about the carelessly
drafted affidavit of key applicant expert John Lowman.44

On the other hand, Himel J does seem to rely heavily on, and indeed to favour, the
legislative and other government-generated evidence (e.g. reports commissioned by the
Canadian Department of Justice and analogous institutions abroad) attached as exhibits to
the affidavits of various witnesses. It is worth noting, for instance, that her initial
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summary of the evidence from government debates and reports in Canada is over twice as
long as her rather cursory summary of the expert opinion evidence. Furthermore, in light
of her concerns that many of the international experts “had entered the realm of
advocacy”,45 Himel J notes that she has “relied significantly upon the underlying
government reports in summarizing the experiences of foreign jurisdictions.”46 Of course,
many of these reports in turn rely heavily on social science research, a good deal of it
from the very experts called to give opinion evidence in Bedford. What is interesting is
that Himel J prefers to receive this information secondhand via a form of evidence that is
produced and controlled by lawmakers, and that is routinely judicially noticed by the
court.47

Ultimately, it is a combination of expert and government evidence that appears to prevail
in the first instance decision in Bedford. This is reflected in Himel J’s finding on the
question of whether the impugned laws violate the applicants’ right to security of the
person under s.7, the primary issue to which the evidence in Bedford was addressed:

Despite the multiple problems with the expert evidence, I find that there is
sufficient evidence from other experts and government reports to conclude
that the applicants have proven on a balance of probabilities, that the
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impugned provisions sufficiently contribute to a deprivation of their
security of the person.48

The experiential evidence of the affiants is notably left by the wayside here, as are the
applicants’ appeals to common sense.

That said, a couple of important caveats to the above finding bear mentioning.
First, the influence of common sense is not entirely absent from the reasons given at first
instance. This is apparent in Himel J’s decision on the issue of stare decisis. In finding
that she should revisit the Supreme Court of Canada’s earlier decision on the
constitutionality of the bawdy house and communicating provisions in the Prostitution
Reference, Himel J relies partly on developments in the jurisprudence under s.7—a
rationale affirmed by the courts above.49 However, when it comes to revisiting the SCC’s
s.1 justification of the violation found under s.2b, she finds as follows:

In my view, the s. 1 analysis conducted in the Prostitution Reference
ought to be revisited given the breadth of evidence that has been gathered
over the course of the intervening twenty years. Furthermore, it may be
that the social, political, and economic assumptions underlying the
Prostitution Reference are no longer valid today. […] I conclude,
therefore, that it is appropriate in this case to decide these issues based
upon the voluminous record before me. As will become evident following
48
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a review of the evidence filed by the parties, there is a substantial amount
of research that was not before the Supreme Court in 1990.50

This passage points to the availability of new evidence, both in the world and in the
courtroom, as raising a doubt about the SCC’s earlier ruling. At the same time, though,
Himel J identifies a shift in “social, political, and economic assumptions” as an added
justification for revisiting the SCC’s s.1 analysis. In other words, the challenge to legal
precedent comes not only from new evidence, but from a newly emerging common sense
that differs from what came before.

Second, and more interestingly, when I spoke to the application judge in Bedford, she
made it clear that she does indeed view the experiential evidence of directly affected
people as critical to the adjudication of Bedford, and of Charter cases more generally.51
This suggests that the experiential evidence in Bedford may well have been deeply
influential on the outcome of the case, despite not being presented as such in the written
reasons on the application. It also raises an important question about the reason for the
apparent discrepancy between the views expressed by the judge about the significance of
different forms of proof in her interview, and the expression those views find in her
formal ruling—an issue that I return to in the next chapter.

50
51

Bedford ONSC, supra note 1 at para 83.
Interview 14 (2 October 2018).

328

7.3.2 The Ontario Court of Appeal
While Himel J’s remark about changing assumptions hints at the possible role of
common sense in her decision, the weight of common sense in the fact-finding process
becomes more apparent at the Court of Appeal (ONCA). Prior to demonstrating this,
though, it is first necessary to address the ONCA’s approach to reviewing the application
judge’s findings of fact. Generally speaking, appellate courts are required to defer to
findings of fact made at the first instance, absent “palpable and overriding error”.52 As
noted in Chapter 2, however, the Supreme Court in RJR MacDonald Inc v Canada (AG)
suggested that social and legislative facts call for less deference.53 In its decision, the
ONCA majority, speaking for the Court, finds that Himel J’s s.7 analysis in Bedford rests
upon social and legislative facts, to which no deference is owed. As the Court explains:

This was not litigation about whether a particular person's security of the
person was infringed by a specific event. This litigation approached the
constitutional claims from a much broader societal perspective. The
findings made by the application judge reflect that perspective, as should
the review of those findings by this court. We do not defer to the
application judge's findings, but rather assess the record to come to our
own conclusion on the social and legislative facts underlying the
application judge's finding that the respondents' security of the person is
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impaired by the relevant legislation.54

This passage is noteworthy both for its characterization of the facts underlying Himel J’s
decision under s.7, which affects the type of proof required to make out a Charter
violation, and for its non-deferential approach to the review of social and legislative facts,
which affects how authority over the fact-finding process is distributed. As I discuss in
the next section, both of these elements of the ONCA decision are ultimately overturned
by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Although the ONCA does not defer to the findings of social and legislative fact made at
first instance, the Court does defer to Himel J’s findings on credibility and expert bias, 55
and ultimately agrees with her assessment of the evidence on most issues.56 The Court
also rejects Canada’s argument that Himel J did not adequately explain her assessment of
the expert evidence, finding that “she understood the thrust of the expert evidence and
she carefully assessed it […] As she repeatedly indicated, her findings were ultimately
based on the entirety of the record.”57 Thus, the concerns about transparency noted above
do not hold water at the ONCA.

When it comes to weighing the different categories of proof at issue in this dissertation,
however, the approach taken by the ONCA majority (speaking for the Court on all but
one issue) differs somewhat from Himel J. One of the most notable aspects of the ONCA
54

Bedford ONCA, supra note 49 at para 129.
Ibid at para 130.
56
As I discuss below, the main exception is her findings related to the impact of the communicating
provision.
57
Bedford ONCA, supra note 49 at para 138.
55

330

decision is its shifting treatment of different categories of proof. At the outset of its
reasons, the majority makes a point of explicitly centering the firsthand experiential
evidence, in line with feminist epistemological commitments:
The application record is replete with testimony from individuals who
have firsthand knowledge of how the present legal regime operates and the
impact it has on prostitutes engaged in prostitution. In our view, that
experiential evidence, buttressed by observations in several government
reports, makes a very strong case for the respondents' claim that the
legislation puts them at added risk of serious physical harm. 58
This passage suggests that the ONCA, unlike Himel J, relies primarily on the experiential
evidence to resolve the key issues in the case, with the governmental evidence playing
only a supporting role. The majority, however, hastens to add:

We also agree with counsel for the respondents' submission that much of
what the experiential witnesses said about the impact of the challenged
Criminal Code provisions on their lives as prostitutes is self-evident and
exactly what one would expect. Everyone agrees that prostitution is a
dangerous activity for prostitutes. It seems obvious that it is more
dangerous for a prostitute if she goes to some unknown destination
controlled by the customer, rather than working at a venue under the
prostitute's control at which she can take steps to enhance safety. The
advantages of "home field" are well understood by everyone. The non58
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exploitative conduct criminalized by the living on the avails provision and
the communicative conduct criminalized by the communicating provision
contribute in an equally self-evident manner to potential risks to
prostitutes.59

The ONCA, in other words, takes the experiential evidence tendered by the applicants
seriously in part because it accords with their own common sense.

Later in the decision, when assessing the impact of the bawdy-house provisions on people
in the sex trade, the ONCA majority goes on to privilege expert social science evidence
over the experiential evidence: “Because empirical evidence is so difficult to come by in
this area, the appellants and the respondents resorted to anecdotal evidence to support
their positions”.60 The language of “resorted to” clearly implies the inferiority of the
“anecdotal” (i.e. experiential) evidence in comparison to empirical evidence. This
framing also reinforces the boundary work used to exclude experiential observations
from the realm of the empirical in Bedford, despite the important role such observations
play in qualitative research.61

When addressing the constitutionality of the law against communicating for the purposes
of prostitution, the majority (this time countered by two dissenting judges) once again
casts the experiential evidence of people in the sex trade as merely “anecdotal” and thus
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of limited weight. This passage was discussed in the previous chapter, but bears repeating
here:
There was anecdotal evidence from prostitutes that they often felt rushed
in their negotiations with potential customers, and would quickly get into
the customers' cars to avoid detection by the police. To the extent that the
application judge relied on that evidence, informed by her own common
sense, to find that screening customers is essential to enhancing the safety
of street prostitutes, we think her conclusion reaches well beyond the
limits of the evidence.62

In this passage, the majority excludes both experiential evidence and common sense from
“the evidence” that counts, presumably expert social science or government-generated
evidence. Interestingly, however, the majority goes on to draw tacitly on its own common
sense and logic—“its own speculative assessment”, in the words of the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC)63—to suggest that screening might not prevent a violent encounter with a
client:

While it is fair to say that a street prostitute might be able to avoid a "bad
date" by negotiating details such as payment, services to be performed,
and condom use up front, it is equally likely that the customer could pass
muster at an early stage, only to turn violent once the transaction is
underway. It is also possible that the prostitute may proceed even in the
62
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face of perceived danger, either because her judgment is impaired by
drugs or alcohol, or because she is so desperate for money that she feels
compelled to take the risk.64

The majority also points to evidence suggesting that prostitutes may rely on other tools
apart from face-to-face communication, such as intuition, assessments of the customer
and vehicle’s appearance, and the recording of license plate numbers.65 At the same time,
the majority draws on a different kind of experiential evidence—from residents of
neighborhoods where prostitution occurs—to find, contrary to the application judge, that
the communicating prohibition has been effective in reducing social harms. 66 The shift in
focus here from the experience of people in the sex trade to the experience of
neighborhood residents once again displays the instrumentality of the majority’s appeals
to experiential evidence. While seeming to affirm the importance of experiential
knowledge, the majority in fact draws selectively on experiential accounts to affirm its
own common sense about the communicating law.

In their factum at the SCC, the applicants respond to the ONCA majority’s reasoning on
the communicating provision by arguing that the link between the law and the increased
risk of harm to people in the sex trade “is not only supported by the evidence, but it
accords with common sense.”67 They also specifically refute the soundness of the
majority’s reasoning regarding other screening techniques: “…there is no evidence, and it
64
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seems contrary to common sense, to suggest that these techniques could be effectively
executed without the use of some degree of verbal communication, or the time that
communication grants to the sex worker to meaningfully assess her surrounding
circumstances.”68 Rather than drawing on experiential or other evidence to partialize the
majority’s common sense, the applicants in this instance attempt to reclaim common
sense as aligned with their point of view. Despite the different positions of the ONCA
majority and the applicants, then, their epistemic strategy remains the same. In this way,
universalizing appeals to “common sense” prevail—at least rhetorically—over other
categories of proof and forms of knowledge in litigation, including experiential
knowledge.

This is not to say that the triumph of common sense at the ONCA is absolute. In dissent
on the communicating provision issue, MacPherson JA (with Cronk JA concurring)
objects to the ONCA majority’s characterization of the experiential evidence on
screening as inadequate. Like Himel J, he first points to indirect evidence from the 2006
Subcommittee hearings, in which several prostitutes testified that screening is an essential
safety tool. MacPherson JA notes that the evidence of several experts in Bedford further
supports this view.69 Unlike Himel J, however, he goes on to emphasize the importance
of the evidence submitted directly by the experiential affiants:

In my view, the affidavit evidence in this case provides critical insight
into the experience and knowledge of people who have worked on the
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streets, and who have been exposed to the risk of violence first-hand. This
type of evidence should not be set aside lightly.70

With this, MacPherson JA reaffirms the centrality of the firsthand experiential evidence
provided by affiants in the case. Unfortunately, this passage is not reiterated by the SCC,
despite that Court’s general endorsement of MacPherson JA’s reasons.

7.3.3 The Supreme Court of Canada
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately approves MacPherson JA’s
reasoning with respect to the communicating provision, including his assessment of the
evidence supporting screening as an essential safety tool. In doing so, however, the Court
does not specifically underscore the importance of the experiential evidence presented in
the case. Rather, it relies primarily on two key holdings about social and legislative facts
in Charter cases—holdings that constitute the most interesting and important aspects of
the SCC’s treatment of evidence and knowledge in Bedford.

The first key holding, already touched upon above and in Part I of this dissertation, is the
deferential standard of review accorded to social and legislative facts by the SCC in
Bedford. As Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the Court, states at the outset of the
decision:

Absent reviewable error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence, a
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court of appeal should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on
social and legislative facts. This division of labour is basic to our court
system. The first instance judge determines the facts; appeal courts review
the decision for correctness in law or palpable and overriding error in fact.
This applies to social and legislative facts as much as to findings of fact as
to what happened in a particular case.71

While acknowledging that RJR-MacDonald suggested a less deferential standard of
review for social and legislative facts, the Court in Bedford notes that the role of social
science evidence in Charter cases has “evolved significantly” since then. 72 In particular,
the jurisprudence has established a preference for social science research to be presented
via expert evidence, the assessment of which relies primarily on the judge at first
instance.73 In addition to this justification, the Court offers two practical reasons for
maintaining a single deferential standard of review regardless of the type of fact at issue.
First, to do otherwise would require judges to duplicate the time-consuming work of
reviewing extensive evidentiary records, and thereby add cost and delay to litigation.74
Second, social and legislative facts are difficult to disentangle from adjudicative facts,
and from issues of expert credibility.75
Guided by this holding, the SCC defers heavily to the application judge’s findings of fact
throughout its decision in Bedford. To the extent that the Court at this level comments on
the record, it does so largely to affirm Himel J’s findings. The Court’s agreement with
71
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MacPherson JA on the issue of screening is largely grounded in this deferential approach.
As McLachlin CJ explains:

…the majority of the Court of Appeal erroneously substituted its
assessment of the evidence for that of the application judge. […] This was
linked to its error, discussed above, in according too little deference to the
application judge on findings of social and legislative facts. MacPherson
J.A. for the minority, correctly countered that the evidence on this point
came from both prostitutes' own accounts and from expert assessments,
and provided a firm basis for the application judge's conclusion.76

The Court goes on to note that the majority ignored the application judge’s finding
regarding the displacement effects of the communication law, a finding supported by
evidence from the report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws.77 While the Court here points to
experiential, expert and legislative evidence as supporting the finding that screening is an
essential safety tool, its main focus in is on deferring to the application judge.

What is the significance of the SCC’s deference to the application judge’s findings of fact
from the perspective of epistemological justice? A couple of points are worthy of note
here. First, the Court’s holding with respect to the standard of review disregards the in76

Ibid at para 154.
Ibid at para 155, referring to House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
Subcommittee on Solicitation Laws, The Challenge of Change: A Study of Canada's Criminal Prostitution
Laws (December 2006).
77
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between nature of social and legislative facts in favour of maintaining a sharply
delineated dichotomy between law and fact. Indeed, the Court justifies its holding in part
by the need for a clear “division of labour” between trial courts and appellate courts.78
While recognizing the inextricability of social and legislative facts from adjudicative
facts,79 the Court does not extend this same recognition to the distinction between law
and fact itself. To the extent that the law/fact dichotomy tracks onto other dichotomies
engrained in mainstream epistemology—such as the dichotomy between subjective,
value-laden norms and objective, universal facts—the Court’s approach here runs counter
to feminist epistemological insights.

Second, the deferential standard of review established by the Court in Bedford leaves the
fate of epistemological justice largely in the hands of trial judges, for better or worse.
This is a risky move. As discussed in the previous chapter, assessments of evidence
inevitably call for the application of common sense and logic—the contents of which
may vary significantly from one person to the next. They also depend on the
epistemological assumptions and approach of the decision-maker. Granting primary
authority over the facts to the judge at first instance may bode well in some cases,
however it also puts a lot of stock in a single individual’s interpretation of the record. In
the Bedford case, the result is to reinforce the approach of Himel J, which leads to a legal
victory for a progressive Charter challenger, but in way that arguably fails to give due
weight to experiential knowledge.

78
79

See note 71 above.
Bedford SCC, supra note 1 at para 52.
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The SCC’s second key holding involves reframing the type of fact at issue—and thus the
type of proof required—under s.7 of the Charter, as compared to section 1. This finding,
already touched upon in Part I,80 is perhaps the most significant and promising aspect of
the SCC decision in terms of the treatment of experiential knowledge in litigation. The
SCC’s key point here is to clarify that the inquiry under s.7 is qualitative, focusing on the
law’s impact on individual rights rather than on society as a whole. As the Court states:

The question under s. 7 is whether anyone's life, liberty or security of the
person has been denied by a law that is inherently bad; a grossly
disproportionate, overbroad, or arbitrary effect on one person is sufficient
to establish a breach of s. 7.81

The point is reiterated a few paragraphs later:

The inquiry into the impact on life, liberty or security of the person is not
quantitative -- for example, how many people are negatively impacted -but qualitative. An arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate impact
on one person suffices to establish a breach of s. 7.82

According to the Court, it is only under s.1 that the law’s impact in terms of society as a
whole comes into play. The inquiry at this second stage is both quantitative and

80

See: Chapter 1 at 1.3.1; Chapter 2 at 2.4.2.
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82
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qualitative.83

This reframing of the facts at issue, and concomitant demands of proof, at different stages
of the Charter analysis carries important doctrinal, practical, and epistemological
consequences. Doctrinally, as noted in Chapter 2, it shifts questions of social and
legislative fact over to the s.1 analysis, and thereby increases the potential importance of
the s.1 inquiry in s.7 cases.84 Practically, it reduces the burden on Charter claimants to
tender extensive evidence, including expert and social science, in order to demonstrate a
violation of their constitutional rights, while potentially increasing the onus on the Crown
to justify rights violations with such evidence. Indeed, the Court explicitly points to the
relative resources of the Crown as compared to Charter claimants as a justification for its
approach:

the Crown is well placed to call the social science and expert evidence
required to justify the law's impact in terms of society as a whole.”85 […]
To require s. 7 claimants to establish the efficacy of the law versus its
deleterious consequences on members of society as a whole, would
impose the government's s. 1 burden on claimants under s. 7. That cannot
be right.86
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Ibid at para 125-126.
This shift was anticipated by some of my research interviewees: Interview 1 (6 September 2016) and
Interview 1b (3 October 2018). See Chapter 2 at 2.4.2.
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Most important for my purposes however, are the epistemological consequences. Under
this approach, academic experts are no longer required to demonstrate the existence of a
rights violation. In theory, a single experiential account from a directly affected person
will suffice. The Court’s holding thus suggests the potential to augment the weight of
experiential evidence in proving a Charter rights violation—not only in Bedford, but in
all s.7 cases.87 In this way, it could be read as taking a significant stride towards the
realization of feminist epistemological commitments.

Still, there are some reasons to doubt whether this development ultimately favours
experiential knowledge or epistemological justice more broadly. First, the Court’s
holding may simply shift the focus of Charter cases from s.7 to s.1, and thereby trivialize
the violation of Charter rights along with the experiential evidence used to establish
them. As one of the public interest litigators I interviewed for this dissertation explained:

That gives a lot of authority to that one person's voice. But what it opens is
this much bigger role for section 1 probably. And so I think because of
that, it gives both more and less authority to an individual's voice […] it's
hard for one person's voice to be very authoritative under section 1.88

As discussed in Chapter 2, the government has often been granted substantial leeway in
justifying Charter violations under s.1, including being allowed to lean heavily on

87

This was noted by several of my interviewees: Interview 1 (6 September 2016) and Interview 4 (15
September 2016). See also: Young, supra note 47 at 619.
88
Interview 1 (6 September 2016)
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common sense and logic.89 The Court’s reframing of the standard of proof under s.7
could thus result in the reinforcement of common sense as the prevailing form of
knowledge in litigation.

Second, while experiential evidence may provide a complete answer to a qualitative
inquiry focused on individual rights, it is not the only form of evidence to which litigators
and courts may turn at this stage. To the contrary, in affirming that the impugned laws
violate the s.7 right to security of the person in Bedford, the SCC refers to findings of fact
made on the basis of a range of evidence, including expert social science evidence and
government-generated evidence.90 For example, in reasoning that the bawdy-house
provision prevents the most vulnerable people in the street sex trade from resorting to
“safe houses” provided by others, and thereby infringes security of the person, the Court
directly cites the expert evidence given by applicant criminologist John Lowman. 91 It is
perhaps not surprising, then, that the litigators I interviewed generally agreed that a
robust evidentiary record, including both expert and experiential evidence, remains
essential to putting forward a strong case in practice.92 I return to this issue in the next
chapter.
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See for example: RJR MacDonald, supra note 53 at paras 137, 154; Thomson Newspapers Co v Canada
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7.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have examined how the parties and the courts weigh different categories
of proof in the course of their arguments and reasons for decision. My key findings are
twofold. First, my analysis once again highlights the instrumentality with which evidence
and knowledge are treated in the fact-finding process in Bedford. In particular, I have
shown how the approach taken by the parties and the courts to different categories of
proof often shifts from one moment to the next, depending on the demands of the
adversarial process or the dictates of common sense. This closely parallels my
observations in earlier chapters of Part 2 of how different epistemic norms are
instrumentalized through the fact-finding process. Second, just as the fact-finding process
in Bedford tends to bolster mainstream epistemic norms at the expense of feminist
epistemological insights, so too does it encourage a rhetorical emphasis on hegemonic
forms of knowledge. Thus, I find that the weight accorded to experiential evidence in the
case is minimal, while legislative and other government-generated evidence, legal
reasoning, and common sense are highly valued. In these ways, my observations in this
chapter offer further reason to doubt whether Bedford can in fact be counted as a
progressive victory when it comes to epistemological justice. As I discuss in the next and
final part of the dissertation, my interview data supports, extends, and helps to explain
these findings.
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Chapter 8: The Legal Process in Strategic Charter Litigation
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In Part II of this dissertation, I used the record in Bedford v Canada (AG)1 as a case study
to examine how feminist—and more broadly, progressive—epistemological
commitments fare in strategic Charter challenges to legislation under s.7. I focused on
the rhetorical treatment of three conventional categories of proof: experiential evidence,
expert evidence (including social science research), and common sense. My analysis
brought to light two ways in which the fact-finding process in Bedford fails to uphold
feminist epistemological commitments: 1) by bolstering dominant epistemic norms and
categories of knowledge; and 2) by decontextualizing and instrumentalizing epistemic
norms and categories of all kinds. Ultimately, I argued that there is good reason to doubt
whether legal victories such as Bedford are also victories at the level of epistemological
justice. This in turn gives reason to doubt the value of such litigation in the broader
pursuit of social justice.

In this final part of the dissertation, I delve deeper into the roots of the tension between
legal victory and epistemological justice. What about the context of fact-finding in
strategic Charter challenges to legislation reinforces dominant ideas about and forms of
knowledge? What thwarts the potency of experiential knowledge as a source of critical
resistance? What about this context impels actors to detach both dominant and critical
epistemic norms from the broader frameworks that give them meaning, and to wield them

1

Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 [Bedford ONSC], affirmed in 2013 SCC 72.
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instrumentally? In this Part, I respond to these questions by exploring the broader
dynamics of the legal process through which the record in Bedford and like cases is
constructed and framed. Returning to Twining’s expansive view of evidence as
“information in litigation,”2 I examine the practical, legal, institutional, epistemological,
and human factors that sit in tension with feminist epistemological commitments in
strategic Charter litigation.

The questions of legal process at issue in this chapter cannot be answered solely on the
basis of evidentiary records, let alone the record of a single case study. While abstract
theorizing may allow for some insight on these issues, I turn to a different methodology,
drawing on a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with public interest litigators
(PILs), Crown litigators, and judges who have been involved in litigation under the
Charter.3 These interviews allow me to speak to aspects of the fact-finding process that
lie beyond the record, and to broaden my inquiry to include other strategic Charter
challenges, including recent challenges under s.7 with which my interviewees were
involved such as PHS Community Services Society v Canada (AG)4, Carter v Canada
(AG),5 British Columbia Civil Liberties Assn v Canada (AG),6 and Downtown Eastside
Sex Workers United Against Violence v Canada (AG).7 The latter case in particular serves
as an important point of comparison with Bedford throughout this chapter. The interview
2

William Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays, 2nd ed (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), ch 7. See Chapter 2 at 2.2.1.
3
Some of my interviewees agreed to be directly named in this project, while others chose to remain
anonymous. I have drafted this Chapter accordingly.
4
PHS Community Services Society v Canada (AG), 2008 BCSC 661, varied in 2011 SCC 44 [Insite].
5
Carter v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 886, affirmed in 2015 SCC 5 [Carter].
6
British Columbia Civil Liberties Assn v Canada (AG), 2018 BCSC 62, varied in 2019 BCCA 228 [BC
solitary confinement].
7
Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence v Canada (AG), 2008 BCSC 1726 [SWUAV
BCSC], reversed in 2012 SCC 45 [SWUAV SCC].
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data also allows me to hold up my analysis in Part II against a different set of sources,
and thereby to triangulate my research findings.

The chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first, I offer a comparative account of the
origins and framing of the litigation in Bedford and SWUAV, respectively, as described
by counsel in those cases. This section serves several purposes. First, it puts the Bedford
transcripts into fuller context. Second, it illustrates the tensions that can arise between the
pursuit of legal victory and epistemological justice at various stages of litigation, pointing
to a number of legal process issues that call for further exploration via my interview data.
It thereby provides a compelling narrative prelude, and a helpful point of reference, for
the rest of the chapter. Finally, the comparison between Bedford and SWUAV
demonstrates how, prior to the construction and framing of the evidentiary record,
epistemology factors into the initiation and framing of the litigation itself. Who decides to
go to court in the first place? Who determines how to frame the issues, what arguments to
make, what evidence to tender, and even what kind of language to use? The answers
depend largely on the lawyering approach of counsel, with significant implications for
epistemological justice. The critiques, discussed in Chapter 1, of the power dynamics
between lawyers and other social movement participants resurface here.8 While not the
main focus of my project, the comparative story of Bedford and SWUAV provides a
window into this important aspect of legal process.

8

See Chapter 1 at 1.2.1 under The Detrimental Effects of Litigation on Client Communities and Social
Movements.
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The second section of this chapter draws on examples, comments, and reflections from
my interview data to discuss two distinct, albeit closely related, sets of constraints on
feminist epistemology that arise from the legal process in strategic Charter litigation: 1)
practical constraints that impede the construction of a comprehensive record centered on
experiential voices; and 2) epistemological constraints that compel litigators to
compromise progressive epistemological commitments when framing knowledge in
litigation. In the third and final section, I bring my analysis of legal process to its
culmination by turning my attention back to the relationship between law, fact, and
common sense. Here I demonstrate the persistent influence of law and common sense in
constitutional fact-finding, despite the perceived prominence and importance of tendered
evidence as a means to disrupt the status quo in recent strategic Charter litigation.

My analysis reveals tensions between the pursuit of legal victory and epistemological
justice at every stage of the legal process in strategic Charter litigation, from the
initiation and planning of a case, to the construction of the record, to the framing of
knowledge. It also underscores significant internal tensions within both legal strategy and
feminist epistemology. A recurring theme throughout the chapter is the long shadow cast
by judges, and the realities of human judgment, over the fact-finding process. My
interviews suggest that for litigators, decisions about how to approach facts and evidence
are largely an exercise in anticipating how judges will respond. As a result, I argue, the
epistemic beliefs, experiences, and common sense of judges tend to trump the progressive
epistemological commitments of litigators, as well as the experiential knowledge of
directly affected community members. At the same time, I suggest that experiential
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knowledge can play an influential role in strategic Charter litigation, by inducing shifts in
judicial common sense.

8.2 TWO LITIGATION STORIES: BEDFORD AND SWUAV
8.2.1 Bedford
The story of Bedford, as told by lead counsel Alan Young in an interview, begins in the
early 2000s; it was then that Young conceived of the Charter challenge while watching
the case of serial killer Robert Pickton unfold in British Columbia.9 A few years later,
Young found himself with a surplus of student resources from another project, and
decided to launch the challenge. With the help of his students, he researched the case and
collected the affidavit evidence over the course of approximately four months. Only then
did he secure the applicants who would carry the litigation, largely through personal
connections. Terry-Jean Bedford was a former client of Young who had been enthusiastic
about the prospect of the case since Young had first conceived of it. Young then reached
out to Valerie Scott, wanting to include someone whom he knew to be a long-time
advocate for sex workers. Neither Bedford nor Scott, however, was currently working in
the sex trade. Concerned about standing, Young asked Scott to find someone currently
working in the trade who would be directly impacted by the impugned laws. Amy
Lebovitch thus became the third applicant. 10 The Notice of Application was filed in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice on March 20, 2007.11

9

Interview 5 (25 July 2017).
Ibid.
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Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 (Notice of Application).
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Young’s account of how Bedford arose suggests that the case was heavily driven and
controlled by him, rather than by the applicants or their communities. When asked how
the experiences and perspectives of the applicants contributed to the way the issues were
framed, Young responded: “I don’t think the litigants framed the issues. I think the issues
framed the litigants.”12 As he explained elsewhere: “I don’t do constitutional litigation
based on people coming to me saying they have issues. I pick the issues I’m interested in
and then I find the people to be the figureheads or spokespeople.”13 While not stated as
such, a similar approach was taken by many of the other litigators I spoke to in the
strategic Charter cases they had worked on. For instance, the idea for Carter was sparked
by a few prominent PILs in the course of preparing and delivering a talk at the British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA)’s Annual General Meeting.14 The
BCCLA’s expressed interest in supporting the case then paved the way for the challenge
to proceed.15 It was only later that counsel enlisted individual plaintiffs Lee Carter and
Hollis Johnson, Dr. William Shoichet, and Gloria Taylor, to carry the litigation—what
Sheila Tucker, one of the counsel working on the case, described as an “if you build it,
they will come” approach.16

According to Young, Bedford and Scott gave him a wide berth to approach the Bedford
case as he saw fit. However, as the case gained momentum, some sex worker
organizations began to express concerns about Young’s representation, asking what gave
12

Interview 5 (25 July 2017).
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Interview 1b (3 October 2018).
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brought by an individual inmate, the case that ultimately made it to court was similarly planned and
initiated by prominent PILs in collaboration with the John Howard Society and the BCCLA. Interview 1b
(3 October 2018).
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him the authority to speak on behalf of women in the trade. Given the initiative he took
and his willingness to work pro bono, Young was taken aback. In his view, the case had
brought attention to issues that were previously flying under the radar, such as Pickton
and the plight of murdered and missing women. 17

Still, these organizations sought to become more actively involved, giving rise to conflict
between different groups and Young. Young recalled one particularly challenging
meeting where a number of such groups provided him with a list of sex work-positive
words and phrases to use in court: “I was trying to explain to them: I’m not going to court
to convince the court sex work is good – I’ll lose the case. [….] Don’t ask the litigant to
give the positive message. I’m going to alienate people.”18 The sex worker groups wanted
Young to avoid using the word “prostitute”. In Young’s view, however, it was important
to consciously switch back and forth between “prostitute” and “sex worker” in order to
appear neutral to the court19—to come across, in his words, as “an advocate for the
Charter” rather than for sex workers.20

Further conflict arose when Young suggested he was less concerned about losing the
argument with respect to the communicating provision at the Court of Appeal. In
Young’s estimation, access to an indoor location was a much more effective safety
measure than allowing communication on the street. “That’s when actually people turned

17

Interview 5 (25 July 2017).
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on me. And they politicized it. Because then, you were bringing a case for the elites.”21
Interestingly, in his interview Young drew on arguments similar to those made by the
Crown in the Bedford case to support his position, describing survival sex work as
primarily a “social services issue”, rather than a legal issue.22

The above vignettes illustrate the challenges, discussed in Chapter 1, of representing a
diverse set of experiences and interests within the confines of atomistic litigation, and the
tendency for the litigation process to suppress more marginalized and/or grassroots
voices within a social movement.23 They also demonstrate how Young’s own lawyering
style influenced the framing of the litigation in Bedford in epistemologically significant
ways. Ultimately, Young described the conflict between members of the sex work
community and himself as follows:

There was a fundamental misunderstanding, between me and everyone
else about what this case was. […] My case was not about sex work. Not
at all. It's the context in which the case was brought. My case is about the
rationality of government policy. […] that is where the fight started was
the groups and SWUAV and everybody thought I wasn't promoting sex
work enough. And I kept saying, I do that, I'm losing the case. I can't go to
the court as if I'm trying to suggest your decision is going to open the
doors for women to go into something they don't like. I need to talk about

21
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the rationality of the law, how the government's own law undercuts their
very objective, and then impairs other rights and interests.24

For Young, then, the case was ultimately centered on legal arguments about the Charter,
rather than the lived experiences and circumstances of sex workers, despite the wealth of
evidence tendered with respect to the latter. This is not to say that Young was
unconcerned about the effects of the impugned laws on sex workers. To the contrary,
comments made by Young during an earlier interview suggest that the mistreatment of
sex workers was an important part of his emotional motivation for pursuing the case.25
Nevertheless, Young’s approach in Bedford seems to reflect the lawyer-dominated style
of public interest lawyering critiqued by Scott Cummings, Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Derrick
Bell, Lucie White, Gerald Lopez and others (see Chapter 1 at 1.2.1 under The
Detrimental Effects of Litigation on Client Communities and Social Movements),
according to which lawyers view themselves as experts tasked with representing,
speaking for, and resolving the problems of subordinated people, primarily through the
pursuit of litigation “wins”.
8.2.2 SWUAV
Young’s conception of, and control over the litigation in Bedford stands in notable
contrast to SWUAV’s community-driven origin. Indeed, the origin story of SWUAV
reveals an approach to litigation that more closely resembles Lopez’ notion of “rebellious
lawyering against subordination” than the lawyer-dominated approach of Young in

24
25

Interview 5b (12 September 2018).
Interview 5 (25 July 2017).
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Bedford.26 As explained by Katrina Pacey and Elin Sigurdson, two of the lead counsel in
the case, SWUAV arose through ongoing dialogue between Pivot Legal Society (Pivot)—
at that time a fledging organization composed mostly of law students (including Pacey
and Sigurdson)—and women from the Downtown Eastside (DTES) of Vancouver.27
Pivot was initially concerned about the violence and lack of police protection that women
in the neighbourhood seemed to be facing, and wanted to find out how best to serve them.
They began hosting meetings with women from the community, distributing flyers to
invite people, and providing food and honoraria to all those who participated.28 Through
these meetings, Pivot learned that many of the challenges facing women in the DTES
were closely linked to the criminalization of sex work.29 As Pacey put it: “[I]t was really
an early identification by women in the community that this was a key cause of the
violence that they were experiencing as well as the lack of police protection that they
could access…”30 Discussion then turned to different possible avenues for addressing the
problem.

Around the same time, a Parliamentary process to review Canada’s prostitution laws was
beginning.31 Pivot was also in the midst of an affidavit project in Vancouver to collect
stories from neighbourhood residents about police mistreatment and other issues.32 In
anticipation of the Parliamentary review, and other possible legal action, Pivot worked
26
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with their community partners to collect 91 affidavits from sex workers.33 The affidavits
were then used to support a constitutional analysis of the laws at issue, in a report titled
Voices for Dignity: A Call to End the Harms Caused by Canada’s Sex Trade Laws.34
Following the meetings and the affidavit project, some of the women involved wanted to
continue organizing together. They formed an advocacy group that eventually became
known as Sex Workers United Against Violence (SWUAV).35

Meanwhile, faced with disappointing results from the Parliamentary process, Pivot and
their community partners turned to litigation. They were committed to bringing a claim
that focused on those most severely impacted by the prostitution laws—the heavily
marginalized street-sex workers of the DTES (though Pacey also stressed the importance
of illustrating the full panoply of women’s experiences in the sex trade through the
evidentiary record).36 Another key commitment was to proceed “as safely as possible for
the individuals involved and for the community that was going to be […] ultimately
impacted by the litigation.”37 In the early days of planning, Pivot met with many
individuals in the hope of finding someone who would be in a position to carry the
litigation without compromising this principle, with no luck. The SWUAV organization
was thus formalized as a means to bring the action collectively, with shared support and
resources.38 The statement of claim was filed on behalf of SWUAV on August 3, 2007,
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just a few months after the filing of the application in Bedford.39 Later on, former sex
worker Sheryl Kiselbach agreed to join the litigation as an additional plaintiff.40

Unlike in Bedford, the framing of the legal issues in SWUAV was heavily influenced by
the litigants themselves. As explained by Sigurdson, the SWUAV organization was
composed principally of female-identified, street-level sex workers in the DTES,
including a high number of Indigenous and otherwise racialized people, and people with
addiction, mental illness, and other disabilities. The particular needs and circumstances of
this group drove the approach taken to attacking the laws. 41 According to Pacey and
Sigurdson, it was important to the members of SWUAV and Kiselbach to bring a broadly
scoped challenge, attacking as many of the harmful provisions as possible, because they
saw the laws working together as an interlocking scheme.42 “[I]t was really part of how
this group thought about what the problem was”, explained Sigurdson.43 The litigants
also felt that it was important to make an equality argument under s.15 of the Charter,
despite the expected difficulty of succeeding on this point from a legal perspective.44

Had the case gone to a hearing on the merits, counsel in SWUAV were committed to
centering the experiences of sex workers in the fact-finding process. They believed it was
important for the court to hear directly from sex workers, and thus planned to have
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experiential witnesses testify viva voce, despite the practical challenges this would pose.45
This would have differed from the approach taken in Bedford, where the challenge was
brought as an application via written evidence.
8.2.3 Interplay and Outcome
Counsel in SWUAV and Bedford were aware of each other’s cases and were in
communication, but did not closely collaborate or coordinate their efforts.46 In their
interviews with me, Pacey and Sigurdson’s comments about Bedford were generally
positive or neutral.47 Young, on the other hand, expressed some concerns about the
SWUAV case, though he acknowledged that it advanced the rules of standing in a helpful
way. In Young’s view, the challenge in SWUAV was too ambitious, going after
provisions such as the one on procuring that courts would be reluctant to strike down, and
making an equality claim under s.15 that Young was sympathetic to but thought was “a
stretch”.48 SWUAV also attacked provisions that Young felt ought to remain on the books,
such as protection against the most dangerous, traditional pimps. “[T]hey were going
after pimping and procuring and section 15 […] It was an overreach.”49 These, of course,
were the aspects of the litigation that the community being represented in SWUAV had
specifically called for.

Ultimately, the SWUAV case was diverted by a challenge to standing that went up to the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). In the meantime, Young succeeded in having the
45
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communicating, living on the avails, and bawdy house provisions struck down as
unconstitutional, in a ruling upheld by that same Court. By the time the litigants in
SWUAV were granted public interest standing, the result in Bedford had rendered much of
the BC case moot, and the action did not proceed further.50

Without overgeneralizing from the above comparison, one can certainly see how the
commitment to a community-oriented process in SWUAV—a process that sought to center
the experiential knowledge of marginalized people— came along with certain risks in
terms of securing a favourable legal outcome. The scope of the challenge called for by
SWUAV was indeed ambitious, as was the s.15 equality argument. Moreover, the
decision to bring the action as a collective left them vulnerable to a challenge on
standing. In this sense already, the story of Bedford and SWUAV hints at the tension
between the pursuit of legal victory and epistemological justice in strategic Charter
litigation.

Of even greater interest to my project, though, is counsel in SWUAV’s acceptance of the
need to make epistemological compromises in the litigation context, even while taking
great care to centre community voices as much as possible. This can be seen partly in
how they planned to bring the case on the merits in SWUAV, had it gone ahead. For
instance, despite their unequivocal identification of SWUAV members as experts on the
impacts of the prostitution laws, counsel accepted that they would have to frame their
50

Although it is worth noting that the SCC was willing to grant public interest standing in SWUAV despite
the ongoing litigation in Bedford in part because the perspectives from which the challenges were being
brought in the two cases were different—one revolving mainly around street-level sex workers (SWUAV),
the other not (Bedford). SWUAV also sought to challenge a number of additional statutory provisions on
additional Charter grounds. See SWUAV SCC, supra note 7 at para 64.
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evidence somewhat differently in court, conforming to more traditional ideas of what an
expert looks like51—a point that I discuss further in the second section of this chapter.
According to Sigurdson, if the trial on the merits had gone ahead, they would probably
have tendered the experiential affidavit evidence they had previously collected through
just such an expert.52 Indeed, when asked whether their approach to the experiential and
expert evidence would have differed from what was done in Bedford, Pacey opined that it
would likely have been similar. Pacey also noted that they engaged many of the same
expert witnesses as in Bedford, though they also included some additional experts, and
drafted separate expert reports.53

Counsel’s acceptance of epistemological compromise is also reflected in their expressed
views on Young’s effort in Bedford. For instance, when asked about the mobilization of
common sense in Bedford, Pacey was quick to praise Young’s approach, remarking:
“he’s relatable for the court and he's, you know, got wonderful credentials and he's a very
compelling advocate and he was able to, through his advocacy style, to make this out to
be a really straightforward decision”.54 When asked whether Bedford achieved what
SWUAV was trying to achieve, both Pacey and Sigurdson answered affirmatively,
expressing strong support for the outcome in Bedford. While noting that some
problematic provisions were left unchallenged (and that the political context led to a host
of new problems), Pacey was sympathetic to Young’s strategy of wanting to argue “a
clean, clear case”, describing the result as a “very successful and important outcome and
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a wonderful decision.”55 For Sigurdson, Bedford achieved most of what was sought by
SWUAV, with the notable exception of the discrimination argument under s.15, which
the applicants in Bedford weren’t well positioned to advance.56 “You know, that being
missing, it really captured a lot of our intentions. A lot of our clients' goals were met.”57
Sigurdson also pointed to SWUAV’s intervention in Bedford as an indication of her
clients’ support for the case.58

To be fair, counsel in SWUAV may not have viewed their support for Bedford as an
epistemological compromise at all. As far as Sigurdson could recall, the experiences of
the applicants were “front and centre” in Bedford; without knowing for sure, she
imagined that the case was animated by similar concerns and intentions as was SWUAV.59
This suggests that Sigurdson (and perhaps her co-counsel as well) was simply unfamiliar
with the details of how the litigation in Bedford unfolded. Nevertheless, this lack of
attention to the very different epistemological approach taken in Bedford is itself telling.
At the end of the day, even those lawyers most committed to grassroots advocacy
accorded prime significance to the legal outcome of the litigation, over and above the
manner in which it was achieved.
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8.3 THE CONSTRAINTS OF LEGAL PROCESS
8.3.1 Practical Constraints
The comparison between Bedford and SWUAV in the section above illustrates both how
feminist epistemological commitments may or may not animate strategic Charter
litigation efforts, and how tensions can arise between upholding such commitments in
litigation and pursuing a winning legal strategy. In this next section, I draw on my
interviews to identify and examine a number of factors that contribute to these tensions. I
begin by examining some of the practical challenges that arise in strategic Charter
litigation. While there is much that could be said in this regard, my focus is on how
practical constraints affect the ability to bring an ample evidentiary record centred on the
experiential knowledge of directly affected communities. After addressing some
preliminary points about procedural context and the law of standing, I turn my attention
to the construction of evidentiary records, examining the intertwined issues of cost, the
availability of evidence, the selection of witnesses, the burdens of participating in
litigation, and the form in which evidence is tendered in litigation.
Preliminary Issues
Type of Proceeding
Before focusing in on the construction of evidentiary records in strategic Charter
litigation, I pause to acknowledge some preliminary contextual factors, an in-depth
exploration of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. First, it is important to note
that the fate of feminist epistemological commitments in a strategic Charter case
depends, in part, on the nature of the proceeding and the manner in which the Charter
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challenge is raised. The challenge in Bedford was brought by way of a civil application
for declaratory relief under the Charter. However, a strategic Charter challenge to
legislation can also arise in a number of other ways—for example, in the course of
defending a criminal charge or a civil action,60 or in the form of a constitutional
reference—with important consequences for the fact-finding process. For instance, a
Charter challenger who initiates, rather than responding to, a proceeding likely has more
control over the case’s timing, the framing of the legal issues, the scope of the record
tendered, and the procedures for bringing evidence (though this may be contested), all of
which may assist the challenger to uphold a given set of epistemological commitments.61

In comparison to a criminal or reference case, moreover, a civil action or application may
be an easier setting in which to anchor constitutional issues to a robust and relevant
factual context (the difference between actions and applications is discussed further
below: see Tendering Evidence). Because reference cases lack the adjudicative facts
associated with traditional parties, and are almost always heard by appellate courts (with
the important exception of the Polygamy Reference),62 they pose the risk of being highly
removed from the lived experiences of directly affected people. In criminal trials, on the
other hand, courts may take a stricter approach to admissibility, given the high stakes for
the accused person(s). The adjudicative facts, moreover, may be only tenuously
connected to the social and legislative facts relevant to the Charter challenge. For
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instance, in two recent Charter challenges to the Protection of Communities and
Exploited Persons Act63—Canada’s current legislation governing prostitution, passed in
response to the Bedford ruling—the arguments raised by defense counsel about the
unconstitutional impact of the new laws on sex workers were based on reasonable
hypotheticals which bore little relationship to the situation of the accused themselves,
who were not sex workers but rather third party managers.64

A civil proceeding such as Bedford, then, arguably offers the best avenue for Charter
challengers hoping to advance an in-depth and appropriately contextualized record
centred on experiential knowledge. Examining the many factors that put pressure on
feminist epistemological commitments even in this “best-case scenario” allows me to
make a strong case for the tension between legal victory and epistemological justice in
strategic Charter litigation.

Standing
Another important preliminary issue concerns the law of standing, which constrains who
can bring a strategic Charter challenge. Traditionally, the law of standing has required
litigants to have a direct interest in the issues they raise before the courts.65 In recent
years, however, Canadian courts have allowed litigants without a direct interest to
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proceed on the basis of public interest standing in certain circumstances.66 In SWUAV, the
SCC relaxed the test for public interest standing, significantly attenuating the challenges
posed by standing in strategic Charter litigation, according to my interviewees. 67 Still,
the traditional approach to standing at common law has often created a barrier to both
legal victory and epistemological justice in strategic Charter litigation, and may continue
to do so in some cases.

On the one hand, the standing requirement ensures that a Charter challenge is rooted in
the lived experiences of directed affected individuals—something seemingly essential to
upholding feminist epistemological commitments. As noted by several interviewees,
there may also be good strategic reasons to name directly affected individuals as litigants,
regardless of the law. For instance, individuals help to personalize the litigation for the
public,68 and can create a sense of urgency that leads to a more efficient resolution of the
case—factors that influenced the decision to name individual plaintiffs in Carter and
Insite.69

On the other hand, the traditional emphasis on private standing aligns poorly with the
nature of the issues at stake in strategic Charter challenges to legislation, which affect not
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just individuals but entire communities.70 This harkens back to the critiques of atomism
under the Charter discussed in Chapter 1.71 By discouraging collective forms of
representation in favour of an individualistic approach, the law can create problems for
those hoping to centre marginalized experiential knowledge in litigation. One problem is
how to present the experiential knowledge of a large and diverse population through the
voice of a single, or only a few, individuals72—what I refer to in Chapter 4 as the
problem of representativeness73—though this may be mitigated somewhat by the
participation of experiential witnesses.74 Another problem, underscored by many of my
interviewees, is the heavy burden of carrying constitutional litigation, which can make it
difficult to find appropriate individual litigants, especially where the population at issue
is highly marginalized or vulnerable.75 I discuss this issue further below (see The
Challenges of Participating in Litigation).

The comparison between Bedford and SWUAV illustrates the dilemma that the traditional
approach to standing can pose in light of the above challenges. In Bedford, the applicants
represented a relatively privileged echelon of the sex trade, whose experiences, concerns
and interests likely differed from other, more marginalized women and girls involved in
the trade. Even then, only one of the applicants—Amy Lebovitch, whom Young recruited
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specifically to address concerns about standing—was currently engaged in the sale of sex
at the time of the litigation. The lawyers and community members involved in bringing
SWUAV, on the other hand, were committed to bringing a claim that focused on the
heavily marginalized street-sex workers of the DTES. 76 In the end, the only way to do
that was to proceed with SWUAV as an organizational plaintiff.77 From a feminist
perspective concerned with epistemological justice, this approach had clear advantages.
Not only did it allow community members to protect their individual identities from
public scrutiny, it empowered them to share resources and construct collective
knowledge. Legally, however, naming an organization as the primary litigant in the case
was risky, as evidenced by the government’s immediate challenge to standing—a
challenge that ultimately derailed the case (albeit producing another important legal
outcome).

Even when vulnerable people are able to participate as individual parties in litigation,
reliance on such litigants can present a number of challenges, according to the PILs I
interviewed. For one thing, the instability of some people’s lives can present challenges
in terms of maintaining contact and clear lines of communication.78 Such clients may also
have urgent personal interests that conflict with the longer-term interests of the social
movement. 79 For example, when Gloria Taylor was named as a plaintiff in Carter, there
was pressure to expedite the case so that she could get an order permitting her to obtain a
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medically assisted death.80 As noted by one interviewee, the expedited process that
followed may not have served the broader community interest in a thorough and
comprehensive fact-finding process.81 The recent BC-based challenge to administrative
segregation in federal prisons provides another example.82 As recounted by two different
interviewees, the precursor to that case was a Charter challenge brought by a woman
named Bobby Lee Worm, who was subject to a highly restrictive form of solitary
confinement.83 Because the challenge was focused on Ms. Worm’s situation, however, a
confidential resolution was quickly reached, precluding the court from addressing the
systemic issues raised by the challenge. Following this experience, counsel decided to
start a challenge on behalf of the BCCLA and the John Howard society, rather than on
behalf of individual inmates.84

In contrast to individual litigants, institutional litigants offer a number of advantages,
according to my interviewees.85 In addition to relieving the burden on individual litigants,
and bringing financial and human resources to a case, organizations often have systemic
knowledge of the relevant issues, in part as a result of working directly with communities
over an extended period of time.86 They may thus play a very helpful role in gathering
evidence87 (though individual litigants can sometimes also be helpful in this way when
they have spent time advocating for their cause).88 In the BC administrative segregation
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case, for instance, the John Howard Society directed counsel to correctional officers who
were willing and able to provide evidence about the culture in federal prisons.89
Organizations can also serve as a helpful point of contact for the media, and for
community members who may wish to become involved in the case as witnesses or as
individual parties.90 Given these benefits, and the recently relaxed standard for public
interest standing established in SWUAV, institutional litigants have become an important
part of the landscape of strategic Charter litigation in Canada. In the end, the best
approach for those concerned about epistemological justice may be to name both
individual and institutional litigants, as was done in Carter. Such an approach secures the
strategic benefits of institutional support while mitigating the legal risk of a challenge to
standing, and ensuring that the experiences of at least some directly affected individuals
remain front and centre.91
Building the Record
Having addressed the preliminary issues of procedural context and standing, I now turn
my attention to factors affecting the construction of the evidentiary record in strategic
Charter litigation. I begin by addressing some of the key practical considerations that
influence the scope and content of the record. I then move on to examine how these same
considerations affect the form in which evidence is tendered.
Cost, Scope, and Access to Justice
One of the biggest challenges of bringing (or defending) strategic Charter litigation is the
need to allocate scarce time and resources to a process that invites an almost limitless
89

Interview 1b (3 October 2018).
Ibid and Interview 6 (30 August 2018).
91
Note, however, that naming multiple litigants—especially when they are as differently positioned as
individual and institutional litigants are—may heighten the risk of conflicts of interest.
90

368

quantity of potential evidence. In this dissertation, I have made clear that the proliferation
of evidence in strategic Charter litigation is no guarantee of epistemological justice.
Nevertheless, an approach to litigation informed by feminist epistemology undoubtedly
calls for a robust factual context in which to consider the legal issues at hand, with due
weight given to evidence that advances experiential knowledge in particular. And calling
evidence takes time and money. While test case funding, law students, and pro bono
counsel can all help somewhat,92 cost remains one of the biggest barriers to bringing a
rich body of experientially-grounded evidence in strategic Charter litigation—a factor
underscored by many of my interviewees.93
Today Charter litigation is really all about showing how the challenged
law affects real people in real ways. And that requires a lot of evidence.
[…] And so on the one hand in order to show, to succeed for people who
are most deserving of Charter protection […] you actually have to engage
in a fact-finding process that's expensive, that most marginalized people
can't afford. That's kind of the conundrum.94
The time needed to tender a comprehensive record presents a similar challenge,
especially where there are litigants or community members in need of an urgent legal
remedy, as in Carter and Insite.95
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The conundrum articulated above points not only to the competing demands of legal
victory and epistemological justice, but also to a tension within the pursuit of legal
victory itself. On the one hand, a successful Charter challenge to legislation increasingly
depends on a rich and compelling evidentiary record. On the other hand, the ballooning
costs of constructing such a record may prevent a case from launching or moving
forward, at which point “your process of adjudicating for justice is actually now a barrier
to access to justice for lots of groups…”96, as Raji Mangat, feminist PIL and Executive
Director of West Coast LEAF, put it.

An additional constraint on the scope of the record arises from the human nature of
judges. As noted by several interviewees, litigators who attempt to tender copious
amounts of evidence may encounter resistance from judges reluctant to wade through it
all.97 “[W]e’re dealing with human beings with their own resources and their own ability
to…so they want it concise and clear and to the point”, explained Pacey.98 A good legal
strategy may thus call for self-imposed limitations on the amount of evidence tendered,
regardless of cost, so as not to frustrate the court or dilute the most important
information. At the same time, several interviewees pointed to a lack of guidance from
the court on the relevant issues and evidence needed in systemic Charter cases. 99 This,
combined with the impossibility of knowing what courts will find persuasive, 100
heightens the temptation to bring a variety of evidence on a broad array of issues in order
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to cover all of the bases101—particularly the most familiar ones—rather than focusing on
the experiential knowledge of the community at issue. This unpredictability and lack of
guidance from courts might also explain the temptation to mobilize a plurality of
epistemic norms throughout the fact-finding process, as I observed the parties doing on
the record in Bedford (see Part II). Without knowing the relevant judicial perspectives on
evidence and knowledge, espousing different epistemic norms at different moments
provides judges with multiple pathways to make a desired finding. By contrast, staking
one’s case too firmly on a particular set of epistemological commitments is a risky
strategy within such an uncertain process.

Gathering Evidence
According to my interviewees, cost and time constraints in a strategic Charter challenge
affect not only the scope but also the quality of the evidence that counsel can gather. For
instance, several of the PILs I spoke to remarked that they cannot be overly selective
about experts because they (unlike the Crown, presumably) usually have to rely on
people willing to work for free, or at minimal cost.102 Counsel must also find experts who
are willing to accept the reputational risks of giving evidence in a public proceeding and
being cross-examined on their research. Time limitations can place further constraints on
the selection process, especially when hearings are expedited, as in Carter.103 All of these
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factors may preclude counsel from hiring leading experts in the field. Of course, an
expert’s attentiveness to epistemological justice in their work does not necessarily align
with their professional status. But if counsel cannot afford to be picky about the
credentials of experts, they can hardly afford to be picky about their epistemological
attitudes.

Another limitation arises from the availability of appropriately contextualized research
and expertise on the subject matter at issue—let alone more epistemologically
conscientious forms of research such as participatory action research or community-based
research—which can vary greatly from one case to another.104 The Insite case, for
instance, was unique in being centred on a heavily researched social experiment in drug
decriminalization. As noted by several interviewees, extensive funding had been
allocated to study the supervised injection site at the heart of the case from multiple
perspectives, drawing on both quantitative and quality methods, which facilitated the
construction of an exceptionally compelling evidentiary record.105 In Bedford and
SWUAV, on the other hand, the available research was more limited and did not, for the
most part, directly address the effects of criminalization in Canada.106 For Pacey and
Sigurdson, this underscored the importance of the firsthand experiential evidence.107
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Gathering experiential evidence, however, raises its own set of practical challenges. In
some cases, experiential accounts may be buried in confidential reports or documents,
raising access to information issues. Counsel in the BC administrative segregation case,
for instance, struggled to gain access to data about inmates and the inmate population
through the discovery process.108 More significant to my project, however, are the
challenges that arise when litigators seek to gather evidence directly from marginalized
community members. On the Crown side, this is partly due to the difficulty of finding
experiential witnesses who are able and willing to speak to the salutary effects of a law—
Bedford being an exception.109 Even on the side of the Charter challenger, however, it
can be difficult to engage experiential witnesses due to the heavy burden of participating
in litigation. The next subsection is devoted specifically to this issue.
The Challenges of Participating in Litigation
One of the most significant practical barriers to the advancement of experiential
knowledge discussed by my interviewees was the heavy burden of participating in
litigation, especially as a party bringing a Charter challenge, but also as a witness.110 This
was a major obstacle in SWUAV in particular. As Pacey explained, “sex workers are
actively criminalized, they experience all sorts of stigma, and everything else they
experience was going to make it really hard for them to take the stand”.111 To give
evidence in a Charter challenge, individuals must publicly identify themselves as
108
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members of a marginalized community, share personal (and often painful) details about
their lives in court, and subject themselves to possible cross-examination. While these
requirements are difficult for anyone to meet, they are especially prohibitive for highly
vulnerable people.

People from marginalized communities may also be reluctant to participate in litigation
due to previous negative experiences with the justice system. As Cathie Boies Parker
explained regarding the homeless population she worked with to defend litigation seeking
injunctions against tent cities in Victoria:112

…there's an enormous reluctance to engage with the justice system
because they have very justifiable concerns about what’s happened and
that their voices haven’t been heard in the past, and that, sort of, nothing
good can come from it. Right? So one of the things that's really critical
when you want to get evidence from that group is to have the conditions in
which they can speak.113

According to Boies Parker, the community bonds formed within tent cities were a crucial
form of empowerment in this sense. In Victoria (City) v Adams, 114 in which the city of
Victoria sought an injunction against a tent city at Cridge Park, law students were
initially able to collect evidence from tent city residents to fight the city’s injunction.
When the first injuction application was lost, however, and the tent city was broken up, it
112
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became very difficult to collect affidavits from former residents given their reluctance to
participate further in the legal process, and in particular, to subject themselves to crossexamination.115

It may also be difficult for highly vulnerable people to appear for scheduled meetings and
court dates, or to meet other procedural deadlines, for a variety of reasons. According to
Pacey, the homeless population whose rights were at stake in Abbotsford (City) v
Shantz116—another case in which a municipality sought an injunction against homeless
tent encampments—suffered from such severe mental health and addiction issues that it
was difficult to predict whether they would be cogent on any given day, or even where to
find them.117 Former Crown litigator Craig Jones similarly described the challenges of
tracking down boys and men expelled from polygamous communities in the Polygamy
Reference.118 Limited literacy and/or computer and internet access may exacerbate such
challenges, all of which creates barriers to tendering a rich and diverse array of
experiential evidence in strategic Charter litigation.

When it comes to serving as a party, the burden of participating in litigation is even
greater. In addition to the time, cost, and public scrutiny involved in carrying litigation,
parties must subject themselves to a potentially onerous discovery process.119 These
requirements can make it very difficult, if not impossible, for members of vulnerable and
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marginalized communities to attach their names to litigation, as became the key issue in
SWUAV.

Cognizant of these challenges, several interviewees expressed their commitment to
shielding vulnerable community members, as much as possible, from the harms that
participating in litigation can entail.120 As already noted, this was one of the key
commitments informing the litigation in SWUAV.121 Similarly, in describing the selection
of experiential witnesses in Carter, Sheila Tucker explained, “you pick the ones […] that
are well enough to give a statement—where it’s not going to be of any harm to them to be
participating”.122 Monique Pongracic-Speier described the search for individual plaintiffs
in Insite in similar terms:

our chief concern was a “do no harm” sort of point of view. Because the
intense scrutiny and the political battleground that surrounded this site, we
were very concerned could harm people who just did not have a lot of
resources to draw on personally, and who could be subject to pretty
intrusive scrutiny by the media […] our key concern was to find folks who
were probably resilient enough to be able to participate in the litigation,
through the tenure of the litigation, with supports from the institutional
plaintiff PHS.123
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The commitment to “do no harm” in litigation undoubtedly reflects feminist values. One
might even argue that it aligns with the ethical imperative of feminist epistemology to
know responsibly.124 As Lorraine Code emphasizes, “epistemological questions invoke
ethical requirements.”125 Feminist observations about the oppressive nature of the
relationship between knowers and the known in the mainstream epistemological tradition
are especially pertinent in this regard.126 According to Donna Haraway, the mainstream
tradition “turns everything into a resource for appropriation, in which an object of
knowledge is finally itself only matter for the seminar power, the act, of the knower.”
Careful attention to the circumstances and needs of potential experiential witnesses and
litigants arguably constitutes a form of resistance to this exploitative dynamic in the
knowledge-constructing process of litigation. This commitment, however, is in tension
with another feminist objective in litigation: the pursuit of epistemological justice via the
advancement of experiential voices. In an effort to protect people from the burdens and
harms of participating in litigation, litigators may exclude the most vulnerable and
marginalized people from having a say in the process, whether as plaintiffs or as
witnesses. Alternatively, they may constrain the form their evidence takes, as discussed
in the next subsection.

Tendering Evidence
Not only do the challenges of limited resources and the burdens of participating in
litigation affect which witnesses are included in the litigation process, they also,
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according to my interviewees, affect the form in which evidence is tendered. This too,
can affect the fate of feminist epistemological commitments in strategic Charter
litigation.

In SWUAV, for instance, the key experiential evidence came from the anonymous
affidavits gathered from sex workers in the DTES. In the standing application, the
plaintiffs were able to tender this evidence indirectly by attaching it as an exhibit to the
affidavit of a Pivot volunteer.127 However, Pacey surmised that hearsay concerns would
have prevented them from relying on experiential evidence attached in the same manner
at trial; in order for such evidence to be admissible as a basis for fact-finding, it would
have to come from individuals who were willing to name themselves and be available for
cross-examination.128 As Sigurdson explained, however, “the rationale behind that
collection of affidavits […] was to give them the weight of sworn information from
individuals who were too vulnerable to actually attend the [Parliamentary] committee.”129
It was thus going to be difficult to tender much of this evidence directly. While the
plaintiffs may have been able to bring forward other experiential witnesses, they would
presumably have had to be less vulnerable. The anonymous affidavits, meanwhile, would
still have been included in some way, but likely as an exhibit attached to an expert report
that would have analyzed their content, according to Sigurdson.130 In this way, the
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challenges of participating in litigation, combined with the rules of admissibility, would
have resulted in the foregrounding of expert over experiential knowledge.
Written versus Oral Forms of Evidence
One of the most significant differences in terms of the form evidence takes relates to
whether a Charter challenge is brought as an action or an application, and consequently
whether evidence is tendered viva voce or in writing (or some hybrid of the two, where
the rules allow it). This affects the process by which witnesses give evidence as well as
the form in which the evidence appears before the court, all of which can have an
important bearing on the fate of feminist epistemological commitments in litigation.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the use of application procedures to bring evidence by
affidavit has become a preferred method for bringing strategic Charter challenges to
legislation.131 Application procedures are well suited to such challenges, in part due to the
unique nature of fact-finding in these cases discussed in Chapter 2.132 While social and
legislative facts are often (albeit not always) contested in strategic Charter litigation, the
accounts of experiential witnesses are rarely so.133 Moreover, the evidence tendered to
establish social and legislative facts does not generally raise the same kinds of credibility
issues as evidence directed at contested adjudicative facts, attenuating the need for an oral
hearing.134
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However, the trend towards written evidence in Charter cases of this nature is also a
response to the practical challenges discussed above. One of the major advantages of
proceeding via application, as emphasized by my interviewees, is the much greater
efficiency of written proceedings. Tendering evidence via affidavits and out-of-court
cross-examinations, rather than through in-court testimony, avoids potentially onerous
discovery requirements,135 clarifies the issues and evidence prior to a hearing, saves a
great deal of court time, and ultimately allows the litigation to advance more quickly and
at less expense to the parties.136

Written hearings also give counsel more control over the evidence, and more opportunity
to build an ample record than might otherwise be permitted.137 Young, for instance,
recounted facing judges in the early years of his career who were inclined to decide
constitutional issues on the basis of legal argument, without hearing the accompanying
social and legislative fact evidence (despite the SCC’s directions regarding the
importance of such evidence in Charter cases).138 He explained that after one such
experience in the early 1990s, he changed his process to bring evidence by affidavit early
in a case: “So if a court’s gonna say ‘I don’t wanna hear this evidence’ then still it’s in
front of them, you know.”139 Young also noted how written procedures can create leeway
for counsel to bring tenuously admissible evidence that might not otherwise be heard by
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the court—a point reinforced by others I interviewed, including two judges.140 Thus,
faced with judicial resistance or barriers to admissibility, proceeding by application may
be an effective strategy to ensure the inclusion of certain evidence on the record,
including experiential and other evidence that furthers feminist epistemological
commitments.

Affidavits may also be the only, or at least the most feasible way to tender experiential
evidence from vulnerable and marginalized witnesses. As noted above, it may be difficult
for some witnesses to give cogent testimony at a scheduled court date. By contrast, one
PIL described the process of drafting affidavits as helpful in eliciting more accurate and
coherent life stories when working with severe opioid addicts.141 Experiential witnesses
may also be reluctant to testify in court for fear of public exposure, personal hardship,
and/or as a result of previous negative experiences with the justice system. As Boies
Parker observed, giving evidence in court, rather than via affidavit, can be “very
disturbing and anxiety-making for people”.142 Even when individuals are willing and able
to testify, avoiding the experience of taking the stand may best respect the “do no harm”
principle central to the philosophy of at least some PILs, and arguably also to the ethical
imperative of feminist epistemology.

The decision to proceed via written evidence, however, may come at a cost in terms of
centering experiential knowledge. For one thing, as some interviewees noted, most
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affidavits are drafted in a highly stylized form, often by, or with significant guidance
from, lawyers and law students.143 As a result, the content of an affidavit may be more
strongly shaped by legal considerations, and less reflective of how the witness would
have expressed their own experiences and views. In discussing the construction of the
record in Bedford, for instance, Young observed that the experiential affidavits were
purposely framed to speak to the key legal issues in the case: “it was very pointed to
prove those points”, he stated.144 The advantages of written evidence must thus be
weighed against the potential compromise to the full and free expression of experiential
voices.

The dangers of drafting affidavits on behalf of witnesses are illustrated by the evidence of
applicant expert John Lowman in Bedford. In his cross-examination, Lowman repeatedly
expressed dissatisfaction with the wording of his affidavit, which had been drafted by
Young’s students, noting that it failed to capture the nuances of his research findings.145
Indeed, even Ronald-Frans Melchers, Lowman’s main critic in Bedford, acknowledged
that Lowman’s actual research reports were much more carefully qualified than the
statements made in his affidavit.146 While Lowman initially approved the affidavit, he
explained that had he fully appreciated the nature of expert testimony and the purpose of
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the affidavit at the time, he would have been more careful; indeed, he would have drafted
it himself.147

The transformation of carefully qualified research findings into oversimplified
conclusions through the drafting process raises serious concerns from the perspective of
feminist epistemology (and even from the perspective of mainstream epistemology).148
In addition, though, Lowman’s story serves as a cautionary tale for the tendering of
experiential evidence via affidavit, where the commitment to centering experiential
knowledge is more directly at stake. This concern may be significantly mitigated by a
conscientious approach to lawyering. Tucker and Pongracic-Speier, for instance, both
emphasized the importance of working carefully with experiential witnesses to produce
affidavits that accurately reflect their experience in their own words.149 As PongracicSpeier put it, “It’s very important that it’s in their voice”.150 Still, she acknowledged, “the
role of counsel can get a little bit complicated in that area in the sense of balancing what
it is that the witness wants to say with what is legally pertinent.”151

Beyond the potential pitfalls of the drafting process lays the question of how persuasive
written evidence will be. While recognizing that affidavit evidence can be compelling, as
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it was in Bedford,152 many interviewees suggested that there is something more powerful
about viva voce testimony.153 “I think there’s something just deeper that happens when
you hear somebody tell their story. You have to assess the risk of that to that individual
and whether that’s worth it, but I think it’s a powerful thing”, said Pacey.154 Speaking of
the use of video affidavits in the Polygamy Reference, Jones opined, “it's so much more
powerful to actually show, you know, an emotional survivor of harm talking about that
harm, rather than affidavits that I think everyone sort of assumes are drafted by lawyers
anyway.”155 Others (including one judge) suggested that viva voce evidence may be
important for the court to gain a fuller appreciation of the factual context.156

The importance of leading viva voce evidence may depend on judges’ familiarity with the
lived experiences at issue. For instance, in Tucker’s view the experiential evidence in
Carter could be effectively conveyed via affidavit in part because the experience of being
sick is already so relatable.157 In SWUAV, on the other hand, Pacey worried that the court
might not appreciate the reality of her clients’ lives and the harms they faced without
hearing directly from them, and having the chance to ask questions—in part because this
was how she herself had come to question her initial beliefs and assumptions about sex
work. It was partly for this reason that she and her colleagues planned to tender the
experiential evidence in the form of viva voce testimony, rather than via affidavits and
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out-of-court cross-examinations (though in the end the approach taken in Bedford proved
sufficient to persuade the courts).158

Choosing to proceed orally, however, presented a major challenge in SWUAV. As Pacey
remarked, “[g]oing via the root of viva voce evidence was obviously going to raise a
bunch of very real issues about how do we support sex workers to walk into that
environment? And how can they testify in a way that feels empowering and safe for them
and not retraumatizing?”159 Sigurdson articulated the dilemma this way:

The group of people that were involved have a sufficient level of
vulnerability. It would be very hard to attend as witnesses consistently,
and to bear the burden of that. On the other hand, their evidence was so
compelling, that for a judge to see them in person and to have access to the
truth of both their words and the ways that they are able to respond with
the resilience and the strength and the concern that they have about their
lives and the lives of their sisters and brothers in the neighborhood, we felt
would have been very powerful, and I think would have been really
consistent with some of the goals of that community, which included
getting their voices heard.160

Had the case gone to trial, counsel in SWUAV were hoping to ease the burden of
testifying in court by securing some special protections for the witnesses with the
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agreement of the court, such as not having to testify publicly.161 There is some precedent
for this kind of extraordinary measure. Take, for instance, the account given by several of
my interviewees about the hearing in Shantz.162 Knowing how difficult it would be to
ensure the attendance and effective participation of the highly vulnerable and
marginalized homeless community whose rights were at issue in that case, counsel
brought an application to hold the hearings in the basement of an Abbotsford motel. On
the eve of the hearing, they lodged their clients at the motel, providing food and whatever
other supports they could to ensure that people would be prepared to testify the following
day. The result was what Pacey described as “the most powerful evidence I’ve ever
heard, anywhere, anytime.” Nevertheless, she added, “It was still so hard on our people,
on our clients, man was it hard.”163

In the same vein as the issue of participation in litigation, then, the choice of procedure
(where there is one) brings out a tension between conflicting feminist values. On the one
hand, proceeding viva voce allows experiential witnesses to have a more direct, and
arguably more compelling voice in the fact-finding process. On the other hand, tendering
experiential evidence in writing may protect vulnerable individuals from harm, and may,
in some cases, be the only feasible way for people to participate in litigation at all.
8.3.2 Epistemological Constraints
In the previous subsection, I considered how practical challenges arising from limited
resources, limited available evidence, and the burdens of participating in litigation, put
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pressure on feminist epistemological commitments in strategic Charter litigation. I now
shift my focus from practical to epistemological factors, drawing from my interviews to
examine how ideas about knowledge engrained in law and judicial consciousness
influence the framing of knowledge in litigation. As in the rest of the dissertation, my
focus here is specifically on the framing of expertise as it relates to experiential
knowledge. I begin by examining how litigators and judges conceptualize and construct
these categories. I go on to discuss how my interviewees understand the respective roles
of these categories of proof, so constructed, in strategic Charter litigation, and how this
understanding is shaped by the need to persuade human judges as decision-makers.
Constructing Categories
Who Counts as an Expert?
At the heart of feminist epistemology is an insistence that particular, concrete, lived
experience is an important and authoritative source of knowledge—an insistence that
arises in response to the perpetuation of social inequalities via false claims to universal
and objective knowledge.164 In a world in which experiential accounts are often
discounted as “merely” subjective and anecdotal, one way to promote this idea is by
framing experience as a source of expertise. In writing about the Bedford case, for
instance, feminist legal scholar Sonia Lawrence refers to the evidence given by current
and former sex workers as a “body of experiential expertise.”165 Describing experiential
knowledge in this way challenges the common equation of “expert” (i.e. authoritative)
knowledge with formal academic training.
164
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Beyond the world of scholarship, this linking of experience with expertise is central to
the politics of many social justice activists and advocates. Nowhere is this more clearly
expressed than in Pivot’s Voices for Dignity report, which emphasizes the key role of sex
workers’ experiences and opinions in the evaluation of criminal laws related to
prostitution.166 To underscore the point, Pivot repeatedly refers to sex workers as offering
“expertise” on the effects of the laws at issue.167 This use of the term “expertise” is not
merely rhetorical, nor is it intended to be semantically distinct from the meaning of
expertise in law. Rather, the report describes the 91 affidavits sworn by sex workers from
the DTES as “expert opinion evidence” that “would be presented as such in a
parliamentary hearing or a court of law.”168

Pacey and Sigurdson reinforced this view in their interviews. Take, for instance, the
following remark from Sigurdson:

my view is, and the view of the group of sex workers that I've worked
with, and the counsel that I've worked with […] is that the people who are
most adversely affected by the laws have expertise in what the laws'
effects are […]. They are experts in understanding that, and they can give
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both direct stories and accounts of how that happens, and views about how
that works.169

Nor were Pacey and Sigurdson the only counsel to express such views. Speaking
generally of marginalized groups engaged in strategic Charter litigation, PongracicSpeier opined: “Those people are the experts on their lives, and what's happened in their
lives. And sometimes they are the experts on what's happened in their area or their
neighborhood or their community. Nobody can speak better to it than they can.”170
Comments like these demonstrate the serious commitment of at least some PILs to a
feminist vision of epistemological justice.

And yet, in the standing application in SWUAV, the 91 affidavits from sex workers in the
DTES were attached as an exhibit to the affidavit of a Pivot research assistant, without
ever being identified as a form of expert evidence.171 According to Sigurdson, moreover,
if the trial on the merits had gone ahead, counsel would probably have attached this
affidavit evidence as an exhibit to an academic expert report.172 To be sure, part of the
reason for this falls back to the practical challenges discussed in the previous section;
because the affidavits were anonymous, they could not be directly tendered.173 Still, no
attempt was made to frame this evidence as a source of expertise even rhetorically, or to
suggest that the direct testimony of sex workers in the case on the merits would be
presented as such. As Pacey explained:
169
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[W]hen we did Voices for Dignity, we say I think at the outset of that
report, sex workers are experts on their lives and should be understood as
such. We were not going to take that same approach before the court in so
far as trying to get them qualified as experts. Even though philosophically
that doesn't sit well with me, that wasn't the battle we were going to
fight.174

Sigurdson added:

The assumptions that are made by our system about whether people in
vulnerable circumstances are qualified to give a category of information,
or category of evidence that would be hard for a judge to understand,
aren't consistent with our view that these folks are experts in the effects of
the prostitution laws, as they were then called. So yeah, it's a definition
that competes with the courts' definition of what an expert is, but I kind of
believe in both.175

In other words, when it came to bringing strategic Charter litigation, counsel felt
compelled to adhere to a more narrow conception of expertise, and thereby to retreat
from the strong feminist epistemological stance taken in the Voices for Dignity Report.
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The tension between the pursuit of legal victory and epistemological justice is palpable
here.

Where, though, does this narrow conception of expertise in litigation come from? As
Tucker observed, and as I noted previously in Chapter 3, the definition of a properly
qualified expert at law is actually quite broad.176 According to the SCC in R v Mohan, an
expert must “have acquired special or peculiar knowledge through study or experience in
respect of the matters on which he or she undertakes to testify” (emphasis added).177
There is precedent to support the notion that expert qualifications may arise from
practical training and observation.178 While the courts have been reluctant to recognize
personal experience as a basis for expertise,179 a clear and principled distinction between
specialized knowledge grounded in practical observation, and specialized knowledge
grounded in lived experiences of marginalization, has yet to be articulated in the
jurisprudence.

One source of pressure to adhere to a more narrow definition of expertise might be the
procedural rules and requirements surrounding expert evidence. The need to file expert
reports by a given date, to have experts formally acknowledge their duties to the court,180
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and to restrict the number of expert witnesses tendered in a case,181 may compel litigators
to draw a firmer boundary around a smaller number of expert witnesses than they
otherwise would. On the other hand, one of the Crown litigators I interviewed affirmed
that in at least some strategic Charter cases—Bedford and Carter included—the factfinding process has allowed for considerable ambiguity in the delineation of experts from
experiential witnesses.182 The above comments from counsel in SWUAV, moreover, do
not refer merely to procedural constraints. Rather, they point to the epistemic norms that
animate the law and judicial consciousness. It is to this that I turn below.
What Counts as Legitimate Expert Knowledge?
One of the defining ideas we have about expert knowledge in law is that it should be
objective. Indeed, for many of my interviewees, the most important distinction between
experiential and expert evidence was the expectation of objectivity with respect to the
latter.183 This expectation is enshrined not only in common law, as discussed in Chapter
3,184 but also in judicial conceptions of expertise. For instance, when asked whether the
sex trade participants who gave evidence in Bedford might be viewed as experts
(especially those who had been involved in the production of social science research
themselves), one of the judges I interviewed said: “they’re entitled to tell their story. But
[…] do we give that the aura of an expert? Which as I say is, at least notionally, this more
objective sense of expertise. I mean that’s the definition of expert evidence.” 185 This
judge was particularly wary of confounding people engaged in advocacy with those
181
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providing “objective” expertise—a concern shared by the other judge I spoke to.186

Implicit in such comments is a conception of objectivity that calls for disinterest and
detachment—what I describe in Chapter 5 as the “epistemic ideal of detachment”. At the
heart of this view are the familiar dichotomies that form the bedrock of mainstream
epistemological thought: objectivity versus subjectivity; expertise versus advocacy;
knowledge versus experience. This epistemological framework runs counter to the
insights of feminist thinkers like Donna Haraway, Katherine Bartlett, and Sandra
Harding, who have challenged the above dichotomies by positing a conception of
objectivity that insists upon contextualization and critical reflexivity.187 As Lawrence
puts it, the strict separation of expertise from advocacy “should give any careful scholar
serious pause. It reveals the strict limits of the frame in which the law seeks and receives
expertise—a frame in which a whole truth is possible and the limits of the ‘whole’ are
ascertainable.”188 This limited conception of expertise not only facilitates boundary work
between expert and experiential evidence; it also informs the strategies used to challenge
or otherwise frame particular instances of expert evidence (narrowly conceived) in
litigation.

Lawrence’s comment is particularly apt in the context of strategic Charter litigation,
where the focus is on social science experts responding to complex matters of social fact.
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As noted by more than one interviewee, most social scientists called to speak to social
facts in this type of litigation have reached relatively settled views on the issues they
study, and have engaged in public advocacy—realities that do not square well with the
legal conception of experts as offering objective and detached opinions on matters of no
particular interest to them.189

This point was underscored by Tucker, who described her response to allegations of
expert bias in Carter. As she recounted, one of the key experts in that case—a prominent
medical ethicist named Marcia Angel—created a composite of previously written opinion
pieces as a time-saving measure. Canada, however, objected that the witness was biased
because she was simply repeating a previously formed opinion. In response, Tucker
reported arguing:

She doesn't have to come to the sociological facts with an open mind and
no opinion. In fact, you can't—you are never going to find somebody on
an extremely contentious social issue who you could treat as an expert,
who has no pre-existing opinion on abortion, or euthanasia. That person
doesn't exist. And if they did exist, it would only prove that they were
unbelievably poorly informed for their field.190

She went on:
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You're thinking of the wrong construct of an expert. You're thinking of an
expert from personal injury [cases]. You have to think of an expert for
sociological facts in a different way. […] if they didn't already have an
opinion and they hadn't already considered information aside from our
case, I wouldn't want them at all.191

The judge in Carter ultimately agreed with Tucker’s argument and allowed the
evidence.192 Nevertheless, the judges I spoke with expressed considerable wariness about
the legitimacy of this type of social science expertise, precisely because of its tendency to
bleed into advocacy.193 Indeed, according to one of the judges, this was a key challenge
raised by strategic Charter litigation where social, rather than adjudicative facts, are
central.194

The mainstream epistemological assumptions embedded in law and judicial
consciousness, then, influence which types of expertise are considered more or less
authoritative in litigation. As Boies Parker and Mangat observed, courts tend to view
certain disciplines, e.g. medicine and psychology, as more authoritative than others, e.g.
sociology or social work.195 While Mangat attributed this to judges’ own educational
background,196 the tendency to discount social science expertise may also arise from its
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perceived lack of objectivity, conceived in the particular way noted above.197 As a
feminist advocate, Mangat did not necessarily agree with these assumptions; she noted,
for instance (albeit with respect to family law rather than strategic Charter litigation) that
many psychologists lack a nuanced understanding of family violence, and use highly
problematic tests in their assessments of family dynamics. Nevertheless, she observed,
such an expert may offer the best chance of legal success, especially when the expert has
already been qualified in a previous proceeding.198

The epistemic beliefs of judges and other legal actors may similarly influence the relative
authority ascribed to different kinds of social science evidence in litigation. According to
Pacey, for instance, the type of quantitative research that was offered in Insite tends to be
privileged over the more qualitative forms of research that made up the bulk of the record
in Bedford.199 This accords with my analysis of the epistemic norms mobilized to frame
social science research in Bedford (see Chapter 5 at 5.2.2 under The Privileging of
Quantitative over Qualitative Research). Indeed, some of the interviewees themselves
espoused such views.200 Take, for instance, the following anecdote from former Crown
litigator Craig Jones, in which he describes challenging the expertise of an opposing
witness in the Polygamy Reference:
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we'd already heard a lot about qualitative and quantitative research and I
got the sense that the judge had a bit of a healthy skepticism about [the]
qualitative end of the spectrum. And so when this witness [described
research on the] bodily experience of earthquakes, I said, ‘bodily
experience of earthquakes?’ and she said, ‘Yes, sociology is a very broad
field.’ And I said, ‘Was that qualitative research?’ She said, ‘Yes, that's on
the very qualitative end of the spectrum.’ And then I couldn't resist, I said,
‘Was that SSHRC funded?’ […] that was a way of alerting the judge, in a
very non-hostile way, to this idea that maybe common sense or, or popular
wisdom or whatever it is ought to make one a bit skeptical of anecdote
being presented as expertise.201

Jones’ remark exemplifies the kind of boundary work that operates to exclude
experientially-grounded qualitative research from the realm of legitimate expertise in
litigation. In this case, the boundary work was motivated both by Jones’ own
epistemological assumptions, and by his perception of the judge’s views on the matter.

Meanwhile, as one PIL observed, the poor fit between the realities of social science
research and the ideal of expert objectivity enshrined in law creates plenty of
opportunities for counsel to frame experts in strategic Charter cases as biased.202 Indeed,
several interviewees alluded to accusations of bias on the basis of past advocacy as an
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important strategy in this type of litigation.203 Interestingly, such accusations were not
described as raising doubts about the accuracy of particular expert claims, so much as
destroying an expert’s overall credibility.204 Young attributed the effectiveness of this
strategy to the adversarial context of litigation: “even though destroying the credibility or
value of an expert doesn't mean you establish your proposition - like they don't connect it helps a lot, because the legal system's very binary and adversarial. There's a tendency if
you don't believe one you believe the other, because you have to make a decision…”, he
explained.205 This comment offers useful insight on the phenomenon observed in Part II
whereby epistemic norms, frameworks and categories are decontextualized and
instrumentalized in Bedford. As Young points out, the adversarial imperative of litigation
encourages the parties to detach the mainstream ideal of objectivity from the goal of
truth-seeking, and to instead wield it instrumentally to achieve a desired legal outcome.
Although not explicitly discussed by my interviewees, one can easily see how the
adversarialism of the legal process might similarly encourage the parties to detach
progressive epistemic norms and commitments from their political roots, as a means of
enhancing their rhetorical toolkits.
The Role of the Constructed Categories in Strategic Charter Litigation
Thus far in this subsection, I have drawn on my interview data to examine how the
categories of experiential and expert evidence are constructed by litigators and judges. In
what follows, I look at how my interviewees view the respective roles of these categories
of proof in strategic Charter litigation, and how these views are importantly shaped by
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the need to persuade the court. This analysis further illuminates the nature of the
boundary constructed between experiential and expert evidence. It also helps to illustrate
the competing epistemological frameworks at play in the fact-finding process, and to
once again underscore the tensions that can arise between the pursuit of legal victory and
epistemological justice in this area of litigation.
Experiential Evidence: The Heart and Soul of a Case
Interestingly, almost everyone I interviewed identified experiential evidence as very, if
not the most, important evidence in a strategic Charter challenge.206 Regarding Bedford
specifically, two interviewees (a Crown litigator and a judge) described the firsthand
experiential evidence as critical to the adjudication of the issues.207 Such views arguably
speak to the value accorded to firsthand accounts of experience at common law,
discussed in Chapter 3 (see 3.3.1).

Others emphasized the compelling nature of experiential evidence in court.208 “You can
have all the data in the world, all the scientists, all the qualitative researchers say ‘oh well
I spoke to…’. But nothing changes hearts and minds, even judges’ hearts and minds, like
hearing from somebody directly affected”, remarked Pacey.209 As she put it in another
interview, “if you don't have the individuals, you don't have the heart and soul of the
case. You don't have the sort of individual story that you hope will elicit the compassion
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of the court and the desire to do what is sometimes a courageous thing.”210 Similar
opinions were voiced on the Crown side. “[T]o me, the most compelling evidence is
always the stories of individuals. […] And my view is that judges are much more likely
to decide on the basis of human stories than theories from experts,” said one Crown
litigator.211 Expert evidence, in turn, was widely described as playing a supportive role.
“[W]e’ve often used it as […] a way to kind of bolster what our, what the individual
litigants are testifying about their experience”, commented Mangat.212 Others described
expert evidence as “corroborating” or “buttressing” experiential accounts.213

On the other hand, many interviewees saw limitations in what experiential evidence
could offer to establish social facts. According to Mangat, for instance, individuals may
be unfamiliar with the systemic context of the issue under scrutiny, such as the
mechanisms by which a legal regime operates.214 Furthermore, as one PIL explained, the
Crown tends to dismiss experiential evidence as too anecdotal to justify striking down a
law, especially one that forms part of a complex regulatory regime.215 This was where
expert evidence came in.
Expert Evidence: Efficient and Systemic
Expert evidence was often described as compensating for the above limitations. Mangat,
for instance, observed that experts can provide important evidence about the broader
210
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context of a rights violation, such as the structural features of the Canadian correctional
system that gave rise to the violation of inmates’ rights in the BCCLA’s challenge to
administrative segregation.216 With respect to Bedford, she noted that, while the s.7
violation hinged on experiential evidence (in her view), social science research was
essential to illuminating the shifting social landscape that justified revisiting the issue in
the first place.217

Expert evidence also “makes your people’s evidence less anecdotal”, remarked one PIL
(the same one quoted above as observing the Crown’s tendency to dismiss experiential
evidence as too anecdotal).218 As explained by Boies Parker with reference to her tent
city cases, a multitude of legally extraneous factors may contribute to the personal
challenges faced by any given homeless person in ways that are difficult to disentangle.
An expert, on the other hand, can present a more aggregate picture of the homeless
population, helping to illuminate systemic problems that cannot be efficiently established
on the basis of idiosyncratic individual accounts.219 In her words, “sometimes expert
evidence is a way to get a cluster of information before the court that would just take
forever if you were trying to lead it.”220 This observation harkens back to the practical
challenges discussed in the previous section. It is certainly possible to marshal a large
enough body of experiential accounts to demonstrate systemic forms of injustice. Indeed,
there is longstanding feminist tradition of doing just that, exemplified by the secondwave feminist phenomenon of consciousness-raising (see Chapter 3 at 3.3.1). Given the
216
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resource constraints that arise in the context of strategic Charter litigation, however,
experts—including qualitative researchers who have already collected experiential data—
offer a more efficient way of demonstrating the requisite facts.

Social science research in particular helps to show that the direct experiential accounts
tendered as evidence in litigation are in fact representative of broader social phenomena.
For this reason, some interviewees viewed expert social science evidence as vital to
address the systemic issues at play in strategic Charter litigation, especially under s.1.221
Speaking of Bedford, for instance, one Crown litigator opined, “what alternative do you
have in that case but to use social science evidence, despite its limitations. You have to,
because the very issue the court has to decide about the nature of the harm and its
sources, comes down to a social science question.”222

Some of the more critically reflexive PILs I spoke to, however, questioned the amount of
expert evidence needed in strategic Charter litigation, at least at the stage of establishing
a Charter breach. As Pongracic-Speier put it:

I think there is something that we have to really seriously grapple with in
this type of litigation, as to, you know, how many of the official experts
we require, and why we require them. Are they adding something novel,

221

Ibid; Interview 1b (3 October 2018); Interview 3 (14 September 2016); and Interview 15 (19 October
2018).
222
Interview 15, ibid.

402

versus something that has an alphabet soup on the end, because they're
PhDs or they hold an MA or whatever the case may be.223

Pacey, for her part, was critical of the Court of Appeal (ONCA) majority in Bedford’s
remarks concerning the limitations of “anecdotal” experiential evidence on screening (see
Chapter 7 at 7.3.2), asking: “[W]hat are you saying about sex workers’ voices and the
people who come forward when you’re saying ‘how do we know if they’re really
representative?’”224 On the other hand, Mangat observed that reliance on experiential
evidence alone to demonstrate a Charter violation may pose risks for broader legal and
social justice goals, “because what if the experience is an experience that is quite
damaging to other equality rights’ seekers?”225 Concerns about representativeness are, in
other words, not just related to truth, but also to equality broadly conceived.

Mangat’s point is an important one. It would be a mistake to simply equate the promotion
of experiential evidence with a progressive, feminist approach, especially where there are
competing experiential accounts that remain unheard or underemphasized. Indeed, as
noted above, where practical factors limit the number and range of experiential accounts
that can be heard in litigation, expert evidence may prove critical to facilitating a broader,
more systemic—albeit mediated—understanding of a given phenomenon of social
marginalization. Still, paying attention to the perceived roles of experiential versus expert
evidence as modes of proof, or ways of knowing in litigation, reveals how the dynamics
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of strategic Charter litigation sometimes work against the advancement of feminist
epistemological commitments.

As the discussion above demonstrates, litigators’ views on the role played by different
categories of proof in litigation arise partly from their own epistemic beliefs,
commitments, concerns, and professional experiences. However, these views are also
importantly shaped by the demands of the adversarial process, and, in particular, by the
need to frame knowledge in a way that appeals to judges’ own experiences and epistemic
beliefs. The remainder of this section is devoted specifically to developing this key point.
Persuading the Court
Perhaps the strongest factor influencing the framing of knowledge in litigation, according
to my interview data, is the need to persuade judges as human decision-makers. Of
course, it is impossible to predict what kind of evidence any particular judge will find
persuasive or not—a reality underscored by many of my interviewees.226 Still, the
litigators’ I spoke to pointed to a number of common tendencies in how judges respond to
evidence, tendencies that shaped their own approach to the fact-finding process.

For instance, several interviewees observed that judges tend to be wary of social science
evidence, partly because of the difficulties of evaluating competing research studies and
claims as a non-expert.227 In light of this observation, it is not surprising that some
litigators flagged the ability to present technical or complex evidence in a clear and
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simple manner as an important consideration when selecting experts.228 For instance,
long-time feminist advocate and PIL Mary Eberts remarked that, while statistical
evidence from experts can be very helpful, “as soon as they start getting inconclusive or
muddy, you have to drop them.”229 The preference for clear and definitive constructions
of science noted in Chapter 5 emerges again here, thwarting a more nuanced and
carefully contextualized epistemological approach.230

The litigators I interviewed also generally agreed that judges are most heavily influenced
by firsthand experiential accounts, rather than by expert evidence.231 At the same time,
however, some interviewees observed that experiential evidence may not always resonate
with courts. Young, for instance, pointed to a lack of respect for sex workers as a
potential cause for concern in Bedford, a factor that made him wary of relying on
experiential evidence alone.232 Young’s fear points to one of the more blatant ways in
which the experiential knowledge of marginalized people may be discounted in strategic
Charter litigation—through the biased attitudes of judges.

Countering Young’s concern were comments about the open-minded, thoughtful and
attentive approach taken by judges in several recent Charter cases.233 Even with the best
of intentions, however, judges might have difficulty relating to the firsthand experiences
of marginalized people whose lives differ greatly from their own. Professional experts
228
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whose lived experiences more closely resemble those of judges may then serve as a
bridge between experiential witnesses and the court. Boies Parker gave the example of
using expert evidence to help judges understand the realities of the homeless population
in Victoria in her tent city cases. She explained:

I always say that our most important role as lawyers in these sorts of cases
is to make sure that the voice of the individuals is given expression in a
way that the court can understand, and that it can put into the legal
framework that it needs to in order to come to the right result, right? And,
and, sometimes the experts can help with that, right, because they can talk
about those impacts in a way that make it easier for the court to
understand.234

Young made a similar comment in comparing Bedford to his cases on medical marijuana.
As he observed, everybody can understand what it’s like to get sick, especially judges,
given their generally advanced age. This made the experiential evidence of individuals
who used marijuana to alleviate illness highly compelling, in Young’s view.235 Bedford,
however, was a different story. “There's no identification with sex workers that a judge
would go, ‘I understand that.’ They wouldn't. So you had to dress it up then with
empirical”, he explained.236 Here we see how the limitations of judicial experience affect
the weight ascribed to the experiences of others in litigation. In order to persuade elite
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judges, PILs may thus find themselves bolstering the epistemic authority of academic
experts at the expense of marginalized people. In this way, a strategy that is effective in
achieving a sought after legal outcome may come at the cost of furthering
epistemological justice.

The remarks of Boies Parker and others demonstrate their awareness of the
epistemological concerns that such strategies give rise to. Boies Parker, for instance,
stressed that counsel has an obligation to make sure that expert evidence does not usurp
the firsthand accounts of individuals.237 Mangat articulated the tension as follows:

I think there's always a tension there between optimal litigation strategy,
in how you present the case, how you buttress and bolster individual
experience in a way that is going to be viewed […] as credible by the
court, without in some way, you know, inadvertently sending a message
that the individuals' experience is tertiary.238

She went on to emphasize the need for “thinking creatively about how we can keep those
voices very much front and centre” in light of the increasing role of expert evidence in
strategic Charter litigation.239

Even when judges do find the experiential evidence in a case persuasive in its own right,
several interviewees described expert evidence as a means to make them feel safer or
237
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more comfortable in making bold decisions. “I always think that […] if a court wants to
believe that a thing is true, expert evidence helps them do that. It gives them a basis on
which they can make the finding that is, I think feels safer to them than just drawing
conclusions from individuals' experiences”, said Boies Parker.240 In part, this may be a
product of the concerns about representativeness discussed above. As Pacey opined:

[W]hile judges may find the individual stories very compelling, when
they’re dealing with these broad, very systemic questions, or they’re
looking at big pieces of legislation, and these are big changes, big
questions, they’re very comforted to know that there is a broader basis of
evidence and research that they can rely on. I think that provides a certain
level of comfort.241

The judicial inclination to ground decisions in expert evidence, however, may also arise
from mainstream epistemological assumptions about who counts as an authoritative
knower. In speaking of SWUAV, for instance, Pacey explained:

it's important that the court know and feel comforted by […] who is
helping them with the findings of fact and the decision-making […] so
they can really trust as reliable and trustworthy knowledge holders. And so
sometimes that involves trying to find people that are...who they can really
identify with and know that they feel trust in. And so we knew that sex
240
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workers were going to have a really strong and compelling voice because
they were going to be the central story and the central experience. But we
also wanted others to corroborate that and make the court feel comfortable
and confident in the decision they were going to make...we were hoping
they were going to make.242

Experts, then, are needed not only to facilitate judicial understanding, but also to instill
confidence via a familiar and trusted form of authority. Not only does this exert pressure
against the feminist epistemological commitment to centering experiential knowledge in
litigation, it reinforces the “institutionalized hierarch[ies] of cognitive authority” that
feminists seek to resist through the advancement of experiential knowledge.243 As Code
explains:

The matter of determining what human sources of knowledge are
trustworthy is vital to responsible knowing. The construction of
knowledge is an intersubjective process, dependent for its achievement on
communal standards of legitimation and implicated in the power and
institutional structures of communities and social orders.244
The impetus to lean on mainstream perceptions of authority in litigation may also
influence the selection of experts by counsel in ways that run counter to, or at least do not
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prioritize, feminist epistemological commitments. In discussing Carter, for instance,
Tucker spoke of looking for medical expert witnesses who are “extremely well
respected” to express their support for assisted dying, and their willingness to engage in
the practice. She said nothing about seeking out experts who are particularly
epistemologically conscientious.245

In addition to their own assumptions about epistemic authority, judges may be inclined to
rely on purportedly objective expert evidence as a means to legitimate their decisionmaking in the eyes of the public. As Jones put it, “courts like to paint their decisions with
at least the veneer of rationality and objective fact”.246

I think that judges often decide emotionally and then explain rationally.
And, the personal, anecdotal, heartstrings evidence is highly influential on
the outcome of the case and the decision. But it's often completely absent
from the reasons, where they rely heavily on the objective and the
demonstrable, academic, expert, statistical, whatever, right.247

To the extent that judges rely on expert evidence to rationalize their decisions, litigators
who wish to win their cases must emphasize this evidence. As Pacey put it, “you want to
make it as safe and easy as possible for a judge to do the right thing”.248 The cost of this
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strategy, however, may be to downplay the importance of experiential knowledge, a pillar
of feminist epistemology and progressive epistemology more broadly.

8.4 LAW, FACT AND COMMON SENSE
The power of judges as the human focal point of the fact-finding process not only
influences how litigators select and frame different kinds of evidence; it also affects the
extent to which evidence matters at all. In Part II of this dissertation, I demonstrated how,
despite the extensive evidentiary record tendered in Bedford, including both expert and
experiential evidence from numerous witnesses on both sides, much of the fact-finding
process collapsed back into legal or “common sense” reasoning. The resilience of the
fact-finding process to new and potentially disruptive forms of knowledge in this way, I
argued, signals a danger for feminist epistemological justice. At the same time, the
Bedford example demonstrates how the persistent power of common sense in litigation
can present an opportunity for previously marginalized experiential knowledge to gain a
foothold in law. In the final section of this chapter, I bring the analysis of legal process in
strategic Charter litigation offered in the previous sections to its culmination by returning
to a core theme of this dissertation: the relationship between law, fact, and common
sense. Drawing once more on my interviews, I show how the dynamic I observed in
Bedford applies to strategic Charter challenges to legislation more broadly. In doing so, I
offer further support for the inextricability of legally enshrined categories of knowledge
and proof.
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8.4.1 The Power of Evidence
I began this dissertation by pointing to a striking trend in recent strategic Charter
litigation: a shift in focus from legal to factual issues, accompanied by a notable
expansion in the size of evidentiary records.249 As I noted, this trend can be understood as
arising from a number of factors, including what Mariana Valverde refers to as a “crisis
about the contents of social commons sense”.250 As legal institutions and actors make
efforts to account for a wider array of perspectives, we are no longer so sure of what we
thought we knew. Consequently, matters that were once considered within the purview of
lawyers and judges have now been “ceded […] to outside experts”, as one of the judges I
interviewed put it.251

At the outset of this project, I posited that the trend towards more extensive social and
legislative fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation could assist social justice seekers,
by illuminating the daily realities of marginalized people and by challenging legally
entrenched assumptions that perpetuate inequality.252 In one sense, these intuitions were
affirmed by many of the litigators I spoke to, who emphasized the heightened importance
of a comprehensive evidentiary record in bringing a successful Charter challenge.253
“[I]t’s really important”, commented one PIL, “I don’t think anybody could win a
Charter case today without a lot of evidence…”.254 Sigurdson similarly remarked, “to be
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successful in any Charter litigation […], the record is everything.”255 Noting the
persuasive power of the records in Bedford and Carter specifically, one of the judges I
interviewed opined, “…they probably wouldn’t have won those cases any other way”. 256

Furthermore, several interviewees affirmed the power of evidence, both experiential and
expert, to disturb judicial preconceptions.257 In discussing SWUAV, for example,
Sigurdson emphasized the need for the court to hear directly from sex workers to “unpack
the assumptions about what those people are like”.258 Eberts similarly noted how direct
experiential evidence can disrupt stereotypes about a community—she spoke of
Indigenous women—by humanizing its members.259 Another PIL gave the example of
Carter, where the plaintiffs had to counter the assumption that the prohibition on assisted
dying saves lives, and that such an objective is unassailable. This was most powerfully
accomplished, in this PIL’s view, through the firsthand accounts of people seeking to end
their own suffering, and their family members: “much of that evidentiary record is, sort
of just haunting from those people, from those perspectives, talking about fates worse
than death.”260 Boies Parker noted how experts can also help to unpack judicial
assumptions in this way, pointing, as an example, to the crucial role they have played in
debunking the notion that homelessness and drug addiction are a matter of choice.261 Still
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others noted how social and legislative fact evidence can disrupt the legal status quo by
persuading courts to revisit previous rulings, as occurred in Carter and Bedford. 262

8.4.2 The Persistent Influence of Law and Common Sense
At the same time, however, my interviews, like the transcripts in Bedford, highlighted the
persistent influence of law and common sense over the fact-finding process, casting
doubt on the potential of the latter to disrupt the former.
Law and Policy
Law’s ongoing influence over fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation manifests in a
number of ways, many of which I have already alluded to throughout this dissertation.
For one thing, jurisprudential developments, such as the SCC in Bedford’s holding that a
breach of s.7 can be established by the violation of a single individual’s rights, may affect
the type of proof required at different stages of a Charter case.263 For another, legally
enshrined epistemic norms, such as the expectation of objectivity on the part of experts,
influence both the type of evidence tendered in litigation and how that evidence is
framed.264 Prominent court cases can also significantly shape the trajectory of research
and scholarship, the products of which may in turn be relied upon as evidence in future
litigation.265 Sigurdson, for instance, emphasized how Insite, SWUAV, and Bedford
contributed to a growing body of scholarship on the impacts of criminalization.266
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The persistent influence of law is even more apparent where the resolution of cases
involving extensive evidence nevertheless falls back on legal reasoning and argument. In
some instances, this may be due to the Crown’s approach to defending legislation.
For example, Pongracic-Speier described how in Insite, Canada declined to crossexamine any of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, including the experts, choosing to focus instead
on public policy arguments about drug consumption.267 Several other interviewees
observed that the Crown has often relied on a “reasoned apprehension of harm” to justify
laws under s.7 and s.1, in lieu of a robust evidentiary record.268

Courts, too, have often preferred to decide constitutional issues primarily on a legal basis,
rather than engaging too deeply with complex factual questions, though my interviews
suggest that this is changing. As mentioned above, for instance, Young recounted facing
judges in the early years of his career who simply refused to hear the social and
legislative fact evidence he sought to bring, or to review evidence filed by affidavit.269
Eberts similarly recalled how the SCC majority in Symes v Canada270—a s.15 case about
whether tax deductions for child care should be allowed as a business expense—failed to
mention the evidence her and her client had tendered about women running small
businesses.271 In this way, courts may simply ignore, or at least fail to explicitly
acknowledge, the evidence tendered in a strategic Charter challenge.
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From Jones’ perspective, facts and evidence in constitutional cases are rarely the heart of
the matter; rather, their main role is to provide a basis upon which normative
argumentation can proceed.272 In other words, it is not only the Crown’s approach to
defending legislation, or the courts’ approach to deciding cases, but something about the
nature of constitutional litigation itself that ensures the persistent centrality of law and
policy-based reasoning in the process. The tendency for the facts to be sidelined on
appeal, especially in light of the deferential standard of review established in Bedford,
only heightens this phenomenon:273 “[S]ometimes when stuff gets to the Supreme Court
of Canada you wonder if really the facts matter at all”, stated Jones.274 In a similar vein,
even when extensive evidence is tendered, challenged, and thoroughly considered, the
arguments and outcomes in strategic Charter litigation often still fall back on “common
sense” reasoning—as illustrated in Bedford.
Judicial Common Sense
Perhaps the most powerful influence over the fact-finding process that emerged from my
interviews was the common sense of judges themselves, real or perceived—linked by
many interviewees to the personal experience of judges. This is most apparent in
moments where judges favour their own assumptions and intuitions over serious
engagement with the evidentiary record. Pacey, for instance, recounted how, despite the
extensive evidence brought on the standing application in SWUAV about the lives and
circumstances of sex workers in the DTES, the chambers judge could not grasp that these
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women would be unable to name themselves as plaintiffs in the case on the merits.275 The
ONCA majority in Bedford’s analysis of the communicating provision’s effects,
discussed in the previous chapter, is also illustrative of this phenomenon.276

Even when judges do attend carefully to the evidentiary record, however, their
background assumptions and views inevitably shape how they interpret the evidence. As
one of the judges I interviewed put it, “you have to filter what you're getting in court
through your sense, your understanding of the world.”277 According to one Crown
litigator, the difficulty of sorting out conflicting expert evidence may actually heighten
the influence of common sense in judicial decision-making:

at the end of the day, where you have a conflict between experts that has
sort of denigrated into a shouting match, then really what a decision
maker's left with is first impression, and their own common sense, filtered
through whatever evidence they've established. And so in some sense
common sense, really, is absolutely, at the end of the day, the most
important consideration to take into account.

So...you know, a good litigator's going to be mindful of that, that the
arguments that they're going to be making, either in their factum or orally,
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have to really speak to that common sense, and are absolutely laser
focused on it.278

The above comment points to the influence of judicial common sense not only at the
level of decision-making, but also at the level of advocacy. Counsel, my interviews
suggest, are keenly aware of the extent to which the common sense of decision-makers
influences the outcome of a case, and this shapes the way they frame knowledge in
litigation in a number of ways. For one thing, both Crown litigators and PILs
acknowledged that invoking common sense, while perhaps not sufficient on its own,279 is
a powerful advocacy strategy.280 Interviewees also described how the particular
experience (or lack thereof) of judges influenced the way they, as litigators, framed the
facts in some cases.281 Take, for instance, the following anecdote from Young about his
advocacy at the ONCA in Bedford:

I think the line that worked to get them to accept the factual predicates of
the constitutional challenge wasn't nothing to do with evidence […] I
knew two of the three judges were sports people, because I've seen them at
games. I said, ‘everybody knows the concept of home court advantage.
Why doesn't that apply here? Clearly if someone's working out of a
controlled environment that's theirs, they're going to be safer. Everybody
knows that. Just like teams win more frequently at home.’ And it actually
278
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made its way into the judgment, the Court of Appeal judgment.282

Examples like this one illustrate how judicial common sense, grounded in the firsthand
experience (or lack thereof) of judges, casts a shadow over the whole fact-finding
process.
8.4.3 Shifting Common Sense
From a feminist perspective, the persistent influence of law and common sense in
strategic Charter litigation raises a serious worry, especially where the arbiters of both
are judges whose life experience tends to be far removed from marginalized
communities. The heart of this worry, as articulated by Patricia Cochran, is that “those
things we believe without reasons might be structured, not just by their reliability in daily
living, but by their reliability as parts of a structure of inequality.”283 Where the
marginalization of certain social groups is at issue, Cochran notes, “common sense is
especially likely to overstep its jurisdiction because the knowledge in question may not
be shared between majority and minority groups. And so it is here that injustice is
especially likely to be unnoticed, reified or reinforced.”284 In litigation aimed at
progressive social reform, the persistence of common sense thus seems to signal a failure
to successfully challenge relations of inequality embedded in the status quo.

On the other hand, many of my interviewees, including progressively oriented PILs who
described evidence as critical to disrupting the legal and judicial status quo, also
282
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recognized the important role that common sense can play in advancing the rights and
interests of marginalized people under the Charter.285 This accords with Cochran’s point
about the progressive potential of common sense, despite its hegemonic tendencies.286 In
speaking of how to help judges make courageous decisions, for instance, Pacey
commented: “we don’t frame them as courageous, we say this is the obvious thing that
you should be doing, but they are courageous decisions…”.287 When asked about the
mobilization of common sense in Bedford, moreover, she was quick to praise Young’s
approach: “I think that Alan was smart […] to say, this is just the right thing to do and the
logical thing to do and the rational thing to do, and to not make this out to be some big
courageous move by the court that required a whole bunch of mental leaps, like it was
just obvious.”288 According to Sigurdson, the common sense argument in Bedford was
also the premise in SWUAV: “our thesis was that common sense was 100% on our side”,
she affirmed.289 As Jones put it in his interview: “If you have a winning position it’s
because that has become the common sense”.290

The reflections of my interviewees, then, point to two seemingly contradictory sets of
observations about the relationship between law, fact, and common sense in strategic
Charter challenges to legislation. On the one hand is the notion that facts and evidence
have become vital to bringing a successful Charter challenge, in part because of their
capacity to challenge both legal precedents and judicial assumptions. On the other hand,
285

Interview 4 (15 September 2016); Interview 4b (18 September 2018); Interview 5 (25 July 2017);
Interview 7 (13 September 2018); Interview 8 (14 September 2018); Interview 12 (27 September 2018);
and Interview 13 (28 September 2018).
286
Cochran, supra note 283 at 182-185. See Chapter 3 at 3.4.2.
287
Interview 4 (15 September 2016).
288
Interview 4b (18 September 2018).
289
Interview 12 (27 September 2018).
290
Interview 7 (13 September 2018).

420

however, is the persistence of law and common sense in shaping the fact-finding process,
and the potential power of these forces as means to advance the cause of social justice.

So long as fact and evidence are imagined in dichotomy with law and common sense,
these two sets of reflections appear conflicted. It is only upon recognizing the
intertwined relationship between these categories that the apparent contradiction fades
away. When we imagine law and fact, or common sense and evidence, as mutually
constitutive, it becomes possible to see how experiential evidence and knowledge does
wield influence in strategic Charter litigation, even when its epistemological force is
muted. My interviewees, after all, did not perceive experiential knowledge as powerless
in this context—far from it. While not triumphing as an epistemological category in its
own right, experiential knowledge, in their view, played a crucial role in shaping judicial
opinion. It did so not by directly disrupting and supplanting, but rather by reforming legal
and common sense reasoning.

Drawing on Gramsci, sociologist of law Alan Hunt argues for a conception of counterhegemony that depends upon “the ‘reworking’ or ‘refashioning of elements which are
constitutive of the prevailing hegemony”.291 According to Hunt, “it is precisely in the
engagement with the actually existing terrain, in particular, with its discursive forms, that
the possibility of their transformation and transcendence becomes possible.”292 Reading
Bedford in this way provides insight into Young’s strategy of tendering an extensive
evidentiary record and yet insisting that the case could be decided on a common sense
291
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basis. There are different versions of common sense at play in Bedford. Young’s version,
premised largely on his “home field advantage” argument, aligned with the evidence of
his clients and other experiential witnesses. He worried, however, that some judges might
come with a different set of background assumptions about the nature of the sex trade. “I
was afraid of a court not having the same common sense that I had.”293 In bringing a
wealth of experiential and expert evidence to back up his arguments, Young sought to
persuade the courts not just that the facts were on his side, but that his argument was
indeed commonsensical. He sought, in other words, to shift the court’s very idea of what
constitutes common sense.

Young’s strategy resonates with Suzanne Goldberg’s account of how American courts
absorb social change in constitutional cases. According to Goldberg, newly established
facts about a given social group can provide a cloak of legitimacy for judges to shift their
normative approach to the constitutional rights of the group.294 Over time, as the new
approach becomes more firmly established, the relevant facts become integrated into law
(or, we might imagine, at least into judicial common sense).295 In this way, facts serve as
a catalyst for changing legal norms.

One of the most compelling illustrations of this comes from my interviewees’
observations about the influence of one legal fact-finding process on the next. Pacey and
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Sigurdson, for example, both spoke of how Insite paved the way for SWUAV, which in
turn helped to set the stage for Bedford at the SCC. In Pacey’s words:

They [courts] aren’t supposed to really rely on findings of fact from
previous judgments. But I think that there was a level of judicial education
that happened. Like when I stood up in the Bedford case – we were
interveners – I didn’t feel like I had to really explain who my clients were.
Because we’d done that in SWUAV in such excruciating detail that I really
felt like they knew that, […] and we were able to rely on the education
they received through Insite about the context of the neighbourhood. So I
think that was very valuable.296

Pongracic-Speier expressed a similar view, noting how the findings of fact in Insite had
“filled in some of the background for Bedford in a way that made it unnecessary to start
painting the picture from the beginning”.297 She went on:

And so I suppose, from the point of view of doing strategic litigation that is
aimed at improving the lives of really poor people, marginalized people
within society, each piece can build on the next by having this canvas that
for each successive case has the recognition of certain social, fundamental
social facts already painted on it. […] And so I think there is a kind of
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judicial education that happens by helping judges expose themselves […]
to experiences that are different from their own.298

Pongracic-Speier’s experience in Insite led her to believe that courts can be quite open to
hearing and integrating experiential evidence in this manner. “[T]here was this very
basic curiosity about wanting to understand how this worked, and what was happening,
and understanding something about the people whose rights were at issue”, she
recounted.299

The potential influence of experiential evidence on judicial common sense may also
provide an avenue for such evidence to overcome practical challenges and/or
admissibility restrictions. Sigurdson, for instance, recounted how, despite tendering
experiential evidence through anonymous affidavits in the SWUAV standing
application—a practice that raised “red flags” for the court—the stories told were “so
compelling, and so consistent with an understanding of human experience, that it can tap
into the judicial mind…”.300 In her view, Justice Cromwell’s decision on the application
was ultimately grounded in this evidence.301 This form of influence is, of course, no
substitute for giving due weight to the experiential accounts of marginalized people as an
authoritative source of knowledge in itself. Still, it demonstrates the progressive potential
of common sense in litigation where it is infused with experiential knowledge, and thus
the power of such knowledge to nudge the legal status quo forward.
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8.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I drew on interviews with constitutional litigators and judges to show how
both practical and epistemological factors give rise to a tension between the pursuit of
legal victory and epistemological justice in strategic Charter litigation. While the
practical challenges of limited resources, limited available evidence, and the burdens of
participating in litigation create barriers to the construction of a comprehensive record
centred on experiential voices, the epistemic norms engrained in law and judicial
consciousness put pressure on litigators to compromise progressive epistemological
commitments in the selection and framing of evidence.

Returning to the questions raised at the outset of the dissertation about the consequences
of the shift in focus from law to fact in strategic Charter litigation, I observed two
seemingly contradictory dynamics: 1) the widely acknowledged power of experientiallygrounded evidence to disrupt the common sense assumptions engrained in law and legal
reasoning, and thereby to support progressive Charter challenges to legislation; and 2)
the remarkable persistence of law and common sense in this type of litigation, which
suggests that the above shift may promise less than imagined for social justice seekers
hoping to disturb the status quo. I argued, however, that by recognizing the intertwined
nature of law and fact, and similarly, of evidence and common sense, we can see how
evidence grounded in experiential knowledge might induce a shift in judicial common
sense, and thus how the two phenomena described above can co-exist. In this way, we
can understand both the progressive potential, and the limits, of strategic Charter
litigation as a tool for social justice, through the lens of epistemological justice.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
9.1 INTRODUCTION
At the heart of this dissertation is a concern about law’s ways of knowing in
constitutional cases. This concern can be traced back to an early intuition that, in our
focus on the legal possibilities and limitations presented by the Charter, progressive
social justice-seekers were paying too little attention to the treatment of evidence, facts,
and knowledge in constitutional litigation. Given the recent shift in focus from law to
social and legislative facts in strategic Charter challenges, and the corresponding
proliferation of evidentiary records, this aspect of the pursuit of social justice under the
Charter could no longer be ignored. In this concluding chapter, I sum up the key
elements of the dissertation that has resulted from this initial concern, consider its
limitations, and explore the possibilities it opens up for further scholarship. I end with a
call for greater epistemological consciousness as we continue to engage in and with
constitutional litigation as a tool for social change.

9.2 SUMMING UP
In Chapter 1, I outlined a well-established set of critiques that point to a fundamental
tension between litigation and social justice in the constitutional context. In this
dissertation, I have developed and explored the concept of epistemological justice as a
further, under-examined factor in this relationship. This exploration has been rooted in
two distinct theoretical frameworks. First, I have framed my project as building upon the
New Evidence Scholars’ broad view of evidence as “information in litigation”—or in my
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adaptation, “knowledge in litigation”. As discussed in Chapter 2, the special nature and
dynamics of social and legislative fact-finding in strategic Charter litigation necessitates,
and underscores the value of, such an approach.

Second, I have grounded my assessment of how knowledge is treated in strategic Charter
litigation in the work of feminist epistemologists. As elaborated in Chapter 3, my
conception of epistemological justice is rooted in this literature, which advances an
understanding of knowledge as necessarily situated, grounded in dynamic relationships,
and ethically and politically inflected. At the heart of this approach is a commitment to
centering the experiential knowledge of socially marginalized people, without losing
sight of the complex ways in which experiential accounts are themselves shaped by
broader social norms and discourses.

Progressive scholars, lawyers, advocates and activists often espouse some version of this
conception of epistemological justice as part of their broader commitment to social
justice. In this dissertation, I have sought to examine how such epistemological
commitments fare in the context of strategic Charter litigation—specifically, challenges
to legislation under section 7. In Part II, I undertook a thorough examination of the
record, submissions, and reasons issued in Bedford v Canada (AG)1 as a means to
respond to this question. My analysis revealed that, while feminist approaches to
knowledge are at play in the fact-finding process in Bedford, they are generally
overpowered by the mainstream epistemological framework that they seek to critique—a
framework that understands knowledge in terms of abstract universal propositions,
1
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detached from particular knowers and social contexts. The latter framework, I suggested,
finds support not only in the doctrinal rules of admissibility, but also in how the law
constructs categories of proof, most notably through the dichotomization of law and fact,
experience and expertise, and common sense and evidence.

What is more, I argued, the adversarial dynamic of strategic Charter litigation encourages
lawyers and other legal actors to instrumentalize epistemic norms and categories in a
highly decontextualized manner, regardless of their position in the litigation. It thereby
encourages the strategic reinforcement of the above-noted boundaries between categories
of proof. By the same token, the instrumentality of the fact-finding process takes both
experiential knowledge itself, and the progressive feminist epistemology that supports it,
out of the hands of communities and witnesses, and into a rhetorical toolkit for counsel
and the courts. This raises a doubt as to whether the epistemological commitments that
form an essential component of progressive social justice campaigns can survive when
those campaigns enter the realm of litigation.
Drawing on interviews from constitutional judges and litigators, Part III corroborated and
contextualized the findings of Part II. It also provided further insight into how various
aspects of the legal process in strategic Charter litigation work against feminist
epistemological commitments. In particular, the interview data highlighted the many
practical barriers to constructing a comprehensive evidentiary record centered on
experiential evidence, and the persistent epistemic influence of doctrinal law and judicial
common sense over the fact-finding process. Nevertheless, I suggested that the
experiential knowledge so important to feminist epistemology—and to progressive
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epistemologies more broadly—does play an important, if indirect role, in strategic
Charter challenges, by shifting the contents of the common sense upon which the legal
process in these cases continues to so heavily rely.

9.3 LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES
With this project, I have endeavoured to offer a “critical retelling” of the “practices of
knowledge construction” that shape recent strategic Charter litigation in Canada.2 Of
course, as noted in my preface, this retelling is also a form of socially situated knowledge
construction, with all the limitations and possibilities that entails. It is on these limitations
and possibilities that I find myself reflecting as I come to the end of the process of
writing my dissertation.

One of the most important contributions of this project, in my view, is its in-depth
analysis of the record in Bedford. This analysis offers rare insight into the nuanced
dynamics of the constitutional fact-finding process. What makes the project rich in one
sense, however, is also what limits it in another. My decision to undertake a deep dive
into the transcripts in Bedford meant that I had to significantly constrain the breadth of
my research, focusing, in the end, on a single case study. While my interviews helped to
expand this breadth somewhat, my findings remain significantly tethered to the particular
context and idiosyncrasies of the Bedford case. Studies of evidence, facts and knowledge
in other constitutional cases, and in other legal contexts, are thus crucial to testing and
building upon this work. While this could be done in many ways, there are a few sites of
2
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study that present themselves as especially ripe for further investigation from the
perspective developed in this dissertation.
9.3.1 The Story of Bedford Continued
The first is the continuation of the litigation story that began in Bedford. The federal
government responded to the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Bedford by enacting
the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act [PCEPA].3 As is evident from
its Preamble, this legislation aims to denounce and discourage participation in the sex
trade based on a view of prostitution as inherently exploitative and violent, and as an
affront to human dignity and equality. The PCEPA amends the Criminal Code to make
the actual act of prostitution illegal, criminalizing buyers, advertisers, and those who
materially benefit from the practice, but exempting sellers from prosecution.4
Constitutional challenges to the Criminal Code amendments made by the PCEPA have
led to two noteworthy decisions, both from Ontario courts. In R v Boodhoo, three
individuals convicted of advertising sexual services, procuring a person under 18, and
materially benefiting from sexual services provided by a person under 18 argued that the
relevant Criminal Code provisions violated ss.7 and 2b of the Charter based on a series
of reasonable hypotheticals involving sex workers taking measures to increase their
safety and autonomy.5 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice upheld the constitutionality
of the provisions. In R v Anwar, a common law couple charged with procuring,
advertising, and receiving a material benefit from sexual services as a result of running an
escort business challenged those provisions as violating the ss. 7, 2(d) and 2(b) rights of

3

Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, SC 2014, c 25.
Ibid, Summary and Preamble.
5
R v Boodhoo, 2018 ONSC 7205.
4

430

sex workers, once again on the basis of reasonable hypotheticals. The Ontario Court of
Justice agreed with the applicants and found the provisions to be constitutionally invalid
for the purposes of the case, but did not have the power to strike down the laws under
s.52(1) of the Constitution Act. 6

According to Deborah Haak, a legal scholar who extensively studied these cases and
consulted for the Crown in Anwar, the reasonable hypotheticals presented in Boodhoo
and Anwar were far removed from the actual circumstances of the sellers who were
working for the accused.7 What is more, while expert evidence was presented by both
parties in Anwar and extensively discussed by the court in its reasons, neither decision
makes mention of any experiential evidence from people currently or formerly engaged
in the sale of sex, despite the fact that their rights were at the heart of these challenges.
The predominance of abstract reasonable hypotheticals over the actual facts of these
cases, and the complete absence of experience evidence from those whose rights were
directly implicated, reinforces and heightens the concerns raised in this dissertation
regarding the tension between legal and epistemological justice in strategic Charter
challenges to legislation. The framing of the expert evidence in Anwar also reinforces
some of my findings from Bedford regarding the dominance of mainstream epistemic
norms—particularly norms related to objectivity, expert bias and quantitative versus
qualitative research—in strategic Charter litigation.8 A more in-depth examination of
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these and related Charter challenges could productively strengthen and extend this
dissertation’s main conclusions.

9.3.2 The Intersection of Evidence and Epistemology with Legal Process
The nature of the fact-finding process in Boodhoo and Anwar can be partially attributed
to the distinct procedural context in which these Charter challenges arose: i.e. as part of
defences to criminal charges, rather than civil applications for declarations of
unconstitutionality.9 This points to another site of study that merits more in-depth
treatment than the scope of this project has allowed: the intersection of evidence and
epistemology with legal process. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 8, the type of
proceeding is but one of many legal process factors that can influence how the factfinding process unfolds in strategic Charter litigation, and with what epistemological
consequences. Other important (and often intertwined) factors include the cost and time
constraints faced by counsel, the nature of the parties, the nature of the procedure used to
tender evidence, and the general approach taken to lawyering and judging in the case.

My interviews also yielded important insights about the challenges of participating in
constitutional fact-finding processes, especially for vulnerable and marginalized people.
Interviewee reflections on the recent Charter litigation surrounding tent cities in British
Columbia were particularly compelling in this regard. As noted in Chapter 8, counsel
involved in this litigation identified multiple challenges that impeded the affected
homeless community from giving evidence, ranging from mental health and addiction
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issues to distrust of the legal system.10 At the same time, their comments revealed how
such challenges were at least partially overcome through extraordinary efforts to push the
conventional boundaries of the fact-process—such as the decision to hold hearings about
the constitutionality of city by-laws against homeless tent encampments in the basement
of a local motel room in Abbotsford (City) v Shantz.11 Examples like this point to the
potential value of engaging more deeply with questions of legal process, institutional
design and access to justice as they relate to the study of evidence in constitutional and
other contexts.

9.3.3 The Treatment of Indigenous Knowledge in Aboriginal Rights Litigation
Moving beyond the realm of the Charter, the evidentiary and epistemological (and legal
process) concerns at the heart of this dissertation suggest one additional site for further
exploration: Aboriginal rights litigation. As several commentators have emphasized upon
hearing about my work-in-progress, the questions and themes that drive my dissertation
resonate strongly with this area of litigation. While Aboriginal rights cases raise unique
and complex issues that find no perfect analogy in other legal contexts, concerns about
the onerous burden of proof on claimants, the tension between the interests of individual
Nations and the pursuit of broader Aboriginal rights, and the treatment of Indigenous
knowledge, do bear some resemblance to the challenges that arise in strategic Charter
litigation brought on behalf of marginalized communities.
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Of particular interest is the treatment of Indigenous knowledge in Aboriginal rights
litigation as it relates to the law/fact dichotomy ingrained in the common law of evidence.
In recent years, the movement to recognize and give due consideration to Indigenous
legal traditions has gained significant momentum.12 However, the question of how
colonial Canadian courts ought to become versed in Indigenous law remains unclear. To
tender Indigenous legal knowledge as evidence, as has been the historical practice, carries
implications that must be carefully thought through. To what extent does this practice
obscure the status of Indigenous legal knowledge as a source of domestic law? What does
it mean to treat Indigenous legal orders as a kind of foreign law to be proved in court via
evidence? Indigenous ways of knowing law also challenge the epistemological
assumptions that underpin the dichotomy between law and fact in the Canadian common
law tradition, where “law” is confined to abstract expressions of general principles, and
“fact” to purportedly neutral descriptions of real-life events. Indeed, the inextricability
of factual description from interpretation, and of normative principles from their realworld application in at least some Indigenous oral traditions bears noteworthy parallels to
the insights of feminist epistemologists discussed in this work, helping to underscore my
critiques of the law/fact dichotomy.13 Deeper engagement with Indigenous legal
traditions and related knowledge may thus enrich the concept of epistemological justice I
have developed here and provide further insight into its relationship to legal and social
justice.
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9.4 TOWARDS EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Given the limitations noted above, and the need for further research in some of the
directions I have suggested, my conclusions in this dissertation about epistemological
justice in constitutional litigation are deliberately tentative. I have also avoided providing
normative guidance on how epistemological justice could be better realized in this area
(though my elaboration of the concept of epistemological justice is certainly normative in
nature). And yet, feminist epistemologists have refused the renunciation of a knower’s
ethical responsibility via the detachment of knowledge from how it applies in the
world.14 Let me, then, conclude with a reflection on what this dissertation calls for in
practice: Despite all the remaining uncertainties, and all the work left to be done, what I
hope to have clearly conveyed through this work is the need for advocates, litigators,
witnesses, judges, and scholars to give due consideration to the epistemological effects of
how facts and evidence are treated in litigation, especially litigation directed at
progressive social change. It may be that the pursuit of positive legal outcomes for
marginalized people will always sit in some tension with the broader demands of social
justice, including epistemological justice. Still, the development of more conscious
thought about the construction, mobilization, framing and evaluation of knowledge in
litigation holds the promise of bringing them closer together.

14

See Chapter 3 at 3.2.2.
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